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INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is about the sociology of Georges Gurvitch. He 
holds the most influential position in French sociology today. At the 
Sorbonne he occupies the position once held by Emile Durkheim. Gurvitch 
is in many ways his continuator. On the other hand, he has started a 
whole new trend in sociology which has import for the entire field of 
theory. Deplorably, Gurvitch' s wore are virtually unknown in the 
United States . His theoretical categories could be extremely useful 
for the vast research enterprise going on in this country. However, 
o~ two works b.Y Gurvitch exist in English, plus a number of articles 
in several professional journals . l.toreover, Gurvitch has received 
sweeping di8Dlissal by American th.iilkers. He has been too easily typed 
as a "fo~alist" . 1 
Nicholas Timasheff, in his volume on sociological theory, reviews 
a major part of Gurvitch' s work . He concludes: "'t is an insightful 
exercise in definitions and offers little for theoretical growth."2 
1A personal letter from Gurvitch to the author. 
~icholas Timasheff, Socioloi!cal Theory: Its Nature and Growth 
(New York: Random House, Inc., 1954), p . 162. 
1 
2 
Reviewing a recent Belgian publication on the sociology of 
Gurvitch, Professor Abel of Hunter College has these canments: 
Gurvitch has an able mind, but • • • he is not an original 
thinker. He presents a plethora of ideas on meta-sociology 
that do not appear to be logically fruitful. 
The title of the book is puzzling. Apparently at loss for 
some overall characterization of Gurvitch's work, the author 
chooses Sociologie et pluralisme dialectique. But llpluralisme" 
corresponds only to the ecLectic character of Gurvitch's 
views, and "dialectique 11 presumably only refers to his toler-
ation of contradictions.! 
These statements show a remarkable lack of comprehension of 
Gurvitch's thought. This dissertation seeks to improve this general 
condition. The approach is two-fold. 
First, this work aims to give to American sociology a study of 
current French sociology. It is hoped this effort might lead to the 
construction of a framework 'Which would make possible more fruitful 
cooperative efforts between the United States and France, especially 
in the area of general sociological theory. 
Second, and more specifically, the dissertation presents the 
general sociology of Georges Gurvitch, though only in a cursory fashion. 
This is not a comparative study. Rather it explains Gurvitch1s theo-
retical system and shows how his theory provides a conceptual scheme for 
looking at social reality as a totality. Moreover, it indicates how the 
concept of the total social phenomena is a relevant and a very necessary 
dimension to the contemporary task of sociology. 
3 
More particularly, a central focus of the dissertation is on one 
phase of Gurvitch's general theory. This is his treatment of groups. 
In his terminology, this is the macrosociological or horizontal sphere 
of social reality. 
2. Definitions 
In tnese introductory remarks it is sufficient to s~ this phrase, 
total social phenomena, means social-reality. This is the central con-
cept of Gurvitch' s theory. With this notion he seeks to grasp the 
meaning of society. It is a symbol, an intermediary means to describe 
the richness of the social totality. The basic emphasis of Gurvitch 
is that social reality is extremely complex. It is manifestly difficult 
to grasp, comprehend, and understand the diverse, multi-faceted charac-
ter of society. Yet it behooves ~ne social scientist to try. 
Gurvitch has thus taken this term, total social phenomena, as the 
symbolic image for this task. He has based it on the seminal concept of 
Marcel Mauss. Mauss, in his study, Sociology and Anthropology, introduced 
the idea of the total social phenomena. The concept came from his work 
on the practice of potlatch among certain North American Indians. 
Potlatch cannot be explained by one thing alone. It can only be under-
stood as the end product of many factors. These factors must be seen 
' 
as a totality. The different aspects must . be viewed simultaneously 
as a whole. Gurvitch therefore conceives the symbol, total social 
phenomena, as a useful method by which to look at social reality. 
Social reality must be viewed as a whole. It is all well and good to 
carry on empirical research projects which isolate certain facts and 
describe them in detail, but they are useless unless tied to some view 
of the ~ole which gives them meaning or significance. 
"Facts" are not flowers which grow in the fields and only wait 
to be picked. Facts studied by science must be discovered, 
then classified in order to distinguish the important from the 
accidental, comprehended and constructed in order to fo:nn a 
frame of reference proper to a particular science; finally 
explained, which .is impossible without working bypotheses.l 
Gurvitch seeks to outline certain working hypotheses. He would 
disagree with Robert Merton that the s.o.ciologist must be content with 
intermediary theory. Rather, Gurvitch would say, he must try to de-
velop a general theory which will. help the researcher orient to concrete 
social reality as a totality. In other words, sociology lacks a 
Weltanschauung.,.-in a metaphorical sense . here. The twentieth century, 
since the onset of the neW physics, requires the physical scientist to 
understand the molecular content of a certain element, all the wnile 
noting the unity and reciprocity of the molecules. They are inextri-
cably bound into an atomic arrangement. It is t he same with the com-
ponents of social reality. 
The task of this dissertation is to work .through these hypotheses 
Gurvitch has devised for empirical research, to discover the directions 
which they take and to examine them critically in the light of .American 
sociology. This study is made in the hope that such an exposition will 
be fruitful in .showing new approaches to the study of man in society--
_lrraite de sociologie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1962), I, 155. 
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a study which is increasingly more important and essential as the 
character of the twentieth century unfolds in all its richness, its 
possibilities and its hazards. 
3. Limitations 
As previously indicated, the scope of the dissertation is 
limited to the explanation and interpretation of Gurvitch 1s sociology. 
It includes several critical sections at the end of the work whicn 
deal with the relationship of this theory to certain contemporary 
trends. It is impossible for the study to take into consideration 
every theoretical position which is present in the current sociological 
discussions. Of necessity only the functional and formalistic positions 
are considered. 
The study is necessarily limited to Gurvitch 1s theory, although 
some of his greatest work has been done in the areas of history and 
criticism. These are included only when they pertain particularly to 
the subject at hand. 
Because the two previous studies of Gurvitch have done more in the 
area of presenting and analyzing Gurvitch 1 s microsociology, this study 
concentrates more heavilY on his macrosociology. 
Finally, Professor Gurvi tch 1 s thought is exceedingly rich and the 
nuances are infinite in their possibilities. Therefore, this dissertation 
can only begin to trace the skeletal outline of this man's thought. In 
many places it fails to do his con epts justice . In other instances it 
is already outdated, since Gurvitch is constantly making changes and 
6 
additions. As he affirms in La voca.tion actuelle de 1 .. sociologie: 
All that we would like to add here is that our entire differ-
ential sociology, even our indications .for the establishment 
of types of global societies and structures, only expresses 
these very factors in a partial way. . They must not be con-
sidered as defini.tive. results, but only as invitations, points 
of departure for further exploration and research. This 
really refers to the use of a conceptual tool which is supple 
enough for the description and interpretation of concrete social 
reality, in the fullness of its richness and its sinuosities. 
Such a tool will enable this task to be accomplished without 
abandoning the framework . of soci.olo~, which possesses its own 
method and object, distinguishing it thereby from related 
sciences such as history, geography, and ethnograpey .1 
In other words, even these descriptions can only serve as frames 
of reference, analytical tools. for further thought and research. If 
such a goal is reached, the project will have been worthwhile. 
4. Previous Research in the Field 
Two works have been written about the sociology of Georges Gurvitch. 
In 1955, Rene Toulemont, a Belgian scholar. at the Facultes Catholiques 
de l 10uest Angers, wrote a .volume entitled: Soc.iologie et pluralisme 
dialectique. 2 He considered. this an .introducti.on to the whole corpus of 
Gurvitch's thought. In his introductory comments he sets the limits to 
his work: 
I have sought to give the thought of GurVitch as faithfully 
as possible, although Lt has been simplified necessarily. I 
have abstained from criticism except. at. certain junctures, 
leaving .our own proper c.onceptions .. and . observati ons to the last 
part of the study. 
lParis: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958, I, 503. 
2touvain: Edi.ti.ons Nauwelaerts, 1955. 
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The envisaged work is of such a scope that I was obligated 
to leave certain aspects in the background. In the first 
place, I had to neglect the historical and critical essays 
almost entirely--except when such elements were judged indis-
pensable to understand the thought of Gurvitch. In the second 
place, the present essay is based mostly on the published 
works. But the sociology of Gurvitch never ceases to be en-
riched from his numerous studies which he is making through 
his courses and lectures although these efforts are only 
available in bits and snatches. Thanks to the efforts of the 
author, an imporrant part of these manuscripts have been made 
available to me. 
Obviously Mr. Toulemont has been in contact with Dr. Gurvitch. He 
has listened to his lectures; he has held personal conferences with him. 
The explanation of many of his concepts is accurate and clear. However, 
since the book was published in 1955, certain changes and additions have 
been made by Gurvitch in his theory. Moreover he has subni.tted thi8 
theor,y to valuable empirical research which ToUlemont noted as lacking 
in his work. The study of the macrosociological categories is thin. 
Professor Gurvitch has only recently explained these in depth. Overall, 
Toulemont' s treatment is judicious and sympathetic. Professor Abel of 
Hunter College, referred to above, has failed to read with accuracy 
either the work of Toulemont or Gurvitch. Chapter Eight of this disser-
tation deals with the critical remarks of Toulemont, Abel, and others, 
along with estimations by those who have reviewed or commented on the 
sociology of the total social phenomena. 
This dissertation then, seeks to show the changes and additions in 
the thought of Gurvitch since Toulemont's writing, and to fill in the 
macrosociological theory which was not available at the time of the 
~bid., PP• 8-9. 
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Belgian professor's stuqy. 
The other work devoted to the theoretical position of Georges 
Gurvi tch is a Harvard dissertation by John Vincent Martin, S. J., 
entitled Depth Sociology and Microsociology, written in 1957. Martin 
concentrated on an analysis of the social psychology of Gurvitch. He 
described at length the concept of the collective mind and the micro-
sociological or abstrac~ factors of social reality. He did not concern 
himself at all with the macrosociology or the theory of groups. He 
did attempt to describe Gurvitch's depth sociology and show how this 
is inextricably bound to any theory of social psychology. He sought to 
show how Gurvitch is a continuator of Durkheim, especially in his af-
firming the reality of the collective mind. However, he suggested how 
Gurvitch departed from his predecessor at the Sorbonne.1 Martin's study 
is valuable for his description of Gurvitch's debt to Durkheim as far as 
depth sociology is concerned. He helpfully described the ten levels in 
depth.2 He made a critical assessment of Gurvitch's method, depth soci-
ology, and his concept of the collective mind. Since this dissertation 
was written under the guidance of Talcott Parsons, Martin concluded his 
work by comparing the theoretical position of Gurvitch with that of 
Parsons. The greatest weakness of Martin's work is his failure to make 
any contact with Gurvitch personally. This seems regrettable in this 
day of modem communications. Martin, therefore, was hampered by a strict 
lJohn Vincent Martin, s. J., "Depth Sociology and Microsociology" 
(unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1957), PP• 103 ff. 
2Ibid., pp. 36 ff. See below, Chapter IV. 
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reliance on the published works of the sociologist. The thought of 
Gurvitch is dynamic and subject to change. He is constantly reworking 
his theoretical position. Hence, Martin has missed many of the recent 
innovations in his thought. Moreover, he was out of touch with the real 
personality of the scholar. In the twentieth century, thorough scholar-
ship requires that the expositor make the acquaintance of the person about 
whom he is writing, if that person is living. The student has the obli-
gation and the responsibility to make himself known to the thinker 
involved in the best interests of fairness to all concerned.1 
Throughout this study Martin commits errors of interpretation and 
comprehension. For one thing, he states, "the emphasis in his Gurvitch's 
work is more on the structural than the dynamic aspects of social 
reality". 2 This could not be farther from the truth. Martin goes on 
to say: 
The only dynamic aspects of the Gurvitchian theory are the 
genetic problems : the study of social. detenninism and of 
regularities as tendencies. In La vo.cation actuelle de la 
sociologie3 there is no explicit analysis of these genetic 
problems. The emphasis, is on _what is generally called social 
structure.4 
The boqy of this dissertation will show that in these later years 
and even during those semesters Martin was .writing his study, Gurvi tch 
had developed his theory concerning the dynamic dimensions of social 
lA personal. letter dated May 17, 1962, to the writer from Professor 
Gurvitch, asserts that he was totally unaware of any study made of his 
theoretical sociology in the United States. 
2t-lartin, "Depth Sociology ••• ", P• 32. 
3(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950) First Edition. 
4op. cit., P• 33. 
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reality. However, to be fair to Martin, important additions have been 
made only recently. These are eJq>lained in detail in this study. 
Martin points out that Gurvitch developed a classification of 
groups, but this classification seemed formalistic. Moreover, Gurvitch 
failed to apply it except perhaps in the field of law. Martin makes 
this concluding observation: 
The main concepts of Depth Sociology and Microsociology are 
applied in many different contexts. Consequently 11 Gurvi tch' s 
theoreticalMacrosociology is not so advanced as his Depth 
Sociology andMicrosociology. His present researches in the 
field of Sociology of Knowledge, Sociology of Ethics and 
Genetic Sociology will certainly lead him to perfect his 
theory in the area of Macrosociology.l 
This was an apt prediction. If the macrosociology of Gurvitch's 
theory was undeveloped five years ago, the extent of his study and the 
scope of his publications since then, plus his courses and lectures, 
suggest he has been working diligently in this area. The richness of 
his thought becomes apparent in the subsequent chapters of this work. 
5. The Approach of the Dissertation 
In general, the first part of the dissertation is descriptive. 
The background and life of Georges Gurvitch is considered in Chapter Two. 
This presents his cultural heritage, his intellectual journey, taking 
into account the phases of his study which led him from philosophy and 
law to his work in sociology. A short assessment of his present life 
and activity concludes the second chapter. 
lrbid. 11 p • 35. 
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The third chapter deals with Gurvitch' s general theory. First an 
explanation is made of Gurvitch's views on the present sociological 
situation. He outlines in several of his works the false or invalid 
problems which have sometimes concerned sociologilts.1 He contends 
these cultural survivals of the nineteenth century have caused undue 
difficulty for modern sociologists and have spuriously affected their 
work. This chapter concludes with a brief description of the actual 
role or task of modern sociology. 
The concrete description of Gurvitch's general sociology gets 
underway in Chapter Four with the examination of the total social 
phenomena. His method is carefully outlined. Then follows the analysis 
of depth sociology. This is related to both his philosophical orien-
tation and his work in jural sociology. His debt to Durkheim is 
particularly apparent in this discussion. 
In Chapter Five the horizontal view of sociology, somewhat compar-
able to Tonnies' Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, and Durkheim's organic 
and mechanical solidarity, is described in detail. Only a brief con-
sideration of microsociology appears. Major attention is focused on the 
macrosociological aspects of this horizontal view. This chapter details 
Gurvitch's typology of .. social groupings and social classes. 
Chapter Six continues the description of macrosociology with a 
precise analysis of the tem social structure. At this juncture the 
first critical portions appear, since Gurvi tch 1 s notion of social 
1La vocation actuelle de la sociolo e (Paris: Presses Universi-
taires de France, 19 7 , I, 29 2; Traite de sociologie (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1958), I, 2B-64e 
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structure is worked out as a careful critique of functional and for.mal-
istic theory. The concluding section of this chapter outlines Gurvitch's 
fascinating typology of global or inclusive societies. 
In Chapter Seven the dialectical method of Gurvitcb is analyzed 
against this backdrop of the total social phenomena both in their 
vertical and horizontal aspects. He contends this is the only method 
which can at once describe the individual. parts of social reality while 
maintaining a view of the whole. Same recent research projects using 
this method conclude this chapter. 
Chapter Eight cri tical.ly analyzes Gurvi tch 1 s whole corpus of 
thought beginning with his earl.y ideas on social law and natural law 
and ending with his general sociological theory and his dialectical 
method. The concluding pages show the relevance Gurvitch 1s theory holds 
for current American sociology. This system challenges certain empirical 
trends,; this theory provides a valuable clue to the amazing canplexi ty 
of social reality. Finally, this theory of the total social phencmena 
helps modern sociology to fulfill some of the tasks which it faces in 
the contemporary world. 
The sources for this work come from nineteen months of study wi tb 
Dr. Gurrltch in Paris, numerous letters written in the interim since 
1951, when the for.mal study with him ended, and personal interviews with 
Dr. Gurvitch during the summer of 196o. The discipline of translating 
one of Gurvitch 1s books1 led to an understanding of some of his concepts 
lueorges Gurvitch, The Spectrum of Social Time (Dordrecht, Holland: 
D. Reidel and Sons, 1962), translated by M. Korenbaum and P. Bosser.man. 
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which otherwise would have been much more difficult to grasp and explain. 
Other sources include the numerous publications of Gurvitch and certain 
secondary works which treat his work in their OYer-all analysis of soci-
ological theory. 
To repeat, this approach is not comparative. The aim of the study 
is to explain a neglected thinker• s ideas on sociology. This dissertation 
is therefore explanatory and analytical. It seeks to fill a void as well 
as present a challenge to certain segments of American sociology which 
are dangerously approaching the shoals and reefs of orthodoxy 1 thereby 
freezing the possibilities of imaginative and creative conceptualization 
so badly needed in an age when social change is rapid and revolutionary. 
In fact this century has witnessed a veritable revolution in the 
intellectual, cultural, and social life. of man. . Carlton J. Hayes 1 in his 
perceptive study, A Generation of Materialism, 187.1-19001 sums it up: 
Hindsight is notoriously superior to contemporary judgment. 
Looking backward from ~914.1 or better from 19 39, one can 
readily perceive a nemesis lurking .in the era after 1871 such 
as was hard.ly perceptible at all at the fag end of that era 
in 1900. The mechanistic and materialistic conception of 
physical science ••• at the base of most of the thinking and 
much of the action of the era, was proved shortly afterwards 
to be erroneous. Thanks to the "quantum" theory which Planck 
set forth in 19011 to ensuing atomic investigations, and to the 
work of Einstein, the certitudes of physical 11law" eventually 
gave way to fkepticimn about '~chanica", ~tter11 1 and even 
"causation 11 • 
Relativity and cynamism are the descriptive te:nns of our time. 
This new emphasis in the physical and natural sciences has been felt in 
the social sciences. This new physics has made an equally profound impact 
l(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941), p. 339. 
on the humanities. Instead of harmooy there is emphasis on dissonance; 
dynamism over against . the static, flui.dity in place of rigidity, the 
dialectical in place . of the linear, the discontinuous as opposed to the 
continuous. 
In terms of social theory the neat simple explanations of the 
mid-nineteenth century, those theories resting on single, predominant 
factors to explain. canplex events and phenomena in social reality are 
no longer viable in our age. New conc.epts must be worked out to fit 
the knowledge which modern man possesses concerning his natural and 
social environments. Georges Gurvitch has provided sociology with 
just this kind of theory. It is a theoretical system which fits the 
needs of this modern age. It is a theory which gees a long way towards 
explaining the complexi.ty of man's life in its co~lective and individual 
manifestations-. This theory in no way denies that there are patterns to 
man's behaviour, but neither does it try to reduce this patterning to 
some simple, convenient formua. There has always been a desire to 
establish the laws Which govern society. Moreover, it was the desire of 
some precursors of modern sociology to establish sociology as a science. 
They felt this could be done through discovering the laws by which 
society works. Such a position betrays their close affinity with the 
Newtonian physics of their day. The new physics suggests otherwise. 
This is important for the social sciences. Social reality is complex 
and ever-changing; the results gained from .research and the postulating 
of causal laws will necessari~ have to be relative. This is depth 
sociology's greatest merit • . Dr. Gurvitch attempts to show in his 
1.5 
theoretical system the dynamic, fluid, dissonant and dialectical nature 
of social reality. 
In sum, Professor Gurvitch attacks the existential question of 
social reality. He attempts to present a dynamic theory by which to 
understand and expJ.ain society. He tries to spell out the complexity 
of this reality and yet retain its tentative, tenuous unity. He indi-
cates how unrealistic and costly it is to treat only one part of human 
society at the expense of ita other aspects. Even if one thinks he is 
being scientific by compartmentalizing human behaviour into convenient 
partitions, he is defeating his central purpose of understanding and 
explaining social reality. Man in his collective and individual life 
cannot be neatly divided into particular segments. Somehow there must 
be a wholistic, total approach. In this sense, the dialectical method 
of Gurvitch is absolutely essential. Fran another point of view, human 
behaviour cannot be reduced to one factor or to a limited number of 
factors which can be tested and observed by so-called scientific metnods 
involving statistics and mathematics. This approach overlooks the truly 
"hpman" factor . Gurvi tch is careful to point out that philosopey still 
has something to say to the social sciences without their having · to 
espouse any particular, dogmatic philosophical. position. Philosophy and 
history both are correctives to a sterile, cold, and one-sided approach 
to human behaviour so prevalent among ~ertain students of sociology. 
Human reality cannot be reduced to mere statistics or sociological 
mazes, or described in sets of laws, or understood by certain observable 
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functions. One must get below the mere surface of things. It behooves 
the contemporary social scientist to look at social reality from many 
different levels of human behaviour, thereby seeing the total social 
phenomena in their unity and diversity. 
CHAPTER II 
THE BACKGROUND AND LIFE OF GEOIDES GURVITCH 
Vivid historical events have a lasting effect on the character of 
an individual. Experiences through early life and during the formative 
years provide clues in understanding why a person thinks as he does. 
E. H* Carr, the British historian, gives the reason. 
The facts of history never came to us 1~ure" since they do not 
and cannot exist in a pure for.m: they are always refracted 
through the mind of tne recorder . It follows that when we take 
up a work of history, our first concern should be not with tie 
facts which it contains but with the historian who wrote it. 
What Carr declares about historians can be applied as well to 
sociologists. This is particularly important for an understanding of 
Professor Gurvitch's work. Much of the difficulty with his theory 
derives from a failure to understand his background. 
The categories he uses to express his concepts, the language and 
symbols which couch his theory are the result of varied influences which 
impinged on his early intellectual life. Gurvitch pleads for explanation 
in sociology and through sociology. One of its tasks is to explain 
social reality in all its depths and ramifications. This requires inter-
pretation. The past experience of an individual conditions his manner of 
interpretation Gurvitch 1s particular view of social reality comes from 
his choice to fish in a certain part of the ocean; it results also from 
lEdward Hallett Carr, What Is History? (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1962)' p. 24. 
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his choice of the type of tackle with which to do this job. To understand 
his theory requires a detailed study of his life. Expressed another way 
any scholar's background must be seen as a whole, as a totality incorpo-
rating individual traits and a cultural heredity . The burden of this 
chapter is to discover the total social and psychological phenomena 
which constitute Gurvitch's personality and life . 
Georges Gurvitch was born October 20, 1894, in Norworossisk on the 
Black Sea in Russia . 1 At an early age his serious intellectual journey 
began. Gurvitch admits his thinking often shifted from one position to 
another . It is apparent that there are contradictory influences in his 
intellectual makeup . At the age of fourteen years he started reading in 
philosophy and sociology . He was first attracted to Marxism as presented 
by Kautsky , Plekhanov and Lenin. Their rigorous materialistic determin-
ism impressed him greatly, though as he says, he was not convinced. 
If the economy determines the march of society and history, 
from whence comes my own determinism? Isn't economics a 
product of humanity? If after all this profusion of effort, 
human energy is still considered determined, why then the 
constant a~eal to revolution in order to change the course 
of events? 
He tried to read Karl Marx's Capital at the age of sixteen. Soon 
he discovered it impossible to comprehend Marx without background 
knowledge of Hegel and Adam Smith. To Gurvitch however, Smith was 
notable only for his banality and superficiality. 
~he information for this section is taken from personal letters, 
interviews and unpublished materials graciously made available to me by 
Dr . Gurvitch . 
21~I on itine'raire 11 (¥...SS in the author's personal library), p . 2. 
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He experienced on the other hand &~ obsessive attraction to Hegel, 
even though from the very beginning it seemed to Gurvitch that Hegel 
espoused everything he had found repugnant in Marx8 The Hegelian 
synthesis appeared to him to be unreal and arbitrary. Still he sought 
what he calls "salvation" in this giant of the nineteenth century 
philosophical world. But he became increasingly disillusioned as he 
read Hegel 's Philosophy of Law. Hegel 's ultimate synthesis of the ideal 
in the Prussian conception of the state subsuming at once society and 
the family completed Gurvitch's disenchantment with the philosopher. 
He notes however that this was the conclusion of a seventeen year old. 
He would re-encounter Marx (and Hegel) later on, and the verdict would 
be some""V.rhat different . 
At the time Gurvitch received his baccalaurlat he encountered a work 
-which had an immediate impact . This was L1unique et sa pro;eri't~ by 
Max Stirner. The volume presented a reaction against Hegelianism. It 
was the first real attack upon the philosopher Gurvitch had read. This 
led him irresistably to the works of Kierkegaard and Proudhon. These 
writers demolished every artificial conception of social reality. In 
the process they attacked the rigid determinism of Hegel 's dialectic. 
The intellectual itinerary took the student~next to Kant and the 
neo-Kantians . Gurvitch felt Stirner had neglected one very important 
factor: 11the social dimension of the human person 11 • 1 He says, 
I believed I could find in Kant and the neo-Kantians the 
avenue running from man to humanity and to society. Also 
certain neo-Kantians were making big efforts to reconcile 
Marx and Kant . But more important was the adherence to the 
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critical method which promised to uncover every dogmatism 
including the spiritualism of Hegel and the materialism of 
Marx.l 
Gurvitch spent the first years of his university training in 
Dorpat, Estonia (then part of Russia) . He divided those first years~ 
attending winter classes in Russia and summer sessions in Germany. 
These first years were devoted to juridical studies . Also he spent 
considerable time reading certain key political theorists . Such studies 
were enriched by reflection on certain tendencies in neo-Kantian philoso-
v 
phy, e . g. , Cohen, Natorp, Cassirer, Richert, Windelband, Volkelt, 
Renouvier and Hamelin . From this study Gurvitch reacted against the 
neo-Kantians' tendency towards a platonic idealism, their anti-psycholo-
gism and anti-sociologism. 2 Gurvitch felt this movement had a naive 
understanding of these aspects of human life . He was impressed neither 
by the discussions of that time between Tarde and Durkheim nor b.Y the 
sociological formalism of Simmel . 
In Germany, under the tutelage of Wundt, Gurvitch became convinced 
it was impossible to make a direct parallelism between psychology and 
physiology. Also he saw, after a short time in the psychologist's 
laboratory, there is little correspondence between "real living time" 
and conceptualized time. It became even more apparent for measured 
time, quantified time and spatialized time. A.lJ_ of these times became 
distinctly real for Gurvitch and were to contribute to an important 
1Ibid. , p . 3 
2Ibid. 
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tenet in his later theory. l 
Significantly at this period he began to study Henri Bergson. He 
says, '~es donnees imm~diates de la conscience gave me the freedom I had 
sought in the experimental psychology of Wundt . n2 Bergson's Mati~re et 
memoire and L' evolution creatrice freed him conclusively from the neo-
Kantian spectre which had continued to haunt him during this whole period 
of his development. More particularly, Bergson's influence eliminated 
the last vestiges of rigid determinism. 
However, the spiritualistic realism of Bergson, patent in L 1 ~vo­
lution creatrice, repelled Gurvitch. Also he found unacceptable in 
Bergson a latent individualism which detaches the "profound self" from 
the "superficial self". This latter self is the sole participant in 
real social life for Bergson . This raised numerous questions in the 
mind of the young Gurvitch and dampened his earlier enthusiasm for the 
thought of Bergson. 3 
During the months just prior to World War I Gurvitch took courses 
under Emil Lask . The young scholar was impressed with his teacher's 
vigorous dialectic, mostly borrowed from Fichte. He liked Lask 1s efforts 
to go beyond idealism yet stay within the framework of neo-Kantianism. 4 
lcf. his The Spectrum of Social Time, translated by 
Phillip Bosserman and Myrtle Korenbaum (Dordrecht, Holland:D. Reidel and 
Sons, 1962), pp. 13 ff. 
2
op cit . , p . 4 
3cf. his Essais de sociologie (Paris : Librarie de Recueil Sirey, 
1938), pp . 25-26 for an early discussion on this subject. 
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His interest in Fichte led him to study Iv!ax \·leber . In sociology, 
during this period prior to :Jorld 1 ar I , there ;.ras a justified reaction 
against the thou ht of Rickert, who had reduced the scientific method 
to either gene alization or individ~alization, thus eliminating the 
possibility of the typological method. 1 This typological approach, 
formalized by Max ~reber , belongs distinctly to sociology. Gurvitch 
would be indebted to 1 eber for this method which would be a main 
feature of his own sociological theory . 
Towards the end of his first years in the ~iv rsity, Gurvitch 
co.1pleted a monograph in Russian for a university- wide essay competition. 
His subject was The Political Doctrine of Theophan Prokopovitch and His 
ources : Groti s, Hobbes and Pufendorf . 2 Receipt of the top 
prize convinced him he should prepare for a teaching career . He continued 
his studies in Germany, returning however to the ·niversity of Dorpat 
before the hostili tics of ~'lorld ~var I began. In 1917 he obtained his 
diploraa of licenci~ at the University of Petrograd and continued there 
his professorial preparation. He earned the agregation which made him 
eligible to teach at the university level . 
These university years from 1915 to 1920 produced the seminal 
ideas which would reappear later in expanded form. 
1) Realism. This occupies the primary position in his thinking 
today. It is not to be confused with the concept of realism as set forth 
in the ancient controversy betv:een nominalism and realism. Gurvitch 
lClass lecture byM Faye, the University of Paris, Novomber 27, 1956. 
2university of Dorpat, 1915. 
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means what the common usage of the term denotes, the actual as opposed to 
an abstraction or a figment . His basic aim is to grasp tne real, to see 
the object so that it becomes absolute rather than relat~ve, in the 
Bergsonian sense.1 Gurvitch states this emphasis on realism came by way 
of the intuitionism of two Russian philosophers, Lossky and Frank, who 
were in turn influenced by cert~n slavophile iaeas closely related to 
Russian Orthodox philosophy. Especially important are the ideas of tne 
real existence of the community (although it never absorbs the individual), 
the real community of conciliation in the Church (Sobornost), the con-
cept of a real rural community (mir) . These ideas will be important 
concepts for Gurvitch's categories of the 1We" and the dialectic of 
"reciprocity of perspectives " between the individual and tne collective, 
and the possibility of an equilibrium between unity and diversity . 2 
For Gurvitch religion was to become synonymous with mysticism. 
Even then the danger of moving towards a renewal of the mysticism so 
prevalent in the Orthodox religion pushed him in the direction of dia-
lectical criticism. He therefore distinguished between what is per-
ceived by intuition and what is known (which presupposes a jud~ent) .3 
The idea of a pluralism of realities attracted him. To quote Bergson 
1Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics (New York: 
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1913), pp. 2-9 . 
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as he does, "Philosophy requires a new effort for each new problem"· 1 
Implied here is the belief that each type of experience has an irreducible 
reality of its own. Moral experience therefore is a unique and separate 
type; juridical experience is also a certain specific type . This makes 
possible the separate study of these phenomena. Gurvitch bases the 
sociology of law and the sociology of the moral life on the concrete 
reality of certain specific types of experience . There is a plurality 
of realities . One cannot reduce these realities to a monistic unity, 
to one substance , to make the multiple one . Gurvitch relates he found 
this absolute realism in the mature Fichte, who saw the multiplicity 
inherent in reality itself. He handled this diversity by emphasizing 
the competition and collaboration betv.reen intuition and dialectic . 
2) Gurvitch 1 s studies of the history of social philosophy and 
sociology had considerable bearing on his intellectual development . 
He concentrated especially on those thinkers who were both anti-
individualistic, meaning those who affirmed the irreducibility of the 
social, and the anti-statists, those who refused to identify social 
totalities with one aspect of the whole--namely. the state. This explo-
ration led to his careful study of Grotius, Leibnitz, Fichte, Krause and 
Aristotle. (Indeed, the profound meaning of Aristotle's dictum, 1Man is 
a political animal n, coincides w.i th the position of Gurv-i t ch. ) The 
results of this detailed research were entbodied in Gurvitch 1s principal 
thesis for the Doctorat es Lettres , L 1 id~e du droit social, 1932. 
1Ibid ., p . 13 , from La pens ' e et le mouvant, p . 38 . 
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While making these initial studies in social and political 
philosophy he came upon the work of J. J. Rousseau, whom he considered 
an enigma. First Gurvitch noted Rousseau's propensity towards glori-
fying the State, and yet there exists a clear proclivity towards 
anarchy. Hence Rousseau's thought contains a radical individualism, 
on the one hand and a solid statement emphasizing the reality of the 
social fact, on the other . Gurvitch was intrigued by the doctrine of 
the General Will. It is not a "will" which is synonymous ~ri th the 
majority but is related to the "whole" . Moreover Rousseau argued that 
this rrgeneral will" is fou."ld in each individual. uurvitch's conception 
of the collective mind and its immanence in the individual mind has 
its inception in this suggestive idea of Rousseau. Gurvitch stated , 
'~he presence of the 'general will ' in each individual makes it pos-
sible for the individual and society to have a new life thanks to the 
social contract drawn up between th~~. '~ He went on to say that Kant's 
categorical imperative contains only a faint resemblance to the social 
philosophy of Rousseau. 
Gurvitch took up this whole discussion in his book Rousseau et 
la declaration des droits (1917) . He defended the philosopher by 
focusing on the richness of his dialectic . Yet he found himself forced 
to show the real difficulty Rousseau encountered in his remarkable 
attempt to rediscover social reality through affi~~ng the generality 
of individual reason . Gurvitch felt this was not enough . Reason is 
only one part of social reality. 
1
'I'oulemont, Sociologie et pluralism • • • , p . 6. 
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Proudhon was next . He conceived the social as being part and 
parcel of the participants' lives (miless these persons were alienated. 
Karl Marx was indebted to Proudhon for this insight.) Social reality is 
neither transcendent to the individuals involved nor even external to 
them. This is of fundamental importance to the thought of Gurvitch. 
Proudhon's basic social pluralism resolved in a constant struggle to 
attain a tenuous equilibrium among the multiple competing groups. His 
negative dialectic, his demonstration of the relativity of every social 
prognostication, and his affirmation of a creative humanity following a 
path towards inevitable progress filled the student's mind with joy. 
Gurvitch at the start of his scientific career was an avid disciple of 
Proudhon. This attachment led Gurvitch to read the French theorists of 
revolutionary syndicalism. Sorel was included here though Gurvitch 
claims he found little of value in his thought . Sorel's idea of social 
myth, nevertheless, would be influential in Gurvitch's depth sociology. 
Precisely at the time Gurvitch was reading the French syndicalists 
and Proudhon, the Russian revolutions of February and March, 1917, were 
in progress. Imagine the impact! The factory soviets were coming into 
being. These "councils" tended to elect their representatives not only to 
the central "councils" or soviets but to conduct their local concerns 
democratically; Gurvitch said he observed the actual possession of 
political power by the soviets and by the "councils of management" of the 
large enterprises. His ideal of a decentralized government and a 
democratically planned economy comes directly from this experience. 
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3) The profound effects of the Russian revolution must be treated 
separately in this analysis of Gurvitch 1 s intellectual maturing . The 
direct experience of the revolutions had a tremendous impact. 
In observing, in living through the various reactions of the 
divergent milieux, groups, classes, syndicates, cells, councils; 
observing and livin the literal formation of new organizat~ons, 
the activity of established ones , watching the almost total 
explosion of the pre-revolutionary global social structure, 
I found several ideas which led me to my sociological studies: 
1) Social law being born spontaneously, fully independent 
of the state and its juridical order and being able to enter 
into various relationships with the law of the state. 
2) The depth levels of social reality in which their 
hierarchy and their relationships are completely reversed; 
these levels contradict each other from time to time and 
interpenetrate at other junctures . 
3) The groups seen as a microcosm of forms of sociability. 
4) The global society and social classes viewed as 
macrocosms of groups . 
5) The possibility of a collectively planned economy without 
the rigid control of tne state and based on a pluralistic 
democratic economy with a federalist conception of property. l 
Gurvitch goes on to relate: 
So well I remember a walk with my wife along the banks of the 
Karpovka in Leningrad* During that spring evening in the year 
1920, several months before leaving Russia, I laid out before 
her the principal conceptions of my sociology upon which I 
would elaborate; also the principal concepts of my thesis on 
social law and finally my conception of a decentralized, 
collectively planned economy . 2 
In October, 1920, Gurvitch left Russia . He took with him as the 
sole contents of his baggage, notes for three books: one on Fichte, 
another on the concept of social law, and a third on the scales and 
levels of social reality. The year before quitting the Soviet Union 
he had received his agregation and had taught for one year at the 
~on itineraire. • • , p 7-8 • 
2Ibid., p.8. 
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University of Petrograd-Leningrad . Upon leaving Russia he went first to 
the University of Prague in Czechoslovakia, teaching there for five years 
before going to settle in France . He became a French citizen in 1929 . 
The basic reason he left Russia was that he had lost all hope that a 
truly pluralistic state based on decentralized democratic principles 
could be established. Also he was not in sympathy with the decision to 
draw up a peace treaty with Germany. In a private conversation he told 
the writer he hoped to conclude one more project, a definitive socio-
logical description of the Russian revolutions . 
It was during this period after he had left Russia that h concen-
trated on the phenomenology of Husserl . He had extended conversations 
with Max Scheler whose popularity was particularly great in Germany at 
that time. Gurvitch says of Husserl, '~espite his theory of the open con-
science (intentionality- direction towards ••• ), Husserl appeared to be 
both too idealistic and prone to logicism" .1 While Scheler, with whom 
Gurvitch had many long discussions, made a profound impression on him, 
there were certain aspects of his thought which Gurvitch could not accept . 
First he was attracted by Scheler's intuitionism which was both 
11affective and realist 11 . 2 Gurvitch very soon realized the emotional, 
affective side of social life was tremendously important to understand 
if one were going to be successful in co~prehending social reality. 
Second, he found Scheler's theory of values original and stimulating; 
finally, Scheler provided some first steps towards the sociology of 
1Ibid . ' p . 8. 
2Ibid . , p . 8. Both his study and the erperience of the Russian 
revolutions had taught him that the irrational factors of social life 
play a large part in the movement and change which goes on at the 
interior of social reality . 
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knowl edge . However , he was too much a traditionalist for Gurvitch . He 
rebelled against Scheler ' s devout Catholicism which had turned him 
towards the idealism of Schellin~ . 
Fichte , above all the mature Fichte, seemed to provide the key with 
his concept of dialectical realism. Such an approach provided the answer 
to the problems which the phenomenologists were unable to answer . The 
basic elements of Fichte ' s system which appealed to Gurvitch can be 
listed as follows: 
1) The mutual penetration and intertwining of the intuition on 
the dialectic . 
2) The absolute realism towards which one aims, whether it be the 
transpersonal or the trans-subjective , which is the domain of the Spirit 
in Fichte ' s terms . This domain of the Spirit is that area of the human 
will which responds to the call of duty . It leads towards the constantly 
creative aspects of existence . This is Life . It is that part which is 
a kind of endless stream concentrating itself into points of conscious -
ness . As this transpersonal becomes more systematized and reworked by 
Gurvitch it will serve as the basis for his Sociology of Law, Religion, 
1orals, etc . , which come under the general rubric of Sociology of the 
Spirit . There is some affinity to Helgel at this .junction . This 
absolute realism may lead towards the other aspect of the real world, 
namely the transobjective which results in the stability of being and 
becomes the system of logical essences denoted by Fichte and U.urvitch as 
Logos ,. This Logos is anterior to the subj ect or observer and hence is 
real . It is beyond the material domain and, in this sense , is ideal. 
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Gurvitch ' s conception of Fichte declares the transversonal to be the 
active side , the 1-villing, creative element 1vhich serves as the basis for 
the ethic of ichte . It will also be the spontaneous, effervescent, 
creative level of social reality, the infrastructure in the vertical view 
of social life. The transobjective , the Logos, which serves as the 
foundation of Fichte 1s logic, becomes the superstructure, the external, 
the superficial layer of social reality. Like Fichte, uurvitch sees a 
great conflict being waged betv-reen creation and system, between the 
infrastructure and the superstructure: "these two sectors of reality 
are separated by an irrational hiatus . But as a result of these con-
flicts bridges are thrown over this abyss . They are named conscience , 
society, and cultural -vmrks which are always linked to the superficial 11 . 1 
~fuile in Germany, urvitch had an opportunity to consult the manu-
scripts of Fichte ~ He discovered that they were most difficult to read . 
In fact, Gurvitch was persuaded that certain contradictions one finds in 
Fichte 1 s posthumous works correspond to the extremely difficult passages 
which are impossible to decipher . These contradictions are a result of 
the interpolations made by Fichte's son . From Gurvitch's own 11trans -
lations11of Fichte he discovered his emphasis on antinomy, the perpetual 
struggle going on at the center of social being, with the resultant 
thesis "that neither epistemology nor ethics could do without ontology 11 . 2 
3) Gurvitch also discovered in Fichte the impossibility of 
realizing either the trans-sub,jective or the transob,jective Hithout the 
combined efforts of the dialectic and the intuition . The combination of 
2Loc . cit . 
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these two elements will be the foundation of his method. 
At three places Fichte and Gurvitch differ: 
1) Gurvitch could not accept Fichte's faith that the negative 
dialectic could be transformed into a negative theology of the Absolute , 
thereby preparing for the mystical revelation of the Absolute as God. 
2) He felt the Fichtean dualism between the Logos and the Spirit 
was too narrow to explain the perpetual struggles, the irreducible 
antinomies which are much more complex and numerous than this would 
indicate . Hence Gurvitch is led to his radical pluralism and subse-
quently to his radical dialectic . 
3) Finally, Gurvi tch says he was persuaded that "society, the 
conscience - collective as well as individual - and cultural works 
which Fichte described as being products of the gigantic struggles 
1dthin the real social being , merited a much larger treatment than 
Fichte had given them'' . 1 
His work with Fichte, the study he had made of Husserl, his 
conversations with Max Scheler, the influence of the French social 
philosophers and the intuitionism of Bergson combined with his 
Russian heritage and the indelible impressions of the Russian revolutions 
make up the tapestry of Gurvitch 1s formative experience . Thus endowed 
he had left Russia, sojourned briefly in Prague and finally located 
permanently in France . Once settled he began immediately to prepare his 
theses on the Idea of Social Law. He immersed himself in juridical 
literature, sociology, socialist thought and French syndicalist writings . 
libid.' p. 10. 
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He read once again the whole corpus of Proudhon's thought . He became 
acquainted with the work of Auguste Comte and his followers . The 
sociologists he read and with whom ha studied were predominantly the 
disciples of Durkheim. Among the most influential were Marcel Mauss, 
Lucien Levy-Bruhl and Maurice Halbwachs. Mauss gave to Gurvitch the 
concepts which would become the central SJ.mbols of his theoretical 
system: the ideas of total social pher omena and the whole man . 
/ Levy-Bruhl showed Gurvitch the possibility of a sociology of knowledge 
freed from all philosophical overtones. The stimulating discussions 
with these two scholars are among his cherished memories . 
The philosophers of this period who made an impression were 
Frederic Rauh (who died in 1909), Leon Brunschvicg and Jean l·Jahl . 
Gurvitch saw Rauh as a John the Baptist to his own dialectical empiri-
cism and realism . Unfortunately Rauh attached his radical empiricism 
to pragmatism . Gurvitch also felt Rauh did not have any idea of the 
dialectical implications of this thought . These two weaknesses blocked 
real comprehension of his concepts and the diffusion of his thought . 
From Leon Brunschvicg Gurvitch gained an appreciation for the 
"struggle this intransigeant rational idealist led against every attempt 
to mummify reason, which he saw as being i n perpetual movement; also I 
admired his struggle against every rigid idealism which denies the 
constantly renewing experience of the real and the concrete world" . l 
In Jean \\fahl Gurvitch discovered a thinker who was very near his 
own position, but his tendency towards a mysticism was repugnant to the 
transplanted Russian scholar. 
1Ibid.' p . ll. 
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During this period of study Leon Br unschvicg suggested to Gurvitch 
the possibility of his delivering a series of public lectures on some 
"Current Tendencies in German Thought" . These lectures offered in 1927, 
1928 and 1929, were published in 1930 under the title Les tendances 
actuelles de la philosophie allemande. In this valuable work Gurvitch 
showed how the Whole tenor of German philosophy had changed from that 
which existed same thirty years before and up to the first World War . 
The neo-Kantian philosophy had been supplanted by a new spirit . 
Philosophical scholarship has taken a completely different 
route . It is based on a new and unknown method. One 
university after another has espoused this new movement. 
From Gottingen, where it was born at the beginning of the 
century, and Munich, where resided its primary exponents, 
the movement has expanded to Fribourg, Cologne, Marbourg 
and Berlin. The new current has attracted philosophers 
from the positivist and empirical schools and those of an 
idealist tradition. • • • the name of this new school, 
phenomenology. l 
Following these introductory remarks Gurvitch presented the 
thought of Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, Emil Lask, N. Hartmann, and 
Martin Heidegger . These lectures and the subsequent book were received 
with enthusiasm. However, an incorrect idea was formed about Gurvitch . 
For a long time afterwards the lecturer was taken for a protagonist of 
phenomenology and a disciple of Martin Heidegger . In reality he says 
that he attempted to be as objective as possible in his critical analysis 
of these authors . Gurvitch states that in the lectures he did show a 
clear preference for the non-phenomenologists, Emil Lask and Nicolai 
Hartmann. 
1 Les tendances ••• , pp . 11-12. 
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1. The Juridical Phase 
The book on German philosophy was onLy an interlude in tne actual 
program which Gurvitch pursued at this time . His main concern was the 
preparation of his L 1 id~e du droit social, 1932, 1 the main outline of 
which he had brought with him from Russia . This is a monumental effort 
to show the real basis for law. His thesis will have to be explored in 
detail since it stands as the real foundation upon which his future work 
will rely. Gurvitch's ambition in this project was great . In the broad 
overview the two theses actually written2 show first that sociology of 
law occupies a superior position to that of the mere juridical techniques 
which are a part of any political state; and second, social law, the 
non-political law so often ne lected by jurists, is engendered by each 
collectivity, each group, each class, sometimes spontaneously and 
sometimes through customs, precedents and mores . This law can be an 
explosive and compelling force, as this age attests. 
''What is Law?" has been asked by priests and poets, philoso-
phers and kings, by masses no less than by prophets. A host 
of answers might be given yet the answer to the question 
remains one of the most persistent anu elusive problems in 
the entire range of thoubht . For one may well view the 
entire gamut of human life, both in thought and in action, 
as bein comprised within the word Law. 3 
This statement by Henry J . Abraham is a ood beginning for this 
1(Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1932) 
2L1 id e ••• and Le temps pr~sent et l'id e du droit soc~al 
(Paris: Vrin, 1932) are Gurvitch's two theses for his doctorate. 
The former was his principal thesis. 
1Henry J . Abraham, The Judicial Process (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1962) p 5. 
35 
consideration of Gurvitch's concept of social law. It suggests the 
richness of tnis word . Law is not simply formal in the sense that 
legislative bod~es have made laws and other bodies promulgate those 
laws and administer them. Law is informal as well . Mr . Abraham quotes 
from the work of James oolid e Carter . 
Law, Custom, Conduct, Life - different names for almost the 
same tning - true names for different aspects of the same 
thing - are so inseparably blended together that one cannot 
even be thought of without the other . No improvement can be 
effected in one without improving the other, and no retro-
gression can take plale in one without a corresponding 
decline in the other . 
This description goes a long way in illustrating wnat is meant by 
informal law. The distinction is sometimes made between public law and 
private law. Gurvitch's juxtaposition of social law ana individual law 
is clearer . He points out tnere are no material criteria by which to 
make this distinction betw~en public and private law. The terms are too 
vague . There would be some justification if tney were used in the Roman 
sense: jus publicum - law imposed by the state; jus civile - non-state 
law of society at large plus the law of jurists (bench law or common law) .2 
Social law is the law created and embodied in collectivities of all 
types. It is tne law which is alongside and underneath individual law. 
The law of the tate itself rests on social law . From all that modern 
anthropology declar s it is apparent civilization derives from the 
necessary cooperation of persons for survival. Biology has illustrated 
that the success of tne creature, man, comes from his intense 
1Law: Its Ori in Growth and Function (New York: The Knickerbocker 
Press, 19U7 , p. 320, quoted in Ibia . , p . 
21 1 .d ~ e. • • ' P• 13. 
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sociability. This social solidarity is a result both of instinct and 
also the reasoned desire for well-being. The political philosophers 
who have stressed community purpose and collective values have a long 
historical record to support them. The present concerns about 
natural law and world order are in part real longings for that primitive 
solidarity which has been broken by a rampant individualism. "The sense 
of common purpose implied in Aristotle's dictum • • • goes back to the 
earliest beginnings; the inherited instincts of humanity are against an 
unbridled individualism, and the majority of political thinkers have 
greatly overestimated the rationality of mankind . 111 Gurvitch struggles 
against every anarchical view of social life and any thoroughgoing 
rationalistic concept of political order . He asserts that historically 
and at present law must be defined in its widest sense . Examination of 
the early riverine civilizations indicates the growth of social solidari-
ty intertwined with social law and the more formal manifestations of that 
law created by the political systems wbich arose out of organizational 
necessity. 
P• 4. 
\'That then is social law? 
Social law is' for us the autonomous law of communion by which 
each active, concrete, and real totalit is inte rated in an 
objective fashion. This social law incarnates a positive value. 
It is a law of integration . It is distinguished from the law 
of coordination (the order of individual law) and the law of 
subordination. These latter two are solely recognized by the 
~yst~ms of juridical individualism and unilateral universal-
~sm. 
1John Bowle, 1-Jestern Political Thought (London: l'iethuen, 1961), 
2L'idee •• . , pp ll-12 . 
37 
There are , then, three great branches of law for Jurvitch: 1) 
social law which is the law of communion, integration and fusion; 
2) individual law which is based on interpersonal, interindividual 
relationships; and 3) subordinative law which is the law characteristic 
of non- democratic states . This last type is founded on a hetero-
geneous system of individual law. For example the rule of a paternalistic 
owner over the interior organization of a factory or a capitalist 
industry is for 3urvitch a perversion of the social law which is imma-
nent to the "whole" of the factory . This rule of the owner is based 
on the individual law which is derived from the interindividual 
relationships of the owner and the other members of the factory . 
As a clue to the total thought of Gurvitch concerning law it should 
be noted his general polemic is against an individualism which neglects 
the social facts of life . More precisely, he contends against every 
kind of juridical individualism. A way of summing up his general aim 
would be to say he is seeking a synthesis between individualism and 
universalism (autocracy and dictatorial legal arrangements) by way of a 
1 
transpersonalism. 
Gurvitch sees the whole as distinct from the sum of its individual 
members . The social group i s real . This is in keeping with the 
Durkheimian tradition. He parts company with Durkheim when the latter 
asserts the totality is transcendant to the individual persons . The 
social group is not an entity against which they struggle nor in which 
they find the means to identity; it is not a superior personality nor 
lrbid., p . 111 for a particularly fine discussion of this synthesis . 
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an element which goes beyond the self. Rather it is a superconscious 
activity, immanent in each pe son and derived from t he ensemble of their 
actions . 11In this sense of reciprocal co-penetration between super-
conscious activity and conscious action, the transpersonal whole 
symbolized by the term 'ive 1 , can be characterized as an immanent 
totality. nl 
The key word to describe this real social whole is the 'IItle " • It 
is distinguished from those coordinative relationships which serve as 
the basis for individual law or the juridical arrangements based on le al 
commerce between persons . The pronouns which illustrate this type are 
"I", "you" , "he", "they" and "them" . The "ltle" f eeling or sense :::,ives rise 
to integration or communion or extensive cooperation which alone make 
possible social law. 2 Moreover Gurvitch feels this law of integration, 
or social law, is important because it alone can &rasp the essential 
problems which are present in the new types of institutions of the 
present era: vast labor unions , industrial democracies, federalism, 
social parliamentarianism, the growing importance of international law 
over national law plus socialism without etatism. This suggests a 
pluralism to juridical orders which are simultaneously interdependent 
and mutually limiting in their activity . Th se various juridical 
entities (in the broad sense here) collaborate on an equal footing ~dthin 
national and international communities . "This pluralism and all the 
lrbid., pp . 9-10 . Footnote 3. 
2L ' idee ••• , p . 18 . 
institutions which cause it cannot be understood juridically apart 
from the idea of social law. rrl 
This means that a new conceptlon of power is implicit in the 
tneory of social law. The state cannot alone provide the naked force 
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sufficient to bring autonomous groups into a cooperative endeavor. This 
was the dream of Proudhon that the balance of power be effected between 
the state and the economic groupings. This is possible because a new 
type of justice resting on the transpersonalism of the '~Je" activity 
comes into being . lt is the justice of social law; such a justice 
brings about a synthesis between commutative justice (the outcome of 
individualism) and distributive justice (the product of universalism) 
resulting in an integrative, transpersonal justice carried out by 
social law. There are seven essential parts to Gurvitch's definition 
of social law: 
1) The general function of social law: an objective integration 
of a totality by provision for the fusion of all its members . 
2) The foundation of its obligatory force: the dynamic creation 
of this law in a direct manner by the very same totality which 
integrates it. 
3) The object of social law: the regulation of tne internal 
life of the totality. 
4) Intrinsic structure of tne corresponding juridical 
relatlonship: a direct participation by the whole in the 
functioning of the law without the necessary intermediary 
of an organization. 
5) Its external manifestation: a social power which is not 
normally linked with unconditional coercion. 
1Ibict., p. 14. 
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6) Its realization in certain organizations: the primacy of 
the unorganized over the organized law admittin5 only those 
organized expressions which give an equal opportunity to 
participation . 
7) The subject to which organized social law addresses itself: 
the complex collective person . l 
Each of these characteristics needs to be expanded. The following 
discussion will take up each of these attributes of social law: 
l. The general function of social law. Integration is the general 
function . This function is opposite to that of coordination which 
characterizes individual law. The concept of integration is closely 
allied to the idea of totality . 
The social 11whole 11 represents in its essence a mobile and 
concrete system of equilibria based on a fusion of 
"reciprocal perspectives 11 ; a system which is dynamic and 
where the irreducible elements of multiplicity and unity, 
individual and universal, tend to be s~thesized in a 
fashion which is perpetually changing . 
Integration into this social whole results in its ideal form, in .a real 
social group which is dynamic and immanently a part of each member. It 
cannot be reduced to a simple unity, nor is it a conglomeration of 
dispersed atoms which have as their sole link some comn1on abstract law 
to which they have submitted . Integration is mutual participation and 
implication. Coordination is merely cooperation. Put another way, 
integration is an attempt to realize at the empirical level the values 
of the transpersonal Spirit . This concept of Fichte is the means by 
which a synthesis is realized between the multiple and the one, between 
lL'idee ••• , p . 17 . 
2Ibid . , p . 17 . 
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the individual and the universal. The synthesis resides in the moral 
ideal, in the superconscious creator Spirit (the ''W'e 11 ) . The creator 
Spirit is composed of persons, va~ues in themselves, who participate in 
its activity. This transpersonal Spirit is the immanent totality, 
~~~ere the one ana the multiple are produced reciprocally in a continuous 
movement of mutual participation". 1 This is not simply a moral ideal 
but an essential tendency of all real social beings . 
To be integrated in this totality is to be a part of the production 
of this totality. 'The members integrated in a totality, participating 
in its dynamic unity •• • enter into certain relations of communion, of 
partial communal fusion in what is called the t·we 1 and not into relation-
ships of opposition (me, you, him) which are characteristic of 
coordination. 11 2 
In other terms, integration is a centripetal movement experienced 
in an immediate and direct way. Coordination and subordination are move... 
ments in the opposite directions resulting in multiplicity or centrifu-
gal action. 3 
One might say this conflict between integration and coordination 
is the perpetual battle waged at tne heart of every group. The unity 
of the group is dependent upon a moving, dynamic equilibrium serving as 
the foundation of group life. 
Law in its integrative function goes beyond negativism, restraint 
and coercion . It is positive . Its work is towards peace, union and 
order . 
1Ibid . , P• 17. 3Ibid., p. 19 . 
2. The problem of authority. The very essence of the real group's 
social cohesiveness is the obligatory force it maintains over its 
members . Such an authority comes from the totality itself. An interior 
order, derived from some outside source and imposed on a group, is no 
longer the law of integration but the law of subordination. "Social law 
always derives its obligatory force from the direct authority of the 
whole by which it regulates the interior life of that totality.nl 
This source of authority or obligatory force comes from what 
Gurvitch calls the normative facts . These will be discussed later with 
the relationship of law and justice . Suffice it to say these normative 
facts are derived from the totality and become at the same time the basis 
for that totality's cohesion. 
3. The object of social law. Its unique object is to integrate 
the totality, to make it into a whole whereby it may enter into the 
external affairs of group life . Such an entry into these affairs will 
take one of two avenues: either tne group will be treated as an individual 
or it will be integrated into a larger unity . In the first instance it 
will submit to an individual law; in the second it will be subjec to a 
social law, but one which is different from that of its own .making . 2 
4. The structure of social law. There is a unique type of 
relationship belonging to the concrete social grouping . The members 
participate mutually and directly in the totality of this group . This 
participation itself serves as the basis for their re ulation . Sucn a 
participation creates a l i aison or bond among the various members which 
2Ibid., pp . 21-22 . 
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has a character all its own. The essence of that liaison is discovered 
in the mutual penetration of obligations ana claims on the part of the 
members . Again one can note Gurvitch ' s debt to Fichte . In summary 
the group holds together because 
this is a concrete system in which the individual participates; 
where the part is no longer a part but a functioning and 
dynamic element and where unity ana multiplicity are produced 
mutually in a reciprocally functional relationship. This 
category of the concrete system precedes all juridical 
construction. l 
There is no need for an intermediary structure, though such an 
organization is not precluded. '~hat which imposes these mutually 
cooperative acts is not some nonexistent organization but the value of 
the life in common, the totality as an equilibrium for all its members . "2 
5. Social power as its external manifestation. The power which 
the group holds over its individual members is derived from the totality 
itself. The social whole incarnates this social power. It is "a function 
"' of 'social service' to the end of maintaining the totality itself".-' 
This power once again does not depend upon the existence of certain 
organizations to be effective . Such power can use unconditional 
coercion but it is infrequent . Every collectivity can impose obli-
gations on its members . Such force does not rest on power alone . It 
comes from the element of unity within the totality. As Talleyrand 
counseled Napoleon, 11It is difficult to sit for a long time on a 
1Ibid. , p . 23. 
4roulemont, Sociologie et Eluralisme •• • , pp. 86-87. 
3 E· cit., p . 23 . 
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naked sword 11 • No group can depend upon raw power alone for any length 
of time . The element of the social law, which is the product of the 
collectivity, will ultimately contain the foundation of legitimacy. 
Such a legitimacy may be expressed as a majority action or as a direct 
action of a Lroup representinb the collectivity. Individual law cannot 
express social power . Subordinative law, because of its mixed character, 
can express a social law of domination, which is a perverted type. 
The concept of legitimacy is a crucial problem today. Gurvitch 
contends some notion of social law is needed to resolve this question . 
So many jurists and students of law have placed an excessive and some-
times exclusive emphasis on the role of individual law; this invariably 
tempts them to place some sort of power above the law. They have gone 
so far as to declare this power essential to the very existence of law. 
This has led to the distorted estimation of the state as that powe1 over 
and above the law. 110nly the theory of social law which finds the 
precise place of power in the juridical system and constructs this power 
as an immanent structure of ~he law of integration' is master of the 
situation. n1 
urvitch makes some crucial observations on the nature of social 
pov1er in a democratic state . 
The power in a democratic state is not a power of domination 
but of inteeration in the subjacent, political community. It 
is founded on the social law which ~merges from this community 
and not on a subordinate law. Because this law of political 
integration is sanctioned by an unconditional constraint does 
not transform it into a law of subordination, but only 
lL'idee ••• , p . 25. 
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condenses it into a social la;.r of an altogether particular 
kind: social law condensed and opposed to pure social law.l 
6. The relationship of unorganized social law to tne organized 
level of social reality. This characteristic merely underlines the 
well-spr~g fro which come the nonnative facts, these transpersonal 
values which are products of the totality and are also roducts of that 
level of social life which is unorganized. ''The impersonifiable authori-
ty of social law is completely independent of the existence of or ani-
zation, and the organized social power relies on the purely objective 
social power of the unorganized, subjacent conununity. 112 This subjacent 
community is vastly different from its organized levels. It is richer, 
more irrational, and remains impervious to all attempts to capture and 
categorize it definitively. What one is able to see of tnis unorganized 
level is only a portion of what is really there. "It is limitless in 
content--this substructure upon wnich all the rest stands. ,,3 
7. The subject of organized social law is the complex collective 
person. The law of coordination is interindividual or intergroup. 
These are simple unities. However the law of integration or social law 
deals with complex systems of interaction . These complex persons are 
unities "in which the members conserve their partial personalities at 
the heart of the total personality". 4 Cooperatives and economic and 
political federations and confederations are examples of what urvitch 
means by complex collective persons. 
11 1 id~e •• • J p. 
3 Ibid., p. 29 . 
28 • 2Ibid., p . 28-29. 
4Ibid., p. 32. 
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Thus social law seeks to bring unity out of multiplicity without 
denying such a plurality. It finds this unity in the common values in 
which it directly participates. These normative facts hold together the 
interior life of the collectivity by a social power that is most generally 
free from the necessity to use unconditional coercion. This social law 
finds obligatory force in these normative facts which are the products 
of an organized level of activity characterized by a reciprocal 
relationship among the members, involving both claims and obligations 
on the part of all. 
What is social law about? What is its underlying purpose? Before 
one can answer these questions, one must deal with the problem of 
justice. Law and justice are intertwined. 
i. Justice. 
Gurvitch sees justice as more than either commutative or 
distributive. In fact social justice synthesizes the two and transcends 
them. It reaches the transpersonal, collective level while preserving 
the integrity of the individual. 'fhe history of this concept of justice 
is long. It extends back to the Greeks, to Hebrew religion and to the 
Christian fathers. From earliest times two strains developed: first, 
an individualistic interpretation leading to commutative justice, and 
second, a universal conception espousing certain timeless principles 
and leading to the idea of distributive justice or "to each his due 11 • 
Leibnitz, Grotius, and wolff are early formulators of the contemporary 
concept of social justice. Society involves the cooperation of beings 
endowed with reason. Justice is communal. There is no conflict between 
I 
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the individual and the universal, or the microcosm ana the macrocosm. 
Rather justice is the synthesis of the whole with its parts. Such a 
justice is objective since an objective equilibrium of certain princi-
ples is imposed on the individual consciousness; it is superior to 
every individual or collective will. 1 
Proudbon, in the tradition of Leibnitz, Ficbte and Krause, proposed 
the socialization of justice. For him justice makes possible tne 
conciliation of the whole with its parts. Both are equally real. There 
is then a balancing of personal and transpersonal values whicn are 
equally positive. 
Justice is at once objective and subjective, real and formal, 
or rather it transcends these opposites because it integrates 
individuals in a transpersonal, antihierarchical order, in 
which every individual maintains his own dignity precisely to 
the extent that he is an indispensable member of a community 
that cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts. Justice 
demands the realization of an order which is neitner communism 
nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but liberty in order 
and independence in unity. It is through 'mutualism 11 , tne 
interplay of collaborative associations and their federations, 
through the humanization of property by its transfor.mation into 
a social function in the bands of cooperative associations and 
through counterbalancing of the state by or aniz~d economic 
societies that justice can best be approximated. 
Gurvitch's debt to Proudhon becomes obvious in this conception of 
justice. His course at the Sorbonne on Proudhon, published under the 
title, Les fondateurs fran~ais de la sociolo ie contem oraine: 
Saint-Simon et P.-J. Proudhon, makes this even more exp1icit.3 
1Georges Gurvitch, "Justice" in the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, 
Selienan, ed. (New York: TheHacmillan Company, 1930), VIII, 512. 
~ncyclopedia .•• , VIII, 512. 
3
'Paris: Centre de Documentation Universitaire, 1955), pp. 4-6. 
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Proudhon's concept of justice as a positive and dynamic element leads 
Gurvitch to see justice as the way of resolving conflicts and ant~omies 
at the heart of every society. Simple explanations of the causes of 
these conflicts will not do. 
Only the principle of the synthesis of individualism and 
universalism, which excludes any tendency to reduce the 
a priori values of the whole and of the individual, the 
one to the other, but which recognizes them as equivalent, 
can permit ~he problem of justice to be grasped in all its 
importance . 1 
Where does the problem of justice lie? It resides in the dis-
crepancy between the ideal realm of the moral where there is a perfect 
s~nthesis of the personal and the transpersonal (individualism and 
universalism) and the real world where a fierce conflict takes place 
between these values . The gap between the ideal and the actual is the 
problem area . This gap i s filled in a tentative vra;v by justice. 
"Justice is an essential medium for the moral ideal, an a priori con-
dition for its realization . It is its necessary ambiance, it shines with 
its reflected light; in its shelter alone the moral ideal may display 
its richly individualized and complex tissues. 112 The moral ideal and the 
tentative arrangen1ent of justice are inseparably bound together. Yet they 
are clearly distinguishable from each other. They have different 
structures which make it possible for this distinction to be made. 
The moral ideal is alogical or irrational as Fichte expressed it. 
Justice is that step towards rationalization. 
1 Op . cit . , p . 513 . 
2Loc. cit . 
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The moral ideal is accessible only through action, throu6 h 
a 11volit.ive intuition", consisting in the participation on 
the transpersonal plane of pure creative activity, in which 
each must act in a manner absolutely dissimilar fr~n that of 
all others, discovering b that very fact his place in the 
whole of creative activity . l 
This immediate moral ideal needs to be translated into real life, 
into beneral terms . The means of logic cool off the white heat of this 
moral experience and put it into defined cat 5 ories for application in 
the life of society. 11It f]..o i c) arrests tne intuition-action and 
amalgamates it into a judgment. Justice is midway between morality and 
logic. 112 Intuition changes to recognition in the act of judgment. This 
is very different from the direct experiencing of tnis moral value . 
Gurvitch gives the example of listenin to a symphony concert. One may 
not like the music but tnis does not stop him from feelinb a sense of 
injustice when certain noises are mad which disturb the listening of 
this music for others. 
It is precisely to this act of recognition of the moral ideal 
that justice applies itself, and the values which depend on 
it are consecutive to moral values . Throu6h this act of recog-
nit~on, stron5 ly impregnated with intellectual elements and 
presenting the amalgam of a judgment and an action, the logical-
ization and the generalizatio~ of the irrational qualities of 
the moral ideal are achieved. 
These moral experiences are individualized and incomparable. 
Justice generalizes from these experiences, which is indeed necessary if 
these moral values are to oe relevant. Hence a "certain schematic stabi-
lity is substituted for creative movement; a quantitative element for the 
1 bid . ' p . 513. ~xperience juridique ••• , p . 100 . 
3 Up. cit ., p. 514. 
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ensemble of pure qualities . 111 Justice derives its creative force from 
the very fact that it never cuts itself off from its source, but it 
utilizes the elements of quantificatio , generalization and stability 
in order to be relevant . Clearly, moral experience has its own structure 
which is different from this of justice. Thereby the two can be dis-
tinguished ana recognized, though they must never be separated. There 
are certain affinities between this concept of justic and that of 
Reinhold Niebuhr 2 :is theory that justice is a tentative approximation 
of order reflecting the ultimate value of Agape is similar to this idea 
held by Gurvitch . 
ii. Law. 
"Law is always an attempt to realize justice. n3 This attempt to 
realize justice depends upon the variables in the given social milieu. 
This is the basis for Gurvitch 1 s relativism which forces him to rule out 
the existence of natural law. Law remains law only so long as it seeks 
to realize justice. It becomes something else, something deformed and 
perverted, if justice is not its goal . The logic of the idea runs like 
this: one cannot define law without first defining justice; justice is 
tied to values which make it axiological; the values closest to justice 
are moral ones, based on the ichtean criterion of the moral ideal . 
Startin then with law, what are its characteristics? 
L. "' . . 'd' 100 ~xper~ence Jur~ ~que •• • , p. 
2Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics New York: 
Harper and Brothers, l935~s his clearest statement on justice. 
3L 1 ictee •• • , p. 96. 
1 . According to Gurvitch the "rule of law is distinguished from 
the moral rule by a deterministic or precise and final character . Moral 
precepts are indefinite and infinite by nature . u1 The juridical rule 
is general in its expression and stable in form. The moral rule is 
creative, dynamic and individualized. Law has a more defined logical 
and rational structure than justice . It is both a norm and a judgment 
showing the necessary liaison between the law and the moral truth. 
11In other words [ the lavi) is a judgment of va.lue and a judgment of 
r eality . n2 To explain more clearly the relationship of justice, moral 
value and law, Gurvitch has this to say: 
The relationship of justice and law is much nearer tnat between 
a logical category and the object constituted by that category. 
Justice plays the role of the Logos rather than of the ideal of 
law. The moral ideal is essentially opposed, inasmuch as it is 
unr ealizable , to empirical morality and cannot be embodied in 
tne latter; by its nature it can only exercise a "re ulative" 
function with regard to the moral point of view . Justice on 
the contrary, inasmuch as it is strongly impregnated witn 
logical val ues , has the faculty of forming law directly: it 
does not oppose law so much as constitute it . Justice cannot 
serve as a basis of criticism and appreciation of the law 
because it is one of the elements of it.3 
This clarification helps t o sharpen the distinction between these 
levels of juridical life . Such a life has as its goal justice which in 
reality deals with the relat~onships of persons . 
2. Law seeks to establish a perfect correspondence between the 
duties and claims of all the members of a given collectivity. "The 
structure of juridical rule is essentially bilateral or more precisely, 
l 
Ibid . , p . 104. 2 Loc . cit . 
":\ 
""Encyclopedia . 
. . ' P• .514. 
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multilateral , while the structure of the moral rule is unilateral. nl 
For order to prevail each person shares certain obligations and claims 
with the other persons of his totality. This is the task of law. 
Gurvitch calls this the imperative-attributive character of law. The 
great Russian legal hilosopher, Petrazhitsky, developed this notion . 2 
Even earlier Fichte had described this relationship in detail. Moral 
values are uniquely imperative . This underlines the social character 
of law. 11hen these values are relatt~ized and generalized they take 
on their multilateral character liuperative-attributive) and in this way 
become social . The real intent of law is justice, which is interpreted 
by Gurvitch to mean security, peace and a stable social order. The 
beginning of a conciliation between the personal and the transpersonal 
values occurs at this point . 
The interdependence of reciprocal duties and claims forms in its 
achievement social order. It is the achievement of juridical 
reciprocities, supposing the reality of the other self, as far 
as a center of desires and claims and its interdependence with 
duties which give law in general its character of a phenomenon 
linked essentially to the social life . 3 
Gurvitch in this statement shows once again his reliance on 
Fichte and Scheler for this understanding of the other self and the 
11 1 ·d"' 104 1 ee ••• , p . • 
2
rn the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, XII, Gurvitch wrote the 
article on Petrazhitsky and his work . He points out that Petrazhitsky 
indicated 1~hile moral emotions and their inunediate data have a 
'unilateral' and simple 'imperative• character, juridical emotions have 
a bilateral or imperative-attributive character 11 • p . 103. 
3 p . cit., p . 105. 
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activity of the self as the center of claims and duties . l 
Such a law incorporating witnin it the interdependence of claims 
and duties can be expressed in three different ways: 
a . It can be coordinative . These claims and duties are expressed 
in a subject- object relationship, in an interpersonal, intergroupal 
manner . 
b . This law can be subordinative. The corresponding claims and 
duties are expressed in a master-servant, ruling elite - obeying 
co1nmunity relationship. 
9 · The law can be integrative . This is the level of social law 
where tne claims and duties of the whole and its members are affirmed 
in common. The interdependence is intensified since there is a partial 
fusion of all in the totality . 2 
3. The hint of this third characteristic has already been given . 
Each rule of law is the element of a system, a whole, a complex order . 
"An imperative-attributive rule detached from the social system in which 
it is incorporated would not be able to realize its multilateral relation-
ship . 113 The existence of the imperative-attributive relationship implies 
the existence of a social order . Order is impossible without it . Law 
is pre-eminently social . 
4. The same order of positive law must recognize the same values 
if the imperative-attributive relationship is to exist . The same rules 
1
see the footnote in L1id e • . • , p. 105, for an explanation of 
this idea of Fichte . 
2L1 .d; ~ ee . • • , p . 106. 3toc . cit . 
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of law must be obeyed in the same given social milieu . This becomes the 
fourth characteristic of law. Here Gurvitch affirms the notion that the 
rule of law cannot be above, beyond or autonomous from the given social 
setting . I f it is, it is ineffective , which means it fails to realize 
justice . This leads inexorably to its ceasing to be law. Because law 
must be relevant to the given social setting , law is made positive . It 
cannot be otherwise or it becomes autonomous . This in reality is 
Gurvitch 1s way of resolving the problem of the normative and the relative . 
The normative facts or the common values of a given totality are 
expressed through positive law in two different ways: the formal state-
ment of these normative facts through the techniques of law Gurvitch 
calls formal positive law; to the direct and immediate apprehension of 
these normative facts he gives the name of intuitive positive law. 1 
It is Gurvitch 1s belief this latter form is the "natural law 11 about 
which contemporary jurists and theorists speak . When he denies the 
autonomous nature of law, Gurvitch does not mean to deprive law of all 
normative content . This would reduce it to mere techniques and systems, 
which has so plagued the conceptions of law since the last of the 
nineteenth century. In fact this error has given rlse to the renewed 
discussions on "natural law" . There was a deep awareness that something 
was amiss . In reality, the law is a complex phenomenon which plays an 
intermediary role . It is an attempt to move between heteronomy and 
autonomy , between the normative and the totally relative . 11Law is an 
intermediary as justice is an intermediary between the moral ideal and 
~·idee • • • , p . 107 . 
1 the Logos . " 
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5. The fifth characteristic of law is its option to use coercion 
as a means of effecting its rule . Moral laws on the other hand can neve 
use constraint since they have an indeterminate character and an ir-
rational aspect to their existence . This option to use coercion does 
in no way imply such constraint is necessary. There are numerous laws 
which never require physical coercion for their compliance . For instance 
the laws regulating the Houses of Congress are adhered to from a sense 
of obligation and "lawabidingness" . 11In fact one may go so far as to say 
law which is sanctioned by physical force finds its underlying authority 
in a level of law which is not so sanctioned, and that all organized law 
rests on non-organized law. n2 Gurvitch proceeds to give some of the best 
arguments ever assembled to refute the validity of force as the basis for 
compliance to law. He uses as a source Petrazhitsky in his Theorie 
generale du droit et de l 1 etat . 3 In L1id e Gurvitch cites Rousseau's 
splendid argument on the futility of reducing the legitimacy of political 
power to that of coercion. Logically it would follow that law, since it 
is not dependent upon physical coercion , is not dependent upon the state. 
The theories of etatism always forget that the conditional coercion of 
the non-political organizations exerts a preponderance of influence over 
the citizens and leads directly to their propensity towards compliance . 
'Obviously custom, tradition , education and indoctrination play a promi-
nent part in developing habits of compliance in the citizens of the 
1~., P • 108 . 
1 political community. " 
These five characteristics lead to this definition of law: 
The law is a positive order which represents an attempt to 
realize Justice in a given social milieu by an ensemble of 
multilateral rules with an imperative-attributive character . 
It insists on a strictly determined interdependence between 
corresponding duties and claims, deriving their obligatory 
force from the "normative facts 11 and admitting in certain 
cases the possibility of being effected by coercion without 
its absolute requirement, however.2 
This notion of law makes it impossible to separate the motive from 
the action , the internal from the external. This is the true sense of 
the relationship between the whole and the individual persons, the moral 
value and its external manifestation in the law, the individual and the 
universal , the normative and the positive. All are necessarily linked 
together . One without the other is the death of both. This goes a 
long way to sustain the Christian ethic based on commandments written 
on the heart. 
Law has a positive function as well as a negative one. 11It aids 
as well as restrains; it fulfills an educational role along with a 
preventative one. 113 Law keeps social life from becoming anarchical; 
it also seeks to ameliorate in a positive and effective way. 
The final statement on the role of law concerns Gurvitch 1s idea of 
the presence of law as a totality. The synthesizing role of law brings 
together individualism and universalism. This synthesis is possible 
lpeter H. Odegard, Robert K. Carr, :t-1arver H. Berstein and Donald 
H. Morrison, American Government: Thea Politics and Constitutional 
Foundation (New Yor 1 , p. • 
21 1idee ••• , p. 111. Jrbid., p. 112 ~ 
through the "reciprocity of perspectives", a concept developed by 
Gurvitch. This notion is especially important in his method and 
general sociological theory. The concept of reciprocity shows the 
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dialectical relationship between the individual. and the whole, between 
the multiple and the one. His principle of order is the multilateral 
structure of the juridical precepts. Mutuality is possible through the 
imperative-attributive relationships embodied in the law. This is what 
gives law its social character. The imperative-attributive complex 
would be impossible without the reality of the other "self" which leads 
to the interdependence of claims and duties. Yet these claims and 
duties must be the same. Therefore the social milieu must be the same. 
All these factors lead to the conception .of the "whole". This is the 
essence of law. 
The prejudice of seeing law as necessarily individualistic and 
purely abstract has to be rejected for the juridical sphere in 
general. The idea of the "whole n, of the "concrete universal", 
is indispensable for grasping the general notion ~f law. The 
door is open, thence, for the idea of social law. 
The obligatory force of law is the next step in this idea. 
iii. The Normative Fact. 
Law never stands alone. It is the product of the social whole. 
Law attempts to realize justice. What then gives law its obligatory 
force? Why is it obeyed? It is apparent that law does not depend upon 
naked force. Something else sheathes the bare sword of power. ~omething 
makes compliance to the law acceptable and even pleasant at times. 
1 ,. L~ee ••• , P• ll.3. 
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In Gurvitch's structure of thought the essence of 11lawabidingness" 
is the normative fact. Some middle concept is needed to placate the 
disruptive tensions implicit in. the following. dichotomies: autonomy 
versus heteronomy, normative duty veraua the practice of duty, rights 
versua force, idealism versus realis , formal law ver~us t he spontaneous 
law which underlies force.1 To repeat, law is neither totally heter-
onomous nor autonomous. It is likewise neither totally idealist nor 
realist, nor totally any of the extreme points on these continua. Law 
is the middle ground, the inter.mediar,y betWeen these various endpoints. 
Law rises above these to an impersoaal or tranapersonal level. "In 
other words l}awJ goes beyond this dialectic to find its obligatory 
force in the objective facts which incarnate certain intrinsic positive 
values (juridical and mora:L in character)'~ 2 This impersonal character 
gives these objective facts an authority for establishing the rule of law. 
This is the authority which underlies the law. The force of obligation 
flows from the normative fact. Thi is the fundamental notion of law. 
It is a difficult idea, but its explanation is essential to an under-
standing of Gurvitcb'a entire system o! thought. 
Gurvitch rejects total reliance upon force for the authority of 
law. Still, law must have sufficient force to be effective. The search 
then is for the !!!! force, if coercion has been eliminated as the viable 
source of authority. Force and law are related. To set them over 
against each other is an error. To make them identical is also wrong. 
lL'idee •• • , P· 114. 
2Ibid., p. 114. 
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It is necessary to go beyond this impasse. This leads to the normative 
~, which raises a question. Is law an ideal element opposed to the 
real? Gurvitch says law is neither. If strictly ideal, it is remove 
from reality; this would overlook i.ts "positive" character. On the 
other hand, if juridical realism is the only essence of law, this 
reduces it strictl1 to the empirical level and repudiates all values 
which give that law content and a "specific reality as law".1 Gurvitch 
quotes Kant: "A doctrine of law which u purely empirical can be like 
the wooden head in the fable of Phaedra , a beautiful-head indeed, but, 
alas, without any brains. "2 
Gurvitch takes the middle position, adopting what he calls the 
·ideal- real method in order to get at the phenomenon of law. This 
phenomenon incarnates "certain positive, extratemporal values"3wbich 
make it different in structure from all ether realities such as morality, 
religion and politics . This peculiar content of juridical experience 
leads to the essence of the normative fact . The ideal-real method is the 
means by which this "ultimate reality of legal authority" is grasped. 
The route the metb d takes is something like this: 
a . Beneath every &9cial_ organization exi ts the 1pontaneous law 
o~ the unorganiz 1ubjacent commuatt,r. 
b. This unorganized coJIIDlUJlit;r1s law is based on a no11Utive 
fact, an objective, transpersonal authori.tJ-• . To state this law exist. i8 
insufficient. To be legitimate the law must be valielJ it DW.st be 
effective. 
lLt .b:-' 1 116 ;;;;...;.I.U;;;;;.;;;.;e..;;e~· --.• ...;•;;.ol p. • Jrbid. , P• 117 • 
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c. OnlY active communities can engender or make law. Passive ones 
are incapable of this, e . g., friendship communities or those groups 
based on adoration or love. A community must be active, must have some-
thing to accomplish. Ideas are the product of action. Thinking is 
action . (Fichte is present again.) Values are creative and the products 
of creative action. The efficacy of this normative fact comes from the 
following sequence: in order for an active community to create the law, 
it must be impregnated by it; and the law, in order that it be a real 
law, must be created qy the given community and given authority by that 
community. In other words, at one and the same time the communities 
create the law and base their very exis~ence upon it. '~he communities 
create their being in engendering the law, which also serves as their 
foundation. 111 To be more explicit: 
One cannot s~ either that the law pre-exists before the com-
munity or the community before the law, but that they are 
born and affirm each other together. They are inseparable in 
their existence and their validity . These communities, 
within which the constitution b,y the law and the gener~ting 
of a law coincides, are precisely the normative facts . 
These normative facts are derived from the concept of justice. 
Justice is the search for stable order , peace and union. To realize 
justice requires the creation of certain values which are held in common. 
The normative facts are the core elements of juridical life; they are 
the components of law. Law is not a set of abstract rules which can be 
examined piece by piece in a legal laboratory. Law is more than this . 
1Ibid., P• 119. 
2Loc. cit . 
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Underneath are those elements ~ch are ~t once more concrete and more 
objective than rules of law: these are the normative facts".l 
In sum, the authority ot law reate on certain common values de-
rived fran the community and of necessity binding .. th.e community together, 
in other words establlihing justice. These values are translated into 
law; they are the components of law alth.ough the law is the more fo~al, 
logicalized expression of t se basic values. The normative fact raises 
the question of the sourc.e of law. Positive l..aw contains t wo basic 
elements: 1.) the normative fact as the source of its obligatory charac-
ter and 2) its actual exi1tence as the guarantee of its real effectiveness 
as a rule. 2 Gurvitch reject• the popular n tion that law rests o 
custom, juridical practice, convention and precedence. He says it i 
necessar.y to go below and find the sources of the "sources". Hence 
there are in his terminologr primary .sources and secondary sources. The 
former would be the no~tive facts; the latter would include the leYel 
of infor.zal law, e.g., custom and convention plus the formal expression 
of law itself. "rhe primary sources are the normative facts which unite 
authority and effective guarantees. Hence ~at were once considered the 
sources of law become the 'techniquea 1 for implementing and stating the 
normative facts.n3 
These seconda~ sources are relatiYe and tentative in character. 
They do not have the stability of the primary level. The dialectical 
relationship between the two levels gives law its continuity on the one 
2Ibid. I P• 133. 3~., P• 134. 
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hand and its flexibility on the other. 
However Gurritch finds it unnecessary that the primary level 
express itself solely thr.ough secondary means. He distinguishes, there-
fore, between formal positive law (which includes every type of means 
through which the normative fact may be channeled) and intuitive 
positive law, which is a .direct and immediate. apprehension of the 
nonnative fact without recourse to the mediary level.1 This leads 
logic~ to a considerati n of natural law. 
i v. Natural Law. 
Gurvi tch defines natural law as ltthat law libi.ch, grounded in the 
innermost nature of man or of society, is infiependent of convention, 
legislation or other _institu'ti nal devices"· 2 The principle of natural 
law tries to find a solution to the persistent problem of the relation-
ship between the ideal an the real. 
The problema which it [aatural law] r .aisea are a old as the 
earliest speculation regarding lawJ fo_r it is a renecti of 
. the antinomies inherent in .the realm of jurisprudence itself, 
wherein ideal norm is confronted with the deYiationa of reality, 
apri rism ltd. th empiricism, autonoJI.Y. with heterono1111, stability 
of the established order with the ~c of moral progress, 
justice with securit;r, ideal with s c.ial.. necessit3 and immobile 
organization with t~e elastic continuit;r f life. 
Natural law has taken many forms to deal with these critical 
questions. It haa been seen as a metacultural . ethic for law as a whole, 
or the "a pri r.i element antecedent to all law"lJ:; or the ideal source of 
law providing the constant test for positive law. Others have seen 
1Lri~e •• • , p. 135-136. 
2"Natural Law" in the J?ncyc.lopedia of Social Sciences, II, 284. 
3toc. cit. 4toc. cit. 
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natural law as "the invariant rules of law in contrast with the 
changing",l or a species of autonomous law which is detached frcm the 
positive realm and contains its own verification; finally, as a spontane-
ous law "differentiated by its living and organic properties from the . 
law promulgated in advance by the state or its agenta".2 
Gurvitch inquires whether there can be a natural law. His answer 
is negative. Social reality contains certain antinomies, certain con-
flicta which are real and undeniable. ftThe natural law theorists have 
resolved all the antinomies contained in the juridical sphere by trans-
posing these contradictions into an entire~y detached sphere."3 This 
merely begs the question. !he real goal must be to do away with every 
type of artificial abstraction. The only .way to do this, suggests 
Gurvitch, is to bring idea and fact into some kind of synthesis. 
A purely autonomous law .is a contradiction in terms. If there is 
any correspondence between ~laims and duties, this means a common value 
has been agreed upon in a given social. milieu, and from that value has 
sprung a law which has validity and , authori~y. Hence "if a law is 
effective in the life of a totality, this means .its purely no~iative 
character has been destroyed". 4 In more explicit terms : 
The law cannot seek to serve justice, which demands the esta-
bliahment of security and peace without becoming positive. 
A purell autonomous law is no longer a law, but a moral 
postulate, an opinion on the . law, rising from a poi%t of view 
concerning the moral ideal, but not the law itself. 
~~erience Juridisue. • • z. P• 103. 2Loc. cit. 
~:92erience Juridisue. • . , P• ll6 4toc. cit. 
5Loc. cit. 
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If justice is the attempt to establish order, security and peace, 
or simply the making of a society, and such an order is realized by 
instituting an equilibrium between claims and duties of all persons in 
the social whole, then this particular_ type of "equilibrium" is only 
viable for a given social milieu. Natural law as an abstract theor,y 
floating above such particular and peculiar contingencies is irrelevant; 
it cannot exist as law since law, to be law, must be effective . 
qurvitch's analysis of natural law. has been attacked frequently. 
His position was introduced in L'idee . He ans.wers his critics in 
L'!!eerience juridique~ His argument denies the possibility of 
identifying justice and natural law. Seeing natural law as purely 
transcendent law, synonymous with justice is attempting to make it 
a criterion for judgment . This is a contradiction in terms. 2 A law 
to be effective must function within the domain of the empirical, within 
a concrete social milieu. Natural law fails to do this. Justice is the 
mid-point between the moral ideal and the real . According to Gurvitch 
justice is also the substance of all law. Law, it must be remembered, 
seeks to realize justice . Justice and natural law are never the same. 
It is impessible to deduce "from a logical categor,y the object which 
it constitutes"· 3 Justice f aila to aene as the basis for judging 
let~ PP• 10.3-137 • 
2E;xperienee juridi<pe ••• , P• 116. 
Jrbid. 1 P• 118. 
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existing law since "it is the constitutive e~ement of all law".1 
Gurvitch uses the following analogy: 
One cannot decide if a chair is good or baQ by applying the 
logical categor.y of the substance of .which the bject is made. 
It is evident one can criticize and judge existing law according 
to a moral ideal. One can say that this law is moral.lJ' better 
than another, but that is precisely' because the moral is 
different from the law and one is beyond tbe categories of both 
law and justice. 2 
Natural law theor.y creates an artificial abyss between what is 
called natural law and positive law or the ideal and the empirical. 
The three suggested answers for bridging this gap lead to difficulty. 
The first affirms that natur.al law is the superior of the two. This 
results in anarchy, on the one hand, since each person has the right to 
decide when a particular juridical regulation is against his conception 
of natural law; on the other hand, if one judgeB a particular social 
group, such as the church, possesses a superior positive law, then it 
is free to interpret the natural. lav as. it sees fit. This becaues a 
form of collectivist anarchy. 
The second answer a.ffir.ms that positive law is superior to natural 
law. This leads to the conclusion that positive law alwaya can do that 
which "is permitted by natural law,; but even more, it is permitted to do 
those things which are condemned by natural law. 113 Natural law is 
reduced to a nonentity in such a system. 
The third "solution" recognizes that each order of law i equal to 
the other. This would lead to an impossible impasse since there would be 
no third order of law to arbitrate between natural law and positive law 
~c. cit. 2r.oc. cit. ~x;perience juridique. . • , p. 129. 
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when conflicts would arise.1 
Gurvitch therefore rejects natural law because of the impossible 
problema it poses. He points out that there are those theorists of natu-
ral law who would relevatize it by putting it into different categories 
according to time and place. Harry Emerson Fosdick's aphorism is 
recalled here: 'The eternal truths must be put in changing categories." 
Yet this would give to natural law an almost infinite variation, while 
recalling its supposed immutability and its entirely a priori character. 
2 Gurvitch asks, "what are some fundan~ntal rules of natural law?" When 
one begins to examine these so-called rules, he soon discovers they are 
based firmly "on the authority of a given social milieu making them 
actually rules of positive law. The only difference is that these 
normative facts are expressed in an immediate and intuitional way with-
out going through certain formal means-'1.3 Often natural law is contused 
with this intuitional positive law. All the concrete, particular rules 
supposedly included in it are really dogmatiz~d, intuited positive laws 
which have validity only in the social milieu of the-particular theorist. 
Remember the role of justice is to establish order, security and 
peace. Who is to say such a social order ctoes not exist among the 
Dahomeans, for instance, who sacrifice the most beautiful members of the 
clan to placate their gods? It is always necessary to see the particular 
expression of justice within its own setting. Failure to do this leads 
1 Loc. cit. 3~., p. 128. 
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to a new expression of arbitrariness.1 
In effect, Justice provides only a tentative reconciliation 
of conflicting equivalent moral val ues; it is a mobile and 
unstable equilibrium, infinitely d7namic and changing. 2 
The idea of justice, concludes Gurvitch, ia so Tariable it is 
impossible to use this as the universal criterion by which to judge 
empirical, positiTe law, even if it were admissible to assume that 
justice is a metacultural ideal. 
v. The Juridical f!ixPerience. 3 
The previous discussions on the idea of social law including the 
nature of law, justice 1 the normative fact and natural law have set 
the stage for a genera~ overview of juridical experience as conceived 
by Gurvitch. 
A fundamental notion tbrougnout his presentation is the concept of 
reality. There is an irreducible reality to every form of experience. 
This makes it possible to stud1" morals, law, religion. All such 
experience is divided into two levels: aO the surface level of intel-
lectual renection and construction and, b) the spontaneous or immediate 
level, the ground of all experience. 
Juridical reality contains then a conceptual structure, including 
certain provisions to reduce the conflict of various competing interests. 
Underneath these secondary features are the intuitive acts of recog-
nition. The juridical experience is a complex of these ingredients. 
1 . 2__ Ibl.d., pp. 120-121. -:Ibid., p. 120. 
J.:rhe writer is indebted to Rene Toulemont 'a summany of this material 
in his volume previously cited. See especially pages 78-80. 
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The juridical. subject is always collective. True, an individual 
can promulgate the law, as Pharoah from his throne or a factory owner 
from his oak-paneled offic.e. However the ~aw which he pranu.l.gates or 
announces was the product of a community, a collectivity. 
Moreover, it is on!7 by a collect~Yity that a normative tact caa 
be grasped md be the source of authority. This is linked with. the need 
for social order, the content of justice. In turn justice must be 
established in the common values, the normative facts, which are intu-
ited. by a living cOJlll!Umi ty. These values become the basis for the 
claima and duties of each person. Justice is the balance of these 
claims and duties. Such an equilibrium results .in a social order. The 
law seeks to establish justice, to provide the construction or the means 
b;y which securit,y, peace and unity may be acquired by tb.e camnonwealtb. 
In SUilllllal7= "a) the individual can promulgate the law as does the 
collectivity; b) only a collectivity can create the law, but c) the 
juridical given which results from this o.an be individual as well as 
collective.~ This latter step eans the result may be an individual 
law in accordance with Gurvitch's notion of contractual or coordinatiTe 
law as distinguished !rom integrative law. However, to be more precise, 
individual law ia. never purely individual. It implies the imperative-
attributive relationship which is part .anQparcel of the normative facts 
whether those facts be the products of the integrative community or of 
relations witn others. 
lsociologie et pluralisme. • • , p. 19. 
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Juridical experience is fraught with antinomies and conflicts. 
This leads at once to its complexity and its pluralism. 
The antinomic character of juridical eJq>erience has another 
spect which distinguishes it from other Eaperience, also 
antinomic in character, that is • • • conflicts surge fortn 
at the very interior of each immediately perceived given. 
In each of these • • • an unrelenting conflict occurs between 
the infinite and the finite, the irrational and the rational, 
the individual and the general, quality and quantity, the 
moral and the logical, the dynamic and the static, the creative 
and the rigid, all these tensions forming the very essence 
of the spiritual data of juridical experience.! 
In the midst of this conflict canes juridical experience as the 
arbiter. It affirms both the ideal and the sensate. Juridical experi-
ence sees the two as equal. To recognize the existence of specific 
juridical experience permits the researcher to grasp the reality of law. 
Law is related to moral experience since it is comprised of justice; the 
reality of law finds its expression in the intuitive ana formal avenues 
of positive law. Yet the specific juridical experience cannot be identi-
fied with either the underl.J'in.g value realm. or the purely sensible. In 
Gurvitch's words: 
While the given reality of moral experience has a character 
which is ideal, the reality of law grasped by the juridical 
experience is intermediary between the realm of sensible facts 
and the ideal world; the juridicaLuperience, being a mid-
point between the sense experience and the experience of the 
spiritual, has for its basic data neither ideal values nor 
the facts donated by the senses but certain normative facts, 
certain seDBe facts which incarnate by their very existence 
certain values.2 
~erience juridique. • • , p. 64. 
2Ibid., PP• 17-18. 
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Gurvitch e:x:plairul the. law is an .intemediary between the ideal 
or moral and the logical, between the creative impulse itself and the 
stable system which produces continui.ty. Law operates between the 
purely quantitative and the qualitative, between the strictly individu-
alized and the universal; in sum, the juridical experience is the mid-
point between the moral experience and the logical ideas which define 
and delimit. To repeat, the task of the juridical experience is that 
of a go-between, an arbiter, a builder of equilibria, a means for 
establishing justice. 
Obviously such a task eans these equilibria will vary according 
to the differeDt social milieux. As Gurrl.tch often states, there are 
varying equilibria within a give society, withixl a particular totality. 
This then, is a radical pluralism, the direct result .of Gurvitcb's 
radical empiricism. This pluralism is .inherent in the juridical 
experience. Basically this pluralism. can be traced to two main sources~ 
a) the plurality which results from the spiritual data of juridical 
experience, namelt, the diversity of juridic.al values, "the multi-
plicity of aspects under which is lived the idea of justice in all the 
richness of its infinite totality";1 and b) the irreducible pluralit7 
of the centers of juridical experience resulting in a plurality of 
juridical orders, each of which must be taken into consideration. 
The question remains as to how this pluralism is handled. GurYitch 
makes several helpful distinctions: first, the depth of juridical 
~xperience juridique. • • , p. 77. 
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experience can be separated between the organized law and the spontane-
ous law. In other words the mode of expressing the normative facts can 
be either direct or through formal means. The former is intuitive 
positive law; the latter is formal positive law. These two distinctions 
intersect each other but in no w~ does Gurvitch identify intuitive 
positive law with the spontaneous level of law or the formal law with 
the organized plane. 
It is wrong to think that a technical process necessary to 
state a law needs to have an organization thereby implying 
that spontaneous or unorganized law can only be expressed 
b,y direct intuition. Many technical processes do not require 
an organization, e.g., custom, precedent, codes, programs, 
etc. Stated by these unorganized formal processes, unorgan-
ized law becomes a formal positive law and thereby remains 
unorganized.l 
Second, there is the distinction between the normative facts 
derived from a fusion in the totality and those arising from the 
"relations with the other". This distinction helps to explain the 
opposition between individual and social law. At the most profound 
level of juridical life, the level of normative facts, there are two 
types of facts which are juxtaposed: the individual and the integrative. 
The first type describes the intuitive acts which remain apart and 
affirm an interdependent relationship; the second type sets forth the 
intuitive acts leading t o a participation of all in one and the same 
act.2 Gurvitch upholds the priority of the latter over the former. 
lrbid., p. 133. See also pp. 136-139 in L'idee du droit social. 
2Exparience juridique •• • , P• 74. 
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Personal values belong to the individual type, transpersonal values to 
the law of ccmununion. Commutative justice becomes the essential eJq>ression 
of the former, distributive justice of the latter. However, the inte-
grative form rises above both commutative and distributive justice in 
its support of transpersonal values, values which are both subjective 
and. objective, both individual and universal.. The dialectic is once 
again present. The tension is reso~ved by accepting it and showing 
the principle of mutuality. One other type completes the corpus of law. 
This one has a mixed character. It is the law of domination, a per-
version of social law. The perversion ccmes from its reliance on a 
subject-object dichot~, best illustrated in &a absolute monarch or a 
patronizing factory owner. T se three forms of law, then, become the 
system of law: 1) social law or the law of integration; 2) individual 
law or interindividual1 intergroupal. law; and .3) subordinative law or 
the law of domination. 
Gurvitch states repeatedly that in these distinctions he does not 
in any way mean to suggest that one type is superior to the other forms. 
He has been criticized for this seeming lapse in his claim to objec-
tivity. Certain critics have declared the spontaneous., unorganized law 
appears to be favored by Gurvitch. He re.f'u.tes this with vigor. The 
spontaneous comm1njty subjacent to the demoDratic society can be good 
or bad. This is ~ democracy must continue to place a great emphasis 
on education. The law of integration is no better than the law of 
coordination. It is necessar,y to have coordinative law in order that 
the external relationship• of the subjects of a community are regulated. 
HI have always sought to show these two kinds of ~aw, integrative and 
coordinative, as irreducible to each other; they are of equal value, 
hence spontaneous social law does not have priority over individual law 
on any scale of value. al They are both essential. 
When Gurvitch uses the words perYersion or deformed to describe 
subordinative law, he does not make a value judgment. He merely seeks 
to qualify the distinction. History shows subordinative law has at 
certain periods been the best so~ution for particular situations. Who 
is to s~ that a Nkrumah is not the best solution for Ghana or a Nehru 
for India? They both wiel considerable power and would fit this 
category of subordinative. ~aw. Certain periods of marti.U. law are 
essential in the life of every nation. A president of a democracy 
during war must asswne such powers. Subordinative law, then, is mere]J 
a descriptive term for certain types of rule. 
There is some criticism or Gurvitch 1s category of intuitive law. 
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It would appear he has entered the back door of natural law. He counters 
that this cbarge is unfounded. Intuitive law can be detrimental to a 
totality. For instance the intuited law of the whites in the Southern 
United States would maintain racial segregation. The formal law, on the 
other hand, .has . expresse.d the normative facts of the entire nati n in 
a much more rational and moral way. 
The final problem or juridical experience concerns the pluraliam 
of values. 'What is the principle of their unity? Gurrl.tch asserts 
~erience juridique ••• , p. 75. 
unity is immanent to the juridical values and groups which engemier 
them. In the case of values, they cease to exist if they are separated 
from their parent groups. Each group, if it exists as a particular 
entity, does so within the wider context of the totality which en-
compasses it. This principle can be seen as a series of concentric 
circles moving from the smallest _social unit out to the widest unity, 
which is the international community in its broadest sense. The 
normative facts of the nation, therefore, can only be real as they 
are made effective within the wider context of the international com-
munity. All of these circles of law or, more specifically 1 groupings 
engendering law, are dependent upon each other. In this sense, the 
unity is implicit within the multiplicity. The principle of unity is 
integration: how well are the values integrated into the task of 
justice; how well is each group integrated into the next wider social 
unit.1 
vi. The Kinds of Social Law. 
Four general ways are cited by Gurvi tch for distinguishing among 
the different kinds of social law. 
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l) Subjective social law and objective social law. SubjectiTe law 
concerns the ensemble of claims and rights belonging to the complex 
collective personalities, the specific subjects of social law. Objective 
social law deals with tbe whole gamut of institutions (normative facts) 
and rules which make up a juridical system. This distinction takes into 
consideration the imperative (objective) -attributive (subjective). 2 
1L1idee. • ., PP• 47-48. 
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SubjectiYe social law can be expressed at the organized level since the 
division of social power in an organization is iD reality a consignment 
of rights and hence of duties. This subjective type can also be 
eJtpressed in certain unorganized ways such as in the right to join or 
leave a group or assuming the right to act for a group in a crisis. 
2) Spontaneous or unorganized so~ial law and organized social law. 
The spontaneous level is absolutely essential to all organized ex-
pressions.1 
3) Particular social law an common social law. This distinction 
points to the superiority of the communal social law which seeks to 
serve the general interest over and above the particular social law 
which is "ethnocentric" in its expression. 2 
4) The relationship of social law and the state. These distincti ns 
are among the most interesting and practical. 
a) Pure and independent social law - Pure means that it is 
able te integrate its members without recourse to unco ditional coercion. 
Independent means that when it comes into conflict with the state it is 
equal or superior to it. 3 How is this type of social law expressed? 
These examplea appear in contemporary politics: 
i. ) ~ternational law. This is by far tile clearest example 
of independent and pure social law. It is pure because it does not 
possess the means of unconditional restraint. Perhaps the United Nations 
might have possessed this power right after World War II if 1 t had not 
1Ibid., P• 49. 2Ibid., P• 51. 3rbid., pp. 53-54. 
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followed the suggestion of the United States concerning the control of 
atomic power. No doubt an organization like the United Nations is 
independent, since its obligatory for.ce (llQmative fact) is inde-
pendent of the individual states 1 whims; this obligatory force canes 
from the totality which it integrates. 
il.) The social law of the suprafunctional, un rganized 
national community. This level of law is essential if an "informal" 
legal structure exists to fUnction as the basis for all formal mani-
festations, especially the law of the state. 
In our opinion this independent and pure social law is the 
only source upon which to base ••• the claimed supremacy 
of the unorganized law of the national community over all 
other juridical orders 'Which it includes, particularly 
that of the state.l 
iii.) Economic law. Gurritch obsenes that the economic 
order is becoming more aud more a separate society over against the 
state. It often arises outside the law of the state. Moreover each 
member is free to leave the economic organization as he pleases. 
There is no dependence upon ultimate coercion in order to realize 
integration.2 
iv.) Ecclesiastical. law. This law develops outside the 
state, and in certain periods of history has been superior to that of 
the state. Excommunication is seldom considered a for.m of physical 
coercion. Gurvitch has maintained in more recent works that excom-
munication is a conditional restraint only to those wno are outside 
lr.• id.ee. • • , p. 56. 
~bid., PP• 56-59. 
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the Church. For those who are within the Church this has the fore~ of 
an unconditional section, since they are threatened with the loss of 
salvation.1 
Thi~ pure and independent social law, however, never loses its 
positive legal character. It always relates to certain particular, 
given social realities; it seeks to realize certain objective values. 
To make the distinction between pure and independent is in no way an 
attempt to reassert a new concept of natural law. 
~ Pure social law in the service of the state. At this level 
the distinction between private and public law is operative. In case of 
conflict with state law the pure social law becomes subordinate. This 
then is the "private law" which sutmi.ts to public law. However the 
auton~ of social law remains intact. It retains its obligator,y 
character. The normative facts at the base still obtain. ".Pure social 
law, considered here as private law, remains as a variation of the 'law 
f the society' opposed to the state. "2 It collaborates with the pure 
and independent social law b,y limiting the state through the formation 
of countervailing juridical powers. Examples of this type are many: 
i.) The social law of particular groupings. Athletic teams, 
an orchestra, a club, a family or political party are just a few out of 
many. These groups find it impossible to be independent, since they must 
depend upon a common social law for their existence. They submit to the 
1
La vocation actu.elle de la sociologie, 1950, p. 309. This was 
quoted in a footnote in Toulemont, Sociologie et pluralisme dialectique, 
PP• 89-90. 
2Ibid., P• 90. 
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state in order that particular interests do not abuse their rigbts.1 
ii.) The law of "federalized 11 property. This concerns a 
special kind of law derived from such groups as corporations, mutual 
insurance canpanies, and similar types in which the property belongs 
at once to the totality and to the individual members. This law 
incorporates both individual and social. law. It is both CaJIPlex 
collective person and an ensemble of individuals. The law's fWlction 
is to resolve the problem of the relations between the individual and 
the collectivity concerning the ownership of property. If the state 
were to take over the sole control of property, this would lead to a 
denial of private property. 
However, the state retains the largest control of this law since 
particular groupings often assert their Oil!l interests to the detriment 
of others. The state is the only organ which can maintain a certain 
equilibrium among "claims and duties". 
c) The social law annexed by the state but maintaining its 
autonomy. This type holds a position between pure social law and the 
compressed social law serving the state. "Annexed social law is an 
autonomous law of integration subordinate to state law and directe 
towards the goals of the state."2 However, its autonomy and ebli-
gatory force are preserved. This annexed social law is a separate 
entity from the state. It is more than any mere organ of the state. 
The point is that the social law's "purity" is violated since it no 
longer depends on conditional restraint to maintain integration but 
~'idee ••• , pp. 63-64. 2 Ibid., p. 69. 
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uses the unconditional coercion of the state for this purpose. 
Nevertheless annexed social law performs certain functions within the 
state which challenge centralization. It is a public law, given a 
privileged position by the state. This law's autono~ always remains 
quite tenu.ous. It depends upon the state involTed since the state can 
intervene into the internal concerns of. this or that social gr uping and 
regulate it for its own enos; a marked change from pure social law is 
noted.1 Privileged public law tnen occupies the mid-position between 
effective autonomy and capitulation to the law of the state. Examples 
of this type are numerous: the law of local self-government, e.g., 
county, city and state (how else can one explain the relative inde-
pendence of these local governments, the obligatory force which their 
courts hold, the s;yzstem of elections and their openness to the popu-
lation unless one understand this concept of annexed social law?) 2 the 
autonomous law of certain artisan groups. taken from history, such as 
the guilds of the Middle Ages; .3 the public law of such groups which 
control mines, forests and water, and organizations of social security;4 
the law of decentralized public institutions, e.g., the post office, 
hospitals and state universities;5 the disciplinary law effectivelY 
applicable to the autonomous groupings which have been annexed by the 
state. The British Parliament provides a good example of a body which 
retains its own methods for maintaining discipline. Two final examples 
of annexed social law are experts or professional groups which serve 
1~, p. 7.3. 2Ibid., PP• 74-75. Jrbid.., P• 76. 
4Ibid., pp. 76-78. 5Ibid., PP• 78-80. 
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the state and ethnic minorities within a given terri torial state. 
d) The social law compressed to fit the state system of law. 
The essential mark of state ~aw is it.s. monopoly over coercive power. 
This does not give it abso~ute sovereignty. It enjoys a relative 
political sovereignty limited qy the deeper levels of social law.1 
Specifically this limitation comes from the various orders of social 
law Which undergird aAd englobe the state as a territorial grouping. 2 
These, too, have a sovereignty which cannot be denied. "State law ••• 
only becomes a law of integration as a. democracy. n) "When the consti-
tutional law of a state is bombarded by the unorganized social law of 
the objective subjacent community, the liaison is. made with this under-
lying social law which is condensed and .introduced into the lif'e of 
the state through the latter's monopoly of coercive power. "If this 
penetration does not take place, i.f the organization of the state is 
more or less independent of the int.rastructure or the subjacent poli-
tical comanmity, it results in a subordinative order of lew and not in 
a social law.n4 Briefly, wben the state reflects the infrastructure, 
designated as collaborat~on, and becomes this style of association 
itself, the fact that it controls coercive power will in no way detract 
from its dependence upo an underlying social law. 
A state is democratic when the state law incorporates a condensed 
version of social law. AJJ a juridical syst it exists in a veritable 
~;;;;....;' id .. · -~-e-•--.•.-;..•., p. 8). 
3Loc. cit. 
2Ibid., p. 84 
4Ibid., P• 85. 
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sea of law. The state and society are still juxtaposed. This con-
frontation presents various persistent problems, but they can be 
resolved if one keeps in mind this conception of condensed social law. 
i.) The principle of sovereignty and the idea of social law. 
This does not mean general will as Rousseau contended in his Social 
Contract. Nor can this be resolved by any theory of representation. 
The will of the people can change so readily; there is no way to put it 
into general terms, since it has to be expressed as a ''mandate•. This 
places the will within too defined an enclosure. Sovereignty resides 
in the unorganized and transpersonal collectivity. ''The principle of 
popular sovereignty is really the need to base the rational and organ-
ized superstructure of the state on its objective and unorganized 
infrastructure.nl 
In summary, "the principle of popular sovereignty affirms the 
sovereignty of the social law of the subjacent political communit;y over 
its superimposed organization, the state". 2 Such a principle means the 
electorate will use every technique available to open up the organs of 
the state to the penetration of this law and spirit which reside in the 
subjacent political cammunity. 3 When this happens, democracy becomes a 
reality. 
ii.) The problem of responsible action by the adminjstrative 
agencies of the state. Each agency of government bas certain duties to 
perform. What of its role and status? Does each agency have a totally 
l._rbid., p. 88. 2rbid. .3rbid. J p. 89. 
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dependent role vis a vis the state or is it the possessor of a certain 
juridical personality of its own? Gurvitch declares these agencies of 
the state are partial persons which are integrated into the total 
complex collective person of the state.1 
iii.) The subjective, public rigbts and. the idea of social 
law. The problem here concerns the declaration of cert ain human rights 
based on religious principles or natural law and the total lack of a 
juridical construction to make these rights part and parcel of pesitive 
law. As in the problem relating to the agencies. of the state, if one 
conceives the state as a simple unity, absorbing the multiplicity of its 
members, the state alone determines what are the rights of man. If, on 
the other hand, the state is seen as an ensemble of juridical relation-
ships between the citizens, then each relationship becomes equally 
determinative, thus eliminating the empty concept of public right and 
the rigid unity of the state. The solution is "to see these subjective 
public rights as subjective social rights, rights of participation in a 
whole, this whole taking a direct part itsel.t' in the internal juridical 
relations without presenting itself to its members as a completely 
distinct subject". 2 These rights which are derived from such a relation-
ship intertwine and fom a systematic unity within the whole . They add 
to the characteristics of the complex collective personality of the 
state. Gurvitch reasserts here as in the previous problem the essential 
dialectical tension between the individual and the collective. This 
will be an important feature of his sociology. It is what he terms the 
lrbid., PP• 89-90. 2:rbid., P• 91. 
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"reciprocity of perspectives". 
iv.) The problem of federalism and the idea of social law. 
Again the theme appears. It is neither a concept of the federalist 
state as a simple coordinative order between the state and its members 
nor the subordinative arrangement of a superior power dominating uni-
laterally the members of the state. 
The essence of the federalist state, of all federations in 
general, even of confederation, cannot be reduced to a purelf 
coordinative arrangement nor an absorption in the unity of 
the state, but the essence beloigs to the idea of integration 
of the members into a totality. 
This means a perfect balance is set up between the individual members 
and the totality. In such an arrangement the proper personality of the 
individual parts is protected and safeguarded. Residual powers are 
left to the individual states. On the other hand, the individual parts 
cannot quit the whole. They are indissolubly linked to the whole. They 
are interdependent. More than this, they are held together by an uncon-
ditional coercive power. But such a power does not stand alone, naked 
and unsheathed. It is based upon that popular sovereignty of the sub-
jacent coommni ty. When the state falls to find its essence from this 
prilnary source, it ceases to exist. This is the basic substance of the 
federalist principle. It is a logical outcome of Gurvitch1s theory. 
It is the ideal political system, as he sees it. 
One problem remains to be considered. This concerns the relation-
ships of social law and the state. When positive law and the state are 
seen as synonymous, difficulty occurs. 
1Ibid., p. 92. 
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One confuses the normative facts and tbe technical processes 
for stating these facts when the state and positive law are 
seen as identical. This goes on to affirm that state law 
delegates its authority to all the formal sources of law. 
It is erroneous to give to the formal way of expressing the 
normative fact a dependence upon state law over other formal 
means. Final.ly, ••• one confuses the guarantee of real 
effectiveness of a juridical rule, which is indispensable 
to its relevancy, with constraint and particularly with 
unconditional coercion of the state. But this effectiveness 
is guaranteed by the diverse nonnative facts which undergird 
all law, and this guarantee is absolutely different from the 
arrangement of sanctions, a fortiori certain unconditional 
sanctions which presuppose the existence of the state.l 
Quite clearly, positive law does not depend upon the state for its 
existence. What then is the relationship between positive law and the 
state? Gurvitch begins by suggesting what that relationship is ~: 
1) The state cannot be elevated above law. This is an "imperialist 
conception 11 of the state. 2) The state cannot be identified with the 
law. This is the error made by Kelsen and others. 2 3) The state 
cannot be seen independent of the law and law independent of the state. 
Gierke was wont to make this error. 4) The state cannot be seen as 
inferior to the law, which was the misconception of Duguit. S) Lastly, 
the state caiUlot be interpreted as only partially intersecting the 
world of law. Even the most autocratic type of political system is 
founded on a law. Hence there is only one positiTe way to see this 
relationship between the state and positive law. 
~'id6e •• • , p. 151. 
2see Gurvitch's treatment of Kelsen is his Le temps present et 
l'idee du droit social, Part I, Section II, Chapter II. Cited in a 
footnote in L'idee •• • , p. 151. 
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The state must be considered as a defined circle of law 
inscribed in an infinitely larger circle of non-political 
law. In the juridical life, the state is as a an~, deep 1 lake in the immense sea of law ~ch encloses it on all sides. 
Gurvitch uses the following diagram2 to illustrate this dialectical 
relationship between the state and positive law. 
The State 
1L1 ·d ' 1 ee. • ., p. 152. 
~c. cit. 
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In summary, this whole discussion on social law can be viewed 
graphically with this concluding diagram. £r L'idee du droit social:1 
Pure and Independ-
ent Social Law 
Pure social law 
but under the con-
trol of the state. 
LAW IN GENERAL 
LAW IN GENERAL 
lrbid.' p. 153. 
Subordinative 
of the non-
democratic 
state. 
87 
This diagram shows how the law of the state is indeed a part of 
the "larger sea of general law". In terms of social law, one can see 
readily that the state is related to social law only at certain junctures. 
Pure and independent social law is diTorced from the unconditional 
coercive power of the state altogether. Moreover, non-democratic 
states are not based on social law at all, even the "condensed" 
variety, but on a law of domination or subordination. State law and 
social law only intersect, therefore, in certain specific cases. 
This concludes the description of Gurvitch's juridical phase. 
The emphasis in his work shifted after this long preoccupation with 
the law. However, the roots of his sociological theor.y are found here. 
This will be patently clear in the chapters to follow. 
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2. The Sociological Phase 
These preoccupations with the concept of social law and especial~ 
its relationship to the state led Gurvitch to make some assessments of 
the political scene . He attempted to correlate his sociological analyses 
with his strong political convictions about the superiority of the 
decentralized planned economy based on democratic structures. He 
approved of the factory councils and representative councils which 
held a firm hand over the economy. He considered that the regulatory 
and disciplinary power of management operative in most factories and 
enterprizes was based on a ''perverted social law". As described 
previously, such a subordinative system was submissive to an arti-
ficially derived individual law of property which "by itself failed 
to serve juridically as the basis for any social power 11 • 1 In his 
L'exp~rience juridique, Gurvitch includes two long discussions on 
socialism and democracy. These were written in the period between the 
two World Wars , but his introduction to these chapters in the book 
brings his thought up to date. 2 
Gurvitch states, 111 had to distinguish more clearly in my work 
between value judgments and descriptive statements . 113 This he did in 
1944, at New York, when he made a deliberate effort to put down his 
ideas for a program of political-social action in his Declaration of 
Social Rights . 4 His goal was to write a work which would inspire the 
41on itineraire. . . , p . 12 . Grhe third part , pp . 235-296. 
~1on itineraire ••• , p . 12. 
4New York: Editions de la Maison Francaise , 1944, and Paris: 
Vrin , 1946. 
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fomulators of the Fourth Republic's constitution. He comments, "Alas 
in vainl However, a beginning can be observed in the Popular Feder-
alist Republic of Yugoslavia during these recent years. nl 
Obviously Gurvitch raised some important questions in his two 
theses on the idea of social law. Some of these questions were socio-
logical and philosophical as well as doctrinal. His theory of the 
normative facts as the source and authority for all law came under 
special attack. Hence he felt he had to answer his critics. This he 
did in L • exp~rience juridique. 
Other interests attracted him. After he defended his thesis and 
received his doctorate, he taught for several years as a professor at 
the College SeVigne. He also taught sociology as a replacement at the 
University of Bordeaux. In 1935, he followed Maurice Halbwachs at the 
University of Strasbourg as a professor of sociology. His interests 
now were focused almost entirely on general sociology. He began his 
analysis of general sociology in a surprising manner by undertaking a 
study of a subject which had long fascinated him, namely, the relation-
ship between the sociology of the moral life and moral philosophy. This 
is one of the clearest examples of how the European approach differs so 
widely from the empirically oriented American school. •If it's logical, 
it's true," is the way a professor friend somewhat derisively described 
European sociology's philosophical tradition. On this subject of moral 
philosophy, Gurvitch published a small volume entitJ.ed Moral Theorz and 
lap. cit., P• 12. 
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the Science of Morals.1 He tried to show the possibility of a fruitful 
cooperation between the two disciplines. Both have as their domain of 
stud;y, moral experience. Such experience has an irreducible reality 
which calls for uniquely characteristic methods to study these phenome-
na. Moral experience is full of variations and surprises. Such experi-
ence contains the relationships of duties, values and creative freedom. 
Such experience is studied b,y moral philosophy. Sociology on the other 
hand, describes the infinite variations of this moral experience. Phi-
losophy 1 s domain is the interior life of this eJCperience. Sociology 
tries to understand the role of this experience in social reality. It 
does this b.1 establishing a typol gy of moral experiences which is then 
applied to given social milieux at once integrating this experience with 
the total social phenomena. 
In 1948, Gurvitch says that while preparing the second edition of 
this book, he discovered that he had, without realizing it, linked soci-
ology of the moral life to a particular philosophical position: 
In the first place I had supposed that a person could attain 
the immediate moral experience and secondly, I had admitted 
to a stable hierarchy of the kinds of morality, which accorded 
a pre-eminence to the morality of creative liberty. I 
promised myself therefore to return to this question.2 
In 1938, Gurvitch had published his fir.S"t book dedicated solely 
to sociology, the Essais de sociologie.3 In this collection of essays 
~aris: Presses Universitaires de France, 19,37. A revised edition 
appeared in 1948 and a third edition in 1961. 
~on i tineraire. • • , p. 14. 
-'paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1938. 
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he made for the first time the distinction among microsociology, soci-
ology of groupings and the typology of global societies. This work also 
contained his thesis, latently present in his books on social law, that 
of the reciprocal immanence of the ind~vidual consciences and the 
collective consciences . He designated this b,y the term he borrowed 
from Theodor Litt, reciprocity of perspectives. He. notes, 1~nhappily, 
I committed the error of only developing in detail the microsociological 
typology (in particular, mass, community and communion) without pro-
viding as extended a study of the typ.ology of groupings and global 
societies."l This led to his critics' assertion that he favored the 
microsociological elements as baving the most important position in 
social reality. "In reality, I am inclined to .put the emphasis on the 
.types of global societies, all the while insisting on the dialectical 
tension between all three scales."2 
In his Elements de sociologie juridique, 1940, he tried to spell 
out this necessary dialectic between all three and to give some concrete 
evidence for this t heory. As he moved more and more in the direction of 
being a "full-time 11 sociologist, he made an effort to rid his theory of aey 
philosophical overtones which would belie a particular position. He 
admitted he didn't always succeed in this .effort. The ideal-realist 
position which was borrowed more from l:'ro:udhon than Fichte had a 
remarkable staying power. He asserts he would only be rid of this 
tendency later on. There is a real question as to whether he has ever 
fully succeeded. This will be analy.zed .in. a later critical chapter. 
~on itin~raire •• • , P• 14. 3p aris : Au bier, 19 40. 
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After the armistice and the demobilization of France in 1940, 
Gurvitch had an opportunity to go to the United States. He was invited 
by the New School of Social Research of New York to come there and teach. 
He arrived in New York in mid-October, 1940, knowing scarcely how to 
read English and possessing no facility to speak the language. His 
teaching at the New School was mainly in the area of the history of 
French sociology. The first two years he taught in French. In 1941, 
he participated in the formation of the Ecole Libre des Hautes Etudes 
at New York under the leadership of the French government. Gurvitch had 
the task of heading up the French Institute of Sociology within this 
school. Gurvitch comments that the discussions held under the auspices 
of the Institute were especially influential in his thinking. Both 
American and French sociologists participated. Among the problema 
considered by the persons participating in these meetings was the 
question of the future of France. What would be the social and poli-
tical structure of the Fourth Republic? It was this setting which 
provided the impetus for Gurvitch formulating his own ideas in the 
Declaration of Social Rights, 1944. 
Gurvitch was impressed by American juridical philosophy. Roscoe 
Pound and his school made a real impact on this twice-expatriated scholar. 
It was a result of this confront ation w~th American leaders in sociology 
of law that Gurvitch decided to rework his own sociology of law in a 
more realist position. This effort was published in 1942 as SociolosY 
of Law.1 The content of this volume will be incorporated into later 
~ew York: Philosophical Library, 1942. A revised edition appeared 
in London: Kegan Paul, 1947 and 1953. 
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chapters dealing with the development of his sociological thought . 
At this point Gurvitch's interests and thought were turning in 
other directions . He was becoming increasingly concerned with the rela• 
tionship between empirical research and theory in sociology. Gurvitch 
was struck by the disproportionate amount of descriptive and experimental 
effort among certain elements of the American school of sociology and the 
paucity of scientific results . He was also impressed by the lack of so-
phistication on the part of many American research scholars. They 
appeared to be without any conceptual tools and a general inability to 
distinguish between the important and the accidental . They seemed to have 
an even lesser notion about the right questions to ask . Finall~- he was ap-
palled by the over-use of technical skills, such as surveys, questionnaires 
and statistics, ~ich could only lead to superficial descriptions. This 
necessarily sacrificed every effort at real understanding. Moreover, 
such a reliance on techniques deprived them of coming to grips with 
sociological theory . Certain American approaches to sociology surprised 
him by their lack of substance and depth . It is his feeling that 
empir ical research in sociology has declined in quality during the last 
twenty-five years . It is at present clearly inferior to the classic 
work done by Znaniecki and Thomas in their The Polish Peasant in Europe 
and America (1918-1921) , and that by the Lynds in Middletown and 
Middletown in Transition. It is even of a lesser quality than the work 
of Le Play and his school in France . To fill this void Gurvitch 
suggested a symposium on soci ological theory and its applications in 
the twentieth century. This effort was published in the United States 
in 1946, and in France in 1947, under the title, Twentieth Centm 
Sociology. 1 It was done with the collaboration of WUbert E. Moore 
of Princeton and included contributions from American and European 
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s ciologists. Outside a recognition of the "false problems" inherited 
from the nineteenth century 1 which had handicapped the progress of 
sociology, "this c llection," according to Gurvitch, "has scarcely been 
of value beyond serving as a work for listing in bibliographies I was 
the least satisfied of all with the pr ject."2 
GurTitch returned to France in 1945. He iumed.iately took the 
initiative to organize in 1946, the Centre d'Etudes Sociologiques 
within the framework of the Centre National de. la Recherche Scientifique, 
in the hope that he could make a contribution towards the joining of 
general sociol gical theory and empirical research in France. Gurvitch 
said he counted heavily on the sy-stematic spirit of the French and on 
their precise philosophical training in their youth. 3 This observatioa 
says considerable about the differences in orientation betweea the 
French and American schools. However, Gurvitch continues, 
I was, alas, too optimistic. Though one accepts acme interest.. 
ing public discussions and the three "Weeks of Sociology" which 
were filled with content and good teaching (Industrialisati n 
et technocr atie, 1948, under rq direction, Villes et compagnes, 
1952, led by George Friedman, and Sociologie de la famille 
contemporaine, 1955, under M. Sorre's direction), though one 
Includes several research studies which achieved same success, 
and these efforts resulted in 110rthwhile publications, still the 
Center has failed in realizing this indispensable conjunction 4 between theory and empirical research which sociology so needa . 
lriew York: Philosophical Library, 1946. The French translation, 
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1947. 
~on it.ineraire .•• , p. 16. 3Ibid., p. 17. 4z.oc. cit. 
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Gurvitch left the direction of the Center in 1949. His health 
and pressing responsibilities made it necessary to curtail some of his 
outside activities. He was involved in teaching regular classes at the 
Sorbonne and at the Ecole Practique des Hautes Etudes, to which he had 
been invited in 1948. He decided at this stage in his work to concen-
trate his total effort to the task of bringing theory and empirical 
research into a fruitful relationship. With this goal in mind he helped 
to found in 1946, the Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie. This has 
been one of the most influential sociological journals in France. It was 
with this same purpose that he published his systematic sociological 
theory under the title La vocation actuelle de la sociologie, in 1950.1 
A new revised and expanded edition of this ~ork in two volumes has recently 
appeared. The first volume was published in 1957. It deals with Dif-
ferential Sociology. This contained at last an equal treatment of 
microsociology and macrosociology. 
It is in this work that Gurvitch pushes his .relativism and empiri-
cism to their extreme limits. This results in what he calls dialecti-
cal hyperempiricism. The terminology designates about as concisely as 
possible the nature of his methodology. The components of this dialec-
tical approach include complementarity, mutual implication, ambivalence 
or ambiguity, polarity and reciprocity of perspectives. The dialectical 
tensions are observable among the microsociological types, the types of 
groupings, social classes and the global societies. These tensions 
!paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950, and Volume I of the 
new revised edition, 1957. A third edition has been published in 1963 
along with the first edition of Volume II on problems in general sociology. 
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exist among the depth levels of social reality, the hierarchies of which 
vary with each type of partial or global structure. This dialectic 
occurs among the total social phenomena, the a-structural elements, the 
structures and organizations; the dialectic describes the w~ in which 
sociology, history and ethnology are related to each other. These 
factors give an idea of the dynamic quality of social reality which 
requires an equally cynam.ic approach for its study. Finally, this 
method seeks to achieve an adequate understanding of the phenomena of 
social reality, the necessar,y step to realize certain causal expla-
nations. 'When it seeks causal e:xplanations, sociology will require 
help from history. ~ne of the secrets of cooperation between theory 
and empirical research in sociology is utilizing the very precious 
materials which caae to sociology from history. ul History, on the other 
hand, has need of the findings of sociology. The typol gy of sociology 
is essential for the study of global social structures. Gurvitcb 
declares that this is where the thought of Marx again becomes important 
in his understanding of social reality. 
This same dialectical hyper-empiricism served as a guide for 
Gurvitch's study", Les detenninismes sociaux et liberte bumaine, 1955. 
Here he showed how determinism and freedom interact. This is the re-
lationship between biological and environmental heredity and freedom. 
Gurvitch sought to stu~ sociologicall7 the pathways of freedom as the,y 
~on itineraire ••• , p. 18. On this subject see Gurvitcb's 
t~ontinuite et Discontinuit~ en Sociologie et en Hi~toire", which 
appeared in the Annales, 1957, and WLa Crise de l'Explication en 
Sociologie•, in Cahiers Internationaux de Soc.iologie, XXI, 1956. 
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criss-cross the different soci al frameworks. "The pluralism of social 
determinisms which are always partial and their relative unification in 
the sociological determinism necessary to carry out certain efforts in 
common, change [ as scales of determinism] with each type of global 
society.nl This leaves a large place for human freedom, both in its 
individual and collective expre sions, in social life. Such freedom 
is the source of the unexpected, the unpredictable. In this same work 
Gurvitch confronts the problem of the multiplicity of social time, a 
problem which he t ok up in a public lecture course at the Sorbonne 
during the academic year, 1957-1958. There are a number of types of 
social time. Each global structure or social grouping hierarchizes 
these times according to their character and historical situation. 
During his sojourn in the United States Gu.rvitch gained a particu-
lar interest in the sociology of knowledge. For a long time it had been 
apparent to him that one could not study the sociology of the moral life 
or the sociology of law with sufficient relativism and realism without 
recourse to a study of the sociology of knowledge. Earlier he had been 
impressed by the work of Scheler and Levy-Bruhl in this whole area. 2 
The study of symbols and signa as a means of expression and diffusion 
further enforced his interest in the sociology of knowledge. Ideology 
as a separate concern of Marx had influenced the thought of Karl 
Mannheim. Gurvitch felt forced to follow the same lead. Thus in 
1Mon itineraire •• • , p. 18. 
2
see Max Scheler, Philosophical Perspectives, Oscar Haac, translator 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), Chapter II, "The For.ms of Knowledge and 
Culture", PP• 13-50. 
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1944-1945, he gave a course at Harvard on the Sociology of Knowledge. 
He made a constructive critical ana~sis of all the conceptions formu-
lated up to that time. In the following years the problem was pursued 
further in his public lectures at the Sorbonne and in his advanced semi-
nars at Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes. In several of his publi-
cations he included sections on the Sociology of Knowledge.1 He saw 
the necessity of distinguishing between different kinds of knowledge: 
perceptive knowledge of the external world, knowledge of the "other" 
or of the "We", of groups and societies, common sense knowledge, politi-
cal knowledge, technical knowledge, scientific knowledge, and philo-
sophical knowledge. He showed their functional correlations with the 
various social frameworks. The intensity of th se correlations and the 
hierarchizati n of the kinds of knowledge into a functional framework 
vary according to the types of partial and. gl bal structures. Hence, 
these dichotomies emerge: mystical and ratienal knowledge, intuitive 
an reflective knowledge, speculative and positive knowledge, symbolic 
and adequate knowledge, individual and collective knowledge. 
He described the multiple points of rapport between these forms and 
kinds as they operate within a particular global structure. This is the 
basis for an empirical and concrete study of the problem of the socio-
logy of knowledge. Furthermore, such an approach, Gurvi tch claims, 
1
•La probl~me de la sociologie de la connaissance", Revue Philo-
a hi ue, Part I (Octobre - Decembre, 1957), 494-502; Revue Phil., Part II 
Octobre - Decembre, 1958), 438-451; Revue Phil., Part III (Avril -
Juin, 1959), 145-168; nta probleme de la soc~olegie de la connaissance•, 
Traite de sociologie, ed. Georges Gurvitch (Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1960, II, 103-136. 
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removes sociology of knowledge from any competition with epistemology. 
The sociology of knowledge poses certain questions for epistemology but 
makes no effort to provide a solution, since that is outside its domain. 
Gurvitch once again sees these two disciplines as mutually enriching one 
another; in fact they need each other if they are going to be creative 
and relevant. 
Gurvitch is in the process of completing a book entitled ~ 
Introduction to the ~ociology of Knowledge, which will appear very soon. 
Very interestingly, following these considerations he was led to study 
the phenomena of social classes, the suprafunctional macrocosms of 
groupings which remain as partial structures. The problem of social 
classes was the subject of a public lecture course at the Sorbonne 
during 1952-1953. These lectures served as the corpus of a book, !h! 
Concept of Social Class from Marx to the Present Day.1 
The approach which he followed in his sociology of knowledge took 
him to the sociological study of the moral life. Again, a public lecture 
course at the Sorbonne, 1956-1957, gave him the opportunity to develop 
in detail this subject. He had previously outlined his thoughts in his 
lectures called "Introduction to the ~ociology of the Moral Life~, given 
in 1948. Again he distinguished several kinds of moral life: traditional 
morality, finalistic morality, morality of virtues, judgment after the 
deed, imperative morali~, morality of symbolical and ideal images, and 
creative morality. These kinds of morality are engaged in a much more 
1Paris: Centre de Documentation Universitaire, 1954. 
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profound relationship with social reality than the parallel kinds of 
knowledge. Hence the sociology of the moral life. can establish function-
al correlations between social frameworks and. the different kinds of 
morality on a much larger scale than was possible with the sociology 
of knowledge. The microsociological elements and the non-structured 
groupings are important social frameworks for the analysis of moral life . 
The most concrete and complete study comes from juxtaposing the moral 
life with the social classes and above all the types of global structures. 
This enables the researcher to describe the different scales incorpo-
. 
rating the various kinds of morality as well as describing the changing 
accentuations of the forms of morality, e . g. , rational or mystical, 
intuitive or reflective, rigid or natural, atrophying or expanding, 
strongly followed or defeatist, collective or individual. 
Finally, the sociology of the moral life, in calling for empirical 
research in this area, does in no way enter int occGmpetition with moral 
philosophy. It does propose certain new problems for moral philosophy 
to consider. 
In recent years Gurvitch's publications have foll•wed these general 
patterns delineated in this summary. It was only fitting that he should 
have been chosen by the Presses Universitaires de France to edit the 
two volume symposium by a team of French sociologists. Entitled Trai te 
de sociologie, Volume I appeared in 1958 and Volume II in 196o. The 
format of this symposium follows the general lines of Gurvitch's system-
atic thought . He wrote the sections dealing with the object and method 
lz.aris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
of sociology, the histor,y of sociology, the problems of general socio-
logy (an excellent summar,y of his whole system), the problems o1' the 
sociology of knowledge, problems of the sociology of the moral life, 
problems of the sociology of law, and an introductory statement sug-
gesting the relationship between psychology and sociology. 
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He continues to be active in various sociological organizations in 
France and elsewhere. He participated in the third annual Colloquium 
sponsored by the Association Internationale des Sociologues de Langue 
Fran9aise, held in Geneva in May, 1960. He was chosen to give the 
general conclusions and summary of this conference. The subject of 
these sociologists' meeting was one dear to the heart of Gurvitch 9 
Structures sociales et democratie economique.1 
His most recent book, published in 1962, considers in detail his 
methodology. Its title: Dialectique et sociologie . 2 This will serve 
as the basis for the later chapter here on his approach to sociology. 
His teaching reflects these later trends in his thought. A recent 
course which he offered at the Sorbonne was entitled, 11Sociologie et 
dialectique". He was invited by the International Sociological Associ-
ation to address their meetings in Washington, D. C. on the Sociology of 
Knowledge in September, 1962. He had plans to lecture at Baker Uni-
versity, Baldwin, Kansas, on "Social Determinism and Human Liberty" plus 
giving public lectures on his methodology. He had also accepted invi-
tations to lecture in Canada and Japan, but all these commitments had to 
!Brussels: Free University of Brussels Press, 1961. He is at pre-
sent president of this organization of French language sociologists. 
2Paris: Flammarion, 1962. 
102 
be canceled at the last moment due to an attack on his life by right 
wing extremists in Paris. They succeeded in bombing his apartment, but 
both Gurvitch and Mme. Gurvitch escaped serious injury. Both suffered 
shock, and Gurvitch himself had a nervous breakdown which forced him to 
cancel these pending engagements. He has always taken a strong stand 
against terrorism. Prior to the attempt on his life he had publicly 
expressed his opposition to the terrorist activities of the Organisation 
de 11 Armee Secr~te. This wuld explain the attack on hirr .• 
The concluding statement of this background chapter comes from 
Professor Gurvitch himself. It explains the driving force behind his 
work as an academic and a citizen of the world: 
In terminating, permit me to indicate that destiny has seemed 
to desire that in nw reflection and my work I go "against the 
current". The rhythm of~ thought has nearly always been in 
contrast to that which was a la mode. I am therefore "excluded 
from the horde". For the most part., the American and French 
sociologists CQnsider me a "philosopher" who has entered the 
wrong door, and the "philosophers" regard me as a traitor who 
changed his camp a long time ago. 
However, this sense of isolation which at times has been 
discouraging, appears to me to be very natural: my position 
implies the necessity of an intimate collaboration, not only 
between theory and empirical research, but also between socio-
logy and philosophy. Both must renounce their dogmatism and 
their sense of superiority. In exploring reciprocally and 
criticizing each other mutually, they can and must, all the 
while maintaining their complete autonomy, ask of each other 
certain basic questions to whiih only their incessant dia-
logue is capable of answering. 
4Mon itineraire •• • , pp. 21-22. 
CHAPTER III 
AN OVERVIEW OF GURVITCH 1 S SOCIOIDGICAL THEORY 
General sociological theory deals with the basic theoretical 
framework by which the specializations in sociology may be pursued. 
This chapter concerns an analysis of the residual problems of the 
nineteenth centur,y which affect sociological theor.y today. In order 
to understand Gurvitch's thought it is well to get in mind the questions 
he confronts and the issues he combats. This exploration begins with 
Gurvitch' s estimation of the current scene in sociology. 
1. The Current Scene in Sociology 
Sociology at present ia passing through a period of crisis. This 
crisis is caused by several factors. It is, therefore, patently neces-
sary to define the task, method and limits of this social science. Soci-
ology is a new discipline, relatively speaking. Its whole history i.sm·· 
pomprised of the difficult decades of the nineteenth century and the 
disruptive, volatile years of the present century. 
However, it is wrong to consider the history of sociology as 
being the same thing as the history of the social philosophies 
popular during the nineteenth century. Sociology's need is to 
become a science in the full sense of the term. Thence, it 
mu.st cut all ties with social philosophy. It must go beyond it.1 
~otes on a lecture given by Dr. Georges Gurvitch at the University 
of Paris on December ll, 1956. 
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These are the opening words of a course Gurvitch offered at the 
Sorbonne on the History of Sociology during the year 1956-1957. The 
statement indicates the general plan which sociology must follow to 
extricate itself from the residual problems inherited from the nineteenth 
century. Since its inception during the first half of the past century, 
sociology has had a difficult- time . Mainly 1 this difficulty has come 
at the point of trying to liberate itself from any liaison with dogmatic 
philosophy. This has meant rejecting all historical dogma which de-
scribed social reality in tenus of "order 11 or "progress". 1 However, 
the overthrow of such philosophies of history led to an equally errant 
emphasis on "predominant social factors". 2 Examples Gurvitch suggests 
are the so-called "schools. of sociology" which place almost total e:m.pha-
sis on the geographic, biological, anthropological, demographical, techno-
logical, economic, psychological, idealistic or formalistic factors.3 ' 
Thus at the close of the last century a dedicated effort was made to 
free sociology from every dogmatic premise. At this juncture the criti-
cal spirit came to the fore 1 paving the way for empirical study of the 
social facts which could give a common basis of exploration for soei-
ologists. It is necessary to mention that Durkheim did much to clarity 
the specificity of social reality by insisting the method of approach 
laeorges Gurvitch, La vocation •• • , I, 2. All references are to 
Gurvitch unless otherwise indicated. 
2Ibid. 
3 "La crise de l' explication en sociologie 11 1 Cahiers Internationaux 
de Sociologie, XXI (Janvier..Julllet, 1956), 3. 
be one of seeing "the social facts as things" •1 W.. . G. Sumner and 
C. H. Cooley in the United States, and Hobhouse in England made 
important contributions to the clarification of sociology's task 
2 during the early part of this century. 
10.5 
Following their work, sociology took on the special characteristics 
of the different countries. Gurvitch explains that in France, 
the categories of Durkheim 1s school of sociology were 
broadened and refined by the work of Lucien Levy-Bruhl 
and his students Marcel Mauss and Maurice Halbwachs ••• 
But they soon showed a marked preference for the archaic 
societies and showed a desire to refor.m the spirit of 
certain social sciences.3 
Germany, despite the work of Max Weber and the phenomenological 
school of Max Scheler, st~ed on a purely speculative level. Its theory 
has been formalistic in nature (for example, L. von Weise). This ulti-
mately led to the acceptance of the totalitarian ideology of the 
National Socialists.4 The United States has been captivated by scien-
tific technique, empirical research, and statistical methods • .5 
Now Gurvitch asks: 
What is going to be the destiqy and orientation of sociology 
in this present historicaL,setting, where, after the military 
defeat of totalitarian racism, the battle is engaged but not 
resolved between the different types of global structures: 
~e Durkheim, Les re es de la methode sociolo ' ue 
(quatrieme edition; Paris: Felix Alcan, 1907 1 P• 20. Durkheim declares: 
"La premiere regle et la plus f'ondamentale est de considerer lea faits 
sociaux camme des choses." 
~ vocation. • , I, 2. 
3rbid. 
-
5Lecture notes, January 11, 19.57 . 
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organized capitalism, communism, technocracy, collectivism, 
pluralism, etc.; where resultant conflicts are arising between 
national and international planners, brought about either by 
trusts and cartels, nation-states, or by the producers and 
consumers themselves; where atomic energJ must ultimately be 
substituted in industrial production for black or white oil.1 
In 1960 Gurvitch observed that there has never been a time exact]¥ 
like the present when the social structures of modern civilizations are 
threatened totally by technology. This becomes clear upon examining the 
relationships between technology, the cultural works of civilization 
and the social structures. -:Before 1 social structures challenged 
technology] now, the contrary is true. n2 At the t.ime this stat.ement. 
was made, the summit meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev had just 
been cancelled over the "U-2 incident". Gurvitch noted that this 
summit meeting faUed because political power was dominated by the 
military; the leadership of the state was virtually in their hands. 
There is a "formal n democratic structure but underneath private inter-
eats prevail: workers are dominated by their own technicians, "trusts n 
by their own kind of economic planners, politicians by party bureaucrats 
and the bureaucracies of the state; the latter is more and more domi-
nated by an army which is day by day increasing its destructive power. 
This holds for the U. S. S. R. as it does for the western world. 3 Add 
to this the condition of sociology: "It has abandoned its real task; it 
has capitulated to the 1 test-o-mania 1 and 1 quantophrenia 1 to use 
l1a vocation •• • , I, 3. 
2personal conversation with the author, August, 1960. 
3Ibid. 
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Pitirim Sorokin's terms,; this occupation with tests and measurements 
has made it impossible to offer aQ1 sociological explanations to certain 
grave problems such as Fascism and technocracy. nl 
Gurvitch raises four basic questions concerning sociology: 
(1) If sociology depends on the interaction of certain concrete social 
structures 1 can it be considered a science in the full sense of the 
word? (2) If the answer is yes 1 then what are the limits of sociology 
as a science? (3) If one separates the indicative and the nor.mative 1 
in other words, the objective "facts" from judgments of what should be 1 
does this eliminate all possibilities of practically applying the 
.findings of sociology? (4) With what important issues should sociology 
be occupied?2 
Gurvitch presents answers to these questions from the position 
of his philosophical and juridical background. The questions Gurvitch 
raises fit within the context of "being". The ontological nature of 
social reality is undeniable. Individual existence is part and parcel 
of social existence. Social existence is indissoluably linked with 
individual existence. Attempts to separate the two are useless. Gur-
vitch comments on Reinhola Niebuhr's Moral Man and Immoral Society. 
In a lecture on the "Sociology of the Moral Li!en,3 he contends that 
Niebuhr denies real contact between society and morality. Social life 
for him -would be amoral. Neither collective nor social morality exists. 
1
combat. (Paris) 1 January 231 19571 P• 7 • 
~ vocation •• • 1 I, 3. 
3uurvitch1 course given at the Sorbonne 1 1956-1957. 
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The domains of the moral and the social are such strangers to 
one another, [ in Niebuhr's thought] that a post factum appli-
cation to society of ethical criteria valid in the individual 
conscience, would be perfectly inoperative .1 
Gurvitch indicates such a position would reduce all attempts to 
realize ethical criteria to a bitter cynicism. Moreover all human 
behaviour would be relegated in advance to the amoral or even immoral. 
Further, this position excludes artificially from social reality 
the majority of the elements which are included in it, such as 
non-conformist behaviour, cult\Ulal patterns, attitudes, symbols, 
creative innovating behaviour, collective ideas and values, and 
the collective mind which is expressed in certain mental acts 
such as intuition and judgment.2 
There is a dialectical relationship between the individual and the 
collective which such a position ignores; rather it puts them in virtual 
isolation. This dialectic is necessary to the understanding of social 
reality as it is existentially conceived. Gurvitch, therefore, under-
stands the orientation of sociology to be concerned with the inescapable 
involvement of "all existence" in a plurality of social situations which 
are often paradoxical. 3 Such contradictoey situations can be illus-
trated by the rapport between the individual and society, the relations 
of '~e "1 "Alter Ego 11, and "We". 4 These various relationships or 
involvements in the social situation itself can only be put in bold 
relief b.f the operative processes of "complementarity", "ambiguity", 
"Polarization" 1 the dialectic of "mutual implication" and 
1 Lecture notes, University of Paris, Dec ber 6, 19$6. 
2Ibid. 
3La vocation ••• , I, 4. 
4-.rbid. 
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"reciprocity of perspectives".! 
Gurvitch believes that sociology is faced with the growing plural-
ism of groups which oppose one another in the struggle for equilibrium. 
Moreover, knowledge itself has became a valid field of scrutiny for 
sociology. 2 He points to the ineffectiveness and "fatigue" of a great 
number of present social s;ymbols. This problem needs to be confi'onted 
since the requirement for "active" symbols is particularly crucial. 3 
He registers a concern for an increasing dearth of reflection on the 
"rhythm of social reality". 4 
This is the existential situation facing sociology today. Gur-
vitch emphasizes the theoretical spadework required if such problems 
are to be answered. The vast empirical work done by .American sociolo-
gists is deceiving. The enormous amount of accumulated material has to 
be selected according to specific criteria which are not available due 
to the lack of agreement among sociologists. This is particularly 
disconcerting when it is readily admitted a conceptual scheme, serving 
as a point of departure, is indispensable. S 
One concern repeatedly appears in Gurvitch 1s writings. Sociology 
is faced above all with a crisis of explanation and its subsequent 
1Ibid. See below, section five. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
-
4rbid. See especially the whole of his Detendnismes sociaux et 
liberte humaine; also, The Spectrum of Social Time. 
Sibid , pp. 4-S. Cf. his "Le concept de structure sociale", 
Cahiers ""'Iiite'rnationaux de Sociologie, XIX (Juillet-Decembre, 1955), 3-44. 
communication. It is sUllllled up in one word, 1 1 e;xplication. 1 This 
problem of explanation takes different forms: 
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l) Over-explanation. There are times when too much eJq>lanation is 
offered based on too little factual matter. An example of this is 
evolutionary theory which seeks to give a "sense of history" or answer 
the question,~ere is society going?" This is not a legitimate task 
2 
for sociology. 
2) A false interpretation. This results when an explanation is 
given that is not supported by the evidence available. Seeing social 
reality in terms of one predominant factor is an illustration.3 
3) OverJ.y simple explanation. This problem in explanation is 
due to an inadequate view of the complexity of social reality. An 
example of this exaggerated approach is the desire to make too broad a 
generalization from a limited field of research. 
The typological or monographic techniques, if they are used 
too narrowly, deny the dialectic between microsociology 1 the 
sociology of groups ~d social classes, and the study of 
inclusive societies.4 
4) Over-emphasis on empirical research. United States social 
science researchers have actually renounced every possibility of expla-
nation by transforming sociology into sociography.5 When mechanics of 
sociological research become an end in themselves, when the researchers 
fail to rely on an adequate theoretical framework for making general-
1
cahiers Internationaux ••• , XXI, 4. 
2Ibid., P• 5. 3rbid., P• 6. 
hrbid. Srbid. 
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izations and explanations, then the crisis of "interpretation" is 
... ,,..,. 1 espac1~ severe. 
Such a crisis of explanation can threaten the ver,y life of soci-
ology. First, its vary autonomy as a science is threatened. It is in 
danger of becoming a common denominator for the social sciences. Second, 
it is in danger of becoming an auxilliary science to help keep recalci-
trant groups in line with existing structures . Third, it is in danger 
of becoming subservient to technocracy. "The sociologist's advice must 
be profitable for industr.y. Empirical researchers are becoming techno-
crats.n2 This is very close to the thesis pursued b,y Loren Baritz in 
his book, The Servants of Power: A History of the Use of Social Science 
in American Indust;:y. He maintains that social scientists have amed 
management with powerful new weapons with which to manipulate their 
workers. They have shown industrial managers the Rorschach tests and 
Thematic Apperception tests--by which workers unknowingly tell things 
about themselves which they would not have otherwise revealed if they 
had been left to the usual methods of "communication". A practiced 
device is to share with the workers why management decisions were made 
as they were. This gives the workers a false sense of belonging, 
according to Mr. Baritz. They are merely tools in the hands of manipu-
lators who have obtained their power from the social scientists who have 
sold themselves to the highest bidder. 
Gurvitch concludes that this crisis in explanation has arisen out 
of five misinterpretations: first, the attempt to encase in rigid 
1Ibid. 2:rbid. 
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for.mulas of determinism the causes of social reality; second, the fail-
ure to understand the dialectical relationsltip between comprehension and 
~lanation. Weber has had a great deal to do with this misinterpre"" 
tation. His suggestive concept of "verstehen" (the understanding of 
the internal sense of behaviour) reduces comprehension to introspection 
and subjectivity. Third, the tendency has been for each branch of 
sociology to enclose itself in self~ade limits and fail to see the 
total social phenomena. Fourth, the repudiation of the dialectical 
process in sociology has led to the compartmentalization of different 
factors in social reality, making it impossible to grasp the total social 
phenanena en marche.1 Fifth, this crisis of explanation is "due to the 
crisis in general theory. All science must explain through 2 theory. 
Science must have certain hypotheses for guidance in research."3 Bad 
theory is preferable to none at all. Explanation is impossible without 
a general sociological theory; the more theory is neglected, the more 
impossible it is to conquer the problem of explanation.4 
This assessment of the present scene in sociology then serves as 
the impetus for defining a systematic theoretical scheme. However, 
before a discussion of Gurvitch' s general theozy is undertaken, it is 
necessary to understand the historical approach he makes. 
2. False Problems fran the Nineteenth Century 
Certain fundamental problems concerned sociology during the century 
1Ibid., p. 10. 
.3rbid., P• 12. 
2Italics mine. 
~raite ••• , I, p. 241 • 
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of its birth. These have largely been resolved, but the,y are signifi-
cant as an historical background against which Gurvitch builds his 
theoretical system. 
i. Sociology or Philosophy of Histo.J')'? 
When sociology was founded, one of its prime considerations had to 
do with the end of society. ''Where are we going?" or ''Where is society 
going?" or "Where goes the world?" However, to ask such questions is to 
become deeply involved in the time-worn considerations of philosophy of 
history. This has no place in sociology. Comte, in declaring sociology 
to be the positive science of the social facts seemed at first to sepa-
rate himself from such philosophy of history. However, he went on to 
declare sociology to be the science of sciences and also pointed to the 
inevitable achievement of man (by virtue of this new science) which 
would be culminated in the npositive phase", according to Camte's theory 
of developl!lent . Moreover, the great founders of twentieth century 
sociology did not escape Comte 1s error. 
Durkheim declared society developed in the sense of growth in 
organic solidarity and from there, in the sense of liberty, 
equality and fraternity. Hobhouse, Dewey and Mead believed 
society progressed without pause towards the tota~ triumph of 
reason. Saint-simon announced . the coming of the era of social 
solidarity, Proudhon, the perfect realization of social justice. 
Marx was convinced that the varied 1 alienations' of man, which 
he described, were only temporary ani he promised their disap-
pearance in a society without class. 
Gurvitch gives four basic reasons why all pretension towards a 
philosophy of history must be eliminated in sociology. (1) Value 
judgments are confused with descriptive judgments of reality when a 
lLa vocation ••• , I, )D. 
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certain goal or end for society is discussed. (2) Society does not 
develop unilaterally, as certain philosophies of history imply. Social 
reality illustrates clearly the discontinuity of movement and develop-
ment in its various structures and levels.1 (3) A philosophy of history 
often implies a monistic interpretation of social reality. There is not 
one society, but there are many 11societies 11 • 2 (4) Finally, philosophy 
of history destroys sociology's competence to analyze the present 
situation by placing an emphasis upon the transformation of society. 
It is only in renouncing the illusions concomitant with a 
philosophy that must point to sane end and which includes 
a unilinear and continuous social evolutionary theory, that 
sociology can concentrate on the really scientific description 
of such structure or concrete social situation. It does 
this by tracing the diverse possib~e perspectives, often 
antinomic in nature which are revealed in a society that is 
constantly being remade. It is then free to ~tilize the 
results of these analyses in a practical way. 
ii. Sociologies of Order and Progress 
This second false problem inherited from the nineteenth century 
deals with those interpretations of the social reality which would reduce 
its character to one or two simple formulas: either social reality 
can be defined by its stable, crystalized order of structures, or there 
is observable in the social system a movement towards inevitable pro-
grass. Bonald, de Maistre and Ballanche are representatives of the 
former position. Con rcet, Saint-8imon, Proudhon, Marx and Cournot 
are proponents of the latter. The division between static and dynamic 
1Ibid. 2Ibid., p. 32. 
3rbid., pp. 32-33· 
social structures, first fonnulated by Auguste Comte, is an artificial 
distinction.1 These are dialectical and interpenetrating in reality. 
Such a reduction of social reality to either one of these descriptive 
tenns smacks of a value judgment; it is also a naive appraisal of the 
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complexity of the dynamic, fluctuating, social configuration. It amounts 
to an arbitrary reduction of this complexity to over-simplified con-
ceptual abstractions. Such abstractions are usually made by social 
philosophers or sociologists who are influenced by a particular period 
in history in which such easy assertions as these could be made. Every 
social structure contains the forces of order and progress; present also 
are the static and the dynamic, the centripetal and the centrifugal. 
Lord Acton's aphorism is descriptively correct, "the only absolute is 
change". What forces will prevail, how they are arranged, the manner 
in Which they are expressed will differ in each given milieu and epoch. 
iii. The False Conflict between the Individual and Society. 
It is equally false to place the individual over against society 
or to maintain that every social grouping is reducible to its individual 
members. It is likewise false to maintain society has a psychological 
and moral preeminence over the individual person. Moreover, to insist 
that the two abstractions simply interact is to d~ the actual situ-
ation. According to Gurvitch there is a dialectic once again set up 
between the individual and society. They are not "exclusive entities, 
2 
exterior to one another". He goes on to say, in the first place, 
1rbid., pp. 35-36. 
2~, P• 31. 
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Neither the individual nor society is able to exist without 
the other. • • The individual is immanent in society and 
society is immanent in the individual. From this reciprocal 
immanence one finds society anew in the depth of the 'Me 1 , 
and discovers once again the 1Me' in the depth of the 1We' 
of society.l 
In the second place, the reason for this conflict arising between 
the individual and society has its "origin in certain optical illusioDB 
which have been compounded by false interpretations". 2 There is a 
tendency to consider the conflicts observed in both oneself and society 
as conflicts between the collectivity and its individual members. The 
study which Durkheim made on suicide underlines how false abstractions 
can lead to equally errant conclusions. 
Durkheim placed in opposition to one another 'psychological 
causes" for suicide . • • and "social causes", giving to these 
latter factors the predominant role. Maurice Halbwachs--his 
continuator--reached the conclusion that each suicide could 
be e.xplained both from the point of view of the individual 
and that of the collec~ivity without having to discover con-
flict between the two. 
Thus, this conflict is an artificial one. The complexit-y of social 
reality points to the necessity of seeing the total social phenomena 
and the total psychological phenomena. To isolate one level of social 
life and declare this as being the wbole story is to view complex 
social reality in an unrealistic way. 
To dtsire to separate complete~y 'Mine", ''Thine ""'and "Ours" 
and more largely the tension between the individual, the 
interpersonal, and the collective (We, groupa, global societies) 
is to dissolve or destroy, as such, the conscience itself. 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid., PP• 37-38. 
3Ibid., P• 38. 
The collective conscience and the individual conscience 
consist precisely in the interpenetration of these three 
factors and in their dialectical relationships, from which 
come all cultural works (in particular s;ymbols) .1 
In the total psychological phenomena neither the individual 
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conscience, the conscience of others, nor the collective conscience can 
take a dominant role. They all three form the whole man. The problem 
of conflict between the individual and society is poor~ put. It is 
both artificial and unrealistic. 2 An individual is by definition a 
member of a society or probab~ many societies. A contemporar,r his-
torian lends support to Gurvitch's contention. 
The facts of history are indeed facts about individuals, but 
not about actions of individuals performed in isolation, and 
not about the motives, real or imaginary, from which indi• 
viduals suppose themselves to have acted They are facts 
about the relations of individuals to one another in society 
and about the social forces which produce from the actions 
of individuals results often at variance with, and sometres 
opposite to, the results ~ch they themselves intended. 
Probab~ one of the most striking illustrations of this indis-
soluble link between the individual and society appears in Bergson's 
Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion. 4 He points to the 
celebrated story of Robinson Crusoe. This is supposedly about a man 
totally isolated on an island in the middle of the sea. Yet Crusoe is 
~bid., p. 40. The distortion of social reality by psychologists 
is aptly described by Talcott Parsons in the introduction to Max Weber: 
The Theorz of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1947), p. 27. 
2cf. Gurvitch' s 11Is the Antithesis of 'Moral Man' and 'Immoral 
Society' True?", Philosophical Review, LII (November, 1943), 533-552. 
~. H. Carr, What Is History?, p. 64. 
4paris: Presses Universitair~s de France, 1932, the first edition. 
1953, the 66th edition. 
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never free from his society, Bergson suggests, since each day he uses 
those tools and goods which were saved from the shipwreck. Without 
them he could not exist. With them he is able to subsist and by virtue 
of using them he maintains a constant contact with the very society in 
which he was born and by which he was "socialized". 
iv. The Relationships of Sociology and Psychology. 
Sociology and psychology are not opposed to each other. It is 
false to assume they can exist independent of each other or that an 
ultimate choice must be made between the two, though such a demand is 
often made . The substantive material of society cannot be adequately 
studied by either individual psychology or a collective psychology or 
sociology alone . The disciplines are interdependent and the task 
requires a joint effort . 
However, this conflict between the two areas of study continues 
to the present day. In America certain scholars, such as the psycholo-
gist Kardiner in his The Individual and His Society,l assert there can 
be no possible contact between psychology and sociology. The school of 
Du.rkheim has made the opposite mistake by reducing all their study to 
collective psychology, to the neglect of the more individual .phenomena . 2 
Both disciplines have their particular material to study: psychology, 
for example, has the abnormal phenomena of the human mind and the mind's 
physiological characteristics; sociology deals with the basic material 
~ew York: Columbia University Press, First edition, 1939, third 
edition, 1946. 
~a vocation • • • , I, pp . 44-45. 
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of social organizations, social structures, and the cultural works which 
constitute civilization, e. g., knowledge, religion, law, art, and 
morality.1 
Yet they find a common meeting place. 
The living drama of increasing and decreasing tension towards 
the spontaneous which is manifested in the unpredictable, the 
instantaneous, the fluctuating, takes divergent directions 
moving between the poles of the Me, Aiter~Ego or the Collective 
(We, Groups, Societies); this tension is only possible 
within the context of the same mental process or, as we would 
prefer to say, within the concept of the total psychological 
phenomena. In the total psychological phenomena • • • t he 
three directions of these living tensions are revealed to be 
as- intimately linked as are the same poles in the total social 
phenomena, in which they are integrated, be it partially or 
completely.2 
This illustrates clearly that both disciplines study the human 
condition; in such a study the lines between the disciplines are far 
from distinct and only relative. Man is a whole, and 1tthe Vle, Groups, 
Classes, and Societies in Which he participates militate against his 
being cut into fragments") The total psychological phenomena and the 
total social phenomena must be treated as a whole. Since they inter-
penetrate, are interdependent and remain bound together in an inextri-
cable totality, this requires a method of study which takes into account 
this dialectical tension. This method will be described in the seventh 
chapter. Suffice it to say that psychology can take the researcher 
either in the direction of the more spontaneous levels of psychical 
~bid. ' pp. 45-46. 
2Ibid., P• 46. 
3rraite •• • , II, 334-336. 
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life, which can be expressed collectively, interpersonally or individu-
alq (usually all three at the same time), or towards the collective o! 
the We, groups, classes and global societies. 
The psychical phenomena are total. The point is, whether they 
move in the direction o! the spontaneous or towards the organized, they 
are inextricably related to the total social phenomena. Within the 
total psychic phenomena, three disciplines operate: collective psy-
chology, social psychology and individual psychology. Thec'partitions 
between these three are relative. The social psychologist, as he 
studies interpersonal and intergroupal relations, is dependent upon 
collective psychology (whose domain is the collective mind) since the 
collective conscious is prior to every type of "human relations". 
Language is a case in point. A ~' a group or a society is essential 
!or language to have any meaning. 
It is the same !or individual psychology. This discipline depends 
on the collective mind "since neither the individual, whether uncon-
scious or conscious, can be isolated !rom the interindividual psychical 
1 
relationships or the collective psyche". Every person, though singu-
larized by the psychologist, is the kind o! person he is because o! his 
interaction with the given social milieu. Be it understood this primacy 
o! the social is more latent than manifest. The following diagram 
helps to show the relationships among these three psychologies: 
~raite •• • , II, 336. 
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Every conflict situation arising from the dynamic activity of 
social reality has its effect upon the total psychical phenomena. A 
psychological reality exists as well, whose interaction with the social 
gives rise to further conflict situations, all of which make an impact 
on the psychical phenomena. 
Finally the cultural works of a society or a group are at once the 
products and molders of these total psychical phenomena. Hence, there 
is a possible psychology of language as well as a sociology of language . 
'Psychology looks for the phases of the spontaneous, and sociology the 
degrees of crystalization. n1 
Gurvitch rejects the American school of cultural antnropology, 
since to him it reifies culture to such an extent it drains it of all 
content . Moreover, cultural anthropology forgets that culture is the 
product and producer of social reality and psychical reality. They can-
not be separated. The rapport between these two realities is dialecti-
cal. Such a dialectic, which tries to inscribe the psychical within the 
~id., P• 337 • 
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social, makes possible an understanding of the complex interdependence 
of the total psychical phenomena with culture. 
Gurvitch includes two other diagrams which help to explain these 
relationships. The first is an ideal conception as yet unrealized by 
either sociology or psychology: the psychical phenomena are inscribed 
within the social. The second is realistic, presenting what actually 
obtains in current research. 
Total 
Sociological 
Phenomena Phenomena 
In both conceptions it is understood there are areas of the total 
sociological phenomena Which are entirely outside the interests of the 
psychical, e . g. , the morphological, organizations, technological means 
and patterns, and social structures. The importance of the psychological 
explorations into such areas as the Ego, "the relations arising from 
~' Yours (singular), and~ varies according to the manifestations 
of the total social phenomena in their different types and structuresn.1 
lrraite •• • , II, 338. 
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v. The Difficulty of the Single Predominant Factor. 
If there is one 'problem which plagues sociology more than any 
other, it is the problem of the single predominant factor. From the 
most sophisticated scholars to the most naive laymen, this error seems 
more likely to frustrate the development of a thoroughgoing science 
than anything else . Any so-called school of sociology wnich puts a 
particular emphasis on geography, biology, technology, psychology, eco-
nomics or culture illustrates this error. Reductionism to a simple 
predominant causative factor is too simple . It is too neat. It does 
not take into consideration the dynamic and complex nature of social 
reality. Such a reduction is seductive. In periods of stress people 
want easy answers. They are confused, distraught and weary. There is 
an increasing presence of fear. Simple solutions to complex problems 
are demanded. It is then that radical politics of the "right" or "left" 
gain recognition and support. Still, the cloistered halls of the uni-
versities have harbored the skilled researcher and scholar who after 
all his labor comes forth with a thesis that purports to explain the 
total social phenomena by either a materialistic determinism, or a 
"survival of the fittest", or the influence of the Protestant ethic, or 
the role of climate • • • ad infinitum. 
Gurvitch gives two examples of outstanding thinkers in the history 
of sociology who failed to escape this error of the single predominant 
factor. Emile Durkheim, the founder of modern sociology, saw the im-
portance of social reality as a phenomenon which cannot be reduced to 
the sum of its parts, a reality which has a unique quality of its own 
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and therefore cannot be identified with any other reality. He goes 
further to show there are various levels to this reality: the super-
ficial or morphological, the institutional, incorporating symbols, 
values, and ideas which are at one and the same time the content of 
social reality and are produced by that society itself; and at the deep-
est level Durkheim observed the "free currents of the collective con-
1 
science". Three branches of sociology interpenetrate and mutually 
support each other in their attempt to examine the data of these several 
layers. Those branches are social morphology, social physiology and 
collective psychology. It would seem Durkheim had solved the problem of 
the single predominant factor. However 1 he and his followers fall into 
the trap by giving too much importance to the collective conscience, and 
thence, to collective values and ideas. His innovating concepts de-
generate into a new spiritualism. 
Karl Marx is Gurvitch 1s second example. He contends that Karl 
Marx in his early years and at the end of his life "never considered 
economics as a 'predominant factor' to explain social reality". The 
works of his youth described a society as a collective activity, a col-
lective effort which is both spiritual and material. Social reality is 
irreducible. It is a whole which produces the very elements which be-
came its content. These productive forces cannot be separated from 
their social frameworks, nor from the individual and collective con-
sciences nor their cultural works. They make up a totality, albeit an 
active totality. It was only later that Marx tried to simplify his 
1La vocation •• • , I, 52. 
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conception and directly identified the economic life with social reality. 
This error was made when he integrated the '~roductive forces" of 
society and the "relationships of production" so completely that they 
could be described in economic ter-ms: "the ensemble of the productive 
forces and the relationships of production is that which we call 
society. ,1 
Gurvitch goes on to say that what both Durkheim and Marx lack is 
a sufficient relativism. 
Durkheim • • • would have escaped the danger of returning to 
the very conceptions he proposed to canbat, if he had admitted 
the morphological base, the organizations, institutions, the 
symbols, values and collective ideas, and finally the "free 
currents 11 of the collective mentality have an importance which 
differs according to the types of society, in particular 
according to the diverse social structures; at times, even the 
simple social conjunctures cause them to fluctuate perceptibly 
in their relationships. The same holds for Marxism. If Marx 
would escape from the single predominant factor, he would have 
to admit the relative importance of the ~terial productive 
forces", the "relationships of production", the "reality of 
the collective conscience", cultural works, and "ideology". All 
of these are essentially variable in differen~ types of so-
cieties whose "natures" are not all the same. 
This solution for Durkheim ana Marx is characteristic of Gurvitch. 
His concept of relativism as it relates to the types of global society 
will be a recurring notion in his own thought. Such a relativism calls 
for a "radical empiricism" to uncover all "predominant factors 11 which 
are couched in quasi-scientific terms but are nothing more than simple 
dogmatisms. In sum, the espousal of a predominant factor is a two-fold 
error: 1) it tends to immobilize and harden that which is essentially 
1Ibid., P• 5~. 
2Ibid., p • .5.5. 
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variable and dynamic; 2) it destroys the object of sociology, which is 
'~o know a specific social reality as an ensemble of its hierarchical 
[ depth] scales, levels and myriad aspects, whose hierarchies depend 
upon the type of society and its structure1~l 
vi. The Role of Laws in Sociology. 
This final problem inherited from the nineteenth century is par-
ticularly difficult to eliminate. There has always been a desire to 
establish the laws which govern society. Moreover, it was the desire 
of same precursors of modern sociology to establish sociology as a 
bona fide science. They felt this could be done b,y discovering the 
laws b,y which society works. This assumption was a natural outgrowth of 
the Enlightenment . Their hope, however, was based on a close affinity 
with the Newtonian physics of their day. Now, the natural sciences are 
teaching the social sciences. Physics declares it is impossible to 
establish causal laws. 
In microphysics • • • following experiments with electrons and 
quanta, the equation of uncertainty was introduced. Since then 
one is more and more ~eluctant to seek strict regularities and 
even causal liaisons . 
Gurvitch feels it is impossible 11to formulate in sociology so-
called causal laws since the discontinuity between cause and effect is 
so great 11 • 3 However, there still remains the need for 11causal explana-
tions". This type of research must be done within the context of the 
total social phenomena. Gurvitch explains why: 
2Ibid., P• 57. 
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The on~ laws which could be valuable in sociology are the laws 
of probability founded on statistics. But they are only appli-
cable in ver.y occasional and restricted situations, preferably 
at the material base (morphological and ecological) or at the 
level of external collective behaviour which can more or less 
be predicted, that is regular, habitual, and traditional.! 
If it is impossible to speak of hard and fast causal laws, it is 
useful and necessary to assert there are "tendencies towards regularityn. 2 
This means there are direct, observable integrations of various elements 
'Within a social whole. These integrations are what might be termed 
functional correlations.3 Observable are certain correspondances be-
tween two groups of social facts. These cannot be relegated to any 
other period or any other place. They reveal that these ensembles of 
social facts are in a mutual relationship with each other, a mutual 
causality. There is no assurance they 'Will remain so. There is the 
one certainty: they are inte~rated into the same framework of the total 
social phenomenon. This means that the realities of certain cultural 
works such as knowledge, art, religion, law and education are not mere 
products of the social frameworks. If they were, they would lose their 
specificity as an irreducible reality. The dialectical method, so es-
sential to sociology, is the only w~ of assuring that this perspective 
is maintained. The tendencies towards regularity are 9nly applicable 
at the macrosociological level. Only here does the sociologist observe 
1Ibid~_, . p . 61. 
2-rraite. • • , I, p. 244. 
3rbid. Gurvitch uses the same meaning for functional correlation 
that a mathematician gives to the term. See Robert Merton, Social 
Structure and Social Theo;y (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 2nd ed., 
1957), pp. 21-25. 
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certain patterns or directions towards which the ensembles point. He 
must necessarily withhold final judgment as to the final outcome or 
endpoint of these patterns or directions. This discussion will be more 
detailed in both the next chapter and Chapter Seven where Gurvitch's 
methodology is analyzed. In summary, direct integration is the key 
step in the process of sociological explanation. Under certain circum-
stances it will be impossible to discover any real tendencies or precise 
functional correlations due to the difficulty of the phenomena with 
which the sociologist is working. This in itself is an element of 
explanation. This kind of honesty is sorely needed at the present hour.l 
This discussion of the invalid problems inherited from the nine-
teenth century, sane of which have been almost totally eliminated, 
others of which are constantly reappearing in various disguises and 
forms, shows clearly the questions and the issues which Gurv.itch is 
facing . It is important to remember these as the outline of his theory 
develops . He is reacting against certain false problems and assumptions. 
They are historically discernible yet often hidden under new categories 
or put into attractive garbs. Their artificiality and falseness remain . 
One of the tasks of contemporary sociology is to unveil these false 
problems and to clarify the real role of the sociologist. 
;3,. The Actual Task of Sociology 
The field of study for sociology is social reality tttaken in all 
2 its levels, all its aspects, all its strata in depth". Elsewhere 
1Ibid., PP • 244-245. 2La vocation •• • , I, P• 4. 
Gurvitch writes: 
The object of sociology is the typology of the total social 
phenomena: the microsociological types, the types of group-
ings, the types of social classes, and the types of global 
societies. It studies them] within their movements of 
structuration and destructuration at the interior of these 
various types located in the time segments1which are recon-structed according to their discontinuity. 
This statement reveals Gurvitch's distinction between sociology 
and history. Sociology is not interested in continuity. In fact it 
emphasizes the discontinuity of the types in order to observe the total 
social phenomena in all their flux and movement. These are the irre-
ducible elements of social reality. They give birth to various mani-
festations which became the characteristics of the given social reality. 
These total social phenomena parallel the "normative facts" of juridical 
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experience. These are the elements which express that subjacent totality 
that is constantly changing, constantly building, destroying and re-
building. '~hese phenomena are the homes or reservoirs which create 
and stimulate, which provide the means by which the We, groups and 
societies are at once creating and being created, changing and being 
2 
changed." In another volume Gurvitch defines social reality as the 
center where man participates in mankind.J This reality is irreduci-
ble to any other reality. The total social phenomena affirm this 
reality more than anything else. Sociology studies these social phe-
nomena within the context of their ceaseless movements between 
lcahiers Internationaux •• • , XXI, 15. 
2rraite •• • , r, p. 20. 
3spectrum of Social Time •• • , p. 1. 
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"structuration" and 11de-structuration" seen in the microsociological, 
groupal, and global types. It is particularly imperative that sociology 
accentuate their contingency. It therefore needs to call attention to 
the ruptures between the various types, between past, present and 
future, between different time segments and continua of reconstructed 
time periods, with the ultimate purpose of grasping the total social 
phenomena in their processes of development, retardation and recovery.1 
Sociologists of the nineteenth century tended to be uni-dimensional 
in their approach. '~wentieth century sociology is above all multi-
dimensional. It is sociology in depth."2 It is "existential sociology". 
What does the depth sociologist see? 
The social reality to the practiced eye of the sociologist is 
arranged in levels, strata, planes, or in vertical layers. 
These strata, or levels, interpenetrate and mutually impregnate 
each other. Moreover, they do not cease to enter into con-
flict: their rapport is tenuous, paradoxical, and dialectical. 
This has to do with the inextricable tensions inherent in all 
social reality, which one is able to qualify on a vertical 
scale. To these relative polarizations are added, at each 
depth level, the horizontal conf.licts and tensions; tne antago-
nism of classes is a good example.3 
Sociology seeks to bring all these conflicts and tensions to the 
surface. It tries to see them in their specific social context. The 
acuteness of these tensions varies according to tne multiplicity of the 
structures involved, the pluralism of types and even of their con-
junctures. "It no longer ••• belongs to sociology to resolve or 
lneterminismes sociaux •• • , p. 37. 
2La vocation •• • , I, 63. Notice the rapport this concept has with 
depth psychology. In fact, another descriptiva term for Gurvitch's 
sociology is depth sociology. 
3Ibid. 
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camouflage .these conflicts."1 Sociology's vocation is to develop its 
capacity for unmasking the contradictions and latent tensions existing 
in any given social reality, the framework of which is the total social 
phenomena. 2 
The intellectual honesty of the researcher in sociology is 
measured b,y the steadfastness with which he finds proof in 
a struggle without mercy against every endeavor destined to 
mask or silence the acute drama, which, at each instant of 
society's existence, is played out between the differ~nt 
strata of society and at every level of these strata.; 
Several thinkers have seen the multi-dimensional character of 
social reality. Significantly their backgrounds are varied. For 
Gurvi tch the most important are Proudhon, Marx, Durkheim, Hauriou, 
Bergson and the ·phenamenologists. All went far towards uncovering the 
various levels of social reality. Each may have intended to do same-
thing else. The point is that each revealed a pluralism and depth to 
social reality which calls for an adequate methodology to examine such 
complex phenomena.4 That methodology will be the next step in this 
study. 
Gurvitch emphasizes that these precursors of depth sociology 
represented diverse philosophical positions. Though they saw the multi-
dimensional nature of society, they were unable to renounce all tenden-
cies favoring particular philosophical theses. This serves as a warning. 
his Deter.minismes sociaux •• • , pp • .37-.38; 60-61. 
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Nothing will undercut the vocation of depth sociology more 
than to utilize the analysis of the different levels to the 
end of defending a particular philosophical thesis. It is 
necessary to renounce even the use of such methods as "in-
version" or ''phenomenological reduction 11 since sociology as 
science .can have nothing to do with a particular philosophical 
position. l 
It will be part of the task ahead to see if Gurvitch successfully 
avoids this pitfall he describes . Remembering his philosophical herit-
age and an admitted awareness of his own propensities towards certain 
philosophical doctrines, it should be interesting to follow the develop-
ment of his method. He is quick to assert all particular systems of 
thought must be overcome if sociology is to carry out its vocation as a 
science . This requires a radical empiricism, one Wich is scrupulously 
relative in its analysis of the different relationships at the interior 
of social reality. 
CHAPTER IV 
GURVITCH 1S SOCIOLOGY OF THE TOTAL SOCIAL PHENOMENA 
James Baldwin has entitled a recent book of essays, Nobody Knows 
My Name. 1 It is a poignant title suggesting the depths of uneasiness 
which he faces as an individual. These essays, though written by an 
American Negro, coming out of a definite social milieu, have a universal 
ring to them. The search for identity goes on for humanity in general, 
and the individual in particular. This is a world-wide search involving 
individuals, groups and nation-states. 
The very shaping of history now outpaces the ability of men to 
orient themselves in accordance with cherished values. And 
which values? Even when they do not panic, men often sense 
that older ways of feeling and thinking have collapsed and that 
newer beginnings are ambiguous to the point of moral stasis. Is 
it any wonder that ordinary men feel they cannot cope with the 
larger worlds with which they are so suddenly confronted? That 
they cannot understand the meaning of their epoch for their own 
lives? That--in defense of selfhood--they become morally in-
sensible, trying to remain altogether private men? Is it any 
wonder that they come to be possessed by a sense of the trap? 2 
In concluding these introductory remarks to his book, The Soci-
ological Imagination, C. Wright Mills goes on to say that information is 
not lacking for modern man. This is an age of fact. Reason is not miss-
ing either. It is available in large part. What modern man needs is a 
1New York: Dial Press, 1961. 
2New York: Oxford University Press, 1959, pp. 4-5. 
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"quality of mind 11 • 1 It is the kind of mind which will help persons use 
creatively and imaginatively the information, the knowledge which they 
possess, "in order to achieve lucid summations of what is going on in 
the world and of what may be happening within themselves"· 2 This, Mills 
calls "the sociological imagination". 
Pick up any issue of American Sociological Review or American 
Journal of Sociology and examine the contents. It becomes readily clear 
that on the one hand "information" is not lacking. It is also patently 
clear that "scientific 11 exploration is being done in bits and pieces. 
What exactly is meant by this statement? Simply this, that social 
scientists in general and sociologists in particular have failed in 
recent years, since the advent of statistical know-how and grand ac· 
ceptance of the social scientists and their wares by the power centers 
of industrial society, to ask the important questions or wrestle with 
the encompassing perspective that belonged to the classical thinkers in 
social thought. It is out of style, so to speak. Yet a curious thing 
is happening. The physical sciences are moving in the direction of 
greater synthesis in knowledge, while the social sciences seem to be 
breaking and disintegrating the social totalities into a ~d of dis-
parate parts. Granted, this must be done in order to understand the 
integral workings of the social whole. But it is false to leave the 
social body dissected on the laborator,y table without realizing at the 
same time there are just as many, if not more, factors at work which 
unify that body ana cause it to function as a whole. The two processes 
~bid ., P• 5. 2 Ibid. 
-
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must be conducted at one and the same time. To leave out one is to 
distort the picture. 
This search for identity with which James Baldwin is concerned 
and which characterizes the condition and concerns of peoples all over 
the globe, raises other problems. Is not this question the real one 
being raised by the emerging nations of Africa, Asia and South America? 
Now this search for selfhood and nationhood invariably involves the 
study of history. Yet the modem social scientists in America have 
little sense of the historical dimension. Furthennore, historians dis-
trust social scientists. This creates an unfortunate abyss, since both 
need each other and are hopelessly inept in the long run without this 
mutual support . To quote C. Wright Mills once again: 
The sociological imagination enables us to grasp history and 
biography and the relations between the two within society. 
That is its task and its promise. To recognize this task and 
this promise is the mark of the classic social analyst. • • • 
No social study that does not came back to the problems of 
biography, or history and of their intersections within a 
society has completed its intellectual joumey.l 
History gives depth to the study of present day cultures and so-
cieties. ·~e are what we are today because of what we were yesterday" 
may be a cliche, but there is considerable truth in it. The common 
attitude of an, .American branch of sociology is reflected in this state-
ment by Robert Merton: 
Social scientists believe it no longer sufficient to describe 
the behaviour, attitudes, values and social relations obtain-
ing in a complex society simply on the basis of a large but 
scattered array of documents, both public and private, and on 
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educated guesses about wnat people are thinking and feeling. 
Studies of the historical past, of course, have no alternative. 
But in the study of present-d~ societies, these procedures 
are giving w~ to systematic, though far from perfected, 
methods.l 
There is much to be commended in this statement, much that is 
acceptable. However, there is an implicit denial of the historical 
reference. This emphasis on systematic methods for the study of present-
day societies by-passes unconsciously the necessary reference to the 
well-springs of the past ~ch go a long way in explaining !9l people 
feel and think as they do ~· History is necessary for the sociologi-
cal imagination. 
This whole discussion really points to this: sociology can be 
distorted in two ways. It can move from reality by soaring flights into 
meaningless, abstract theorizing, or it can become a series of fragmented 
problems concerning social adjustment. Both courses are bereft of the 
historical dimension and comprehension of tne interrelatedness of the 
whole and its parts. Both lack the sociological imagination. 
1. The Problems of a Methodology in Sociology 
The purpose of knowledge in a general sense is for the "quickening 
of human life .... the advancement of tb.e human spirit per se. 112 The goal 
of scientific knowledge is fitted into this overarching purpose; it 
seeks to enable man to augment and order his experience. In the social 
1Robert Merton, "Now the Case for Sociology," in the New York 
Times Magazine, July 16, 1961, pp. 19-20. 
'1Iuston Smith, The P}?oses of Higher Education (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1955. , p. 2. 
sciences this vocation asks the dual questions of why and whither in 
human behaviour and tries to prepare the ground for their answers. 
The problem can be put in a two-fold way. First, how does man 
get at the causal nexus which will provide some notion as to why this 
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or that happened and is happening; and second, how does he overcome the 
basic fact that he is part and parcel of that causal nexus, part of that 
object? 
The solution is not so simple as it once was. A clear-cut dis-
tinction could be made in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries be-
tween the method (subject) amd the object of study. This was a result 
of Newtonian, mechanistic physics which spilled over into the study of 
human behaviour. Then it was that primitive social sciences believed 
there were discoverable laws ruling man's behaviour in a deterministic 
and inexorable fashion. The so-called scientific method combined the 
inductive approach with deductive logic for internal consistency in 
hypothesizing. It was all based on empirical observation, giving the 
scientist a supposedly f ool -proof method. Simply, get the facts and 
generalize from them. But a revolution occurred in the physical 
sciences which affected the social sciences . The universe no longer 
was viewed as a mechanist ic thing. Darwin in biology bad introduced 
the concept of change . Lyell had already begun this new way of thinking 
with his work in geology. The study of astronomy added to the final 
dissolution of a universe of iron-clad laws . Karl Marx picked up the 
challenge with his work in economics and social philosophy. Henri 
irrari in his little volume La science et 1 'hypothElse summed it up 
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when he said a hypothesis was not a hard and fast law forever a part of 
the storehouse of scientific knowledge once it had been verified. No, 
it too is subject to constant scrutiny and has no continuing home, no 
sacred position. In science, he said, there are no absolutes. Thus the 
relationship between the hypothesis and empirical research became re-
ciprocal or circular. The scientific process entails collecting facts 
to verify hypotheses. These verified hypotheses then serve as guides 
to uncover, analy2e and systematize facts. In the atomic physics based 
on the work of Max Planck, Rutherford, Albert Einstein and others, this 
new process becomes particularly acute. Rutherford's methods were 
recently described: 
He had a driving urge to know how nuclear phenomena worked 
in the sense in which one could speak of knowing what went on 
in the kitchen. I do not believe that he searched for an 
explanation in the classical manner of a theory using certain 
baaic1laws; as long as he knew what was happening he was con-tent. 
The physical scientist has long ago abandoned the search for ~· 
This must also be so for the social. scientist.2 Niels Bohr makes certain 
conunents which lend support to this whole discussion: 
In every experiment on living organisms there must remain some 
uncertainty as regards the physical conditions to which they 
are subjected, and the idea suggests .. itself that the minimal 
freedom we must allow the organism will be just large enough 
to permit it, so to say, to hide its ultimate secrets from us. 
On this view, the very existence of life must in biology be 
considered as an elementary fact, just as in atomic physics 
the existence of the quantum of action has to be taken as a 
basic fact that cannot be derived from ordinary mechanical 
lsir Charles Ellis in Trinit~Review (Cambridge, Lent Term, 1960), 
p. 14, quoted in E. H. Carr, What History?, p. 75. 
2see above, Chapter Three, pp . 126-128. 
physics. Indeed, the essential non-analyzability of atomic 
stability in mechanical terms presents a close analogy to the 
impossibility of a PhySical or chemical e~lanation of the 
peculiar functions characteristic of life. 
This statement seems to rule out any simple reductionism as be-
haviourism in the social sciences or, for that matter, the natural 
sciences. The central thrust of Bohr's statement is that the method of 
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science has changed because the understanding of the object has changed. 
Moreover, this object, whether it be in the physical universe or in 
human behaviour, has become much more complex and fleeting. It is a 
kind of Proteus, says Gurvitch. Human experience "escapes us when we 
think we have caught it; we are dupes ~en we believe we have penetrated 
its secret; we are victims of it when we believe we are free of it, if 
only for a moment 11 • 2 
What this discussion is leading to is the growing awareness on the 
part of both physical scientists and social scientists that there is a 
profound relationship between the subject and object, the method of 
observation and the object of observation, which is suggestive of a dia-
lectical tension that cannot be neglected. This is to say that the 
method is determined by the object; likewise, the object changes and is 
conceived in new ways by the method employed. The method of research is 
an operational tool in the hands of an observer. The observer in the 
social sciences in particular is also a part of what is observed. This 
makes his task particularly difficult and the old conceptions of 11objec-
tivity" come in for some hard scrutiny. Again, Niels Bohr does not 
lwiels Bohr, Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge (New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, 1958), p. 9. 
2Georges Gurvitch, Dialectique et sociologie (Paris: Flammarion,l962), 
P• 8. 
limit this problem to the social sciences. 
The critical point is here the recognition that any attempt to 
analyze, in the customary way of classical physics, the "in-
dividuality" of atomic processes, as conditioned by the quantum 
of action, will be frustrated by the unavoidable interaction 
between the atomic objects concerned and the measuring instru-
ments indispensable for that purpose.l 
In another passage Bohr makes this much clearer. Though lengthy, 
it is worth quoting verbatim for purposes of illustration. 
You will surely all have heard about the riddles regarding the 
most elementary properties of light and matter which have puz-
zled physicists so much in recent years. The apparent contra-
dictions which we have met in this respect are, in fact, as 
acute as those which gave rise to the development of the theory 
of relativity in the beginning of this century and have, just 
as the latter, only found their explanation by a closer exami-
nation of the limitation imposed by the new experiences them-
selves on the unambiguous use of the concepts entering into the 
description of the phenomena. ~e in relativity theory the 
decisive point was the recognition of the essentially different 
ways in which observers moving relatively to ~eacn · other will 
describe the behaviour of given objects, the elucidation of the 
paradoxes of atomic physics has disclosed the fact that the 
unavoidable interaction between the objects and the measuring 
instruments sets an absolute limit to the possibility of 
speaking of a behaviour of atomic objects which is independent 
of the means of observation.2 
This is a critical observation. Its meaning for the physical 
sciences still has not been fully realized. It serves to highlight 
even more the position of the social sciences. They are faced with this 
'~oving relativity" plus the existential position of being part of the 
object itself. This at once sets them apart from the natural and physi-
cal sciences in that their problems are more acute and more complex when 
1Bohr, Atomic Physics •• • , p. 19. 
2Ibid., p. 25. 
it comes to being a "science" in the full sense of the word. 
In recent years the social sciences have become aware of a general 
malaise among many of their fraternity. The reason is that there is 
growing concern the brotherhood is failing to answer the really signifi-
cant questions facing humanity. The ~and whither have taken on a 
will-o-the-wisp character Tools for statistical research have been 
developing rapidly, but the solutions fail to come . The drilling has 
produced no moisture for an arid land. The research seems to be barren 
and fruitless. It is a vast desert of abstracted theory, or empiricism, 
or concern with trivia . The crucial question becomes one of discovering 
the method which will enable the social scientist to observe and de-
scribe human behaviour in as objective a fashion as possible. This leads 
to the basic contributions of Georges Gurvitch . In these introductory 
paragraphs basic problems which plague the social sciences were con-
sidered. It is the purpose of the description which follows to show 
that Gurvitch is qui~e aware of these problems and has posed some so-
lutions which should be carefully weighed . Up until now he has been 
treated with indifference and almost totally neglected. Thus far the 
catalogue of issues reads like this: 1) How can social science and 
history be mutually supportive? 2) What is the proper arrangement be-
tween theory and empirical research? 3) What is the relationship be-
tween method and object, subject and object , the observer and the 
observed? 4) How can the totality be grasped and its individual parts 
still studied? 5) How can the purposes of knowledge be served, answers 
provided to the questions of why and whi ther in an age of increasing 
intellectual and academic specialization? Obviously these issues are 
interrelated . They will serve as the criteria for analyzing Gurvitch's 
method and his understanding of the object of sociology. 
2. Method and Object 
It has long been an accepted axiom that a discipline in order to 
be a science must follow the scientific me~hod. This is the only cri-
terion. The object is not important . If the method is followed, this 
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is sufficient. Now it has become patently true that this is too simple 
an explanation. It is readily agreed that the object and method are 
reciprocally interactive. The method is determined in large part by 
the object. The object m~ change, thereby requiring the method to 
change. They must be seen together: object and method, observer and 
observed. Aa indicated above, the very nature of the scientific method 
has evolved in response to the type of universe that has emerged before 
the persistent efforts of the scientists . The tools or the methods one 
uses as a scientist are no more absolutistic than the hypotheses mentioned 
previously. 'Moreover, as the quotations from Bohr so explicitly state, 
this method has became increasingly dialectical, in terms of the re-
lationship of the instruments of observation (including the operator) 
and the material being observed. It is also dialectical in the sense of 
the tenn "complementarity", which means that seemingly contradictory 
hypotheses verified under separate and different conditions, are 
actually mutually supportive and contribute to the overall "storehouse" 
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of factual material . One theory of light is applicable under certain 
given conditions. Another theory is equally true under other circum-
stances. It is in the face of this growing realization of dialectical 
quality to both the physical universe and social reality, that Gurvitch 
goes beyond the simple basis for a discipline's being called a science . 
He points out that all reality is dialectically interrelated by virtue 
of the human element, itself a dialectical tension between the individual 
and the collective. Even if the natural universe were not dialectic, 
the method for studying it involves the human factor . The choice of 
artificially derived frames of reference brings in this dialectical 
aspect and hence calls for operational processes which are applicable to 
such phenomena. In other words 1 every science, and more acutely soci-
ology, constructs its object of study. It chooses, generalizes from 
the phenomena it observes , never encompassing all that universe. As 
knowledge expands, the periphery of mystery extends. Artificially 
conceived abstractions serve as the categories for systematizing and 
analyzing. Hence the method and the object are, in this sense, one. 
One sees therefore, that a whole dialectic already exists 
between the spheres of the real, the operational framework 
of the science and the object which it constructs from this 
method. But this dialectic is particularly intense in the 
social sciences by virtue of their "engagedn character where 
conscious and unconscious value judgmints enter in and against 
which they must unceasingly struggle. 
The dialectical method is proposed by Gurvitch then as the solu-
tion for this problem of the relationships between the object and 
subject, the observer and the observed, summed up in the problem of 
lnialectique et sociologie, p. 183. 
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objectivity. If a science is going to be a science, it will have to 
adopt a method which will deal realistically with this "engaged 11 charac-
ter of the social disciplines. E. H. Carr, in a Cambridge lecture, de-
lineates this notion. 
In the social sciences subject and object belong to the same 
category and interact reciprocally on each other. Human 
beings are not only the most complex and variable of natural 
entities, but they have to be studied by other human beings, 
not by independent observers of another species. Here man is 
no longer content, as in the biological sciences, to study his 
ow.n physical make-up and physical relations. The sociologist, 
the economist, or the historian needs to penetrate into forms 
of human behaviour in which the will is active, to ascertain 
why the human beings who are the object of his study willed to 
act as they did. This sets up a relation, which is peculiar 
to history and the social sciences, between the observer and 
the observed.l 
Such differences in the domain of study require the social sciences 
to find a way of handling this quality of "engagement". The dialectic 
seen as a hyperempirical and radically relativistic method is the way to 
deal with this characteristic. Gurvitch, then, is meeting head on the 
problems of subjectivity and the nature of the material being studied. 
He notes the inextricable bond which dialectica~ly links the proper 
domain of the discipline with the method for studying it. The true 
nature of the dialectic will be revealed in the character of this sphere 
of study which for sociology is social reality. 
1carr, What is Histo;Y?, p. 89. 
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3. Social Reality as the Total Social Phenomena 
Martin, in his study of Gurvitch, errs in st ating that "soci-
ology is defined (ror GurvitcliJ by its method rather than by its 
objectn.l He has failed to see how Gurvitch relates reciprocally the 
domain of study and the method. Martin is contradictory when in the 
next paragraph he asserts, n for Gurvitch social reality is its rsoci-
ology1s~ object of study or the total social phenamena."2 
He is right in this statement. It is the object of concern which 
will determine the method for getting at these phenomena of social life. 
As that object changes, so does the method. There is no sacred scien-
tific method which the scientist is obligated to follow. c. Wright Mills 
once more nails down the point: 
Polykarp Kusch, Nobel Prize~winning physicist, has declared 
that there is no "scientific met.hod ", and that what is called 
by that name can be outlined for only quite simple problems. 
Percy Bridgman, another Nobel Prize-winning physicist, goes 
even further: 'There is no scientific method as such, but the 
vital feature of the scientist's procedure has been merely to 
do his utmost with his mind, no holds barred." 11The mechanics 
of discovery," Williams. Beck remarks, "are not known ••• I 
think that the creative process is so closely tied in with the 
emotional structure of an individual. • • that • • • it is a 
poor subject for generalization ••• u3 
The object of sociology will not only determine and relativize the 
character of the method, but this object will be the definition of the 
vocation of sociology. 
First, to follow Gurvitch's lead, what is not the domain of soci-
4Martin, Depth Sociology• • • , p. 1. 
2Ibid., P• 8. 
~ills, The Sociological Imagination, P• 58. 
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ology? It is well to remember that Gurvitch is convinced sociology 
must have a specific field of stu~. It must study a particular reality 
in a particular way. This is what sets it apart from other social 
sciences and from history. Hence, J. S. Mill's definition is unac-
ceptable, since it is too general and ignores not only the specificity 
of social reality but its very existence.1 Other authors see sociology 
as the integrative discipline of the particular social sciences. This 
throws it into the lap of epistemology, and refuses it status as a 
science itself. All discussion on method is fruitless; and moreover, 
the comparative method which is so much a part of sociology is elimi-
nated by such an understanding of the domain of study. This agrees with 
c. Wright Mills's criticism of one sector of what he calls abstracted 
empiricism in American sociology. This "school" defines the function of 
sociology as that of being a pathfinder for the onrushing social scien-
tists. Quoting Paul F. Lazarsfeld, 
[The sociologist] is so to say the pathfinder • • • When a new 
sector of human affairs is about to become an object of empiri-
cal scientific investigations, it is the sociologist who takes 
the first steps. He is the bridge between the social philoso-
pher, the individual observer and commentator on the one hand 
and the organized team work of the empirical investigators on 
the other hand ••• n2 
This really denies sociology a life of its own, a domain of study, a 
vision and a vocation. 
Gurvitch next tackles the so-called formalists. These theorists, 
~raite ••• , I, 4. 
2
•'What is Sociology?", Universitets Studentkontor, Skrivemaskinstua, 
Oslo, September, 1948 (mimeo) in Mills, op. cit., p. 59. 
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such as von Wiese and George Simmel of Germany, attempt to overcame the 
position of the former criticism by giving sociology a specific status. 
However, they choose the wrong method. Sinunel says that "sociology 
studies the forms of interpersonal relations". Gurvitch comments that 
the great merit of this position is to indicate that sociology in its 
generalizing will necessarily have to look for distinct types of structures. 
But the great weakness of this theory is to see forms without contents 
• • • This approach spins theories about forms but does not include the 
concrete expressions of groups and societies.1 Furthermore, to reduce 
the essence of social reality to interpersonal relations is to fall 
hopelessly into a nominalism which also denies the existence of real 
groups and societies, or more generally social reality as a specific 
entity. 
In general, Gurvitch reacts against all .theories which deny the 
irreducibility of groups and of the society, ~ich fail to see them as 
indecomposable realities. 2 Hence, the culturalists arose as a distinct 
school to combat this "formalism" and nominalism of von Wiese, Simmel, 
Dupreel, Bogardus, Park and Burgess, and Znaniecki, among others. The 
domain of sociology, however, is dissolved b.1 the cultural anthropolo-
gists and abstract culturalists, as Alfred Weber (brother to Max), into 
the culture or civilization as such. The definition of sociology would 
be somewhat like the following fo~ these cultural anthropologists: 
1T "t"' ra~ e •• • , 
sciences socialesll, 
a footnote, Ibid. 
2Ibid., P• 6. 
I, 5. Cf. Durkheim and Fauconnet, "Sociologie et 
La revue philosophique, 1903, P• 401 ff. Cited in 
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Groups and societies are only the executing instruments of a 
score which has been orchestrated in advance--this score is the 
"system" or ''form" of a civilization. All that remains to the 
sociologist is to discover the different types. They are quite 
numerous for some (Toynbee saw about twenty); for others there 
are only a few discernable (Spengler recognized only four).l 
Gurvitch does not make room for cultural anthropology as a sepa-
rate discipline. For him this study is within the domain of sociology. 
Gurvitch feels more affinity between himself and the cultural anthro-
pologists of the United States than he does with tne sociologists. It 
is a point worth remembering. French sociology in general is closer to 
cultural anthropology than it is to sociology in America. More will be 
said about this observation in the critical section. 
It was Marcel Mauss who cleared up the true relationship between 
society and civilization. Civilization, he says, is a social phenomenon 
of the second degree . Like all total social phenomena, it has its 
boundaries and its particular spirit. '~he form of a civilization is 
the totality of its specific aspects which reveal the ideas, the practices 
and the common products, or more or less common ones, of a certain 
number of given societies, invented by ana carriers of this civili-
zation. u2 l' auss underlines the dependent character of societies and 
civilizations . There are as few civilizations without societies as 
societies without civilizations. This conception of the total social 
phenomenon, 'Which will be scrutinized at length shortly, strikes at the 
roots of abstract culturalism in sociology . Culture is the content of 
society, the cement of groups and global totalities. To separate culture 
1Ibid., P• 1. 2T ·t"' ra~ e. • • , I, 8. 
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from the domain of society is to deny society once again specific, 
concrete content. Such abstraction is impossible. Current definitions 
of society in contemporary American text books suggest the difficulty 
of making this separation which Gurvitch is describing. For instance, 
one of the most popular college texts says a society has four charac-
teristics: 1) it occupies a definite territoryj 2) it provides for a 
means of reproduction; 3) it is an independent entity; and, 4) it 
includes a comprehensive culture.1 Such a definition straightway aug-
gests that Gurvitch has a definite point to make. If culture is neces-
sary for a society, and society essential for a culture, how can the two 
be studied separately? This question will be considered at a later 
point in this study. 
The fundamental roots for Gurvitch 1s view of social reality are 
found in works of the "founders 11 of sociology. He pays particular 
attention to Saint-simon, Proudhon, Comte, Marx and Spencer. These 
thinkers are important precisely because they saw "the specificity of 
social realityn.2 Saint-Simon called sociology "social physiology". 
He aaw society as a real entity in movement, in which the collective 
efforts, both spiritual and material, were something different from the 
individual participants with whom they interacted and interpenetrated. 
For Auguste Comte, human society (Humanity with a capital "H 11 ) was a 
real totality. It imposed itself on its individual members as bo~h 
subject and object, as the acquired and the effort, the speculative and 
~enry M. Johnson, Sociolo~: A Systematic Introduction, (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1960 , pp. 9-13. 
~raite ••• , I, 8. 
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the active, all in all, a totality which implied religion, education, 
and knowledge as regulative forces within it. Proudhon saw social 
reality as an immanent totality, the product of collective efforts, 
revealing several levels or dimensions . It was made up of collective 
power, reason, creativity and conscience or mind. Justice and the 
"ideal" were often in conflict. Other levels were law and similar agents 
of social control. Marx, the foremost prophet of social realism, 
viewed the social classes, society and man himself as real entities . 
These totalities were created by the interpenetration of social life 
illustrating a dialectical tension between the productive forces and 
the means of production (the social structures); the spiritual products 
or cultural works of religion, ideas, representations were all implied 
in the material production itself. Such groups as social classes in 
certain frameworks could be a productive force escaping the "ideolo-
gical superstructures".! Finally, Spencer saw clearly that the domain 
of sociology consists in studying "institutions", the means of "social 
control", and "social structures n. For him these were !!!,! entities. 
The real precursors of Gurvitch's thought are Emile Durkheim and 
certain of his disciples. Looking at Durkheim first, Gurvi tch discovers 
three separate definitions of sociology in his writings. The first two 
are explicit, the final one is implicit . Gurvitch has long been recog-
nized as one of the foremost critics--in the finest sense of the word--
of Durkheim. He says the first definition of sociology, according to 
1Ibid., PP• 8-9. 
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Durkheim, is given in his Regles de la methode sociologique (first 
edition, 1894). Here the theorist states that sociology is an autono-
mous science; "a social fact can only be explained by another social 
fact" and "must be treated as a thing 11 • Society thinks 1 feels 1 and acts 
completely differently from the members of it considered in isolation. 
The social fact for Durkheim is exterior to the individual and exercises 
such a constraint upon him. In the second edition of his book 1 Durkheim 
clears up some misinterpretations by adding that this external constraint 
may be seen as a kind of "social pressure 11 • He suggests that the indi-
vidual is affected by the "free social currents" of the collective mind. 
This world of the social facts cannot be known by introspection. It 
can only be known by its collective representations.1 The second defi-
nition has Durkheim agreeing with Marcel Mauss and Fauconnet in what 
they wrote in La grande encyclopedia fransaise of 1901. Here sociology 
is the science of institutions. "The institutions are the ensemble of 
acts and ideas which are incorporated as the contents of these 
structures. The individual finds himself before these acts and ideas 
which are more or less imposed upon him. 112 Durkheim himself wrote, 
"Sociology can be defined as the science of institutions, of . their 
origins and function."3 
Gurvitch criticizes this definition as being much wider and more 
relevant than the first, but the term "institution" has a rigid, almost 
cadaverous character. There is no roam in this definition for the 
lE . ssa~s •• • , P• 5. 3~., P• 6. 
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creative, the unexpected, the effervescent. Moreover, this was the 
phase in Durkheim's thought when he rejected the rights of any other 
social science to have a domain of its own to study. If this is the 
science of social institutions, would not economics study economic 
institutions, political science, political institutions, etc.? He 
concluded that all the social sciences are really absorbed into that of 
sociology. However, Gurvitch points out that different methods can be 
used to study the same area. Sociology is typological in its method, the 
particular social sciences are systematizing and analytical, history and 
ethnography are singularizing. tloreover, the same domain may be studied 
at different levels. Social morphology looks at the ecological and the 
morphological superstructure; grammar studies the signs and symbols 
incorporated in language; the science of law examines the patterns and 
roles of law, etc.1 In Durkheim's third definition he sees various 
levels, or depth sociology, also nascent in Proudhon (as previously 
mentioned), Marx, Bergson, and Hauriou, all preparers of the way for 
the real task of sociology and for its definition as well. Durkheim 
failed to see the plurality of methods which could be used to study this 
multi-dimensional social reality. 2 This aspect will come from other 
sources in Gurvitch's background. Still, Durkheim, according to 
Gurvitch, had the great merit of seeing the need to view social reality 
from a double perspective: that of looking at it as a social whole 
and at the same time examining the characteristics within that whole. 
1 J Traite ••• , I, 10. 
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However, Durkheim tried to establish too tight a causal line. Thus, he 
forgot the functional correlations, the calculation of probabilities, 
tendencies towards regularity and the modes of integration within the 
totality. Moreover, he had not sufficiently distinguished between the 
different social types . He was of the belief that such clear-cut 
qualitative distinctiomwould fragment the total nature of social reali-
ty, and one would be unable to see the continuous line of their develop-
ment . This necessity to see an evolutionary development from the archaic 
or primitive to the advanced and complex (quite obvious in his Elementa-
ry Forms of Religious Life) failed to include the great contribution of 
Max Weber, namely that of comjlrehension (verstehen) whd.ch enables the 
sociologist to establish these qualitatively distinct 11ideal 11 types . 1 
According to Gurvitch, Weber borrowed this conception of verstehen from 
the historian Dilthey (1833-19ll) who really meant by this tenu, 11tne 
direct grasping" or intuition of the real concrete totalities and the 
human meanings which are a part of them. However, Weber could not ac-
cept this definition, since he was hamstrung qy a conception of the 
human conscience which is closed and not open. This makes it impossible 
for an intuitive grasping of the ensemble, the real, the concrete in 
social life. Weber is the victim of a radical nominalism and individu-
alism which characterizes his conception of social reality. He rejects 
straightway the direct apprehension of social groupings or societies; 
he knows only fragmented particles, a mere collection of individual 
~raite •• • , I, 12, and C. I. S., XXVII, 9-10. 
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behaviours. Weber defines sociology in the following way: 
Sociology is a science which attempts the interpretative 
understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive 
at a causal explanation of its course and effects. In 
action is included all human behaviour when and in so far 
as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to 
it. Action is social in so far as, by virtue of the sub-
jective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or 
individuals), it takes account of the behaviour of others 
and is thereby oriented in its course.l 
Elsewhere, Weber makes this statement which underlines tne non-
realist position of this great thinker and the place where Gurvitcn 
finds his greatest difficulty in accepting what he has to say: 
• • .For the subjective interpretation of action in socio-
logical work all collectivities such as states, associations, 
foundations, must be treated as solely the resultants and 
modes of organization of the particular acts of individual 
persons, since these alone can be treated as agents in a course 
of subjectively understandable action. • • for sociological 
purposes there is no such thing as a collective personality 
which "acts"· When reference is made in a sociological con-
text to a 11state 11 or a "nation" or a "corporation", a "family", 
or "army corps", or to similar collectivities, what is meant 
is, on the contrary, only a certain kind of development of 
actual or possible social actions of individual persons.2 
Gurvitch asks if Weber doesn't fall into a kind of psychologism 
which is a result of his "interpretative comprehension" limited to the 
individual participant. He also points out this psychologism is limited 
by his "culturalism". Here Weber reduces all the social sciences to 
sciences of culture (Kulturwissenschaften).3 Weber goes on to attribute 
roles, symbols, patterns and values, the role of a "Predominant factor", 
animation 
2 Ibid., pp. 101-102. 3'fraite. • • , I, 13. 
155 
depending upon the subject being treated. This is particularly spelled 
out in his sociology of religion writings, i. e. , The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism.1 However, this culturalism did lead to 
his formulation of the typological method which has been an invaluable 
contribution to sociology. This method grew out of Weber's polemic 
against Rickert. The latter denied the possibility of sociology's be-
coming a science of culture, since it wanted to generalize in an area 
where generalizations are impossible. Weber discovered his typological 
method in response to this criticism. Types in sociology are considered 
to be "founded on the interpretative comprehension (understanding) of 
the meaning of behaviours, first of all, a subjective meaning, but which 
includes the cultural significations as well. These types are inter-
mediary between generalization and individualization ••• n. 2 By gener-
ality Weber does not mean an average or mean point; nor does he mean by 
individuality the sense of uniqueness. ''The ideal type as Weber used it 
is both abstract and general. It does not describe a concrete course of 
action, but a normatively ideal course, assuming certain ends and modes 
of nonnative orientation as 'binding' on the actors."3 It then described 
a typical action, not a real concrete one. It is a methodological tool, 
not an absolute concept. "The ideal types of social action which for 
instance are used in economic theory are thus 'unrealistic' or abstract 
in that they always ask what course of action would take place if it 
~ax Weber, The Protestant Ethic ana the Spirit of Capitalism 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958). 
2 ; Traite •• • , I, 14. 
3weber, The Theory of Social • • • • , p. 13 (Introductory remarks b,y 
Talcott Parsons, the translator and editor. 
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were purely rational and oriented to economic ends alone. ,,1. 
These types then are irreducible to any other types. They are 
qualitative and discontinuous types. '~hey are conscious stylizations ••• 
coherent images which are original or unique and serve as operational 
references for empirical research. 112 In this sense Weber always empha-
sized the pragmatic aspect of this concept. '~nly the movement 
from the ~ubjective sense' to the 'cultural meaning' furnished, according 
to Weber, by the particular social sciences, seemed. to him to limit the 
hypothetical and somewhat utopian character of his typology.n3 This 
typology of Weber was minutely broken down into various categories: 
social relationships, types of groups, types of global societies, types 
of power, procedures, types of charisms, types of struggles, types of 
religions, and various other types, including types of whole civili-
zations. Gurvitch suggests this taxonomf has a close affinity with 
George Simmel and his social forms. Whether this is so or not, the 
relationship between Weber and Simmel is in their mutual nominalism 
which denies the specificity and realness of collectivities or social 
reality. mweber reduced the social facts to 'chances' of individual 
behaviours and to meanings, ignoring thereby all other levels of social 
reality: the morphological base, the organizational level, symbols, 
roles, attitudes, and the collective mind.n4 Weber, like Simmel, 
van Wiese, and the majority of the American sociologists, sees the 
1~., P• lll. 
3Ibid. 
2 . , 14 Traite ••• , I, • 
4Ibid. 
-
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social as a web of interpersonal relationships wnose unity is a '~roba­
bility". '~eber ignored totally the problem of social structures; he 
did not grasp the conception of the total social phenomena at any of 
their levels and it impoverished social reality to the point of denying 
it altogether . ,.J. 
In summary, Weber made two great contributions: a) he developed 
a typology which was both discontinuous and qualitative; b) he did not 
fall into the trap of linking comprehension to explanation. However, 
he is at fault in the following ways, according to Gur~~tch's view: 
1) He made an arbitrary liaison between comprehension and sub-
jective interpretation. 
2) It is impossible to justify the passage from subjective mean-
ings to social and cultural meanings. 
3) He failed to leave any room for objective criteria in the 
establishment of types. 
4) The types which he did establish were linked to a spiritualized 
culturalism. 
5) The unfortunate fragmentation of types made it impossible to 
apply them to the various levels of the total social phenomena. 
6) The destruction of the social reality was caused by his radical 
nominalism. This made it impossible for Weber to grasp the reality of 
groups, classes, and the "We", as well as their cultural works. 
7) He tried to combine culturalism, psychologism, and formalism, 
1Ibid., PP• 14-15. 
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but failed to do so. They remained quite heterogeneous and resembled 
globules of oil on the sea of social reality. 
8) Finally, the total absence of a dialectical spirit made it 
impossible for Weber to see the total social phenomena or to grasp the 
collective wholes as real totalities.1 
Moreover, he failed to see that comprehension and explanation are 
only passing moments of one and the same process. This would become 
clear only in espousing the dialectical approach which clarifies this 
relationship and all others that go to explain the dynamic quality of 
social reality. 
Marcel Mauss is the terminal point of any discussion for Gurvitch 
on the definition of the method and object of sociology. This disciple 
of Durkheim def ined sociology as a science which "applies the wholistic 
method to the study of the 'total social phenamena'"·2 Mauss, in his 
efforts to understand the phenomenon of "potlatch" among the Kwakiut~ 
Indians of North America in particular, developed the notion of the 
total social facts, "that is to say, these phenomena such as potlatch 
set in motion ••• the whole of society and its institutions ••• all 
these phenomena are at once juridical, economic, religious, even aes-
thetic and morphological". 3 "l'hese are 'wholes' or entire social 
systems which we have described according to their functioning. • • they 
1T •t ' ra1. e. • • , I, 15. 
2~., p. 18. 
3sociologie et anthropologie (raris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1950), p. 274. 
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are dynamic ••. as opposed to a rigid or cadaverous condition ••• 
While considering these as wholes we perceived their essential quality, 
a movement of the total, a living aspect • •• nl Mauss gives this defi-
nition to sociology: '~he principle and the end of sociology is to 
apperceive the group as a whole, and its behaviour as a whole. n2 "l'he 
view of the total social phenomena can meet the arguments of the histori-
ans who say sociologists are too abstract b.1 separating society into 
bits and pieces. 113 It can also aid psychology, since sociology sees 
"the whole man or the complete man in which the body, soul, and society 
are interrelated and where the total social phenomenon and the total 
man tend to mean the same thing. tt4 
Gurvitch gleans five lessons from tbe sociology of Marcel Mauss: 
1) His conception of the total social phenomena was a reaction 
against the hyper-spiritualism of Durkheim's last period. Mauss substi-
tuted a relativistic realism and empiricism. 
2) Mauss reacted against the rigid, fixed notions of Durkheim's 
institutionalism and saw social reality as dynamic, in movement, ex-
hibiting tendencies of revolution and explosion within the most tra-
dition-bound groups or societies . 
3) He reacted as well against the separation of comprehension and 
explanation as two different processes . He could not accept the Weberian 
reduction of comprehension to an interpretation of the internal or sub-
jective meaning of individual behaviours. 
1Ibid., p .. 275. 
3rbid. 
2Ibid., P• 276. 
4rbid., pp. 276, 304-305. 
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4) He was opposed to every kind of abstract culturalism. 
5) Finally, he found unacceptable the separation of sociology and 
history according to objects of study. Both deal with the total social 
phenomena. Only their methods differ. 1 
Marcel Mauss, then, occupies the most important place in Gurvitch's 
immediate background. It is his heuristic conception of the total 
social phenomena which serves as the symbol to explain the multi-faceted, 
canplex dynamic unity of social reality. This is not to say t hat 
Gurvitch accepted everything Mauss had to say concerning this notion. 
In fact, he makes it clear where he feels the sociologist failed. 
First, Mauss hesitated to accept or rather did not spell out his quali-
tative typology to the extent that it clearly distinguished sociology 
from history. The reason for this is that Mauss identified the total 
social phenomena with the global societies and with them only. In other 
words, he was unable to see how these phenomena could also be incorpo-
rated into the microsociological elements and the lesser macrosociologi-
cal groupings. "But, to establish types of global societies along the 
lines of the total social phenomena, it is necessary to type their 
structures."2 The total social phenomena would have no body, no form., 
no handle by which to generalize. It is essential then, to type their 
structures whether they are complete or partial. (A structure is com-
plete when it is ·a global society.) Seconaly, Mauss failed to provide 
the points of reference for seizing these phenomena and their movements. 
~raite ••• , I, 18-19. ~bid., p. 19. 
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There is an absence of sufficient accentuation of the depth 
levels whose multi-dimensionality provokes a perpetual coming 
and going of mutual implications and polarizations; insuf-
ficient attention is paid to the tension between the astructur-
able, structurable and structured elements which are juxtaposed 
in the social macrocosms. 
The total social phenomena can only be seen in dynamic wholes 
moving from structuration, to destructuration and on again to restructur-
ation. In the last analysis, it is the dialectical movement among the 
microsociological aspects, the groupal and class macrocosms and the 
global societies, each with their own manifestations of the total social 
phenomena, which escapes the otherwise sharp perception of Marcel Mauss. 
This will be Gurvitch's own contribution to this notion. 2 
In sum, Mauss lacked the proper method to view this object of 
sociology. His typology was imprecise; he also failed to understand 
the place of the dialectic as the modus operandi for grasping these 
total social phenomena in their totality. The dialectic is the only 
assurance the sociologist possesses that every philosophical pretension 
will be eliminated; moreover, it is the only method which can possibly 
grasp the full impact of a social reality so susceptible to change, to 
movement, to upheaval, to volcanic eruptions, to the unexpected; it is 
the only method which can at one and the same time provide a way of 
understanding both the centripetal and centrifugal forces which are 
operative in the social whole. 
Thus Gurvitch comes to this conclusion: '~ne cannot define the 
libid. 
-
2Ibid., P• 19. 
-
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specificity of sociology without stipulating precisely at once its 
domain and method whose interpenetration give birth to its object.nl 
This then, is the more concise and explicit statement of the relation-
ship between object and method. The domain of sociology is social 
reality. Social reality is the total social phenomena. 
There is no doubt in the minds of laymen as well as professional 
sociologists that a quality of life exists which is called social. It 
is obvious to the practiced eye as well as to the untrained one that 
man is a social creature. Aristotle's dictum, ·~ is by nature a poli-
tical animal," still holds when taken in its generic sense . Yet the 
notion of social life, social reality, groupal living, and society is 
ephemeral. It is elusive and difficult to grasp. Its content escapes 
categorization and neat conceptualization. Still) there is this aspect 
of life which calls for disciplined attention and study. Scholars, 
writers, artists, musicians, historians, and social scientists have been 
trying to describe it. Mass movements, social classes, Western civili-
zation, the Muslim world, political parties, the primitive cultures, the 
family and clan units, and economic groupings are some of the names 
given to group phenomena. These are far from precise terms. Others are 
even more vague. Still social reality has an irreducible quality for 
those who follow the findings of Emile Durkheim. It is something more 
than the sum of its individual members. This social reality is a real 
totality; it is far from static. It is moving, creating, changing, 
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threatened from below, from without, and from within by all kinds of 
conflicts and tensions. It is never at rest. Even the most tradition-
bound global societies have within them the latent seeds of radical 
change. This era is one of rapid social change. Increased technology, 
communications, globe-encompassing means of transportation have brought 
once isolated peoples into relationships with persons of divergent back-
grounds and outlooks on life. The process of change is constant and 
swifter than in yester.year. A group or a class, a society moves from 
this hierarchy of relationships to the next hierarchy in a matter of 
years, or even months. At the center are those classes or groups in 
conflict which vie for power and through revolution upset the former 
arrangements instituting their own notions, their own hierarchy of ideas, 
symbols, roles, attitudes, organizations and creative endeavors. Social 
reality is caught in a tug-of-war between the centripetal forces Which 
unifY and the centrifugal forces Which threaten to tear it apart. If 
such disintegration occurs, the new forces soon right the ship or re-
build it and put it on a tentative even keel. 
Unilinear, unidimensional, single views of this social reality 
which would fix and arrange, systematize and absolutize, are outmoded. 
New conceptions, new methods, new visions must be found to describe a 
social reality which has changed so much from that which the first 
social scientists began to look at in the beginning years of their 
disciplines. 
Social reality is more than its surface manifestations. One can 
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count noses, houses, cars, trucks, schoolrooms, acres of land being 
farmed, tenements, playgrounds, the number of votes for a candidate, 
ascertain age, sex, length of residence, and increases in population 
density, but this will not explain social reality. One can add up the 
number of times one person speaks to this or that individual in a small 
group, the number of times this individual is chosen for leadership, the 
number of times this process is followed to make a certain decision, but 
this will not describe the profound qualities of social reality. The 
question of why asserts itself at each juncture. For instance, ~' 
asked M. Mauss, do these North American Indians practice potlatch? Is 
it for juridical reasons? Do the economic motives answer this question? 
Are the religious aspects sufficient to explain this phenomenon? No, 
none will do alone. The solution only comes in seeing this as a total 
social phenomenon. 1 
But how are these total social phenomena arranged? What exactly 
are they? Again, looking at potlatch it is readily discernible by ex-
ternal observation that certain material factors are involved, certain 
artifacts can be catalogued, certain numbers of people located in certain 
ways, involving this amount of foodstuffs and banquet tables, etc.; all 
this can be added up and tabulated. But this is only the surface mani-
festation of potlatch. It tells the observer something, but it fails to 
answer the total question of ~~ Beneath, one can see certain social 
organizations at play. The arrangements of the families, the ceremonies 
1
sociology of Law, pp. 263-264. 
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that accompany this practice, the ritual, the specific w~s of social 
organization, in sum, make possible the practice of potlatch. These tools 
of social life are discernible no longer qy external observation, but 
are only comprehended by getting at their various meanings. In other 
words, . this stratum of social life is less accessible to the sociolo-
gist. He must dig more deeply, and when he does, he discovers this is 
not all. The organizations are insufficient to explain everything. 
Obviously social reality is more than what can be observed by the 
external tools of the physical senses. These fail to explain. The 
sociologist must explore in depth the more profound levels of social 
reality to capture even a partial understanding of its life. Hence, 
taking a lead from the work in psychology, Gurvitch has developed what 
he calls a "depth sociology 11 • The total social phenomena are arranged 
not only horizontally but vertically. It is this vertical view of 
social reality that commands a closer inspection. 
i. The Vertical View of Social Reality. 
The origins of this notion in Gurvitch1s thought are easily trace-
able to his work in social law theory. The chapter on his background 
spelled this out in some detail. There are two levels, generally speak-
ing, to social life: the organized and the spontaneous. Or in Marxian 
terminology, the superstructure and the infrastructure. There are 
various degrees to these two levels. These degrees are discernible on a 
vertical line moving from the hardened crust of the morphological mani-
festations through the levels of the superstru.cture, becoming more 
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supple as the descent is made, finally crossing over into the realm of 
the spontaneous. 
It is essential to see this conception of depth sociology as a 
symbolic image or tool for grasping the whole idea of social reality. 
This is a device and not an absolute . The procedure for describing this 
fundamental conception of Gurvitch will be first, to show the develop-
ment of his thought, second, the method for distinguishing between these 
stages, and third, the description of the ten depth levels . 
Briefly, the development of Gurvitch 1s notion of depth sociology 
followed his studies in legal sociology which gradually moved into 
general sociology. As indicated above, he saw social life divided be-
tween the two general levels of superstructure and infrastructure. 
This thought came from his concentrated studies in social law, especial-
ly as he sought to work out the notion of obedience and the source of 
the law's authority. Why do people abide by the law? He answered that 
beneath any type of coercive power was the social force, the infra-
structure of lawabidingness built into the warp and woof of social life . 
If one explored this notion deeply enough he came to the normative fact 
which is the ground for all authority in law. This normative fact was 
a creature of the social collectivity and in turn changed and affected 
it. It was at once the creature and the creator of social life . This 
normative fact existed at the spontaneous level beneath the crusted 
surface of the organized social life. Going back further into Gurvitch's 
life it is well to recall that the notion he had of social law and the 
general outlines of his sociology came from the direct experience of the 
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Russian revolutions . These two levels to social reality were crystal 
clear to the young student. In times of relative peace and quiet these 
levels are less discernible, but still they provide a method for under-
standing and explaining social life. 
Gurvitch says he is not the only one who has had such notions 
about social reality. He includes in the list of the precursors of 
depth sociology, Proudhon and Marx, Durkheim and Hauriou, and Bergson 
and the phenomenologists (who proceed by inversion and reduction towards 
the "immediate 11 ) . The basic ideas which have been underlined by Gur-
vitch have been mentioned previously. It is sufficient to say that 
Gurvitch feels each one of these thinkers, though he had the notion of 
depth levels as descriptive of social reality, nevertheless could not 
escape creating a hierarchy of values. Proudhon as a rationalist gave 
the most important place to collective reason. Marx placed greatest 
emphasis on the material forces of production. Durkheim, who rejected 
in his early career every temptation to give the primary position to 
morphological factors, gradually placed the collective mind in a superior 
rank which he identified as Logos or Spirit. Bergson finally reached 
the conclusion that the social spontaneity incarnating the elan vital in 
society is of primar.y importance. Hauriou, influenced by his Thomism, 
affirmea without hesitation the superiority of the spiritual in the drama 
taking place between the various levels of social reality.1 In sum, 
lLa vocation •• • , p. 65. 
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It would no longer be possible to compromise depth sociology 
to a particular philosophical thesis. Depth sociology would 
have to renounce every tendency towards supporting one type 
of method such as "inversion 11 or "phenomenological reduction", 
since as a science it could have no particular philosophical 
orientation whatsoever.l 
This last statement is of particular importance in the development 
of Gurvitch's thought on the vertical view of social reality. In a 
footnote to this passage just cited, he recognizes that he erred in both 
his Essais de sociologie of 1938 and L'experience juridique of 1935, by 
proclaiming the special value of phenomenological reduction or inversion 
for the depth analysis of social reality. He does the same tning in his 
Sociology of Law, 1940. One passage from these works will be sufficient 
to illustrate his allegiance to this philosophical position. In 
L' experience juridique, he asserts tnat in order to grasp the "immediate 
juridical experience" it is necessary to proceed by an effort of 11re-
duction and inversion (which ••• goes downward by stages), moving from 
daily experience of juridical life to the pure experience of the immedi-
2 
ate"· 
His Essais de sociologie produced this statement: 
There remains only one way to find the objective criteria which 
will enable making the distinction between the different forms 
of sociability: it is the method of inversion or phenomenolo-
gical reduction (Husserl), which is the immanent decomposition 
of the domain bl digging deeper to the superimposed levels of 
social reality.:; 
He goes on to s~ that this descending process, which moves from 
libid. 
2L'experience juridique, p. 63 . 
~ssais ••• , pp. 20-21. 
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one depth level to another until one arrives at the most profound source 
of social experience, is the method of depth sociology and reveals a 
vertical social pluralism. 
Finally, in his Sociology of Law, he states that: 
The best approach to problems of the sociology of the noetic 
mind (or of the human spirit) and to the determination of its 
exact place among the various sociological disciplines, would 
seem to be via the levels--or depth--analysis of social reality. 
This type of analysis is inspired by the "method of inversion" 
(Bergson) or ''phenomenological reduction" (Husserl), i . e . , an 
immanent downward reduction through successive stages towards 
whatever is most directly experienced in social reality. l 
What method does he use to get at these depth levels? Martin, in 
his study, suggests that though Gurvitch denies any allegiance to the 
phenomenological method of reduction or to Bergsonian inversion, he 
still unconsciously maintains this as the way to move from one level to 
another until the deepest point is reached , the ground of being, the 
ontological fact which is before everything else . Gurvitch in recent 
publications admits that he tended to favor a particular philosophical 
method in order to grasp the depth levels . He feels now he has sue-
ceeded in divesting himself of every tendency in this direction because 
he has developed his dialectical method. The radical ''hyper-empiricism" 
of this new approach militates against any philosophical "reductionism" 
and makes it possible for him to utilize several means to get at the 
vertical pluralism of social reality. The different depth levels inter-
act in varying ways. They are hierarchized differently according to 
the types of societies and their global structures, as well as partial 
structures . This requires constant surveillance and study of each 
1sociology of Law, p. 42. 
of these depth levels as they function within the various frameworks 
of social reality. There is no general scheme for social reality. It 
can only be determined by examining the various discontinuous and 
qualitatively different types of social frameworks. 
There are three methodological rules to remember when applying 
this vertical view to social reality: 
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1) To say that one level is more profound or a deeper position than 
another is not to imply a value judgment. This merely means that a 
level is more accessible or less accessible to direct ext ernal obser-
vation. Hence, the most "superficial" layer is that of the morpho-
logical and ecological factors. This signifies that these factors 
are more readily observable. PThe stages below in social reality are, 
therefore, simply those which require a greater effort in order to 
grasp them and study them scientifically."1 
To talk in terms of depth is really to talk of the degree of 
difficulty involved in grasping the "data" or the phenomena which exist 
beneath the obvious in social reality. In this sense, sociology follows 
the goal of any science, namely, to 11find the hidden". 2 
2) This second rule concerns the total view of these phenomena. 
All of these depth levels are indissolubly linked together and inter-
penetrate. I£ they were isolated from one another, they would cease to 
exist. Each is a moment of the total social phenomenon. Each is united 
irreducibly and indivisibly within this total complex. Gurvitch makes 
lLa vocation •• • , P• 66. 
2sociologie et dialectique, P• 1. 
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it plain that there can be no system of continuity developed between 
these different levels. In reality the more valid characteristic is that 
of discontinuity. There is never a time when a society is totally 
cbhesive or completely disruptive. The two forces of cohesion and 
disunity or divisiveness are at work. It can be described only in terms 
of degrees of cohesion or diversity. There are moments, fleeting 
moments, when conflicts are overcome and a complete sense of unity is 
realized, but they soon pass. Witness the recent Algerian independence. 
Moments of unity existed perhaps when such independence was proclaimed 
after so many years of torment and conflict, but this unity was short-
lived. The conflicts, the tensions and the divisions returned in short 
order. The degrees of disunity must be plotted. This is the way in 
which to see these total social phenomena. 
These tensions between the phenomena are not only observable 
within the global societies where the task of discerning them is much 
easier, but within the various groupings, social classes, and even the 
microsociological elements. "To limit the conception of the total 
social phenomenon ) to global societies woula be committing a grave 
methodological error. Each group and even each form of sociability 
can and must be equally conceived as total phenomena, that is, envisaged 
in the whole of their depth levels.•~ This means that the approach of 
analysis remains the same in every aspect of sociology. It does not 
change. It must also be kept in mind that the three sociological planes 
11a vocation ••• , p. 68. Cf. also The Spectrum of Social Time, 
P• 7. 
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or types are only distinguished pragmatically and methodologically. 
Their divisions are always relative and they, too, form a whole. They 
are inextricably bound together. The types of societies, the types of 
groupings, and the forms of sociability presuppose each other and are 
dialectically related. They, then, make up what is known as the complete 
total social phenomena.1 In a summary statement, the total social phe-
nomena are the points of reference for carrying on sociological study. 
They suggest at once the necessary unity of the task as well as the 
various levels or domains of research which are available and which 
must be undertaken. They unify the effort, while at the same time break-
ing down the task in order that the work is scientifically respectable. 
Finally, the nature of social reality reveals a constant compro-
mise being formed between continuity and disconti nuity. In sociology 
discontinuity is stressed over continuity. The reverse is so in history. 
Nevertheless, in order to eliminate any errors and overburdening of the 
facts concerning this facet of sociological analysis, it is essential to 
realize that the degrees of continuity and discontinuity vary even 
according to the different types of social frameworks. This stresses 
once again the necessity of turning to the dialectical method and to a 
super-empiricism coupled with a radical relativism. 
3) The number of depth levels is not fixed. These are merely 
operational tools for studying social reality fr~m one viewpoint, the 
1Ibid. 
-
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vertical . It is not an ~priori conception. 'The validity of these 
sociological frameworks can only be verified from a practical stand-
point.nl It is possible to haveN /- 1 number of depth levels. Clearly 
there is no roam for absolute boundaries or partitions in science . 
Sociology is looking for some conceptual tools which help in getting at 
the analysis of social reality, to the end of explaining why and whither. 
Every scientific step is a partial understanding. It is based on 
applied rationa 1 procedures situated mid-way between the 11instrumentaln 
and the "dialectic 11 and the "coherent". ''Depth sociology constructs 
and delimits social reality in more or less artificial levels in order 
to arrive at some effective operational frameworks which can serve as 
points of rapport for empirical research . 112 If these frameworks are 
going to do their job they must remain flexible, supple, and subject to 
change as the need arises . It may be they will have to be added to or 
some levels deleted. 'The dialectization of the simple, which Gaston 
Bachelard considers as the vocation of contemporary science, finds in 
sociology a particularly singular and complete application. n3 
ii. The Depth Levels of Social Reality 
Gurvitch proposes depth sociology as one way to look at social real-
ity (the total social phenomena). If the sociologist follows from the most 
superficial layer down to the less accessible levels until he reaches 
the least accessible, he will have ~way of describing the strange, 
exciting, continually changing and deceptively appearing social reality 
3rbid. 
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in which he and every human being live . The techniques for getting at 
these various levels will change as the process downward continues. The 
more simple methods or tools will be sufficient for the more superficial 
layers; the more complicated tools will be required to arrive at a 
sufficient description of the lower depth levels. The following approach 
in depth can be traversed: 
(1) The surface level of morphology and ecology. This layer is 
viewed from outside. It is the most superficial and the easiest to 
observe. Here the observer notes the perceptible persona and things; 
he is looking at the "geographic and demographic basis of society 11 • 1 
He notes the density of population, its distribution in relationship to 
the soil, its mobility in the urban centers; he marks the number and 
kinds of churches, monuments, buildings, prisons, residences, stores, 
factories, means of conununication, various means of transportation, the 
types of products, both farm and industrial, tools, machinery, and work-
shops. These are all part of "social morphology". 2 It is at this level 
that one notes the interpenetration of the natural milieu with the 
social attitudes and influences. Even the geographical factors have 
been transformed qy the social activity, by the human element. The very 
reason for the desire to "control 11 the natural environment is socially 
derived. It is out of this process of socializing the material milieu 
that the conception of property arose. Property, then, has a social 
meaning implicit even in the most individualistic notion of private 
1 Sociology of Law, p. 43. 
21a vocation. 
. . ' P• 70. 
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ownership. "The property consists in an intense participation of the 
things of society; all that is, in one way or another, appropriated, 
is penetrated b.Y social fluids.ttl This suggests the reality of social 
layers beneath the notion of property which sustain the whole system of 
property. This was the basis for Marcel Mauss 1 s discovery of the ''total 
social phenomenon" as he observed it in the whole practice of Le Don 1 
. 2 forme archaique de l'echange, 1923. 
(2) Social organization. Probing more deeply into social reality, 
one soon encounters the organized aspect of social life. A meeting is 
held at the local union hall to decide what the decision will be con-
earning the latest offer from the board of dir~ctors of the local steel 
plant; a marriage ceremony is held in a church where at a particular 
moment in the service both the religious organization and the state are 
represented. The Congress defeats a bill for medical care; the Supreme 
Court decides the states must reapportion their legislatures. These are 
all illustrative of the "organized" side of collective life. ''The 
organizations are those pre-established collective behaviours which are 
managed, hierarchized, and centralized according to certain derived 
patterns and mich fix in advance the expected behaviour in a more or 
less rigid manner. 113 
These organizations exercise considerable constraint or social 
pressure. They are onet of the ways in which social control is applied. 
11a vocation ••• , p. 71. 
2cr. his Sociologie et anthropologie, pp. 145-284. This monograph 
is reprinted in these pages. 
3
op. cit., p. 71. 
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There is always a certain distance present between the organizations and 
the spontaneous social life characterized by the sense of "We"· This 
distance is always plotted in terms of degrees. This also points to 
the "realtt social life which can never be captured in an organization. 
The organization is only partially successful in reflecting or contain-
ing this spontaneous level beneath. Here is Gurvitch 1 s early work in 
sociology of law being applied. In fact, his discussion of the differ-
ences between authoritarian regimes and democratic systems clearly de-
lineates this notion of the interpenetration of the superstructure by 
the infrastructure. 
Gurvitch makes it especially clear that the organization is not to 
be confused with a social structure. He is particularly short with the 
American sociologists who have not seen this organized aspect as being 
only one level of social reality. They have been impeded by their 
nominalism to such an extent in order to bring these atomistic elements 
into some kind of unity, they have had to rely on the notion of organi-
zation. They have tried to distinguish between formal and infoxmal 
organization in order to take care of the nonstructurable elements 
(astructurable in Gurvitch's terminology), but this is to confuse the 
two separate categories of organizations and structures. The organi-
zations form an important part of the structures, but they are only one 
layer of social reality, one aspect of the total social phenomena which 
are partially revealed (in toto) in each structure. The organizations 
can never express a global society even if that society is rigidly and 
completely organized. "· •• The importance,,. the efficacy, role, 
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characteristics, weight an~ number of organizations, var.y functionally 
according to the social structures which make them possible and in 
which they are integrated.nl Elsewhere Gurvitch makes this point even 
clearer when he states: 
The structures represent a precarious balance of multiple 
hierarchies; as such they constitute a phenomenon which is 
much more complex than the organizations. The structures 
have a considerably richer content than the organizations 
and this makes the notion of structure more complex as a 
concept. If the structures never succeed in expressing 
entirely the total social phenomena, the organizations, taken 
separately in their whol~, never succeed in representing 
entirely the structures. 
More will be said about these relationships when the discussion 
centers on the "horizontal" aspects of social reality. Suffice it to 
say at this juncture that Gurvitch is making every effort to define very 
carefully the conceptions of organization, structure and total social 
phenomenon . Care must be taken in showing how he personally defines 
these terms, in order that his theoretical position is understood. 
If the organizations are only partial expressions of social 
structures which are themselves partial expressions of the total social 
phenomena, then one must push further into the interior, or below the 
surface, to discover the next level of social life which is revealed to 
the sociologist as he makes this effort to probe beyond the mere surface 
of things . 
(3) The stratum of social patterns. In Gurvitch's original ex-
pression of these depth levels, he did not include the role of social 
11a vocation •• • , P• 407. 
2Ibid., p. 439. 
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patterns . He went further to the layer of symbols. His Sociology of 
Law, published four years later in the United States, did contain this 
level. Why did he decide to include this stratum? Has he complicated 
the study of social reality from this perspective of depth analysis by 
adding this stratum of social patterns or models? He will also add the 
levels of social roles and attitudes . The same question can be asked. 
This level containing signs and signals and rules lends a certain 
regularity to social life, whether this be in the form of a set of ex-
pectations one can make concerning a certain behaviour or as an over-
riding influence which leads to a specific pattern of behaviour. These 
models or patterns cover a vast domain of traditional cliches, slogans, 
social signals and signs which are formulated in advance, plus very tempo-
raJY fads, modes and fancies. They are a particular level of social 
reality because they go beyond the sphere of organizations where, indeed 
they play a promin ent role . In fact, these latter could not exist with-
out them. They also influence the collective behaviours which take 
place outside the organizations . In other words, these patterns affect 
the two levels on either atde of them, and are distinctlY different. 
How? Certain illustrations will help to indicate this. This will also 
show how many factors are included in this substratum: national and 
regional dishes, fashions in clothes, industrial and agricultural tech-
niques, manners, etiquette, protocol, are all examples. What is more, 
national and local festivals, education, political life, juridical life, 
179 
and even moral and religious life are permeated by these patterns. "The 
social patterns guide and direct not only behaviour but also mental life 
itself, whether it be collective or individual. 111 This would include 
both intellectual colorations such as the mental "states 11 of represenot-
tations, perceptions, memories and opinions and mental "acts" of 
judgments and intuition, and emotional and voluntaristic colorations, 
encompassing the irrational or affective side of human nature. 
Patterns are both traditional customs and routines ana the passing 
fashions and modes of any era. Hence, patterns are neither simply rigid 
normative rules by which groups are ordered, nor are they fleeting fads 
of a given society, but they are in some sense both. Currently, there 
is a distinction made between cultural patt erns and technical patterns . 
Gurvitch feels this somewhat valid, though relative . They once again 
interact. The cultural models would relate to the spiritual or value-
oriented side of social life . These would reveal the character of 
religion, knowledge , art and education, plus morality and law. Tech-
nical models would refer to those aspects of daily life such as the ! 
recipes for preparing a certain dish , or the methods to carry out eco-
nomic transactions. However, it is clearly seen that the way in which 
economic life is organized and regulated affects the cultural patterns, 
since no segment of social life is totally made up of either ideational 
or technical processes. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this basic 
interaction to which Gurvitch is pointing is the description of the 
1La vocation ••• , I, 73-74. 
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impact of technical change on cultural patterns given in the UNESCO 
study edited by Margaret Mead ana entitled Cultural Patterns and 
Technical Chan~e. 
Technical change is ••• as old as civilization and since 
time immemorial the ways of life of whole peoples have been 
transformed b.Y the introduction of new tools and new technical 
procedures, as inventions like the plough, the domestication 
of animals, writing, the use of steam, the f ctory assembly 
line, and the internal cambust~on engine, have been diffused 
from one country to another. Relationships or relative domi-
nance between two peoples, population balances, dynasties, and 
whole religious systems have been upset by some change in 
technology, just as the inventions which underlie technological 
change have themse±ves arisen from changing conceptions of 
nature and of man. 
Gurvitch finds it necessary at this level of social reality to 
distinguish clearly between signs, signals and symbols. He points out 
that the American behaviourists so often identify signs with symbols. 
Signals as such do not have a symbolic character. They merely act to 
remind, to transmit an order of society or group which in turn prescribes 
a certain behaviour on the part of the members. Hence, when the whistle 
blows in a factory at 8:00 a.m. it is a signal that work is to begin 
officially. The signals are closer to technical patterns than cultural 
ones. 
Social signs are certain expressions "which are substituted for a 
particular meaning ana fulfill the role of an intermediary between this 
meaning and the collective or individual subjects who are called to 
comprehend or to grasp it". 2 An example would be an arrow pointing the 
~argaret Mead, ed., Cultural Patterns and Technical Change 
(New York: UNESCO, 1953), P• 9. 
21a vocation •• • , pp. 75-76. 
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way to Paris. This arrow says simply, this is the shortest way to Paris 
and it is by this route. These signs are not symbols. They express 
very completely what significations they wish to convey. This is not so 
for symbols. The reason why will become clear when that level of social 
reality is discussed. 1 
In answer to why Gurvitch decided to add this stratum to the seven 
original depth levels, the reason probably lies in his discussions and 
readings and experiences in the United States, particularly with cultur-
al anthropology just coming of age early in the 1940's. As has been 
maintained up to this point, Gurvitch is more closely allied with the 
whole school of cultural anthropology in the United States than he is 
with the work here in sociology. The comparisons will be made in the 
subsequent chapters. It is enough to say at this juncture that his whole 
discussion of cultural and technical patterns subsumed under the heading 
of social models shows his coming to grips with this 11 new11 area of study 
in the United States. It was only after World War II, as Clyde Kluck-
hohn points out in his Mirror for Man, that cultural anthropology began 
to be studied seriously in many of the colleges and universities. 2 
It is also clear that Gurvitch tries to show there is a distinc-
tive difference among the levels of organization, social patterns and 
collective behaviours. This latter considers those more or less regu-
lar collective behaviours which are not linked to an organization, and 
thus have a distinctive quality of their own. 
lclass notes, the University of Paris, November 26, 1956. 
2New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949, pp. 168 ff •• 
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(4) Unorganized collective behaviour. The social patterns imply 
this level. It is this unorganized collective behaviour that fulfills 
the social models. There is often a separation or inconsistency be-
tween the expected behaviour and that which is observed. This gulf 
varies of course. It is only on rare occasions that the behaviour does 
not follow the expected patterns of the more superficial level. The 
study of these more or less regular behaviours reveals a hierarchy 
based on the criterion of spontaneity. One moves from the more rigid 
and regular to the more unpredictable and dynamic. The following will 
serve as an illustration of the scale: 
a) Rituals and traditional ceremonies founded on rigorously de-
fined traditions, which are followed to the letter. Religious ritual, 
juridical and administrative processes are particularly clear-cut 
examples. 
b) Then come the collective behaviours such as practices, morals, 
routines, or "kinds of life" which are much more supple than the 
ritualistic and traditional type. Perhaps the term folkloric would be 
acceptable to describe this style of behaviour. 
c) Fashions and fads are fluid and changing behaviours. They 
are not linked to custom or habit, but are constantly renewed and sub-
ject to revision . One observes these in fashions, be they li~erary, 
artistic, philosophical or millinery. 
d) Finally comes the "level of collective behaviours" which reject 
the accepted patterns and promote the unexpected. These are the non-
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conformist, the insubordinate, and the "highly irregular 11 • 1 
These distinctions recall once again Gurvitch's previous work in 
social law and the sociology of law. It is enough to recount from his 
Sociology of Law that two vertical classifications were given: "jural 
reality corresponding exactly to the two superimposed strata of active 
sociality: spontaneous sociality and reflected sociality. u2 In other 
words, these were the two levels of the organized and unorganized law 
which correspond to the distinction between the organized behaviour and 
the unorganized behaviour or the vertical degrees wnich are obvious at 
this particular level of social reality and help exceedingly in the 
scientific description of what is. 
Gurvitch goes on to state that if this level of regular collective 
behaviour were recognized and so defined, it would eliminate the con-
fusions which have arisen over the term institution. Especially these 
confusions are o·bvious in the Durkheimian school, the work of Hauriou 
and above all with the Americans such as Maciver, Sorokin and Parsons. 
Of late the term has been linked with social structure, which has only 
added to the confusion. A discussion of this problem will follow in the 
section on social structure . It is adequate at this point to say that 
the real difficulty comes with trying to link patterns, organizations 
and regular collective behavioUrs together in the same concept . The ter.m 
institution is either used in too broad a sense or one too narrow. It 
would be better to eliminate it from the sociological vocabulary and 
~vocation •• • , p . 79 . 
2sociology of Law, p . 221. 
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follow a procedure which would define these in more specific and special-
ized terms. 1 
(5) The web of social roles. In describing the collective be-
haviours of varying regularity it became obvious that there was a level 
beneath which was one more spontaneous, tending to be more innovating 
and creative, more unpredictable and more prone to do the unexpected. 
In this whole description of the total social phenomena it is becoming 
clear that the criterion for the separation and the discovery of depth 
levels lies with the element of spontaneity. 11 The combinations and 
interpenetrations of the social roles appear to us as representing a 
level in depth which is more spontaneous than that of unorganized be-
haviours of varying regularity.»2 The position of this depth level is 
exactly between the collectiv~ behaviours and the more profound level 
of collective attitudes. These webs of social roles, which can support 
the structured and even organized aspects of a society along with the 
spontaneous, effervescent and creative, are defined in the folluwing way: 
Social roles are web-like springboards for possible collective 
and individual actions, which contribute to the structuration 
and destructuration of the macrosociological social frameworks, 
1An example of the kind of definition against which Gurvitch is 
reacting is this one given in Harry N. Johnson's sociology text: "A 
social institution is • •• a recognized normative pattern. As such, it 
applies to a particular category of relationships. Thus the institution 
of marriage is a complex normative pattern that applies t o all marriages 
in a particular system or a particular segment of a social system. These 
marriages (relationships) conform to the pattern in varying degrees, of 
course; but married partners all know the pattern itself, if it is truly 
institutional, and they regard it as morally valid and binding.", p. 22. 
2La vocation • •• , p. 80. 
whether only in realizing the unexpected, whether in inno-
vating or even in modifying more or less profoundly, and to 
the limit, in contributing to the re-creation of the social 
frameworks and their structures.l 
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There are several kinds of social roles. 1) The structural social 
roles such as those of status, or belonging to organizations, imposed 
roles or the traditional and routinized roles of regular behaviours; 
2) symbolic social roles which can be the same as the first, but they 
form bridges and junctures between the organized and the spontaneous; 
3) fluctuating social roles which are clearly a part of the more spon-
taneous elements. They contain the rich possibilities of the unexpected, 
the modifying, the creative. 4) The latent social roles which are 
played by certain social classes; 5) the aspired social roles also be-
longing to certain groups and social classes as well as individuals; 
6) finally, imagined social roles existing somewhat apart from this web 
of interlocking roles; this has to do with imaginary roles certain per-
sons think they hold and must be associated with the psychopathological. 2 
Gurvitch is wont to point out that these webs and dramas of social 
roles are played by groups as well as individuals. He criticizes 
G. H. Mead for his reducing social reality to the interp~y between 
roles and persons. This ignores the collective nature of groups as well 
as the specificity of social reality. Moreover, it ignores the other 
depth levels of social reality and overemphasizes one aspect, one 
stratum, one layer of the total social phenomena. On the other hand, 
2Ibid., pp. 80-81. 
he attacks Linton, Parsons and others for confusing the terms status 
and role, either in giving them too broad a connotation or too simple 
and banal an interpretation. He finds himself in agreement with J. L. 
Moreno when he points to the impossibility of roles being isolated. 
They always tend to form clusters. He cites Sorokin approvingly when 
he says "without an entire drama there can be no role, for a role is 
possible only in the contact of all the roles of the drama. A role can 
become a social role only in the presence of a social matrix."l 
However, Gurvitch finds certain deficiencies in Moreno's theory. 
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These criticisms serve well to suggest what Gurvitch includes positively 
in his conception. He discovers a lack of clarity in Moreno's charac-
terization of social reality in general, of groups and the microsoci-
ological elements in particular. Moreno still attributes the social 
roles solely to individuals. He fails to understand that these trames 
et drames (webs and dramas) of social roles form indissoluble wholes 
themselves which must be understood as a separate depth level. Moreno 
does not take into sufficient account the conflicts and struggles be-
tween the various roles being played by the same individual or group in 
different social situations. There is lastly a lack of adequate analysis 
of the relationship "between certain roles and the processes of structur-
ation plus a negligence of the variations or roles which are present in 
the different types of structure 11 • 2 
Gurvitch uses certain examples to illustrate this theory. He 
1Ibid., p. 8). 
2Ibid. 
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points to the obvious fact that each individual participates in several 
different groups at the same time. Hence, the individual plays a 
different role in each group. The type of person he is varies according 
to the group or the situation. He may be a militant member of his local 
union and a docile husband. Another example cited by Gurvitch is the 
way in which the role of an individual or group varies according to the 
social juncture. A revolutionary may after a time become a conservative 
as the reins of change have been taken up by those who have gone beyond 
him. Karl Marx expressed this with special vigor when he described the 
changing roles of social classes. This generation's revolutionaries 
become the next generation's reactionaries. To wit, says Marx, look at 
the role of the bourgeoisie. 
A final example deals with the conflicts and antinomies which 
spring up over the desire to get and maintain one's hold on the status 
positions. Here one can see the conflict between the "regular roles", 
the symbolic, aspired, latent, and modified roles. These conflicts 
exists as much for groups as for individuals. When they come between 
groups there is usually a change in the whole social structure; when 
they occur between individuals and within the individual, this often 
leads to neuroses and inferiority complexes. 1 
What is apparent here is that the roles played by the different 
groups and individuals are often in turmoil and in conflict. They are 
rarely in total harmony. These antinomies and tensions go a long way 
to explain these same factors in social reality as a whole. These 
lrbid., PP· 84-85. 
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conflicts can be followed on the horizontal plane as well as in this 
vertical description. "In effect, the social roles prescribed by an 
organization could easily be distinguished from the social roles which 
are much more spontaneous, less regular and which come from a direct 
conunon action.nl These could then be distinguished from the desired 
roles, which are latently present and which the collective or individual 
subjects strive for and lay a claim to in the future. In other words, 
this depth analysis could select a faculty in a university or a labor 
union and follow this method of studying the different levels of social 
roles with a guarantee of some very interesting results. 
In conclusion, these social roles are webs of social positions, 
both collective and individual. They cannot be separated from each 
other, from other social roles or from the social framework in which 
they are enacted. They are one stratum of the total social phenomena. 
They are a part of the whole. "To consider a social framework, a group, 
a structure, or an organization as a simple assemblage of social roles 
is to fall once again into the nominalistic error of failing to see the 
whole."2 These skeins of social roles, forming indissoluble wholes, 
serve as positions from which collective and individual action springs; 
this leads to the unexpected, to the creating and modifying of the social 
frameworks themselves. However, these webs of social roles never en-
tirely express the whole. They imply something beneath them of a more 
spontaneous and dynamic quality. It is the level of collective atti-
tudes, the first real level of the spontaneous or collective mind. 
1Ibid. ' p. 85. 2T ·t"' ra1. e. • • , I, 16). 
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Why did Gurvitch add social roles to his original set of seven 
levels? This can only be a guess. During his stay in New York he had 
come into contact with the work of Moreno and the whole movement of 
sociometry. Moreover, he had been much impressed by the thought of 
G. H. Mead. He had long been an admirer of Mead's efforts to explain 
the relationship between the microsociological and the macrosociological. 
As Gurvitch worked through this material concerning social roles, he 
felt he had discovered the immediate bridge between the more spontaneous 
factors and the organized collective behaviour and social patterns. 
These webs of social roles are not as dynamic and effervescent as col-
lective attitudes. They are the last semblances of superstructure. 
Perhaps the biggest reason is that Gurvitch did not feel he could neg-
lect the enormous work which had been done in this whole area. It 
seemed to be a useful category for specifying this depth analysis, if 
kept in its proper perspective. 
(6) Collective attitudes. This new level marks the advent of the 
spontaneous itself. The observer now enters the domain of the collective 
mind. These attitudes open up the more profound.levles which represent 
the unorganized, the immediate, the spontaneous first enunciated in 
Gurvitch's social law theory. Many would reject this area of concern as 
being outside the realm of sociology. This, they would say, belongs to 
psychology or social psychology. Gurvitch reminds the student that it 
is difficult to separate the total psychological phenomena from the total 
social phenomena. This was explained in detail in Chapter Three. He 
specifies in an additional remark from La vocation that "for us the I 
I 
I 
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attitudes belong at once to the 'total social phenomena' and the 'total 
psychological phenomena' which represent two intersecting circles sharing 
the same 'territory' concurrently. 111 
Now what is a collective attitude? To begin with, it is a kind 
of disposition which pushes a real collective unity to do this or that 
act. It is a very particular kind of social environment in which the 
"organized elements, models, signs and rules exist as much as the prac-
tices, social antagonisms, collective values and ideas 11 • 2 These atti-
tudes serve as a privileged climate for certain symbols, especially of 
the emotive type, by which collective values are expressed in a social 
framework. An attitude is an essential part of every social grouping. 
This will be one aspect of the definition of a social grouping which 
will be the particular concern of the next section of this chapter. 
Social or collective attitudes represent the most paradoxical 
aspect of social reality. They can be persistent and fluctuating, 
predictable and totally unreliable, easily understood and grasped and 
veritable will-o-the-wisps. In sum Gurvitch offers this definition: 
They are wholes, social configurations (Gestalt) more often 
latent than actual, which imply at once a mentality, in particu-
lar of affective preferences and dislikes, of predispositions 
for certain types of behaviour and reactions, for certain tenden-
cies to assume certain precise social roles, a collective char-
acter, finally a social frrunework where the social symbols are 
manifested and where the particular scales of values are 
accepted or repudiated.3 
l1a vocation. • • , p. 86. A footnote. 
2T . t' ra~ e ••. , I, 164. 
3ia vocation. • • , p. 87. 
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The attitudes cannot be detached from the total social phenomena. 
They are one aspect of the whole. 11 They are one aspect of the social 
Gestalt, expressing the environments whose importance for social reality 
cannot be overlooked. 11 1 It is an error to oppose the individual atti-
tude with the collective one. This is the old story of the false con-
flict between the individual and society. They are related through the 
dialectical process of ambiguity, complementarity, mutual implication, 
polarization, and reciprocity of perspectives. Moreover, persons change 
their attitudes in accordance with their roles and the groups in which 
they play out these roles. This is one of the reasons why public 
opinion polls so often fail to ascertain the true "public attitude". 
Pollsters confuse the somewhat hesitant responses of the so-called 
representative sample which are 11 stacked" and 11 directed11 from outside, 
with the real attitude of the group and the person. If one is going to 
be a success in getting at what a person thinks or feels on a specific 
subject, he must get beneath and bridge the gap between what he says 
and what his real attitude is. 2 
The American school of social psychology has reduced this element 
of attitude to strict psychological categories. In doing this, they have 
stripped it of its most important characteristics. This has led to some 
grave errors. The most apparent is in thinking that if one simply 
changes the attitudes of individuals, they will be able to ameliorate 
successfully a social condition. The best example is in the problem of 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid., p. 88. 
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the Negro's rights in the United States. All the education in the world, 
every attempt to change attitudes without at the same time attacking 
the very structure of the problem, will result in complete failure. An 
attitude is a part of the total social phenomena, .and b.1 virtue of this, 
it implies all the levels of social reality (organized and unorganized); 
it is a partial whole itself, a social configuration in which the mental 
is only one aspect. This is the important feature of the idea, so 
often overlooked b.y an approach which sees only the psychological 
factors. This partial approach is the common error of maQy persons of 
"good will" as well as individuals who would protect the status quo in 
the South. The proper view of the collective attitude is necessarily a 
sociological one. It is a collective Gestalt, one level in the whole 
of social reality. This level then contains more than the webs of 
social roles, the practi~es and styles of' a particular life, the flexible 
and organized activities of the participants and the groups of a given 
social reality. It is a support for all of these upper strata, and it 
affects them at every stage. Still, this is only the edge of the col-
lective mind or the outer limit of the truly spontaneous levels. 
Probing more deeply the observer is confronted b.y the level of symbols, 
not signs or signals, but symbol8, which are at once the products of 
the mind and the means through which the mind acts and expresses itself. 
( 1) The social s;ymbols. The level of. social. S1l!lbols begins to 
strike at the heart of the spontaneous infrastructure. It is extremely 
vast and penetrates nearly every one of the total social phenomena. 
Expressing the very same role as the '~o~ative facts" for social law, 
these symbols 1 being both the producers and the products of social 
reality serve as the cement which binds and gives unity to these 
multiple phenomena. It is through the level of symbols that the 
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separations and fissures are healed or. reunited. It is also signifi-
cant to repeat that the very notion of the total .social phenomena is a 
symbolic conception attempting to describe the nature of social reality. 
In this sense 1 it is illustrative of the apparent truth that this 
reality cannot be grasped in its completeness b,y one conception or a 
series of conceptions. It is beyond the adequacies of language. Yet 1 
symbols are essential if a start is to be made towards any kind of cam-
prehension. 
In essence, the symbols urge or beckon the members of a society to 
1 participate directly in the "contents of that which is symbolized". 
Gurvitch underlines his assertion that symbols cannot be reduced to 
signs or signals. Symbols can never e:xpress the full meaning of that 
which is being symbolized. The symbol is always an inadequate vehicle. 
This is the first principal characteristic of a S.11Jlbol. The second 
characteristic is the way in which it puahes 1 cajoles, calls the subject 
to which it is addressed to participate in that which it signifies. 
This implies also that there is a close relationship between the symbol 
and the symbolized. They nmtually interact. One might compare this to 
means and ends. They are never entire~ separated. The ends affect 
the means and the means influence ultimately the ends, especially if 
1La vocation •• • , P• 90. 
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means inconsistent with the nature of the end are employed to ~ealize 
this end. Hence, this same kind of dialectical interaction is observ-
able between the symbol and the symbolized. 
Same examples of social symbols which Gurvitch uses are the statue 
of Joan of Arc calling forth certain collective values evoking national 
loyalty, the totem which symbolized the god of the clan, the cross 
which reveals a whole gamut of values and ideas as well as the actual 
memory of Calvary and the Resurrection, and the national nag which 
brings forth the responses of patriotism. The activities of the mind 
are necessarily dependent upon ~bols which are socially derived. 
Hence, all mental activity is in a profound sense, a social process. 
Every social symbol has two poles: first, it is a particular kind 
of "sign 11 and second, it is an instrument for participation.1 Just 
because symbols may be more "rational 11 today is no reason to assume that 
they are becoming simple signs (meaning, they are expressing completely 
that which is symbolized). This is to overlook the volatile, changing, 
multifaceted character of social reality. Moreover, the symbols will 
always remain as means to participate in that which is symbolized, which 
is distinctly different from the role of signs as defined above. 
~e of their essential characteristics is that they reveal while 
veiling and veil while revealing, and that while pushing towards par-
ticipation, they also restrain it. n2 This points to the extremely 
1 
_Ibid., p. 92. 
~he Spectrwn •• • , P• 3. 
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ambiguous character of symbols, which is a way of underlining their 
"human and social quality". 1 S,mbols can be either intellectual, meaning 
their dominant characteristic has to do with logical categories, or 
mathematical formulas or conceptual frameworks for particular sciences; 
they can be predominantly emotional as in the .mass for the dead or the 
celebration of a wedding; finally, they can be primarily volitional, 
that is, they serve as devices for affecting radical change. As is 
often the case, they can be all three at the same time. It would be 
more accurate to emphasize this ".functional pluralism" of symbols. This 
again illustrates the way in which the total social phenomena and the 
total psychological phenomena intersect. The,y are dramatically ptesent 
~4 this level of social reality. 
One can say therefore, that the symbolic function is insepa-
rable from man in his individual and collective life, since 
he is first of all a constructor of varied symbols, the mission 
of which is to master the obs.tacles which he faces or at 
least to manage them better.2 
The symbols have a task of expressing that ~ich is inexpressible. 
The way in which they "succeed" at this job depends on numerous vari-
ables: 1) the subjects who create the symbols or who elaborate on them, 
2) the subjects who are the objects of these "created" symbols, in other 
words the "receivers", 3) the types of partial or global social 
structures, 4) the historical circumstances, 5) the social frameworks 
such as types of societies, groupings or forms of sociability, 6) the 
relationship between the symbol and the symbolized, 7) the nature of 
~vocation ••• , p . 93. 
2Ibid., P• 95. 
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the obstacles which the symbol faces and must either master or manage, 
8) the particular characteristics of the symbol or the symbolic content, 
9) the number and manner of illusionary elements or strictly straight-
forward material, 10) the degree of rigidity or suppleness to the 
symbols, and ll) the degree of intensity of each depth level, the con-
1 fli.cts between them, etc. 
These variables go a long way to suggest the extreme relativity of 
this depth level. It also shows the close affinity between the symbolic 
sphere and the total social phenomena. This reaff irms the symbolic 
character of the notion itself. The total social phenanena as a &Jill-
bolic conception only Tery inadequately expresses what social reality 
happens to be. This is why these terms and these levels cannot be seen 
as absolutes or as a priori truths. These depth levels are inadequate, 
partial, and incomplete substitutes for social reality. The explanation 
of the universe is the obstacle confronting the sociologist. This is 
perhaps a partially successful attempt to manage the affair. 
There is little doubt that these symbols seek to fill the gaps, 
fractures, and splits which .are present in social reality. They are a 
fluid social cement. "'n t$ fashion the social S)'lTlbols are more 
attached to the non-technical products of civilization, such as lan-
guage, education, knowledge, morality, art, literature, religion, law, 
etc.n2 Gurvitch here leans towards the common idea that religion and 
other similar cultural products integrate and uni.t) societies. 
lrbid., PP• 95-96. 
2trhe Spectrum. • • , p. 3. 
197 
Since symbols are incomplete signs, or substitutes, it is impera-
tive to ask the obvious question. For what are they substituting? 
'What is this content to which they point? There is a sense in which 
certain intuitive we feelings DlWlt exist. prior to symbols, undergirding 
them and giving them validity. Why then do symbols become fatigued? 
These are questions which need to be raced and. which point to deeper 
levels of social reality. Again, it is obvious that such questions 
arise from Gurvitch's ana~sis of social law and his experiences in the 
events of the two Russian revolutions. 
(8) Creative collective behaviour. The spontaneous elements are 
becoming more apparent. It is an easy thing to study so.eial reality 
from the standpoint or supposed regularities . and predictable orderli-
ness • But this is too siro.pl.e and overlooks one of the most important 
aspects of social reality. There IU'8 those who would say in order for 
any study to be made of society a clear-cut pattern of regularity muat 
exist. Gurvitch asserts that this is not tzue. There are those who 
would say for the collective itself to be real such regularities are 
essential. This is likewise false. Gurv.itch maintains that there are 
those critical moments in history when the existing structures, pat-
terns, and s;ymbols have been overturned~ A new regime has been insti-
tuted; new patterns and symbols and organizations have been fomed. 
These periods must be explained. Sociologists cannot afford to neglect 
these "revolutionary" factors present in the total social phenomena. 
Though they are dramatized at those decisive ~omenta of truth" when 
the issues are crystal cl.ear and the "overthrow" is complete, this 
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phenomenon is present during wery epoch. Creative collective be-
haviour constitutes that special stage of social reality "where inno-
vation, choice, invention, • • • in short, the degrees of human freedom, 
••• are partially exposed to view.nl Here, it becomes acutely ap-
parent that Gurvitch's experience during the Russian revolutions, his 
trials during the war and his observations within French society, 
especially during these past years of the Indo-Chinese and Algerian 
colonial conflicts, have all played a part in his "discovery" of this 
level of social reality. This also illustrates his debt to both Fichte 
and Bergson. 
Reasons for neglecting this depth .level are numerous. As previ-
ously stated, it is easier to study a "static" society than one which 
tries to make room for the unexpected. The term "institution 11 has 
caused much difficulty in taking into account this factor of human 
freedom. The individualistic character of most notions about inno-
vation and creativity readily denies that change, revolutions, and 
invention may be brought about by collectivities. In fact, the two are 
interrelated to such an extent that it is false to separate them cate-
gorically. Finally, it is false to juxtapose the dynamic and the static. 
This is an utterly simplistic notion of social reality. This is one of 
those residual problems of the nineteenth century and implies the philo-
sophical idea of order versus progress. 
It is far more in keeping with the nature of social reality as it 
is revealed to the historian and the sociologist to recognize that in 
:Lrhe Spectrum. • • , p. 4. 
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"every society, in every group, every moment of their existence, an 
agonizing drama is being played between the conservative forces and the 
innovating forcesn. 1 These innovating forces are at work up and down 
the depth levels, provoking the reactions and the resistances to their 
creative impulses. It is only in particular circumstances that these 
forces of human freedom succeed completely. Still they are constantly 
at work. 
What motivates these creative collective behaviours? "'What stimu-
lates them to action? It is implied that beneath are certain values, 
ideas which serve to compel certain actions. This becanes the ' next 
depth level. 
(9) Collective ideas and values. "Behind all types of collective 
behaviour and attitudes, behind all organizations, all patterns, signs, 
roles and symbols, can be discovered a whole world of collective ideas 
and values.n2 Before the sociologist is the question of the meaning of 
certain gestures, patterns, signs and symbols which are used by a par-
ticular group. Perhaps these have a religious function, or they are of 
juridical importance, or they have a certain economic significance. The 
sociologist is faced with the task of interpretation and comprehension. 
His only source of help is to get to the fundamental meanings, which 
means coming to grips with the values and ideas that are behind these 
gestures, signs, symbols and patterns. 
~vocation •• • , p. 100. 
2trhe Spectrum. • • , P• .5. 
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This does not mean that the sociologist takes a particular philo-
sophical position just because he is dealing with values. The reverse 
is true. To neglect the study of values implies certain preconceptions 
about the nature of social reality and human existence. Sociology is 
not concerned with the validity of this or that value. It is concerned 
with what values and ideas are important for this group or that society. 
It is clear that values cannot be lived or grasped or created or sf-
firmed without the intervention of certain collective acts. This makes 
1 it part of the domain of sociology. Such sophisticated sociologists as 
Weber, Znaniecki and Sorokin have renounced the exploration of this 
depth level under the false modesty of saying this goes beyond the scope 
of sociology and belongs solely" to philosophy. They do this, says Gur-
vitch, in curious ways. They assert that values sort of drop fran the 
sky, that human behaviour is unilaterallJ dependent upon these miracu-
lous elem·ents which are to be studied and catalogued by theologians, 
philosophers and jurists. Sociologists, for the sake of scientific 
objectivity, must keep clear. This is once again to deny specific con-
tent to social reality. It is the old deficiency of the formalists, 
who would create the categories but siphon off the real content, leaving 
onll' empty shells. 2 The sociologist must see that there is a depth 
level of ideas and values which are not merely epiphenanena of material 
forces, as Marx would have it, but concrete phenomena, in and of them-
selves, which react with all the other levels of social reality in a 
1La vocation ••• , P• 104. 
2rbid., p. 105. 
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dialectical fashion. However, these ideas and values are held by and 
creatures of a collective mind, signifying another depth level . This 
becomes the deepest layer of social reality. It is that which under-
girds all the other strata. It becomes the final step in the process 
of depth analysis. 
( 10) The collective mind. This final rung in the descending 
reductive process is the passkey to Gurvitch 1s vertical view of social 
reality as well as the basis for his sociological "realismtt. This depth 
level also shows his continuing allegiance to the Durkheimian tradition. 
It is at once his most provocative and most difficult idea. Hence, it 
will be necessary to dwell at some length otl this conception of "col-
lective consciousness" or the collective mind. 
The collective consciousness is found at every level . It is the 
last level to be studied and since it interpenetrates all the strata 
of social reality, it has a distinctiveness of its own, meaning it has 
a proper domain, a certain "territory" along this vertical continuum. 
'7rom the sociological point of view, it does not possess priority, but 
constitutes one among many of the levels of the total social phenomena , 
which ought to be taken into account . n1 
This level is distinctly separated from ideas and values . It can 
grasp them and hold them just as do individual .minds . Moreover, it is 
the most profound level from the standpoint of spontaneity and immediacy • 
As was mentioned above, this level gives the element of "realism" to the 
whole of social reality. It is of course united with the other nine 
1rhe Spectrum •• • , P• S. 
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levels, but this collective mind gives the distinguishing specificity 
to the work of sociology. The collective mind or conscience is the 
great contribution of Durkheim. Gurvitch is following in his footsteps, 
but he does so only afPer rejecting what he finds impossible to accept 
in the Durkheimian scheme. 
The reader will want to refer to an earlier section of the chapter 
for a brief description of Durkheim's development.1 In general Gurvitch 
finds three points where Durkheim fails: First, he gives the collective 
mind a totally transcendent character. This is what Bidney calls 
cultural idealism as opposed to cultural realism. 2 Second, Gurvitch 
reproaches Durkheim for identifying the collective mind with the Logos 
or Spirit (idealism again), or an a priori reason which leads him to 
identify it with a Supreme Being, leading finally to the affirmation of 
its divinity. Third, he rejected Durkheim's employing of the term 
collective mind in a purely singular fashion. Gurvitch will mainta.in 
there is a plurality of ~n. 
The collective mind is the foundation of Durkheim's thought. He 
finds in this conception the irreducibility of the social. It is the 
most important part of social reality. It gives society its specificity 
ana posits the notion that such a "given" is more than the "sum of its 
parts". 
Durkheim 1s notion of ~stitution" gives rise to his development of 
lsee above, pp. 1.5o-153. 
2navid Bidney, Theoretical Anthropology (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1953), PP• 23-53. 
20.3 
depth levels which lead irresistibly to the collective mind itself, the 
primordial quality and substantive factor which is beneath all of social 
reality. The term institution calls, for the following appraisal: each 
institution can possess an external constraint which influences the 
lives of the individual members. More than likely this is a simple 
pressure which comes from outside as well as within .the social entity. 
In order to study these institutions it is necessary to understand their 
internal significations in their collective acts, and for that it is 
essential to go below the surface to find the symbols which lead to the 
values that consequently point to the direct mental life of the collec-
tive mind which is the source of such values. 
All in all, Durkhe:im attempts t .o do battle with those thinkers who 
would reduce social reality to a simple exercise between individual 
minds, or "human relations" in the modern terminology. His special 
object of attack was Tarde. However, Gurvi tch finds that Durkheim him-
self is subject to the same criticism. He reduces all communication to 
the interdependence of isolated individual minds. This he does through 
symbolic communication. The reason for this is that Durkheim has the 
currently outmoded conception of the conscience as being closed. Thus 
communion bas to be founded on s~bolic forms. In depending on thia, 
however, Durkheim actually takes the very same position as Tarde. He 
sees the collective mind as an outcane of individual minds. Now comes 
the crucial question, as far as Gurvitch understands it. "How is com-
munication possible between individuals, since the symbols must have the 
same meaning, and is this same meaning possible without a union, an 
interpenetration, a partial fusion of the minds, which underlie all 
symbolic COlliiilUilication? nl 
Gurviteh goes further to ask why this contradiction exists in 
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Durkheim. The answer has already been given. Durkheim is bound to the 
"classical" conception of the conscience or mind which understands it 
as being closed up within itself. It is as Martin suggests, a kind o! 
Leibnitzian monad. 2 
It is the negation of the latent aptitude or the conscience tQ 
be open, to become intuitive; it is &,,fundamental miscon-
ception which represents the conscience as a kind of circle 
or box and not as a tension towards that which is beyond it 
and which resists it, as a beam of light intending towards 
its larger essence.3 
This idea of openness and the Husserlian notion of intentionality 
will be more and more important as this discussion leads to Gurvitch1s 
own definition of the collective mind. Obviously the problem here is 
that of the creation of the collective mind in such a way that it does 
not soar into a transcendent abstract.ionism and stUl retains an ir-
reducible quality. Gurvitch 1s idea is much more than a simple inter-
action of individuals, the nominalistic error. Gurvitch finds the only 
way out is the "opening" provided by the intuitive dimension of every 
consciousness. This opening is always virtual and seldom totally actual. 
But nonetheless this is the way in which the fusion does take place and 
the collective mind becomes a reality sui generis, without necessarily 
1Essais de sociologie, p. 123. 
~artin, Depth Sociology. . . , p. 114. 
3&ssais de sociologie, p. 123. (Italics supplied.) 
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floating into a transcendent abstraction that requires the valiant 
effort of sheer faith for its existence; this hopelessly involves the 
theorist in a philosophical position which is outside the realm of 
sociology per se. This non-symbolic interpenetration which i s possible 
through the immediate and direct route of intuition makes the existence 
of the collective mind properly psychological. This means that the base 
for this collective psychology is an immediate mutual intuition by the 
minds. "Outside of this approach it is impossible ••• not only to 
distinguish clearly the symbols from the values and ideas, which are 
the immediately given, but also to support the irreducibility of the 
collective consciousness, from a psychological analysis."l 
Durkheim so clearly indicated that the existence of the collective 
consciousness was necessary if sociology were to have its proper area 
of study. Since he made that assertion, and since he rejected the 
psychological notion of an open conscience, he had to go elsewhere for 
a justification of the collective mind. This was done through his 
appeal to a transcendent, "idealisticn abstraction. Now the only way to 
defend the transcendence of the collective consciousness is through 
metaphysical arguments. Gurvitch finds Durkheim was forced to turn to 
these arguments more and more ~s he progressed in his elaboration of 
this idea . His last important work, Les formes elementaires de la vie 
religieuse, is replete with such arguments. If the individual consciences 
are closed, then there is only one way to affirm the existence of this 
collective conscience; that is to assert it is above and beyond them. 
2o6 
They are not juxtaposed against this collective mind. It is external to 
them, and not immanent. The collective mind, by virtue of the latently 
open conscience, becomes a partial fusion which is immanent to each 
conscience, and each individual conscience is immanently present within 
this partial fusion (the collective mind). This interpenetration or 
participation of consciences, individual and collective, is understand-
able by the dialectical method of "reciprocity of perspectives". This is 
Gurvitch's way of solving both the metaphysical and psychological 
problems. It is one of his most important contributions. 
Durkheim runs into further fficulty, asserts Gurvitch, with his 
allegiance to the "closed" conscience, since it must also apply to the 
collective type as well. Hence, the levels of ideas, values, and ideals 
cannot be immediately grasped by the collectivity. "l'hese ideals, etc., 
are its products, its subjective projections and in this collective 
subjectivism the autonomy of the ideal world is obscured. 111 
Gurvitch 1 s debt to Fichte and Scheler and Husserl is apparent when 
he contends that the ideal world in Durkheim1s presentation does not 
"resist" the collective mind, is not the object of the intuitive act, 
is "not affir.med as its immediate and irreducible datum, and therefore, 
heterogeneous to it,; it ~he ideal world] only becomes a result of this 
2 
conscience"· 
What this means is that Durkheim, because of this essential flaw 
in his thought, can only envisage the spiritual world as a mere epi-
~ssais de sociologie, P• 124. 
2Ibid. 
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phenomenon or the collective conscience. It has no existence in and of 
itself which would make possible its study b.Y the particular br.anches or 
sociology such as religion, law, morals, and knowledge, as well as b.1 
general sociology. He tries valiantly to save the objectivity or this 
collective conscience, making possible the distinction between .it and the 
level of ideas, values, and ideals, but he is forced to espouse a 
Supreme Being, a "Conscience of Consciences" who is seen as above and 
beyond. 
Gurvitch declares that both a co~lective subjectivism and a dog-
matic metaphysical position which proclaims the existence of a Logos, 
must be put aside if depth analysis is to go anywhere. In sum, the 
greatest contributioh of Durkheim is his notion of the collective 
conscience. Gurvitch reaaily admits this and feels it is worth saving. 
He is of the opinion that Durkheim failed to probe the possible scope 
of this conception. This is because he did not see all the levels of 
social reality. These levels, in order to exist, must rely on the 
collective mind itself. For example, "the collective behaviours would 
lose immediately their unity and would be dissolved into a heap of dust 
composed of individual actions which have no liaison to hold them to-
gethern.l The same is true of ideals, ideas and values. They would be 
devoid of the social dimension without this real collective mind. 
What is necessary, Gurvitch concludes, is to study the collective 
mind in and for itself as a separate level of social reality (which is 
the domain of collective psychology) 1 but also carefully relating it 
1Ibid., PP• 126-127. 
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to the other levels with which it interpenetrates and fuses. Durkheim 
never really did this kind of study. He was too caught up in a col-
lective subjectivism which was the creator of everything else, and a 
metaphysics of the Spirit, which was his way of justifying the existence 
of this collective conscience. 
What then is the corrected version of the collective mind, ac-
cording to Gurvitch? In answering this question Gurvitch must sol•e the 
basic problem which has come to light in the preceding discussion. How 
are the individual consciences and the collective conscience recipro-
cally and immanently related? Or, how are the individual consciences 
fused to produce the collective conscience? Gabriel Tarde, he says, 
saw the collective conscience immanent in the individual consciences; 
Durkheim was equally successful in understanding the immanence of the 
individual consciences in the collective conscience. Both were only 
half answers. 1 
First the components of the collective mind must be considered. 
The collective mind is consciousness. This leads back to Gurvitch 1s 
reliance on Husseri and the phenomeno~ogists. What is consciousness but 
the intending of somet.lli.ng, even if it is fictitious? One cannot be 
conscious of nothing. Hence the conscience goes beyond itself and 
becomes itself b,y focusing on that which is heterogeneous to it. It 
meets a resistance which gives it its reality. It apprehends, intends 
the objective phenomena (the real essences) which implies that they 
1Ibid., PP• 142-1.43. 
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exist, they are real.l This is what Gurvitch means in the passage 
quoted above when he says there is the ~titude on the part of the con-
science to utilize a tension towards '~hat which is beyond it and which 
resists it, as a beam of light intending upon its larger essence" the 
object that light finds on which to shine • 
This intentionality is the way by which Gurvitch brings about the 
fusion of the individual consciences. This fusion creates the col-
lective mind. The total result is a reciprocal immanence of the indi-
vidual and collective consciences. Depth sociology "considers that the 
conscience is no less immanent to the society, the world, to being, than 
these are to the conscience". 2 The psychic and the conscious are 
imbedded in other realities. There are degrees to this immanence and 
to this intentionality. When these two factors are at a minimum, when 
the dominant feature is passive contemplation of the obstacles or 
objects encountered, these relations are called mental states. (Examples 
would be representations, memory, suffering, satisfactions, stray 
impulses, etc.) When the intensity of immanence and intentionality are 
average, they are known as opinions. These are always hesitant and 
uncertain. The maximum intensity comes when the obstacles lead to an 
overwhelming desire to eliminate them and to create new situations. 
These are classified as mental acts. Examples would be intuitions with 
intellectual emotional or volitional tinges, and judgments. To be more 
precise, the distinction between mental states and mental acts--being 
1 Les tendances actuelles •• • , pp. 43-45. 
2rraite ••• , I, 169. 
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these two elements are the end points of the immanent-intentional 
continuum--is that the former do not succeed in transcending themselves 
and "opening" up to the object of intentionality, whereas the latter 
do rise above themselves and grasp the content or participate in the 
content "proved or affirmed as heterogeneous to the acts themselves 11 • 1 
There are intellectual mental states (e. g., collective repre-
sentatives, collective memories, collective perceptions), emotional 
mental states (e. g., collective satisfactions, sufferings , repulsions, 
joys, griefs and aspirations), and volitional mental states (e . g., 
active tendencies, stray impulses and collective efforts). Likewise, 
these same three divisions obtain for mental acts: intellectual (e . g., 
intellectual intuitions, collective judgments), emotional (e. g., col-
lective preferences and dislikes based on values, collective acts of 
sympathy, love and hate) and volitional (e. g., acts of decision, 
choice, and creation). 2 
In keeping with Gurvitch 1s schema in each social framework these 
various mental states and acts are arranged differently, and their 
mental "colorations" are also different for the same reason. It is the 
same for the collective opinions which hold the middle position on this 
continuum of mental life. 
What Gurvitch is trying to do here is to set up some kind of cri-
teria for distinguishing between the different manifestations of social 
life at its deepest and most elusive levels . He recognizes that it is 
1La vocation •• • , p. 111. 
2Ibid., P• 112. 
211 
o~ under ver.y unusual circumstances that the fusion is complete, that 
the intentionality is realized to its fullest, that mental acts are per-
formed. There must be a way of distinguishing these from the more pas-
sive and "quiet" periods in social life. (Bear in mind those Russian 
revolutions. ) Hence, in certain social frameworks, during certain 
periods of history, the mental states (corresponding somewhat to 
Durkheim 1 s use for symbols, values and ideas which serve to carry on 
the traditions of a society and its culture), rely on the more super-
ficial levels of social reality. These become the more determining 
factors. 
This dependency upon the types of social frameworks and the 
historical circumstances holds just as much for the relationships be-
tween "interpersonal and intergroupal collective mentality and the 
individual mentalityn.l These three mentalities explained in the terms 
Ours (We, group, class, global society), ~, and ~~ make up the 
essential reality of that which is called the psychic or mental. Thia 
reality "is defined as the drama of an increasing or decreasing tension 
which is affirmed more and more as the Ours, t.ne Mine or the Yours 
(singular) in the fundamental experience of life which means directed 
towards the spontaneous ". 2 
To clar.if.y the distinctions further, when passive contemplation 
of the obstacles encountered is the result of this tension, then one can 
call this an intellectual function of ps,ychic life; when the tension 
~e Spectrum •• • , p. 6. 
2La vocation •• • , p. 106. 
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leads to certain docile and yet efficient adaptations to these obstacles 
this may be called an affective or emotional function; finally, when the 
upshot of this tension is a real effort to destroy and go beyond these 
obstacles to the creation of new situations, then one is conf ronted b.Y a 
function of the will or a volitional function. 1 These, again, are only 
descriptive terms. One may be dominant at a given time and in a certain 
framework, but like social life, this is a ~ phenomenon and all are 
latently present. 
There is a patent relativity to the mental life. The tension or 
fusion depends on the particular circumstances. This also underlines 
the total nature of this psychical element. Neither the individual, the 
interpersonal nor the collective is predominant. They are all present, 
for this is a whole phenomenon. 
There is less reason to attribute to individuals (Egos) taken 
as isolated fragments or in their relationships with the Other, 
the exclusive capacity for mental states, opinions and psychic 
acts than to refuse this very thing to collectivities: the 
We, Groups, social Classes and Global Societies.2 
These three mentalities, interpersonal, individual and collective, 
are three directions within the total psychic phenomenon. They are in 
tension with each other and therefore must be studied from the stand-
point of the various dialectical processes, complementarity, ambiguity, 
polarity, mutual implication, and the reciprocity of perspectives. It 
is this last process which is of capital importance in the comprehension 
of the relationship between the collective and the individual minds. It 
libid., pp. 106-107. 
~bid., P• 107. 
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is the way in which the fusion is completed1 the collective conscience 
is created and the individual maintains an immanent role within it. 
This is Gurvitch's answer to the Durkheimian contradiction. In the 
Essais de sociologie he clearly outlines this idea. The collective 
conscience and the individual conscience are only abstractions from the 
same concrete totality of the psychic. The pressures towards conformity 
and obligation are at work both in the individual and the collective 
mind at the same time. The dialectical process of reciprocity of per-
spectives presupposes both the irreducibility of the collective 
conscience and the individual conscience and the mutual interpenetration 
or immanence of these two consciences. This immanence results from an 
intuition of the consciences which are open to each other.1 
To go further, this is not the only process by which these re-
lationships are to be viewed . The other processes of the dialectical 
method reveal in clearer fashion the immanence and the tension or 
indissoluble linkage between the collective and the individual, the 
interpersonal, intermental and collective, the Me, Other and We. The 
singular of I, Your and Our is too narrow. It denies these collective 
acts and states. This is a result of the conception of the closed 
conscience (self-contained and turned in on itself). It is a position 
which affirms the "pure I u. This is purely speculative according to 
Gurvitch. All empirical and historical data suggest this is outmoded. 
The idea of the open conscience 1 ranging in degrees of openness, clears 
the way for the conception of the collective conscience as the creation 
1Essais •• • 1 PP• 136-137. 
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of the individual consciences of a given collectivity, but which remains 
:immanent to them and they to it. This makes room for the fundamental 
basis of social reality, the necessary existence of a We. The only 
possible way for Me, You and Him to communicate is by virtue of an 
underlying We, which is in tum inscribed in a group which is also 
inscribed in a wider relationship. Recall here the whole discussion of 
the normative fact and its necessary implication of ever-wider, more 
encompassing social wholes which give the law efficacy and meaning. The 
sani.e holds for the intuition of the Other by an I. This can only take 
place iff and~ exist within a We, participate in such a !!!1 and thus 
have a basis for communication through symbols and signs and signals 
but also for the mutual intuition of each other. 
This then is the heart of the collective mind: there is an ir-
reducible tension among the I, the Other and the We. They are insepa-
rable in Gurvitch's thought. They are three poles of the same 
phenomenon. If one speaks of the individual conscience, he is speaking 
of a tendency in the direction of the I. If the collective conscience 
is the primary concern this means an. emphasis on the We pole; each 
implies the other. The method for analyzing these three poles of the 
collective consciousness is necessarily dialectic. Those processes of 
complementarity, mutual implication and reciprocity of perspectives are 
most often used to describe and understand these liaisons. In reality 
this method joins together the efforts of sociology, psychoanalYsis, 
behaviourism, the psychological analysis of cultural works and soci-
ometry to study the total social phenomena which are always collective, 
individual and interpersonal at the same time, as well as being at once 
intellectual, emotive and volitional.1 
This dialectical method, especially the process of reciprocity, 
has been consciously or unconsciously employed by many scholars. 2 In 
keeping with the basic thesis that subject and object are falsely sepa-
rated in scientific exploration, thereby making explicit the contention 
that the object of sociology determines the method and the method used 
will result in a certain type of data, depth sociology calls into 
service the dialectical method. This approach clarifies the relation-
ship of the collective mind to the individual minds. It serves to 
explain the various ways in which the depth levels cohere and remain 
linked together in a dynamic whole. 
This completes the vertical view of social reality. Such a view 
which has moved from the superficial, the obvious, the object and sense 
data of social life, down through the strata beneath that make up the 
whole of socialreality, is only an image, a symbol itself, to help in 
the description, comprehension and explanation of this aspect of human 
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endeavor. There may be too many, or not enough depth levels. This is a 
tool for analysis and the number of strata used as points of reference 
for this study is relative. It is a device and solely· that. Such an 
11a vocation •• • , I, 15. 
2rhose authors particularly cited b,y Gurvitch begin with the 'young" 
Marx, who espoused a dialectical sociology which saw the tension between 
the individual and society (his Economie politique et philosophie, 1842-
1843, shows the ''mutual implication" of "total man 11 and "total society"); 
this "liaison" is seen in the following: Charles Cooley, Social Organi-
zation, John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, George H. Mead, Mind, Self 
and Society, A. Kardiner, The Individual and His Society, Scheler, Wesen 
und For.men der Sympathie, Mauss, Sociologie et anthrololo!Ee, and Halbwachs, 
Les cadres sociaux de la memoire. La vocation •• • , , 1 o, lists others. 
approach is based on certain presuppositions which are explicitly 
denoted b,y Gurvitch. 
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1) All the social sciences study the collective and individual 
efforts of man to create a society. The emphasis, then, is on effort 
and not on result, as such. Act always predominates over artifact. 
2) Illustrating his inheritance from the phenomenologists and 
Fichte, Gurvitch asserts that the "science of man" is the science of 
liberty and all the obstacles which it encounters. "There are as many 
branches of the science of man as there are directions man's efforts 
take and the kinds lof obstacles which they overcome.nl The social 
sciences are characterized by their common object of study: the human 
condition. Each considers this condition in its own way and hence works 
out a specitic object and method of its own. The reciprocal relation-
ship of object and method is explicitly noted. 
3) The total effort takes precedence over the particular activi-
ties. This means the co~artmentalization of tne social sciences is 
always relative because man is a whole and social reality is one. It 
will not do to fragment either entity. 
4) The total social phenomena have a primacy over all their par-
ticular levels. These various levels making up each total social 
phenomenon have not only a methodological primacy over the astructural, 
structural and structured sectors, but an ontological one. This is the 
fundamental starting point for Gurvitch. Ontology is the ultimate refer-
ence. 
5) The various social phenomena are related dynamically and 
lLa vocation •• • , I, 15. 
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dialectically. Hence, all separations between them are relative. The 
existential fact is their w.holeneas; they are the total social phenomena, 
united in a complex web which is social reality.1 
This total social phenomenon is ontologically prior to everything 
else, namely, forms and structures; but it is impossible to conceive of 
this phenomenon existing in a vacuum. It is always contained in some 
type of framework, and the way in which the various levels of the phe-
nomenon are arranged is dependent upon the particular social framework. 
Actually, frame means the type of social relationships. The total social 
phenomenon is a result of social involvements. But the frameworks are 
merely forms without content. They provide the context in which people 
relate. The total social phenomena speak of how people relate and the 
results of those relationships. It remains the task of this next 
chapter to describe these "horizontal" characteristics of social reality 
and to show how the vertical and horizontal views of social reality 
intersect and are mutually dependent upon each other. 
1La vocation ••• , I, 15-17. 
CHAPTER V 
THE HORIZONTAL VIEW OF SOCIAL REALITY 
1. From Social Bonds to Social Groups 
Sociology studies the total social phenomena. It also looks at 
the way in which these phenomena arrange themselves in social frameworks 
and structures. Gurvitch contends that a typology of the ways in which 
the total social phenomena are hierarchized is one critical aspect of 
sociological analysis. 
The typological approach is distinguished from the singularizing 
method of history and ethnography and the generalizing method of the 
natural sciences. Sociological types are discontinuous and qualitative. 
This does not rule out the possibility that they can be repeated. It 
does say the types are mid-way between generalization and radical rela-
tivism. This approach generalizes for purposes of showing there is 
indeed a real specificity to each type; it singularizes (as does history) 
in order to show by further comparison among them, which frameworks are 
repetitive. To be sure, sociology uses the data of history, but only to 
show the discontinuity of social types. It emphasizes the ruptures 
among them. Continuity is the particular aim of history . It seeks to 
bridge these ruptures to which sociology points. 
Sociology's typological method presupposes that totalities can be 
understood and their meanings grasped. The method is only used in 
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sociology to study these social wholes. Social types are not rigid con-
structions <>r fleeting in1ages, nor are they the "ideal types" of Weber. 
flThey represent certain dynamic frameworks of reference adapted to the 
total social phenomena and called on to promote explanation in sociology."! 
Sociological types have then an intermediary character: they are 
between generalization and the systematic plans devised for research 
projects; they take the middle ground between explanation and compre-
hension and are at the mid-point between continuity and discontinuity. 
The only method for maintaining the balancing act between the various 
positions is the dialectical. 
i. Microsociology: the Analysis of Social Electrons. 
The firs~ type of social framework deals with the most basic and 
elemental forms of social life. These elements are the microphysical 
particles which make up a real collective group or global society. 
These are at once astructural, infinitely varied, dynamically related 
and the most abstract elements of social reality. Their interrelations 
are complex. Proudhon is right: 1~eality is by nature complex; the 
simple does not come from the ideal nor take us to the concrete.n2 
The existence of complexity must not deter the social scientist from 
making every effort to comprehen.d ~nd explain. 
Briefly, microsociology studies those "social electrons" which 
every group contains. rhey are nthe modes of being bound into the whole 
lrhe Spectrum •• • , p. 13. (Italics added.) 
2nu trincipe fed~ratif, Dentu Edition, 1853, p. 38, quoted in 
Gurvitch, a vocation • • • , I, 205. 
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and by the whole, 'forms of sociality' of which any real collective unit 
is composed. • • the microsociological types are the types of social 
bonds (the~' the 'relations with others'). 111 As indicated by this 
statement, there are two kinds of "social bonds"· The first has to do 
with the partial fusion of persons resulting in the '~ feeling"; the 
second involves the aspect of opposition . This ~s best descr~bed by the 
pronouns ~' you, or ~· The e concerns the degree of interpene-
tration of different selves to form the "collective mind" . 'l'he "re-
lations with others" has to do with those ties which are interactive and 
interdependent . This is the level of interpersonal relations in American 
parlance . Gurvitch takes L. von Wiese's categories of rapprochement, 
repulsion and mixed to describe such "relations with others 11 • ·rhe polar 
relations are the first two; some social ties of this type are a mixture 
of both . The use of signs and symbols is more necessary for these social 
bonds of "relations with others" · '!'hey are more or less closed indi-
viduals and must have a common ground of communication in some type of 
symbolism. 
\Vhen the symbols are the chief base of social connection, the 
minds as well as behaviours , though they converge by having 
the same signs, remain more or less closed to each other: they 
have only corrununication common to them. But when the union 
among minds as well as among behaviours outweighs the sJ~bols , 
they interpenetrate to various degrees of depth and intensity, 
and thus constitute an immanent whole.2 
Recalling the previous chapter, it is evident Gurvitch is under-
lining his conviction that the collective mind (the~) is prior to 
1
'lliass, Community, Communion", The Journal of Philosoph;r, XXXVIII , 
(August 28 , 194~1 486. 
2Ibid. 
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every other form of sociality, since the other forms must, in large 
part, depend upon symbolism. He has changed his statement of this 
position between his Essais de sociologie and the latest edition of 
La vocation actuelle de la sociologie.1 This means that not all 
"relations with others" need go through the mediary of symbols or signs. 
The deepest "relations", such as those of friendship, love, and 
brotherhood, may be intuited direct~. But the important thing which 
Gurvitch is saying here is that the persons remain distinctly individuals 
and are never entirely subsumed in the other. He goes on to say that 
"relations with others" usually means between two persons, whereas the 
We involYes usually thre or more (3 to n .;. 1). However he would admit 
that the We feeling is possible for two individuals. These two types of 
social bonds are present in the social life of any person or group. Two 
individuals who are related as husband and wife, intuiting thereby these 
relations of interdependence, also play the role of We parents or other 
types of ~ in relationship to children and friends, etc. 2 
It is clear that the ~ is ontologicall7 prior to every relation 
with the other, even though these "relations" are intuited. The most 
intimate relations concern two persons who find there a partial oppo-
sition, an "active obstacle or a shock". 3 This intuition is only 
virtual or latent and is ultimately expressed through signs and symbols 
which make it active and real. Such signs and symbols, gestures, words, 
laf. Essais •• • , pp. 49-67; La vocation •• • , I, 116-280; and 
Traite • • • , I, 172-184. 
2La vocation •• • , I, 138-139 • 
.3rbid., p. 138. 
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declarations and words are dependent and ~st be based on a prior 
union of minds, on a pre-existent We. • Language is not the basis o£ tn 
partial fusion of the We because language presupposes it.nl 
In the schematic outline of the forms of sociality (see paget- 230 
for diagrams) Gurvitch moves from these two basic types to show the 
different degrees of partial fusion and partial opposition which can 
result. In keeping with the theory of the collective mind, onl¥ the 
active forms of sociality would produce values, ideas and idealSJ only 
this type would have a common work to do, and hence serve eit er the 
general interest or the particular interest, depending on tbe historical 
situation or the type of social bond. 
These social electrons must be viewed as total social phenomena. 
They are frameworks for these depth levels, these factors wbieh as 
totality are social reality. They are never capable of organizing the 
depth levels into a hierarchy. They include them all either in an 
actual or a latent fashion. For example, when husband and wife are 
manifest]¥ in love with each other to the extent that they are wonder-
fUlly sensitive to the feelings and thoughts of each other, they are 
still living within their relationship all the depth levels, though 
unstructured and lacking in a hierarchical arrangement. From the 
morphological factors all the way down to the collective mind these are 
present in every fo~ of sociability. 2 
Finally, Gurvitch makes the "vertical" distinction once again, 
Lrhe Journal of Philosophy, XXXVIII, 487. 
Zxrait, •• • , I, 112. 
223 
illustrating the intersecting of these two views of social reality. 
That is, there are spontaneous and organized expressions of the social 
bonds. This becomes clearer when the description of the degrees of 
partial fusion are explained. This is the next step in the description 
of microsociology. 
One of Gurvitch's most important and frankly exciting ideas is the 
explanation of the different degrees of fusion in the We. These degrees 
of intensity are succinctly outlined in this paragraph from Gurvitch's 
article in Tbe J oumal of Philosophy. 
Partial fusion among minds opening to each other, and among 
behaviours interpenetrated in a ''we", may appear in different 
degrees of intensity and depth. When the fusion is very weak 
and only integrates superficial states of consciousness which 
open only at the surface and remain closed with regard to what 
is more or less profound and personal, sociality is mass. When 
minds fuse, open out, and interpenetrate on a deeper-andmore 
intimate plane, where an essential part of the aspirations and 
acts of personality is integrated in the "we" without, however, 
attaining the maximum of intensity in this integration, soci-
ality is community. When, finally, this most intense degree of 
union or of 'twe" is attained, that is, when the minds open out 
as widely as possible and the least accessible depths of the "I" 
are integrated in this fusion (which presupposes states of 
collective ecstasy), sociality is communion.l 
Gurvitch first relates this to the problem of social pressure. He 
notes that contrary to what one might suppose, the more superficial the 
intensity, the more closed the individual consciences to each other, the 
least degree of fusion bringing about the most pressure. Where the mass-
phenomenon is strongest, the pressure of "the collective mentality on the 
individual 'I'is strongest."2 It follows then, that the greater the 
fusion, the iess pressure is exerted. Hence community represents the 
l.rhe Journal of Philosophy, XXXVITI, 487. 2Ibid., P• 488. 
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mean or average, and the communion phenomenon illustrates the least 
pressure being exerted on the individual ego. In sum, the stronger this 
social factor is present in the ''ego" the less feeling of pressure is 
sensed. '~or then it penetrates the depth and intimacy of the 1I 1 which 
finds itself internally joined to the other egos."1 This means essentially 
that the dialectic of the reciprocity of perspectives make itself felt 
once again. The ! and the Social are not enemies at war, but are fused 
into the same substance. Only the intensity of that fusion varies; this 
can be plotted on this Mass-Community-Communion continuum. 
Obviously this conception of mass has nothing to do with numbers 
or such popular notions as crowds, masses ., nations, races and classes. 
Mass as a partial degree of fusion is based, as are the other two, on 
collective intuitions. Thereby the Mass can be distinguished from 
herds or gatherings or crowds. 
Gurvitch makes a second observation concerning these degrees of 
fusion. The intensity of interpenetration and the size or numbers in-
volved are in inverse proportion. In general, the larger the aggregate 
or group, the more superficial are the social fusions. In other words, 
the smaller groups have a greater chance of realizing the intense 
cohesion of communion. "A 'We' which is restricted and intensified to 
the place of being a Communion, risks losing size and ability to expand, 
while if it relaxes and allows itself to unbend to the point where it is 
a Mass, it is possible to grow and expand. 112 
2La vocation • • • , I, 145. 
225 
A third characteristic is that the intensity of the fusion in the 
We and the force of attraction that it exercises on its members cor-
responds precisely. In effect, the force of attraction exercised by 
the We is felt so much more when this We penetrates into the innermost 
depths of the self creating a mutual participation of the most intense 
nature. It follows that a Communion exercises on its members a force of 
attraction much greater than the ComMUnity, and the Community itself 
holds its participants with greater force than tne Mass. ConV"ersely, 
the Mass repels its members with more force than the Community. 
In order to clarify these degrees more precisely it is helpful to 
analyze one end-point of this continuum. Communion will serve very well 
for this purpose . First of all, this for.m o£ sociability repres~nts the 
maximum degree of attraction and depth fusion in the "We. The members 
feel only a minimum of pressure. It is the most profound We and its 
participants have the feeling of being exempted from all social and 
individual pressure. The Canmunion presupposes the full and total 
participation, without reserve, in the We. Therefore in the COllllllunion, 
all other conditions set aside, the reciprocal immanence of the self, 
others and the We is expressed most profoundly. This is precisely the 
reason why this form of sociability, being the most intense manifes-
tation of the collectivity, exercises the least pressure on its partic-
ipants. It appears to them as the incarnated collective aspiration in 
which their own intimate aspirations are found re-enforced. The 
participants of a Communion feel they are part of a movement which can 
destroy ever,r obstacle, can free them from their own self-imposed bonds, 
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can lift them above every condition which would ham or hinder. 1 
The situation changes completely if one is not a member of such 
an "in-group". He is looked upon with scorn. He is the reluctant, or 
recalcitrant, the indifferent or the adverse. The charm is broken. The 
Communion seems to him to exercise not the minimum but the maximum of 
pressure: it appears not as a center of attraction but of menace and 
oppression, not as a source of freedom but of servitude. 2 This ambi-
valence of the Communion reveals the acute conflict between its internal 
and external aspects. This is accentuated by bearing in mind that 
certain Communions are based on emotional experiences with certain 
intellectual and voluntaristic colorations bordering on the patho-
logical. However sane Communions :may, on the contrary, result from 
certain mental acts which are very attractive to non-participants as 
well as the members. This is illustrated by certain Communions which 
have succeeded in actualizing some collective intuitions and have been 
able to apprehend values and new ideas which have weight and attraction 
for those unable to participate in the Communion. They even come . to 
represent a source of "freedom". Resistance groups give this appearance 
to those under extreme oppression. 
Gurvitch criticizes roundly those theologians and philosophers 
who wish to define a Communion solely in tenns of "spiritual intuition". 
This, he feels, is to exclude the Communion from real social life. 
'They (the theologians and philosophers) have considered it as a direct 
1Ibid., P• 165. 
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form of participation of the isolated individual in divine grace, spirit 
or the cosmic whole. Thus, according to a certain Christian tradition • 
• • human minds can commune with Christ only when in isolation, and o~ 
through Him as mediator amongst themselves.nl Communion is not the 
special province of geniuses, or saints or mystics and heroes, as 
Bergson would have it, but is open to all kinds of persons and groups 
and involves all kinds of experience, not just the religious. Bergson 
also thought there was a universality to Communion, but again Gurvitch 
says it is just the opposite. This is because as the groups expand in 
size the degree of intensity decreases. Moreover, the protection of the 
Communion against "impurities n always results in schisms. This is par-
ticularly observable in the churches, religious sects, magical brother-
hoods and even among those Communions which supposedly have a rational 
basis as ~chools of thought". The more intense Communions are more 
susceptible to schism than those which are more lax. This explains the 
movement from "church type" to "sect type" in Troeltsch 1 s tenninology. 
It holds then that Communions which are tightly fused because of a com-
mon danger or a highly desired goal, once that danger is past or that 
goal is realized, tend to relax, to change in the directions of Communi-
ty and Mass. 
It is possible for the Communion to be expressed in a global soci-
ety. An intense participation in the We can be realized by a large 
group of people, such as during a revolution, or when Paris was liber-
ated in August, 1944, or when the home team scores a winning touchdown. 
1The Journal of Philosophy, .:x::xxviii, 493. Kierkegaard is an 
excellent example. 
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However, once the crisis has been passed, the Communions tend to dis-
solve into the Community and Mass types. Their duration at this ex-
tended level is very short . 
Gurvitch ends his discussions of these degrees of partial fusion 
by making it explicit that Mass, Community and Communion cannot be 
placed on a scale of values. He states it is imperative to rid the 
sociological vocabulary of ever,y pejorative connotation to Mass and 
likewise to desist from elevating Communion to the preferred position. 
"Fran the ethical viewpoint • • • a scale of Mass, Community and Communion 
is ••• impossible • • • In each of these three kinds of union, ••• the 
latter may just as well be negative as positive.~ A mob of gangsters 
may commune intensely together as they plot their next crime. 
In relation to the most positive values, such as international 
peace or love of humanity, collective intuitions of a very 
weak intensity may be manifested and realized in sociality as 
Mass. Furthermore, we may commune in regard to external events 
(common fright, danger, etc . ) and form a Mass in regard to 
moral duties and even to positive values (which are experienced 
with slight intensity).2 
One last comment must be made concerning the organized and spon-
taneous levels of these degrees of partial fus'd.en. This nvertical" view 
is most clearly evident when examining the differences between pressure 
and constraint. As noted in the second chapter in Gurvitch's work on 
social law, he makes the distinction between these two at the point of 
organized versus spontaneous levels of jural life . The organized level 
exercises the constraint on the individual members since they are re-
moved from the spontaneous fusions which characterize Mass, Comnn1nity 
1Ibid., P• 495. 2~, P• 496. 
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and Communion . The degree of· t his constraint depends on how open this 
organized level is to the spontaneous fusions in the We . representing the 
notion of collaborati on. Organized sociability is guided b,y the princi-
ple of domination . These two principles of domination and collaboration 
serve as the extremes of a continuum once again explaining the difference 
between the organized and t he spontaneous. 
The diagram following (Figure 1. , page 230) will illustrate the 
forefoing discussions on the microsociological types. 
In conclusion suffice it to say these interlacings of social bonds 
make up the content of real collective groups . The groups become micro-
cosms of the forms of sociality. It is here one enters the reala of 
macrosociology where these astructural elements or social electrons aid 
in the structuration and the destructuration of these new social frame-
works . 
ii . Macrosociology: An Overview. 
In his early work in social law, Gurvitch revealed how each realm 
of law called into existence a wider realm in order to give the former 
some point of reference as well as validity. So it is that the pri:mary 
relationships or social bonds which were described in the previous 
section must depend on a larger whole, a group in this case, for basic 
concreteness . The group itself is partially inclusive and in turn must 
know the lar ger reality of the social class or global society for its 
existence and maintenance . Therefore , these three horizontal aspects 
of social reality mutually support each other and depend on each other . 
If one goes in the opposite direction moving from the global society to 
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the microsociological elements, this dialectical relationship is just 
as obvious. In this way this horizontal dimension must be studied in 
the same wholistic way as the vertical total social phenomena with which 
they intersect. 
The microsocial electrons are held together in a cohesive fashion 
by real, collective units which Gurvitch calls particular groupings. A 
grouping is the first phase of macrosociology. In leaving the domain of 
microsociology one is now confronted with real collectivities which are 
externally observable. They have a qualitative aspect which can be 
empirically observed. There are certain material factors which are 
discernible, certain '~rystalized" collective attitudes which can be 
marked, plus certain collective behaviours which can be recorded. 
Groupings "tend ••• to transform into patterns and cliches the symbols, 
1 
values and particular ideas which they use". Put another way, these 
groupings emphasize the more rigid, more organized and structured levels 
of social reality while the microsociological elements underscore the 
more spontaneous. This is only natural, since groupings tend to order, 
structure, and organize, which is quite different from the astructural 
social electrons. Indeed it is impossible to think of a group existing 
at all as a real collectivity unless this "ordering" did take place and 
certain equilibria be established among the different levels of social 
reality and the highly volatile social bonds. A relative cohesion takes 
place within this macrosociological framework which distinguishes it 
from the microsociological frame. 
1La vocation •• • , I, 281. 
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Furthermore, this collective unit is irreducible. It is irreduci-
ble to ~ of its forms of sociability which it organizes in hierarchies 
and arranges in certain configurations. "The group is more than n f 1 
of its forms of sociability, just as the global society is more than 
n f 1 of the groupings which it includes within its framework.ul The 
point is, the unity of the group cannot be reduced either to its forms 
of sociability or the depth levels at its interior. It is richer than 
the sum of these elements. It is a real collectivity. Gurvitch under-
scores this contention, all the while pointing to the particularity of 
the groupings. In other terms, he is saying the realism can be carried 
to the extreme of denying the difference between a social class, for 
example, and a grouping of locality, or the nominalism can be so empha-
sized that groups fail to be real but are merely collections of inter-
acting participants. Therefore, a "differential typology"2 is needed to 
escape either one of these pitfalls. This means that an intransigent 
pluralism is necessary in macrosociology as it was in microsociology. 
The tapestry of social life at the macrosociological level is no less 
complicated. It must also be kept in mind, warns Gurvitch, that a 
classification of any sort is only valuable when it leads to empirical 
research. It is always tentative and only attempts to guide. Th~ 
theorist should take the lead in such activity. Only from the histori-
cal-empirical approach can an authentic scientific stuqy be made. 
lrbid., p. 28,3. 
~his is the subtitle of the first volume of La vocation actuelle 
de la sociologie which is the best introduction and summary of Gurvitch's 
thought. 
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A classification is a rational or logical attempt to set down same 
categories for research. These come by way of the historical-empirical 
route. Gurvitch disagrees with the assertion that too many classifi-
cations lack a logical consistency and that when they possess it they 
are not applicable to empirical research. This kind of hopeless, cir-
cuitous reasoning Gurvitch combats with particular fervor. 
iii. The Anallsis of Social Groupings. 
There is a great interest in every ·country in the study of groups: 
"A million little bargains are transacted. every day, and everywhere 
there are more 'small groups' than anyone could ever count.n1 It takes 
only a cursory glance at social science journals to indicate how wide is 
the interest in studying groups of all varieties, including every phase 
of social life from factory to village to home to local political party 
to teen-age gangland. Gurvitch contends the working categories for such 
a study is spotty, vague and shoddy. He asks why this is so. He then 
shows that the reasons for this may be seen historically. He says in 
reaction to the organic nature of the middle ages and its subsequent 
destruction at the hands of the absolute monarchs who rose during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that a special effort was made to 
see that every particular grouping was denied an existence which would 
interpose itself between the individual and the territorial state. Then 
in the nineteenth century when economic groupi ngs began to arise, these 
were not recognized for their particularity but rather were subsumed under 
certain ideas about the future of society or the nature of the state. 
4Mills, The Sociological Imagination, p . 133. 
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The particular groupings thus were ignored for what they were in and 
of themselves. This tendency was soon followed by the interpretation 
of society as the field of research and particular groupings were only 
appendages to this grand society with a capital "S ". The groupings 
were attached to the notions of consensus, order and institution as 
well as to interindividual and intermental relations. 1 
Some denied the specificity and reality of groupings in reducing 
them to fictional unities, patterns or complexes of individual relations. 
This is the most radical type of nominalism against which Gurvitch wages 
constant battle. Here he finds the Americans firmly entrenched, at 
least those who place such an exorbitant importance on the face-to-face 
groups , the small groups which "serve as an example for the cohesion of 
society at large". This is ridiculous and impossible, Gurvitch contends . 
His reasons will become explicit. 
The next error in the study of social groupings has come from the 
false dichotomy of culture and the social framework. This is impossible , 
as Gurvitch contended in Chapter Three where he reacted against a rigid 
formalism which would denude every social framework of any specific 
content . Culture is that content . 
Finally, he states, the typology of social groupings is doomed to 
failure unless certain factors are remembered; 1) Social groupings are 
abstract-concrete by nature, falling midway between the abstract micro-
social elements and the concrete global societies. 2) Social groupings 
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are no more reducible to their contents than global societies are to 
theirs. 3) The groupings are richer than any of their fonns of soci-
ability taken alone or as a whole. Each social grouping can be an 
autonomous center for the creation of patterns, signs, symbols, rules, 
values and ideas, particularly of social control. 4) A social grouping 
is a partial cohesion of its contents, which means that it in turn is 
part of a larger whole. .5) Neither the groupings, the forms of soci-
ability nor global societies are wholly autonomous, but all presuppose 
each other and in fact are interdependent. Hence, a dialectical ap-
proach is required to study these relationships. 6) Any hierarchy of 
groupings or form.s of sociability is relative. It is dependent upon the 
type of partial or global structure and the historical circumstances. A 
group's role will change according to its global structure and epoch. 
7) The majority of groupings, it must be remembered, often include the 
same persons in their membership. That is 1 they interpenetrate and this 
mutual give and take, this overlapping of membership, will affect every 
kind of classification.1 These factors must be kept in mind at all 
times. This has not been done in the past. Gurvitch hopes his sche-
matic design will help clear up some of these misconceptions. 
What then is a group? 
[It is] a concrete, but partial, collective unity. It can be 
observed direct~ and is based on collective attitudes and 
behaviour, continuous and active, having common works to ac-
complish. There is uniformity of attitudes, works and be-
haviour which constitute a structurable framework tending 
towards a relative cohesion of the manifestations of 
sociability.2 
1Ibid., pp. 289-291. ~he Spectrum ••• , p. 84. 
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There are four essential parts to this definition. They have been 
touched upon previously. It should be sufficient to mention them only 
briefly before moving on to the classification of types. 
1) This is a real collective unity. It is irreducible to any of 
its contents or to the total social phenomena. It is a unity because 
the centripetal forces are stronger than the centrifugal forces and 
hence a certain cohesion is maintained. This means then that such, a 
unity is directly observable. There are regularities and patterns 
which are readily discernible. 
2) A group is created out of certain shared attitudes. How could 
such diverse groups as the different publics or the unemployed or ethnic 
minorities or social classes be groups unless they held to a common and 
continuous attitude which was opposed to other collective attitudes? 
It takes only a superficial analysis of any group to discover there is 
this common attitude which unites the persons of a group into something 
more than interpersonal relations. This very same common attitude is 
the bridge to the more spontaneous levels of social reality as well as 
to the organized strata. However, the collective attitude is not auf-
ficient to create a group. Many attitudes. exist which are continuous 
and collective but fail to bring on the formation of a group. The 
collective attitude must be linked with a connnon task. Furthermor 
such a union needs to be translated into a structurable framework.~ 
3) An active We is essential before this common task can be car-
ried out. A passive We is incapable of engendering the energy to do 
1 . / Tra~te ••• , I, 187-188. 
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this job, or to realize the particular goal or goals. (Here once again 
Gurvitch's social law theory comes to the fore.) Such active and con-
tinuous collective attitudes with certain tasks to accomplish are 
attached closely to the centripetal forces which go to create a group, 
1 
and this is in itself a beginning of structuration. 
4) The final characteristic of this definition has to do with the 
structurable nature of this framework. The tendency towards structur-
ation comes from its efforts at cohesion leading to the formation of a 
unity. "All groupings are structurable, but not all groups are 
structured. Thus, the econauic strata, the unemployed, the age group-
ings, publics, crowds, producers and consumers can constitute groups. 
. . . They are only very rarely structured. n2 
To be structurable means there is a tendency to hierarchism of the 
multiple elements at the heart of the group. If a precarious equilibri-
lllll is established, the group is said to be structured but~ organized. 
Social classes, certain professions, crafts, and families are structured; 
however, the different publics, ethnic groups, producers and consumers 
are structurable groups, but as yet unstructured. Obviously then every 
organized group is also a structured group. A group, however, may be 
structurable or structured but resist all efforts at organization. A 
social class is a good example of this. Keep in mind that the organ-
ized aspect of social life is only one of the depth levels which make up 
social reality in Gurvitch's scheme of things. 
1Ibid., P• 188. 
2La vocation •• • , I, 305. 
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It is now time to look at the general classification of groups as 
Gurvitch outlines it. This classification has an essentially pragmatic 
character. The question to be put before any classification is whether 
it will be useful for empirical research, as a guideline for experiments 
and socio-historical descriptions which lead to an explanation of this 
aspect of social reality.1 
Gurvitch suggests fifteen criteria to distinguish these groupings. 
They overlap, to be sure, so that particular individuals are partici-
pants in several different groups . This is a relative number, meaning 
that it can be augmented or reduced as the need arises. Not every 
grouping has the same importance in each study. It all depends on the 
approach being made. Some groups will be important for the sociology 
of law while less significant for the sociology of knowledge. A selec-
tion of the relevant groupings is then essential according to the type 
of study undertaken. 
The schema of classification follows: 2 
1) Content 
a) uni-functional groupings 
b) multi-functional groupings 
c) supra-functional groupings 
2) Size 
a) small groupings 
lThe Spectrum •• • , P• 87. 
2Cf. La vocation •• • , I, 30b-308; Traitl ••• , I, 190-191; 
The Spectrum ••• , PP• 87-90. 
b) medium groupings 
c) large or extended groupings 
3) Duration 
a) temporary groupings 
b) stable groupings 
c) permanent groupings 
4) Rhythm 
a) groupings of slow cadence 
b) groupings of medium cadence 
c) groupings of rapid cadence 
S) Degree of dispersion 
a) groupings at a distance (non-assembled groups 
b) groupings of artificial contact 
c) groupings assembled periodically 
d) groupings in permanent meeting 
6) Basis of formation 
a) groupings de fait 
b) voluntary groupings 
c) enforced groupings 
7) Ease of admission 
a) open groupings 
b) groupings of conditional admission 
c) closed groupings 
8) Degree of externalization 
a) unorganized, non-structured groupings 
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or aggregates) 
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b) unorganized, structured groupings 
c) partially organized groupings 
d) completely organized groupings 
(Categories c and d above involve organization as an element 
of their structure.) 
9) Function 
a) kinship groupings 
b) fraternal groupings 
c) locality groupings 
d) groupings of economic activity 
e) groupings midway between fraternal and economic activity 
f) non-profit groupings (activities without remuneration) 
g) mystic-ecstatic groupings 
10) Orientation 
a) divisive groupings 
b) unifying groupings 
11) Degree of penetration qy the global society 
a) groupings resisting penetration by the global society 
b) groupings more or less submissive to penetration by the 
global society 
c) groupings completely submissive to penetration by the global 
society 
12) Degree of compatibility between groupings 
a) complete compatibility between groupings of the same type 
b) partial compatibility between groupings of the same type 
c) incompatibility between groupings of the same type 
d) exclusive groupings 
13) Mode of constraint 
a) groupings commanding conditional constraint 
b) groupings commanding unconditional constraint 
14) Principles governing organization 
a) groupings of domination 
b) groupings of collaboration 
15) Degree of unity 
a) unitary groupings 
b) federal groupings 
c) confederate groupings 
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The explanation of each of these types of groupings should clarify 
features already mentioned. First, it will show the pluralism of group 
life; second, it will illustrate the particularity of different groups, 
at the same time giving evidence of their irreducibility and concrete-
ness; finally, it will show how these are abstractions from social 
reality. They mutually interpenetrate and complement, as well as 
require the existence of the larger totality, the global society, in 
order that the centripetal forces of the society dominate over the forces 
which would alienate and divide. In other words, the groups would 
destroy each other in unmitigated conflict if this larger whole were 
non-existent. 
1) Content: A group may have one unique function (a common task 
to accomplish), several functions or a totality (perhaps quasi-total) 
of functions. Examples of a uni-functional type of grouping are an 
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orchestra, an athletic team, a business enterprise, or a cooperative. 
The multi-functional grouping would include those of locality (munici-
palities 1 counties 1 regions and. the state as a "block of local group-
ings nl) 1 kinship groupings, age groupings (youth, etc . ) and political 
parties . Certain ethnic minorities, mystical groups of the Middle Ages 1 
and social classes would represent the supra-functional type. The 
question might be raised as to w~ the state is included in the second 
category and not in the last one. The state cannot be identified with 
the global society, nor does it have suprafunctionality because of the 
inclusive nature of the society itself. This error of considering the 
state as being more than a multi-functional grouping of locality is due 
to the historically determined way in which certain global societies so 
classif.y the groupings that the state is placed in a privileged position. 
The impression is given that 111 1etat, c'est la societe", to change some-
what the famous assertion of Louis XIV . 
Gurvitch also has changed his thjnking between the first and 
second editions of his La vocation. • •• Prior to this latest edition 
he failed to find any group which possessed a suprafunctional role. He 
conceded this role only to the global society. (Either a nation or an 
international society would be such a global society.) However, a 
closer analysis of the social classes and certain national ethnic groups 
persuaded him that such entities have either a suprafunctional or a 
quasi-suprafunctional role. A good example of a quasi-suprafunctional 
lrraite ••• , I, 192. 
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ethnic group would be the Black Muslim movement in the United States.1 
2) Scope: These three criteria of small, middle-sized, and large 
are, again, relative terms. They are important for the reason that size 
significantly influences the very nature of the group. At present the 
social classes are the most extensive; the family is the smallest and in 
between fall the other groupings such as states, economic organizations, 
professional groupings and churches. 'When describing a group as to 
size, it is necessary to correlate this size with the historical circum-
stances and the structures of the society in which it is included. They 
make an important difference. 2 
3) Duration: The descriptive ter.ms are temporary, stable, and 
permanent. The temporary groupings are those which are dissolved as 
soon as their task to accomplish has been completed. Examples would be 
a crowd, a conspiracy or a plot, a band of explorers, partisan groups 
of World War II, demonstrations and play groups. 3 
A stable type would be dissolved only under certain conditions 
such as death, voluntar,y agreement, a decision by the majority of the 
members or a decree from the outside. '~he majority of groupings from 
the household family ••• to labor unions and political parties • 
are stable groupings, but their duration varies according to their 
character and circumstance.n4 
lor. c. Eric Lincoln, The Black Muslims in America (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1961). 
~ vocation •• • , I, 311-312. 
3The Spectrum •• • , P• 91. 4Ibid., p. 93. 
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The pennanent variety of group is one whose dissolution is not 
foreseen. Such groups would be castes, churches, states, international 
organizations, professional associations and similar examples. These 
groupings are less dependent upon the members for their continuation 
and life, since they emphasize those depth levels of organization, pat-
terns and regulations which give them a structured character. Gurvitch 
is quick to point out no higher value is placed on the permanent group-
ing. In fact, a stable grouping can last considerably longer than a 
pennanent one . It all depends on the historical situation and the 
structures themselves . 
4) lihythm: The cadence can be slow, average or rapid. Each 
group has its own metrical time . Gurvi tch has taken this notion from 
Maurice Halbwachs, especia~ from the work he did on The Collective 
Memory.1 Evidently there are different rhythms to life as lived in the 
home or a factory, in an office or a high school, in a church or a labor 
union. The divergence is especially acute when comparing a village with 
a city. In certain groupings the rhythm is very rapid, while in others 
the cadence is slow and deliberate. Gurvitch finds the American ter.m, 
social mobility, very helpful to describe a group's change in goods, 
2 tools, patterns, and symbols taken together as a whole. 
Locality groupings, such as kinship, move in a slower rhythm than 
economic or adolescent groupings. Political parties tend to be more 
rapid in their rhythm than states, which in turn have a quicker pace 
lParis: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950. 
2 The Spectrum •• • , p. 98. 
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than churches . Churches tend to move more slow~ than sects or re-
ligious orders. 
These are generalizations of course and serve on~ as indicators 
for further study of groupings 1 movements within a particular global 
structure at a particular moment in history. 
The classification of groupings according to their rhythm is very 
difficult . It is a delicate operation but a necessary one if a valid 
descripti on is to be made of a real group . This means that such a study 
must take into account the conflict which arises between the times 
lived, the times which are conceptualized and the metrical rhythms of 
the groupings . These distinctions by Gurvitch come from his study of 
social time in wich he makes a systematic effort to define the differ-
ent types of time which correspond to the various types of social frame-
works . A social time is not the same thing as a rhythm. It is more 
inclusive and concrete . For instance a grouping with a rapid cadence 
such as the economic types at the interior of a social class, or busi-
nesses which change personnel seasonally or large cities, favor a social 
time that alternates between advance on the one hand and delay on the 
other. The time of long duration fits such groupings with a slow rhythm 
as churches and villages isolated from large cities.1 
5) The Measure of Dispersion: The measuring term.s ~·are n-on- as-
sembled groupings, those artificia~ assembled, groupings which meet 
regularly, and those in a continuous assembly. The first kind would be 
represented by non-structured collective units, e. g., the unemployed, 
1Ibid., p. 100. 
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producers, and the different publics, but also professional associations 
and social classes would be included. The church and state as permanent 
groupings would fit in between the non-assembled and those which meet 
with regularity. The mass element is especially emphasized through 
these non-assembled types; there are occasions when this does not hold 
however. Artificially assembled groupings are tnose which utilized the 
depth level of signs and symbols to bring the members together, e. g., 
political party members who never attend the meetings or members of a 
committee that never meets.1 
Groupings which meet with same regularity would be illustrated by 
the annual meeting of a corporation or a cooperative as well as fac-
tories, business offices, high school classes, theatrical companies 
and grade schools. 
Permanently convened, intimate groupings would include the do-
mestic family, small hamlets, boarding houses, schools and convents. 
Certain observations pertain to this configuration of groupings charac-
terized in general by their degree of dispersion: 
The permanent groupings tend to be non-assembled groupings 
or at least groupings which assemble very rarely• conversely 
certain.temporary group~gs tend to remain assembled during, 
the ent~re length of the~r duration, such as a rescue team 
in a mountain climbing accident. At the same time non-
assembled groupings often appear (at present above all) as 
more effective and intense social frameworks for knowledge 
language, art, ethics ana religion than groupings which ar~ 
more closely assembled.2 
This statement goes a long way towards depicting the relativism 
and changeability of these categories. Observation and description must 
1Ibid., p. 101. 2La vocation •• • , I, 318. 
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be doubly careful. 
6) The Basis of Formation: The categories once again are group-
ings de fait, voluntary ones, and those imposed. These distinctions are 
necessary since a good number of sociologists try to reduce all groupings 
to "associations 11 • However, "association 11 implies a voluntary group, and 
one must take into consideration those groupings imposed on individuals 
either by force or circumstances. Hence, de fait means the type of 
grouping where the members participate without their particularly 
desiring to or without obeying the directives of a precise organization. 
In other words, there are groups to which one belongs without even 
realizing it. Examples would be social classes, ethnic groupings, con-
sumer groups, the unemployed and different publics. A social class 
would fit the last description when the "consciousness of class 11 is 
at a particularly low ebb. There are, of course, intermediary groupings 
between de fait and voluntary types such as professional groupings and 
worker groups in factories. 1 The conjugal family and religious sects 
also would belong in this intermediary capacity. 2 
Voluntary groupings are those "in which the members participate by 
their own free will, that is, they adhere to the group's rules and have 
joined on their own."3 Such would be professional unions, cooperatives, 
mutual associations, political parties, trusts, cartels, and philan-
thropic societies. It is noteworthy that entry into some groups is 
lcf. Le temps present et l'idee du droit social (Paris: J. Vrin, 
1931), PP• 18-19. 
2rraite ••• , I, 193; La vocation ••• , I, 319-320. 
3rbid., p. 320. 
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considerably easier than disassociation from them. This factor is 
intertwined with the various fonns of constraint. To say that voluntary 
groupings are always democratic or based on collaboration is to commit 
a grave error. Many voluntary types are thoroughly autocratic, while 
same de fait and obligatory groupings are democratic. The democratic 
republic is a prime example. 
The household is a good example of an intermediary among all three 
types. It is voluntary in that the husband and wife decided to es-
tablish a home; it is imposed in that the state regulates rights and 
duties of family members; it is de fait for the children who are born 
into the home. In different societies the role of the family varies, 
a factor which must be taken into consideration at all times.1 
An obligatory or imposed grouping can be either one which forces 
its members to participate or the type that obliges its beneficiaries 
to submit to its "rule". Some groupings are one or the other, while 
there are those which are both at the same time, such as the state or 
an established church. To clarify, there are two aspects of this defi-
nition: an imposed grouping is a corporation when it addresses itself 
to its members, and it is a foundation when it addresses itself to its 
beneficiaries. An example of an obligatory corporation would be the 
craft guilds during the Middle Ages; the foundation -would be illustrated 
by the state as a performer of public servaces such as hospitals, 
schools, universities, and courts. It is obvious that the state 
fulfills both these roles. It is likewise so for an established religion 
1Ibid., P• 34. 
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or one which is predominant in a society. The promise of salvation is 
coupled with certain obligations imposed upon the adherent. During the 
Middle Ages, or in certain "primitive" societies where a unique religion 
is in force, this dual role is particularly clear to see . The sepa-
ration of church and state introduces the voluntaristic element. How-
ever, to deny salvation to individuals carries a force which must be 
reckoned with . 
Other examples of obligatory groupings are the ~ens, phratries, and 
curies , eupatrides and demes, and patricians and plebians in ancient 
Greece and Rome; the castes of India; the guilds, jurandes and etats of the 
Middle Ages. Some of these are corporations, others are foundations 
plus an element of de fait. One general observation can be made . The 
voluntary and de fait groupings are more spontaneous than the tradition-
bound obligatory types . The state may at times be the exception to this 
statement . Above all, every effort must be made to get away from giving 
a priority to any one of these types . This is the error Gurvitch is 
seeking to combat in making these distinctions . 1 
7) Mode of Access: Open, conditional and closed are the de-
scriptive terms. These groupings are distinguished by their "admissions 
policy". Open groups have no special requirements for membership. Often 
they are both de fait and voluntary . Rescue teams, philanthropic asso-
ciations , public meetings , primary schools, municipalities and certain 
public~ created groups which involve no barriers would be in this 
number. 
~he Spectrum •• • , pp. 104-109. 
Closed or exclusive types are impossible to enter. They were more 
prevalent in societies before our time, e. g., the gens, phratries, pat-
ricians and eupatrides, the ~~ and the clans of ancient and primitive 
cultures.; castes in India would also be examples. Some voluntary group-
ings are included. The trade guilds in the Middle Ages, secret societies, 
conspiracies and plots organized against admitting anyone would fit into 
this category. Our own day has few of these types. Perhaps the famous 
New York Social Register or certain trusts and cartels or the haute 
bourgeoisie which recruit solely b,y birth and heritage might be listed. 
Most other groupings would fit into the conditional type. These 
condi tiona, obviously, will be extremely varied. Some will be exacting, 
others lenient.l 
These criteria can be important. A group which has difficult 
membership requirements tends to be intolerant and/or oligarchic.; a 
group which is extremely open may lack consistency. The first type 
favors patterns, regulations and rigid traditi~ns.; the second places 
the emphasis on the more flexible depth levels. 
8) The Degree of Externalization: The criteria are unorganized, 
non-structured, and partially or completely organized groupings. 
Gurvitch reiterates a favorite theme. 1Qne has at times been 
tempted to distinguish groupings according to their 'degree of existence' 
or their more or less 'explicit' or 'implicit' character."2 This is a 
dangerous practice, counsels the sociologist. Such distinctions pre-
lT ·t' raJ. e •• • , I, 194. 
2La vocation •• • , I, 326. 
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suppose the existence of a grouping is dependent upon its organization 
or structure. This is far from the truth. There are unorganized groups; 
but even if they became structured and organized, such forms can never 
totally encompass the social phenomena of the group in all its depth 
levels. In fact, often conflicts develop between the group as a total 
social phenauenon and its structure and organization. Always the total 
base of a group predominates over its partial structures. In swn1 "the 
degree of externalization of a group in an organization or even in a 
structure, is not necessarily linked to the degree of its existence.nl 
B,y way of illustration, certain groupings are not only unorganized 
but unstructured, e. g., the different publics, the unemployed, pro-
ducers, consumers 1 industries, segments of the econauic society. More-
over the "Patterns, symbols, values and ideas which are grafted onto the 
collective attitudes remain indeterminate. This affects their role in 
the global society. They possess only a latent structure, if any at 
all. 112 Keep in mind that such unorganized and unstructured groups can 
become rigidly structured in certain situations. This is especially so 
in the economic society. 
Other groups are structured but unorganized. Such would be the 
social classes, teen-age groups or the "golden age" groupings, ethnic 
and national types, and certain crafts. Most of these can be organized. 
Others cannot be organized into one organization, e. g., the social 
class. This distinction of structuration is helpful when analyzing the 
social class from the standpoint of the subjective factor introduced b,y 
1Ibid., P• 327. 
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Karl Marx, the consciousness of class . One could measure this by ac-
centing the tendency towards structure which is at work in the heart of 
each class . How fluid the middle class really is and how great the 
tendency is for the emergence of a techno-bureaucratic class could be 
measured by looking at the degree of structuration, especially relating 
this to the organizations which supposedly represent them. 1 
These groupings may became organized but usually only in a rudi-
mentary fashion. The variables are important. ~or instance temporary 
groupings are less likely to be organized than those which have a longer 
life; fraternal and kinship grouping3 are more difficult to organize 
than locality types and activity groupings of different kinds . Hence, 
families, age groups, sects and religious brotherhoods have a difficult 
time being organized and yet they are just as much a grouping as 
those which successfully meet the requirements. The explicit or ex-
ternal factors fail to tell the whole story. 2 
Those groupings which are completely organized depend upon the 
happy conjunctions between their total social phenomena, structures and 
organizations for the maint enance of their force and the development of 
their character . An organization can be stultifYing or aid in the 
growth and expansion of a grouping. It all depends on the usual vari-
ables of global society and historical circumstance . This is another 
very good reason why one must steer away from the criterion of 
"organization" for the existence of a group. Over-organization can kill 
the group as quickly as anything. 
lrbid. , P• 328. 2Ibid., p. 329 
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9) Function: Gurvitch lists seven functions by which to dis-
tinguish groupings. These may be unique or multiple. Function in his 
ter.minology is concerned with the specific work(s) the group has to 
aCCOIIlplish. 
a) Kinship - These can be founded on blood relationships or 
mystical origins. The domestic family is a present-day example. 
b) Fraternal - The affinity may be derived from the situation 
(the economic strata within the· social classes) or from belief, tastes 
and interests (groupings of age, sex, puberty rites, those possessing 
the same income or the different publics, cooperatives ana fraternities). 
c) Locality - These have a territorial character. The members are 
tied to a particular neighborhood and must maintain a certain order in 
this place where they live. Cities, villages and hamlets are examples. 
d) Economic activity - 11All groupings whose principal function 
consists in participation in production, exchange, the distribution of 
wealth or in the planning of consumption,"~ould be included here. 
Thus, occupations, professions, farms, workshGps, factories, stores, 
offices, trade societies, trusts, cartels, and cooperatives would be 
examples of this type. 
e) Intermediary between fraternal and economic activity - Certain 
groupings originally were based on family relationships, but also were 
economically oriented. Certain syndicates, shops, and crafts have had 
this mixed character. Good examples would be the old Knights of Labor 
and the Brotherhood of Railroad Engineers. 
l.rhe Spectrum. • • , p. 110. 
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f) Non-profit - Those groupings which would fit this category 
are political parties, learned societies, art groups, civic associ-
ations, athletic unions and literary clubs. 
g) Mystical-ecstatic - Churches, congregations, religious orders, 
convents , sects, magical brotherhoods, Masonic lodges, all would be 
examples of this type. 
It is readily apparent that these seven types of groupings dis-
tinguished by their functions overlap ~ withl .!.the majority of the other 
distinctions already mentioned. Churches and states are particularly 
clear-cut examples. This intersecting of various distinctions calls for 
a special type of study. 
They must be studied as to the repercussions which the diverse 
functions they possess have on the actualization and the equi-
librium, in their framework, of the forms of sociability, on 
the charac~er that their structure takes, on their capacity to 
include in this structure an organized element, on the ex-
pressions they give to knowledge, ethics, law, aesthetics, 
religion and education. l 
The way in which this study is carried out is equally important. 
Gurvitch would say the sole approach which can ade~ately take all of 
these factors into consideration is a dialectical one, about which more 
will be said later. 
10) Orientation: There are two distinctions, divisive and uni-
fying . Divisive groupings tend to create conflict; unif.ying ones seek 
to reconcile . Two types do not fit this distinction. The social class 
is always divisive, while the locality groupings such as the state are 
always in principle groupings of unity . The remaining groups only 
~a vocation •• • , I, 332. 
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exhibit a tendency to move in one direction or the other. This trend 
can be reversed under certain conditions. Hence, divisive groupings 
would include political parties, crafts, professional associations, 
labor unions, employer alliances, industrial associations, consumer 
unions, magical cults, sects and religious orders. "In contrast, 
factories, business e~terprises, industries, managerial organizations, 
economic planning associations, social insurance bodies and universal 
churches are habitually groupings of union. nl 
One error must be eliminated straightway. This distinction cannot 
be linked with serving the "general interest" over against the "private 
or special interest". Gurvitch means b,y general interest, as was 
pointed out in the discussion on his social law, the balance which is 
struck between the various opposing interests. This general interest 
can be helped or hindered b,y either one of these groupings, divisive or 
unifying . 
11) The Mode of Penetration by the Global Society: This is 
described by these distinguishing terms: refractory, partial submission 
and total penetration. 
The reason for this distinction is that on first glance· unifying 
and open groupings would appear to be especially susceptible to pene-
tration by the global society. However, on closer analysis this is not 
always the case, hence the reason for this more precise definition. 
This becomes plain when one considers the social class, certain social 
strata, age groups and publics, all open groupings; likewise, unifying 
lrhe Spectrum • • • , p. 113. 
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groupings such as churches, families, factories and business enterprises 
and totalitarian states, together are refractory towards any penetration 
b,y the global society. On the other hand, divisive groupings such as 
crafts, professions, and the consumers (when they are groups) can be 
very easily influenced by the global society. This then shows that 
the problem of penetration by the global society is separate from the 
other distinctions and must be considered in its own right. 
Refractory groupings may consciously or unconsciously resist this 
penetration. Their motives and means are varied. Maybe they feel ex-
cluded from the.hierarchy of groupings ordered b,y society; or they 
consider themselves deprived of a rank or position they for.merly held; 
or they are convinced they have a unique mission which sets them apart 
from the global society; or finally, they are dedicated to the over-
throw of the existing arrangement of groupings b,y the global society, 
meaning the destruction of the society's structure.1 Groups which would 
fit the first of these possibilities are national minorities who speak 
a different language, racial minorities, the hard-core unemployed, 
slaves, serfs, or any other groups in modern society which are excluded 
from full participation in the whole range of functional groupings. 
Those groupings which feel deprived of position are the estates 
general in France, kinship groups in areas of rapid social change, pro-
fessions and craft guilds. All have been dispossessed in a certain 
respect. They are now separated from the mainstream of events and of 
life in the global society. 
11a vocation •• • , I, 336. 
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Among those groupings which claim to possess a unique mission 
would be the Catholic Church, which at various periods in history has 
tried to replace the framework of the global society with its own. 
The revolutionary impetus as a refractory influence is evidenced 
in certain youth groupings and revolutionary social classes. The 
historical circumstance detennines to a great extent the type of group 
this will be. 
Most of the groupings fit the middle category on this continuum 
of global society penetration. Most of the kinship groupings, locality 
types, economic groupings, non-economic types, and even the mystic-
ecstatic groups ~ccept the patterns, values, ideas and symbols of the 
global society in which they exist. or course they are selective, giving 
their particular interpretations to these depth levels. This is the side 
which refuses to be influenced totally by this external entity,; but 
nevertheless they remain in a kind of tension vis-a-vis the global 
society. 
The groupings which become completely submissive to the global 
society are usually purely cultural or philanthropic, e. g., scientific, 
learned, literary, and artistic societies, universities, high schools, 
professional schools, foundations, public and private centers for 
research and academies. These are then groupings which are involved in 
social control in the broadest sense and in furthering the continuation 
of the global society.1 
12) The Degree of Co,mPatibility between the Groupings: The 
~vocation •• • , I, 338-339. 
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continuum runs along a line from those groupings which are compatible 
through those which are partially so, to the incompatible and exclusive. 
The latter category is set apart as a separate distinction. Gurvitch 
says it is possible to make one or two generalizations. Firat, in 
general, compatibility exists between dissimilar groupings. Cannot one 
participate quite easily simultaneously in a family, locality groupings, 
economic, non-economic, and religious types? Second, the incompatibili-
ty generally arises between groups of the same order. There are ex-
ceptions. Some groups are exclusive; these then will be considered 
separately. 
The end points of the continuum are clearly understood. It is 
necessary to develop the mid-point, partial compatibility and the 
exclusive type of grouping •1 
Partially compatible groups would mean that at certain times these 
like groupings would be incompatible; at other moments they would be 
able to co-exist. Professional groups, crafts, labor unions, indus-
tries, communes, municipalities, counties, regions, kinship groups, 
play groups, civic associations, certain religious associations and 
lodges would be compatible but at times develop situations where 
communication breaks down. There is nothing which says a person can't 
belong to several professional associations or be a member of several 
crafts or labor unions. But there ~ be moments When it is impossible 
to play all these "roles" consistently, when it is impossible to be a 
compatible member of all these groups simultaneously. 
1Ibid, pp. 339-340. 
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The weight may be in the other direction. One can be a member of 
basically incompatible groupings but find through tolerance and sheer 
will a modicum of compatibility can be developed. Examples would be 
political parties in Congress, national minority groups, and various 
confessional bodies comprising the World Council of Churches •1 
The exclusive types on first glance would be fairly easy to 
designate: totalitarian states wnich would deny membership in ~ 
other group, certain religious sects and orders, prisons and slaves, 
plus ethnic minority groups with religious overtones, such as the Black 
Muslim movement in the United States. However, these are relative. 
Though the desire is to be exclusive, it rarely is realized completely. 
The same holds for total incompatibility or compatibility. These are 
abstractions once again, ways to describe and define. They are relative 
and limited. They must be viewed in this light and this fact constantly 
2 
remembered. 
13) The Mode of Constraint: Conditional and unconditional are 
the modes. This is a new distinction. It has nothing whatsoever to do 
with a grouping being closed or imposed. Both conditional and uncon-
ditional can be used in these two types. The only exception is the 
exclusive grouping such as the totalitarian state. 
The discussions on social law should be recalled to clarify 
conditional and unconditional constraint. Constraint has to do with 
the totality or unity of the grouping itself. The force of the con-
straint, the type itself, will depend upon the kind of grouping. Every 
1T ·t" raJ. e •• • , I, 196-197. 
group must depend upon some constraint for cohesion. Conditional con-
straint for Gurvitch means that a person can remove himself from it, 
get around it in some fashion. Unconditional means the opposite. 
Obviously if a group is closed, making it impossible to leave, uncon-
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ditional constraint would obtain in that situatimn. This does not rule 
out the possibility that the conditional constraint can be of a violent 
nature. It can. If one chooses to remain in certain groups and the 
penalties for certain actions have to do with corporeal punishment, then 
this will be the case. The practices of universities of the Middle 
Ages, or modern-day fraternities in colleges, or any kind of hazing such 
as goes on at the military academies are all prime illustrations. 
A family may exercise unconditional restraint on a minor child. 
Other groupings of locality can exercise the unconditional type. The 
point is that the state does not hold a monopoly unless one separates 
it from the other groupings of locality which also exercise a certain 
kind of unconditional constraint. Then, perhaps one can legitimately 
define the state as holding a monopoly on this unconditional variety of 
constraint.1 
14) The Governing Principle of Structures and Organizations: 
Groupings of domination are distinguished from groupings of collabo-
ration. Again, this refers back to the whole section on social law 
(Chapter II). Recall also the section on microsociology. The way in 
which the We can vary within different structures is shown. For example 
the authoritarian and autocratic We can exist and be quite strong 
11a vocation. ~' I, 348. 
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within officially democratic structures. The reverse is a leo true. 
"The intensity of authoritarianism or democracy in a grouping cannot 
be established exactly if one looks only at their structure and organi-
zation. It is often a question of nuance and must be studied micro-
sociologically."l 
There are basically two factors which need to be remembered in 
terms of whether a grouping is democratic or authoritarian. First, the 
degree to which a superstructure (or the organized level) remains open 
to the infrastructure (the spontaneous level) is the degree to which it 
will be democratic or not. The more open and responsive it is to this 
spontaneous level, the more democratic the grouping is. The tighter it 
is closed, the more autocratic it becomes. 
Second, independent of whether a group is organized or not, 
another variable is "the rational or m.ystical character of the power 
which emanates from the group.n2 This means that if a group depends on 
a charismatic formula, a mystical or supernatural force, or a justifi-
cation of power based on emotional factors, the authoritarian type will 
obtain. 
It is also obvious that the type of grouping, democratic or auto-
cratic, will depend on the kind of structure and regime which exists in 
the global society. Also how well do the various groupings in terpene-
trate with this structure and regime? Finally, no global society with 
either a democratic or authoritarian political structure is able to 
influence every aspect of the macrocosm. There will be many differences 
~bid., P• 349. 2 Ibid., P• 350. 
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within the whole. This is why it is essential to study each one of 
these concrete groupings as to their democratic or autocratic charac-
1 ter. 
15) The Degree of Unity: There are unitary, federationist and 
confederationist types. This continuum is very close to that given by 
most political scientists. Unitar,y refers to that grouping which orders 
its microsociological elements in a unique and direct fashion or its 
subgroups in such a way that it has central authority and they play only 
a subordinate role. Great Britain is a good example of the unitary 
type. The federalist type means that a synthesis is worked out between 
the grouping and its subgroupings to effect a unity where the balance of 
power is in the hands of the central group. The confeder tionist type 
is just the reverse of the latter. The subgroupings have the balance of 
power. The United States of America follows the federalist principle, 
the United Nations the confederalist one. 
Gurvitch 1s sociological definition is especia~ significant. It 
is worthwhile quoting completely: 
Being given that every grouping whose structure and organi-
zation are sufficiently rooted in its total social phenomenon, 
that is each group which approaches more nearly the 11corpo-
rationH type than the "foundation" type, can be, in its internal 
functioning, characterized as a "complex collective person-
ality", as an equilibrium between the central personality and 
the partial personalities, as a synthesis between a unique 
subject and a relation between certain multiple persons, the 
definitions which follow can thus be formulated: in the uni-
tary group, the equilibrium between the central personality 
and the partial personalities is established in the complex 
collective person to the profit of the central person; in the 
federalist group, the same equilibrium is established in favor 
l:rbid. 
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of an equality between the central person and the partial 
persons; finally, in the confederalist group, this equilibrium 
is established in favor of the partial persons over the central 
person.1 
This distinction is applicable to all types of groupings, the 
state and economic groupings included. 
In conclusion several observations apply to the foregoing complete 
classification of particular groupings made by Gurvitch. First, these 
various distinctions intersect and overlap. This is deliberate and 
necessary. This complex result really stands for the various stances or 
positions one can take in looking at a grouping. There is an effort 
here to be systematic and yet open. 
Second, this classification is relative. It is "unfinished" and 
always will be. It is a tool by wnich to analyze concrete groupings. 
Third, for Gurvitch, groups are real. They cannot be reduced to the sum 
of their parts. If they are real, just as any other phenomenon, they 
must be classified to facilitate their being studied analytically and 
logically. Fourth, this tapestry of groupings has a design, but that 
design changes according to the historical circumstances and the par-
ticular global society being studied. 
This typology is worthwhile only if it can lead to empirical 
research. Such research has already been done in terms of the soci-
ology of knowledge and morals. Gurvitch discovered it was much more 
useful to study these problems from the standpoint of groupings than 
that of microsociology (which is too unstable) or global society 
(which is too extensive). He has also found that sociometry can be used 
1ta vocation ••• , I, 351. 
to test these hypotheses along with-socioctramas involving gr0ups and 
the use of the theater as a way of studying a control group .1 
Finally, the usefulness of this typology becomes apparent when 
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trying to get hold of such a difficult grouping as that wnich is known 
as the social class . This classification helps to define this collec-
tivity more precisely. It is to this task of defining a social class 
that this study now turns . 
2. Social Class 
Social classes are social groupings , yet the are s ucn a different 
type that Gurvitch analyzes them separately from global soc i eties and 
particular groupings . One feels as if he enters a whole new world when 
he begins to think within the fra ework of social class. Once a5ain, 
these are real groups and this assertion in itself sets Gurvitch apart 
fro other social theorists . The analysis of this definition by Gurvitch 
will serve two purposes: first , it will help greatly in understanding 
his whole conception of macrosociology, and second, it will serve to 
show where he differs from and how he criticizes certain contemporary 
theories in social stratification. 2 
A social class constitutes a universe , a collective whole which 
1
cf . his article entitled 
ouvelles , February, 1956, pp . 
Also , Ibid., pp . 246 ff . 
"La sociologie du th~atre 11 , Les Lettres 
206 ff ., cited in La vocation • • • , I , 353. 
2The sources for this analysis come from the follo1-r.i.ng works of 
Gurvitch: rait~ •• • , I , 198-203; La vocation •• • , I , 354-399; 
The Spectrum • • • , pp . 115-140; D ter.minismes ••• , 176-190; and 
Le concept de classes sociales de x arx ~ nos jours (:F-aris: Centre de 
Documentation Jniversitaire , 1954) . 
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is so vast and rich that it is capable of rivaling even the global 
society.nl The notion of social class is so confusing that one never 
quite knows where he is when reading in sociological literature. 1~he 
ter.m 'social class' is used in different ways by different writers. It 
would be difficult to incorporate in a single sentence all the qualifi-
cations that should be made in any short definition. 112 This statement 
is characteristic. The sociologist in this case goes on to define what 
he means by social class, with the stipulation that the rest of the 
chapter will be spent in qualii'ying what he has said. This is all right 
but by the time one has worked his way through the maze of qualification 
he feels no closer to a concrete definition th@n when he started. Gur-
vitch has the merit of defining social class in a straightforward and 
unambiguous way. This is possible for him since he affirms right off 
tnat a social class is a real group . He finds considerable merit in 
the theories of Marx, M. Halbwachs and Sorokin. He · notes that Marx had 
the insight to see that social classes do indeed exist and are real 
collectivities; moreover, the,y are special products of industrial soci-
ety and have their birth with modern capitalism. Sorokin and Halbwachs 
saw the necessity of combining several criteria in order to get hold of 
the extremely rich content of social class, and they, too, realized the 
fundamental notion for a theory of social class is to affirm that it is 
a real collectivity, a true group, or ~ore, an irreducible macrocosm of 
groupings, an indis.soluble social phenomenon. "3 
l.rhe Spectrum. • • , p . 115. 
3La vocation ••• , I, 357. 
2Harry Johnson, Sociology ••• , p.469. 
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What, then, is Gurvitch's definition? A definition will have to 
distinguish a social class from particular groupings in general and will 
have to provide the framework for studying the social classes as they 
relate to the groupings which are found within them in certain rankings 
of their own, and in relation to the groupings which are outside their 
framework. The definition must account for their interaction with the 
global societies in which they exist, act and struggle (sometimes 
against the global structure), and for their dealings with the forms of 
sociability which make up their microsociological content. 
There are six parts to Gurvitch's definition. Each will be dis-
cussed briefly. He counsels at the beginning of his presentation in 
La vocation that two misunderstandings must be cleared up immediately. 
First, contrary to some critics' evaluations, he includes in his defi-
nition the importance of both the cultural works of the classes and the 
existence of a "consciousness of class". In fact they are necessary to 
each other . The push towards a structure on the part of a class is 
actually its consciousness, and such a structure finds its cement, its 
cohesiveness in the cultural works produced to make this structure, i.e. 
patterns, signs, symbols, social roles, and specific ideas and values . 
It is because of this basic esprit de corps which produces these cultur-
al factors that one can declare a social class exists, has a reality of 
its own which can be described . More will be said about this first 
response Gurvitch makes to his critics. On the second matter, there is 
little doubt that the economic aspect of social classes is a dominant 
one, responds Gurvitch to those who feel he has failed to take this into 
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account, but one must not separate this factor from the total social 
phenomena. This is a persistent theme and is consistent with his whole 
theory. This will became clearer as the definition unfolds. 1 
1) The social classes are groupings de fait. Bearing in mind 
Gurvitch's central aim to illustrate how this classification of group-
ings is at once verified and empirically useful to delimit the notion 
of class, this first characteristic is readily seen. One does not 
choose to enter a social class. He belongs. It is an imposition of 
fact. This does not say that juridical regulations are imposed at the 
same time (unless the class is that one which is in political power). 
One makes a grave error about social class if he confuses it with the 
orders or castes of ancient history and modern India. '~ocial classes 
exist outside the official divisions ••• n~ 
2) Social classes are non-assembled groupings. They are not 
intimate groupings or permanent, or even periodical ones. They are 
particularly explicit examples of non-assembled groupings. 1~sn 1 t this 
what Marx meant by 'Workers of the world, unite1'?"3 There is a strong 
impulse towards structuration (class consciousness) which is manifested 
in several different types of organizations which can enter into group-
ings that have an artificial basis for contact, but this in no way 
detracts from this characteristic of being a non-assembled grouping. 
The social classes are the richest in content of all groupings and 
1La vocation •• • , I, 385-386. 
2Le concept de classes ••• , p. 118. 
3Ibid., P• 119. 
their production of cultural works is greater than any other t.r.pe, 
especially the intimate and permanently assembled "small groups" which 
fascinate the American sociologists so much. This seems to undercut 
much of what they say about the value of small groups .1 
3) Social classes are super-functional, par excellence. This 
means they even challenge the global structure, such as that of the 
nation, and it is this competition with their global structure which 
produces the drive towards superfunctionality. The way in which a 
social class expresses itself is in direct relation to whether it has 
gained the position of power, is ascending in power, or declining in 
power. 
Obviously a multitude of organizations are required to express 
this collective superfunctionality of the social classes. Not one 
organization is sufficient to express this complex of functions. This 
is why the social class, though structured, remains unorganized. A dual 
conflict takes place with a social class. It struggles with the other 
social classes within a global structure and with the global structure 
itself. "Each class is a whole world in itself and would like to be the 
unique totality, either by identifying with the existing global society 
from which the other social classes would be excluded or relegated to an 
inferior status; or by joining with the global society of the future 
where there would no longer be any social classes. 112 
Two other things need to be said about this characteristic of 
1La vocation ••• , I, 388. 
2 Le concept de classes ••• , p. 121. 
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superfunctionality. First, social classes are macrocosms of groupings. 
This means that within them are to be found many different types of 
groups and these too are in conflict to gain the top rung on the hier-
archy; also there is competition between the different sub-strata of a 
class. This internal conflict is in inverse proportion to the intensity 
of the struggle between the classes for ascendancy in the global 
structure. Second, it is patently clear by now that if one attempted 
to reduce the social classes to functional groupings (if this were the 
method of classification), the social classes would have to be left out . 
The picture is like this: certain functional groupings are so arranged 
that they form competing social classes . Other functional groupings 
make up the hierarchy of the global structure. These two hierarchies 
are in competition with each other. Add to this the hierarchy of group-
ings within each class which compete for the always relative equilibrium 
there (which can have grave repercussions on the whole global structure) 
and one begins to get an idea of the macrosociological tensions of 
social reality. 1 
4) This fourth characteristic has already been implied: there is 
a radical incompatibility between the social classes . Though social 
classes are open, they incorporate within them a spontaneous and radical 
element of dislike for the other classes . One cannot participate at the 
same time in two different social classes . This is so since there is a 
thrust towards structuration which implies a consciousness of class 
mixed with the "cultural cement u in the form of values, ideals, symbols, 
l Le concept de classes •• • , pp. 120-122. 
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ideologies and outlook on life, including very definite political 
.d 1 l. eas. 
5) Constant resistance to penetration by the global society is 
the fifth characteristic of social classes. This resistance is based 
on the three factors of suprafunctionality, class antagonism and the 
drive towards structuration. There are other groups which resist this 
penetration such as the Catholic Church, certain youth groupings, and 
outmoded political p~rties . But none are as successful as the social 
classes . '~re the social classes exist and are effectively structured 
they are at once more refractory than all the other groupings to pene-
tration by the global society and they are in competition with the 
hierarchy of characteristic functional groupings of the global society 
in which they live. n2 Each social class considers itself the unique 
center for the global society and seeks constantly to fashion that 
society in accordance with its cultural values, its form of conscious-
ness . The ascending classes and those classes which have been dis-
possessed of power are the most impervious to the global structure. 
The class in power is most open to this penetration all the while 
believing it is dominating the structure. If destructuration is threat-
ened, a battle will ensue between the status quo class and the ascending 
class. Such is the time of revolution. 
6) The social classes have an impulse towards intense structur-
ation . This does not mean organized, to reiterate a point already 
lrbid . , PP• 123-124. 
2T •t ' raJ. e • • • , I, 201-202. 
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repeatedly emphasized. A social class is a unified structure, rut 
because of its superfunctionality it cannot be organized. Structuration 
is the clue to whether a stratum is a class or is becoming one. This 
really means class consciousness or "collective mentality". Marx was 
unclear about this term consciousness. He confused it with ideology.1 
Gurvitch feels one should leave to ideology the doctrinal political 
justifications of the social classes and show these functionally related 
to their cultural expressions. As to class consciousness, this is 
really returning to the conception of the collective conscience. "The 
collective conscience is a partial interpenetration of the indiYidual 
consciences, an interpenetration which admits a scale of degrees. rr2 
Neither the individual nor the collective consciences can be reduced to 
each other. They are reciprocally related through the phenomenological 
conception of intentionality by which, to a certain degree, they are 
"open", they intend each other. These different directions make up the 
total psychical phenomenon: the collective conscience moves towards 
the~' the group, the global society; the individual intends the !_ and 
the interpersonal conscience moves towards the other. This troika of 
intentionality is always present in the psychical life, in every 
conscience. The collective conscience exists just as much as the 
individual and it has a certain priority over the interpersonal since 
communication is necessary here, implying some sort of symbolic language. 3 
1n 't ' . 136 f t t b 1 e e~1smes •• • , p. , oo no e num er • 
21a vocation •• • , I, 395. 
3Ibid., PP• 395-396. 
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The complexity comes at the point of realizing that th:ere are many 
collective consciences in a struggle constantly, and the most powerful, 
the most intense within the global society (the nation as a collective 
conscience) are these of the social classes. They dominate their 
groupings' collective consciences as well as those of the other groupings 
within the global society. This means that the social classes penetrate 
the other groupings and the We 1 s within them as well as those at their 
interiors, but they repel the advances of the nation to a large extent. 
This class consciousness, then, is the basis for the unity of the class. 
This is the collective mentality which is combined with the cultural 
works and the ideology of the class to give each class cohesiveness and 
structure.1 
There are other characteristics which could be mentioned to fill 
in this definition of class* It is an extended social grouping, perma-
nent and open. The movement (vertical) between classes is possible, 
but difficult, since what is required is a change of mentality 
(consciousness) and kind and level of life. Gurvitch admits the place 
of external factors in evaluating social classes as to rank. 
The final two characteristics of social classes are dependency 
upon conditional constraint and the natural divisiveness of social 
classes as implied b.1 their radical incompatibility and their conflict 
with the global structure. 
This definition then can be formulated: 
1 . IbJ.d. 
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The social classes are particular groupings of great breadth 
and scope, containing macrocosms of sub-groupings, partial 
macrocosms whose unity is dependent upon their super-
functionality, their resistance to the penetration of the 
global society, their radical incompatibility with one another, 
their thrust towards structuration, implying a predominant 
collective consciousness and their special cultural works. 
These super-groupings only appear in industrial societies 
where the technical means and economic functions are particularly 
accentuated. They have the following traits: they are groupings 
de fait, open rather than closed; they are non-assembled, 
divisive, permanent, remain unorganized and possess only 
conditional constraint.l 
Finally, social classes are relative in number. Their force, 
strength, and the intensity of their conflict must be ascertained in 
terms of the particular global social structures in which they live, 
and the historical circumstances of the moment. This requires a method 
which can take into consideration all of these factors simultaneously. 
Such a method will be dialectical. Before the method can be fully 
explained, two tasks remain: to define social structure and to define 
global society. These will be the central concerns of the next chapter. 
The crucial difference between Gurvitch and many sociologists who 
have theorized on social class is his basic affirmation that classes are 
real groups. He does not hesitate to assert this claim. It is crystal 
clear in his thought. This is so different from much of the literature 
one must get through in American sociology in order to make an "educated" 
guess about the writers' conception of social class. As one writer puts 
it, '~he raison d'etre for the majority of the empirical studies has been 
primarily descriptive, merely to note the facts of social inequality. 112 
lrhe Spectrum •• • , p. 116. 
2Harold W. Pfautz, 'The Current Literature on Social Stratification, 
Critique and Bibliography," American Journal of Sociology, LVII, (January, 
1953), 406. 
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Other studies have sought to measure the impact of social stratification 
upon the personalities of individuals and groups within a given society 
without looking at the society as a whole. The author concludes, t~ew 
empirical efforts aim at validating a theory of social stratification 
in the sense either of relating the phenomenon to social systems gener-
ally or of explaining the development, maintenance, and modification of 
structures per se . "l Jean Floud, quoted in the above article, makes 
this observation: there has been largely "an attempt to separate the 
study of stratification in contemporary society from its historical 
context in Marxian notions of the class structure. n2 There is an 
amazing degree of agreement between these statements and the whole 
critical work of Gurvitch in this area . Theory is necessary in order 
to know where one is going, what is to be tested, how this social in-
equality is to be explained. The historical developnent is important. 
The type of global structure in which classes exist is important. Is 
there a difference between caste and class? Is it just a prestige 
factor or are there important correlations to be made between prestige, 
power, and political ideology plus social change itself? Is social 
class a substantive conception or merely a heuristic device? Gurvitch 
makes it clear 'Where he stands . This is for him a substantive con-
ception. Social classes are real . They have certain characteristics. 
These can be directly observed and measured. There are objective and 
subjective factors, but for Gurvitch they cannot be separated. They are 
a total social phenomenon. These groups embody a consciousness which 
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varies in intensity. Such a consciousness alone can engender cultural 
manifestations. It is impossible to talk of cultural works apart from 
the collectiwe mind, mentality or consciousness. Perhaps the popular 
term esprit de corps captures what he means. Gurvitch, though he does 
not mention this explicitly, would utilize the statistical methods for 
the morphological characteristics of social classes; he would depend upon 
sociometric devices, sociodramas and other depth testing means to get 
at the deeper levels of social class reality. He would urge the study 
of these classes within their own global social structures, taking into 
account their historical development and their present situation. The 
ways in which the various groupings are in conflict within the social 
classes, the tensions of the groups outside the social classes, the 
struggles among the classes and their drive for power within the global 
structure are all part of these total phenomena. 
If one affirms a realist position, then every attempt to reduce 
social cl~sses to "certain social categories, nominalistic aggregates, 
simple collections of individuals, the results of statistical procedures 
or assemblages of positions, statuses, ranks, roles and monopolies of 
power must be rejected."l They have an irreducible character which must 
be described and then explained. 
It becomes increasingly evident that if one is to study the social 
class, he must affirm there is a certain reality to the class as a group. 
Otherwise he is hopelessly lost in a maze of contradictions. These have 
~raite ••• , I, 199. 
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already been mentioned. Nominalism, in essence, eliminates the whole 
problem of social class . 'Whether Gurvitch's realism solves the problem 
in advance is the question remaining. The most perceptive critic of 
Gurvitch 1 s position is Raymond Aron . (American sociologists generally 
have not read Gurvitch and hence have had to remain silent.) 
Aron, in his course given at the Sorbonne in 1956-1957, points 
to the essential issue. Nominalism knows the reality of the individual; 
realism, the reality of the collective . Both lead to a philosophical 
antinomy, he asserts. They are also in conflict with one another as 
concepts . 
The realist accuses the nominalist of letting escape an es-
sential notion, the collective phenomenon; the nominalist 
reproaches the realist for inventing a collective reality 1 which does not exist, or scarcely so, or unequally if at all. 
Aron believes it impossible to define once and for all such fac-
tors as class . Social reality is so complex and ambiguous. Hence, this 
ambiguity is necessarily a part of sociology, since it exists in social 
reality itself. 
This means no single definition is sufficient even to specify 
different groups in a canplex society. This ambiguity of social reality 
is illustrated by several examples: 1) the agricultural worker, arti-
ficially designated b,y the sociologist, has no consciousness of being a 
part of a group or class; 2) the organized proletariat of Paris are 
individuals who have the same work, similar wages and thought patterns, 
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and have a consciousness of thinking in the same way. Moreover, they 
have a consciousness of their difference from other groups and their 
opposition to them. 
Aron finds the majority of the groups situated between these two 
extreme cases. Most groups are never completely artificial, never com-
pletely internally unified. 
This ambiguity of the social reality is the basic point of de-
parture for all research on the social classes. One is able to define 
the reality of groups by the similarity in the ways of living and think-
ing by the individual or by the consciousness of unity. However, a 
necessary connection between the degree of similarity among the members 
of a group and the degree of class consciousness is lacking. Some 
individuals are very different in their style of living and yet can 
feel themselves members of the same class. Same men who live and think 
the same can lack totally a consciousness of their unity. Indeed, the 
two phenomena are separable.1 
Objective studies on social class are determined by the personal 
inclinations of the observer; his philosophical or political preferences 
enter in. Also the diversity of the reality itself influences empirical 
studies. 
Aron considers the studies of Warner, Halbwachs and a national 
survey group in France. He observes that: 
The limitation of research projects of this order is that they 
neglect that which should be a part of the object of research 
as they study social classes. What is the decisive problem 
lrbid. 
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of the reality of social class? To What extent does the indi-
vidual as a member of a complex society consider himself es-
sentially a membel of a class, and of a class which is opposed 
to other classes? 
Aron distinguishes three basic problems in the notion of class: 
1) What is each class's relation to the economic and social conditions 
of its individual members? 2) Are the objective differences between 
persons psychologically real? 3) Is there a sense of class conscious-
ness coupled with a feeling of opposition to other classes? 
It is ver.y difficult to define the lines between classes on an 
objective scale. Moreover, even if the French proletariat are different 
psychologically, still they are French, with the characteristics of the 
collectivity of France . Add to this the fact that prise de conscience 
of class is never present in the whole totality. Aron feels it is 
unnecessary to accept either the nominalistic or realist definitions. 
It is important, further.more, to distinguish between class consciousness 
and class conflict. A ver.y definite sense of class can exist without 
feeling the distinction will lead to a death struggle. 
Keeping in mind the ambiguity of social reality, Aron declares 
there are only certain distinctions which can be noted about the con-
cept of class. Class incorporates persons who are never gathered 
together in one place. A social class is unorganized and has no legal 
status. One can enter and leave a class without knowing it. It is 
difficult to establish with certainty the class to which a person be-
longs. His manner of thinking is only one of the things a sociologist 
lrbid., P• 44. 
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has to go on. An ideal type of class would look like the following: 
an ensemble of individuals found in a similar social and economic 
situation, utilizing the same thought forms and possessing a conscious-
ness of being a group. Therefore, the three fa~tors of this ideal type 
are: a) sirr~larity of socio-economic condition; b) prise de conscience 
of this socio-economic condition, and c) the will for common action.1 
Aron reproaches Gurvitch for his inclusion of two characteristics: 
resistance to penetration by the global society and the radical incom-
patibility of the classes due to an intense class consciousness. Aron 
feels these are not descriptive terms, though the previous character-
istics are. These are part of a theory based on a certain philosophical 
position. It is not "evident that ••• the class is a ~ totality 
which has a consciousness of itself as a totality.n2 
In defense, Gurvitch points out that he recognizes the ambiguity of 
social reality. He constantly underlines it.s co1nple.xity and the "hidden 
quality" of social life. Now, as to the dichotomy between nominalism 
and realism, considerable ambiguity is present in Aron's position. On 
the one hand, Aron asserts that nominalism eliminates the problem of 
social class; on the other hand, he seems to say there are times when 
nominalism is the only way of explaining certain collective behaviours 
which appear to lack cohesiveness sufficient to warrant their being 
called a real group. In terms of an old adage, is there such a thing 
as being just a little pregnant? Is there such a thing as a class being 
1~., pp. 45-46. 2Ibid., P• 31. (Italics supplied.) 
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only partially real? Gurvitch says no. Gurvitch explains there are 
both active and passive consciousnesses, latent or virtual mani-
festations of which can give the appearance of "nominalism". This comes 
from his whole discussion of the existence of "middle classes", meaning 
in this sense the tendency on the part of some non-assembled groupings 
to move in the direction of structuration (class consciousness among 
other things) which would give them a "class status". These groupings 
appear to be between certain established classes. An example would be 
the newly constituted techno-bureaucratic elements. In another con-
text, Gurvitch describes the relative strength of the ~· The type of 
global structure and the historical situation will determine how strong 
this collective conscience (~) will be. It is unnecessary to deny the 
existence of the collective conscience. Also, certain criteria exist 
by which the agricultural workers can be tested to see if they meet the 
requirements for being a social class. They may simplY be a non-
assembled grouping de fait without a social class status. 
As to the resistance to penetration by the global society and the 
incompatibility between classes, Gurvitch makes it clear these are 
relative. The resistance iricreases as the struggle for power with the 
global society develops. The sense of antagonism increases as the his-
torical circumstances call for a class conflict. If the class is in 
power, as the middle class seems to be in the United States, then there 
is more penetration and less a feeling of consciousness to be expressed 
in political terms• Only when that position is threatened, as it was in 
the 1930's during the dark days of the depression, did the middle class 
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take on a more "political character" and resist the thrust of the 
class(es) from below. Only then was the antagonism acute. As Howard 
K. Smith has said, the Roosevelt era was a conservative era in which 
the values, ideas, symbols and ideals of the ascendant middle claes 
were protected and solidified. Roosevelt took certain measures to 
maintain the position of the middle class. 
Probably Gurvitch would, in the final analysis, agree with Aron's 
three factors for his ideal type. These would fairly well fit tne 
theoretical outline Gurvitch has given. The point is that Aron has 
failed to define what he means by class consciousness. Gurvitch goes 
beyond Durkheim, Aron and others who are willing to accept the Marxian 
assertion about class consciousness but fail to explore the reasons for 
the existence of this class consciousness. Though the morphological 
level is important, the will for common action is mare deeply rooted in 
class consciousness and the existence of cultural works must somehow be 
explained. A mere description of these artifacts is inadequate. 
Gurvitch asserts that sociology, if it is to exist as an indepen-
dent discipline, must have its own realm of study. Such a reaJmis 
social reality. Social reality is the total social phenomena ex-
pressed through social frameworks which are more than mere mental 
constructions or heuristic devices, indeed real collectivities, irre-
ducible to the sum of their parts and each one encompassing in a partial 
way the total social phenomena at all its depth levels. social classes 
as social frameworks are macrocosms of social groups. They vary in 
number, intensity, power and structuration _(prise de conscience) dependini 
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on the various tensions which occur among the depth levels, among the 
forms of sociability and among the various groupings. Such t ensions 
depend upon the concrete historical situation. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE HORIZONTAL VIEW OF SOCIAL REALITY CONTINUED 
1. Social Structure 
Social structure is different from organization. It is unifying 
factor having a reality like that of groupings and social classes. 
There are characteristics to a social structure which distinguish it 
from groupings and classes. In Gurvitch1s thought an understanding of 
social structure is essential before one can establish a typology of 
global societies. 
Gurvitch is interested in a precision of language. Such precision 
is required if sociology is to reach the status of a science. Esoteric, 
obtuse and obscure definitions are unacceptable. Moreover, why muddy 
the waters with any more usages of a term? Try rather to reach some 
agreement. Make every effort to stay with a word and use it con-
sistently. Gurvitch deplores such statements as these taken from a 
popular textbook: 
Such are the vagaries of sociological terms, "status" is 
sometimes used to refer to an individual's total standing in 
society. In that sense, it embraces all his particular 
statuses and all the prestige he may have for his personal 
qualities and attainments. The apprentice sociologist must 
learn to expect some inconsistencl in the use of sociological 
terms, especially from one writer to another. The confext 
usually helps to make it clear what sense is intended. 
lJohnson, Sociology: A Systematic Introduction ••• , p. 19. 
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Just as international meetings are held in the physical sciences 
to discuss terminology and definitions, so Gurvitch would urge that this 
kind of work be done in the social sciences. If no agreement can be 
reached, then the next decades will resemble the recent ones in which 
would-be sociologists have felt impelled to spin new concepts, give 
new definitions, appropriate different words from the world of the 
physical sciences or psychology, couch them in an impossible "clarifying" 
language and publish them as original, veritable "breakthrough" in 
scientific thought. Such forays into the forest of verbiage deprive 
sociology of real value. As expressed by an ancient letter writer: 
"Some people have gone astray into a wilderness of words. They set 
out to be teacher • • • without understanding either the words they 
use or the subjects about which they are so dogmatic. 112 
Some have said that Gurvitch is also guilty of this shortcoming. 
The final chapter of this dissertation will deal with this criticism. 
Now comes the consideration of the problem of social structure. 
The tenn social structure has a long history. It goes back to 
KaliMarx with his notions of infrastructure and superstructure. Gur-
vitch has appropriated these notions to distinguish between the organ-
ized and the spontaneous levels of social reality. Durkheim, of course, 
2I Timothy 1:6-7. The New English Bible (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1961). 
2B5 
had considerable to say about ''morphological structures". In politics 
and economics, in various areas of common life, the term is used, e. g., 
certain significant actions require changes in the political structure. 
In recent years the term has been used increasingly by sociologists 
and ethnologists in diversified ways which have resulted in the con-
fusion described above. Gurvitch mentions in particular Radcliffe-Brown, 
Malinowski, Wirth, Murdock, Parsons, Shils, Merton, Levy and C. Levi-
Strauss.1 
He sees their use of this term, social structure, as a convenient 
way of escaping the inherent nominalism of their theories. 2 Since they 
have reduced social reality to interpersonal relations, to communi-
cations, or a network of roles, statuses and patterns, then structure 
seems to be a way of tying the loose ends together.3 The result of 
such a usage of social structure is, in Gurvitch 1s view, to escape the 
obvious irreducibility of groups and global societies. Radcliffe-Brown, 
for example, makes a distinction between structural form and concrete 
structures (or the network of social relations). This distinction 
serves to show the difference between the static and the dynamic. The 
former has a staying quality while the latter provides for the change 
that occurs within a culture. According to Gurvitch this escapes the 
profound dialectic which takes place between "a real collective totali-
ty, its constituent elements and its participants; it also eludes the 
dialectical study of the relationships between the spontaneous flexi-
1 La vocation. . . , I, 401. 
3Ibid. 
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ibility of creative acts and the collectivity's precarious equilibria, 
cohesions, crystallizations and degrees of intensity."! All these are 
the component parts of a structure. In other words, Gurvi tch asserts 
that such a use of structure denies the total social phenomenon of 
Marcel Mauss. So many contemporary sociologists refuse to recognize 
the concrete reality of the whole, which is irreducible to its consti-
tutive elements. Such an affirmation of the whole leads irresistibly 
to the idea of structuration, destructuration and restructuration, a 
central plank in Gurvitch's conception of structure. It fits his whole 
theory of society being en acte, according to the ter.m of St. Simon. 2 
This is the dynamic element. As opposed to Radcliffe-Brown, it is 
collective as well as individual. Social relations are not alone in 
being creative and subject to modification. The concrete collectivity 
too, is in constant change; it has an observable cadence of structur-
ation, destructuration and restructuration. Very evidently Gurvitch's 
experiences of the Russian revolutions come to the fore here. His 
preceding work in social law and the place of the spontaneous level of 
law are clearly present in this discussion. 
Gurvitch finds little improvement in Radcliffe-Brown's disciple, 
Fortes. Fortes says in essence that the social structure is an ab-
straction serving as a point of reference for analyzing social situ-
ations. To Gurvitch this adds nothing to the definition. In Gurvitch's 
1Ibid., P· 4o2. 
~s fondateurs fran ais de la sociolo ie contem oraine: St. Simon 
et P. -J. Proudhon Paris: Centre de Documentation Universi taire, 19 , 
I, 12 ff. 
own terminology, the social struct~e is concerete and realwhile the 
types of social structures are abstractions to aid in the study of 
social reality.1 
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Both sociology and ethnology need the concept of social structure. 
This term will eliminate those propensities towards trying to establish 
a sociology of order or one of progress. Both tendencies are replete 
with value judgments. A real collectivity en acte eliminates such defi-
nitions. The notion of structure serves as a corrective to those con-
captions which would juxtapose the dynamic and static. Such a 
juxtaposition i s impossible if the idea of structure is viewed dialecti-
cally. Gurvitcb cl aims his definition of social structure does away with 
all cultural abstractionism. This theoretical tendency tries to separate 
culture and society for purposes of study. Gurvitch contends such a 
separation is impossible and undesirable, methodologically and theoreti-
cally, if one holds to the idea that social reality is the total social 
' phenomena. 
Social structure is a way of clarifying the term organization. 
This is especially needed in sociology where the conception has been 
bandunabout to such an extent it is devoid of precise meaning. Organi-
zation and social structure are not the same thing. Certain social 
structures provide the milieu for more and more organization. This 
seems to be the case in the present century. Other structures are less 
propitious. At no time can an organization express either the social 
structure in all its richness or the total social phenomena. This is 
likewise so for the social structure. It cannot capture the total 
1 ' La vocation •• • , I, 403. 
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social phenomena in their entirety. There is always that whicn spills 
over, which erupts, which creates the unexpected. This illustrates the 
intermediary aspect to structure. 
Just as psychology needs same way to express the wholeness of 
personality, so sociology and ethnology require such a unifying princi-
ple. Gestalt theory does this for psychology; social structure plays a 
similar role in sociology and ethnology. 
Social structures are certain configurations, certain environ-
ments, certain ensembles en marc he, put in relief and made 
concrete; in other words, they are concrete cohesions which 
are dynamic, and which give certain empirical points of refer-
ence to the thesis that the whole in sociology is irreducible 
to its component elements and its participants; at the same 
time the whole cannot exist without these several members; the 
two factors are dialectically related.l 
This is the Gestalt feature of social structure. The structure, 
though distinct from the total social phenomenon, does give these 
phenomena, when they are structured, greater concreteness and thereby 
greater distinctiveness. They come into sharper focus, especially as 
a global society. 
The social structure makes it possible to study global societies. 
A comparative typology is only realized when these concrete structures 
are visible and described, and then abstracted into types for empirical 
study. 
Finally, a distinction is necessary between social conjuncture and 
social structure. By bearing down on the definition of structure, one 
sees how these two are different. Conjuncture as a conception comes 
from political economy. It is inevitably tied to history. When certain 
lrbid., P• 407. 
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factors intersect or coalesce, the time is ripe for a certain type of 
functional grouping or social class or form of sociability. However, 
these conjunctures take place within a particular social structure and 
the impact is reciprocal. Their interrelationships are indeed much more 
complex than one would first think.1 
These then are the reasons why the term social structure is es-
sential to sociology and ethnology. Gurvitch's conception of this 
notion is diametrically opposed to certain contemporary movements in 
sociology, specifically the institutional theory of Talcott Parsons and 
his followers and the structural-functionalist movement under the 
leadership of Robert K. Herton. AI3 Lipset·r. and Smelser so clearly 
indicate in their recent volume2 the new generation of sociologists in 
the United States have in large part come under the influence of either 
one or both of these schools which have their home bases at Harvard 
and Columbia respectively. The successor to Durkheim at the Sorbonne 
is critical of these two positions. His arguments are concrete. Basi-
cally they center in this notion of social structure as it relates to 
the total social phenomena. 
i. The Institutionalists. 
Gurvitch centers his attack on the fuzziness of the definitions 
he finds in the work of Talcott Parsons. Three ter.ms which lack pre-
cision are: social structure, the social system, ana institution. They 
~raite ••• , I, 208-209. 
2
seymour M. Lipset and Neil J. Smelser, editors, Sociology, the 
Progress of a Decade (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1961), pp. 1-14. 
290 
are often linked tautologically in Parsons' writings, which explains 
nothing and on~ succeeds in making the task of sociological theory more 
difficult. Gurvitch laments that after such a long dearth of serious 
work in sociological theory, it is unfortunate the silence should be 
broken with the imprecise formulas of the don from Harvard. He finds 
Parsons' conception of institution to have so much breadth and ambiguity 
it has all but eliminated the iaea of structure. He is caught in a 
vicious circle: "Social structure is comprised of a totality of insti-
tutions and the institutions are certain manifestations of structure."l 
This predicament is an outcome of Parsons• inability to grasp the full 
meaning of social wholes . He has attempted to do it by seeing them as 
collections of social relations, roles, positions, strata, values or 
rigid organizations. Parsons• ultimate goal is acceptable, but his aim 
is poor . There seem to be social collectivities, all right, and they 
have a certain concreteness in their appearance, but how exactly does 
one put his finger on the organizing principle, on that which gives that 
collectivity cohesion, unity, wholeness or reality. Parsons tries the 
modern formula. He takes the atomized individual and puts him in re-
lation with another individual; they interact in same sort of ordered 
fashion (to do otherwise is to return to the Hobbesian fear of anarchy) . 
~ this order? The basis for that interaction is a common set of 
values which when internalized are at once institutionalized. Perhaps 
the finest translation of Parsons is that of C. Wright Mills in his 
The Sociological Imagination: npeople often share standards and expect 
11a vocation • • • , I, 419. 
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one another to stick to them. In so far as they do, their society may 
be orderly. ttl 
Social structure, according to Parsons, has to do with the more 
complex ways in which people are di£ferentiated in their roles and 
positions so as to bring about this order. Such an arrangement of 
various roles based on expectations, obligations and correlative rights, 
is the social structure. 2 The whole thing is called a social system. 
11It is a system of interactions which is developed in a milieu, between 
certain motivated actors who communicate by a common culture. n3 
This raises an immediate question. Is there in the thought of 
Parsons a dif£erence between social system and social structure? The 
social system also seems to be identical with the idea of social action, 
e. g., in his book title, Toward a General Theory of Action. Gurvitch 
suggests that action in Parsons' usage is more closely allied to conduct 
or behaviour than it is to creative, raw, or vital action. In French 
there is a subtle difference between action and acte. This becomes 
-
important to Gurvitch. The place of Fichte's philosophy helps to sug-
gest why. Moreover, social action and social system are identical with 
social reality in the Parsonian sense. Gurvitch notes that when Parsons 
talks of the role structure, this identification b~tween action and sys-
tem seems to be more clearly reinforced. Finally, Parsons himself 
lap. cit., p. 27. 
2La vocation. . . , I, 419 • 
~alcott Parsons, El~nts our une sociolo ie de l'action, trans-
lated by M. F. Bourricand Paris: Presses Uni versi taires de France, 
1955), P• 53, cited in La vocation •• • , I, 419. 
declares he is seeking a "general theory of action 11 for purposes of 
discovering a common basis for psychology, sociology, ethnology and 
political economy. However, the distinctions are hazy. 1 
Parsons tries his best to extricate himself from such a lack of 
precision. He does this by continuously employing the phrase, "the 
structure of the social systems 11 • 2 The analysis of this social 
292 
structure is carried out on two levels: first, there is a description 
of the dominant value system, and second, the social differentiation 
which is arranged according to these values. 
A stable system of interaction • • • invests its participants 
in terms of mutual expectations, which have the dual signifi-
cance of expressing normative evaluations and stating contin-
gent prediction of overt behavior£ This mutuality of 
expectations implies that the evaluative meanings of acts are 
shared by the interacting units in two ways: what a member 
does can be categorized in terms meaningful to both; also, 
they share criteria of behavior, so that the~e are common 
standards of evaluation for particular acts.j 
A person participates in these relationships according to socially 
designated roles. These are normatively regulated. Structurally, a 
"role component is the normative component which governs the partici-
pation of individual persons in collectivities.~ The social structure 
seems to be the normative pattern, that is, regularities of behaviour 
based on what is expected. Apparently the social structure is distin-
guished from the social system in that it refines the dominant scales 
1
"La structure sociale, 11 CIS, XIX, 22. 
2 Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free 
Press, 1951), p. 68. 
3Talcott Parsons, et. a~, eds., Theories of Society (Glencoe, 
Illinois: The Free Press, 1961), I, 42. 
4Ibid., P• 44. 
of values and social nonns, "thereqy utilizing this sublimation as 
justification of the stratifications which characterize a given social 
system. nl Social structure would be the ideal types of social systems 
which are constructed in accordance with the hierarchy of values domi-
nant in the social systems. Gurvitch sees a close affinity with Max 
Weber's typological theor.y. 2 It is not surprising since Parsons has 
been greatly influenced by the German sociologist. Ideal types are 
abstractions from concrete social reality so formulated for purposes 
of analysis. To Gurritch, this identification of social structure and 
ideal types has not helped to clarify the two concepts. Social 
structure in this definition has lost its concreteness, its reality. 
There can be types of social structure, but this is different. 
Such an identification results in something else. Parsons is 
caught in the tangled web of confusing the method of study with the 
component element of social reality, which he himself says is social 
structure. To get out of this impasse he decides to make a liaison 
between social structure and the term institution. He attempts to 
define social structure by the word institution which is so vague and 
so abused that the outcome only serves to militate against any sort of 
precision. 
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Parsons and company define structure in this new sense as an insti-
tutional integration. Structure is a combination and a differentiation 
of institutions. ·~ociological theory, then, is for us that aspect of 
21a vocation •• • , I, 420. 
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the theory of social systems which is concerned with the phenomena of 
the institutionalization of patterns of value-orientation in the social 
system ••• n1 Some of the Parsonian theorists go so far as to identify 
social structure and institution. What is institution or institution-
alization? Social position of an individual, as stated above, is depen-
dent upon certain norms and values. When the position is accepted, or 
when the norm is both widely accepted in a group and deeply imbedded in 
the lives of the individual participants, a no~ is said to be insti-
tutionalized. A cluster of institutionalized norms is usually referred 
to as a social institution. Another word for it is normative pattern. 
Already it is becoming apparent that social structure and institution 
are similar, if not the same. Gurvitch is of the opinion that the word 
institution is an unhappy choice. It is both too broad and too narrow. 
This is so if one takes the Durkheimian definition. Durkheim said 
institution meant the ensemble of acts and ideas which confronted the 
individual in society. However, it is obvious that all pre-established 
beliefs, ideas, values, and collective behaviours cannot be the same. 
Durkheim failed to make certain distinctions in his conception of 
institution. The concept is too narrow in that it overlooks certain 
elements of social reality which are a part of the social structure. 
These are the nonconformist, revolutionary, creative, free currents of 
the collective mind, which make up the forms of sociability. 
Briefly speaking, the term institution is too vague. It has been 
prostituted to such an extent that little delimitation is possible, and 
~arsons, The Social System, p. 552. 
few boundar.y lines can be established~ It fails as a scientifically 
useful te~ for this reason. 
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Parsons, in his use of the term, tries to incorporate so many 
other popular definitions that the difficulty is intensified. He 
includes the idea of sanction, the cultural institution of Malinowski, 
the recognized and systematized morals of Sumner, official and quasi-
official groupings, rites and procedure of Maciver, and above all the 
statuses, roles and rules of Ralph Linton. Such a melange lacks co-
herence, unity and the quality of totality. Parsons attempts to syn-
thesize these disparate elements under the rubric of common values and 
orientation towards values. He even claims, says Gurvitch, that such a 
common preference can be found in a global society.1 
In essence, Gurvitch sees Parsons forced to create an artificial 
unity resulting in an artificial system whose keynote is integration. 
This does social reality a grave ;njus~ice. It totally neglects the 
spontaneous and unexpected, the effervescent and explosive facets of 
global societies and their components. The emphasis upon action as the 
basic element for analysis, instead of action in the creative sense, 
finds equilibrium and integration as the key terms. In contrast, 
Gurvitch sees social reality as dynamic, subject to constant change; 
society is en acte. This is a result of both collective and individual 
effort, choice, invention, decision and creativity. There is an ef-
fervescenee and freedom within social reality which must be considered. 
Parsons fails to go beyond "the expected, the sanctioned, the regular; 
lcahiers Internationaux de Sociologie, XIX, 27. 
296.. 
he does not see the conflicts among classes, groups, scales of values, 
the different social times, the different determinisms and among the 
different depth levels themselves.nl 
In conclusion, Parsons' concepts and terms are fuzzy; he confuses 
the social system with the structure and institution as well as with 
social action. They are often used tautologically. The whole pattern 
reveals an incapacity on the part of Parsons to get beyond his spiritu-
alism (ideal types) and nominalism (groups are not real) in order to 
seize social reality as a totality "and to explain the basis for the 
unity of these various collectivities. 112 
ii. Functionalism. 
The foregoing discussion leads into Gurvitch 1s critique of 
functional-structural theory. Robert Merton is the important figure 
here. Gurvitch views Merton as more critical and astute a scholar 
than Parsons . However, he finds in his theory a plethora of confusions 
which complicate the task of sociology. These are confusions and dif-
ficulties which Merton himself has pointed to in evaluating functional 
theory: 
a) First is the confusion resulting from a view of the inter-
dependence of all the elements of social reality on the one hand and 
their constant movement on the other . In other words, there is no real 
understanding of "society en acte. 11 
b) There is a lack of precision in distinguishing between motives 
behind certain behaviour and the observed consequences of such behaviour. 
11a vocation ••• , I, 426. 
2 . Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie, XIX, 29. 
297 
c) A confusion reigns among the functional "services" given to 
the whole and those meant only for a part of the whole. 
d) A problem arises in declaring such and such a function india-
pensable and the admission of behaviours which ar e functionally alterna-
tive or equivalent. 
e) A difficulty develops f rom juxtaposing the conformist patterns 
(adherence to the integrating functions) and the dysfunctions, which 
Merton refers to as "those observed consequences which lessen the adap-
tation or adjustment of the system."1 
f) There is confusion between those functions which are india-
pensable and the functions which have no real role to perform. 
Gurvitch observes that despite this set of valid questions facing 
functional theory, Merton and his colleagues go merrily on their way 
developing the structural-functional theory. The manner of their 
attempt to bring order out of chaos is by asserting that "structure 
affects function and function affects structure."2 Furthermore, 
"functional analysis, all in clarifying the practices Which appear 
irrational, accents the dynamic element of structure and aids in 
'social engineering'."J Gurvitch declares that when one is finished 
dealing with functional theory, he must reach the conclusion there is 
a patent lack of clarity in the terms structure and function and the 
way in which t hey interreLate. 
lRobert K. Merton, Social TheoSt and Social Structure (Glencoe, 
Illinois: The Free Press, 1957, p. • 
2rbid., P• 82 . 
Jcrs, XIX, 30. 
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To reiterate, Gurvitch defines function as a work to accomplish. 
Hence he says a grouping is either uni-functional, multi-functional or 
suprafunctional. In social reality these functions (or works to ac-
complish) are also found outside the social structures. The active 
forms of sociability can have certain functions, the same holding true 
for certain unstructured social groupings. At the heart of partial and 
global structures, whole societies perform functions along with particu-
lar groupings, social classes, organizations, public services, ad infi-
nitum. These functions can be negative or positive. They have a wide 
variety of purposes and take divers directions. These functions are 
related in Gurvitch's theory as symbolic functions are related in mathe-
matics. Merton's work includes a very clear definition of this symbolic 
function in mathematics: "[Function] refers to a variable considered 
in relation to one or more other variables in terms of which it may be 
expressed or on the value of which its own value depends.ffl This is 
essentially what Gurvitch means. 
The heart of Gurvitch's criticism of Merton canes at the point 
where he finds the functionalists abstracting the concrete function of 
a particular We . These We' s are totalities en marche. In other words 
. 2 . they have something to do; they funct~on . There ~s a sense in which 
function for Gurvitch somewhat parallels the notion of role ( in the 
collective sense) of George Herbert Mead and his followers . 
Gurvitch returns to a previous criticism when he points out that 
lop • cit. , p. 21. 
2La vocation . . . , I, 429. 
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social structures are dynamic elements. They are in the continual 
process of structuration, destructuration and restructuration. Such a 
dynamic interpretation poses all kinds of problems for the structural-
functionalists who admittedly place the emphasis on "the statics of 
social structure omd neglect the study of structural change. nl When 
they do, it is in terms of the confusing distinction, dysfunction. 
Finally, Gurvitch asserts that a separate functional analysis is 
unnecessar.y for the very reason that a hierarchy of functional group-
ings is observable in each global social structure and is studied from 
this standpoint. The conflict between this hierarchy and t hat of the 
social classes can upset the established .stratification; or the particu-
lar groupings can take up those functions which were not theirs previously 
or abandon their original works to accomplish. The study of these calls 
for a certain type of functional analysis. Merton's method adds little 
to the understanding of these phenomena. 
iii. Gurvitch 1s Definition of Social Structure. 
What precisions does Gurvitch try to give to this concept of social 
structure? For his discussion of the term he goes back to an early 
notion, the total social phenomenon. Obviously, the social structure is 
an integral part of this total social phenomenon. Ontologically and 
methodologically there is before everything else a social whole. The struc-
ture comes afterwards. The total social phenomena always are more than their 
~erton, Social Theory •• • , p. 53. 
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structure, either partial or global. To repeat something said earlier, 
these phenomena in their totality can be expressed a-structurally 
through the microsociological frameworks whether they be the relations 
with the other (inter-individual and inter-groupal)--this is the level 
of social interaction and social relations in American sociology--or 
the We and their different degrees of intensity (mass, community and 
communion). The structural frame of reference only comes into the 
picture at the macrosociological level. It does not always obtain in 
every grouping. There is the possibility of structuration only in cer-
tain groupings; the tendency towards structuration is particularly 
intense with social classes. The global society as the most concrete 
macrosociological framework is always structured. This social macrocosm 
can never be reduced to its structure for the simple reason there are 
always a-structural elements at play plus the changing historical circum-
stances and the presence of non-structured groupings which can act in 
such a way as to upset the tenuous hierarchy that is the essence of its 
social structure. What is the difference between a non-structured group 
and a structured one? The former lacks this specific hierarchy of the 
forms of sociability, the depth levels, the means of social control, 
the different 11social times", and social determinisms. The unstructured 
group would want for a clear sense of group consciousness and suffer 
from a deficiency in a cohesive culture. 
Other elements are present in a global society. Each includes 
a hierarchy of functional groupings, competing social classes, patterns 
for the division of social labor and for the accumulation of goods; 
finally, each embraces its OWf precise civilization which it has 
created and from which it benffits. This comprehensive culture 
cements together these various factors. 
In sum, the following eiements make up a social structure: 
a) Certain multiple hierarchies, most often in tension 
with each other and somitimes in competition. 
b) Their manifest b t precario~s equilibrium requires 
constant effort at rene al and reaffirmation. 
c) A certain cultural cement is created to combat this 
precarious existence an4 give it stability. 
d) A clear group co~sciousness of these particular hier-
archies and their tenuo~s character. 
e) The constant mov~ment of structuration, destructuration 
and restructuration llnli:ing the structure with the society 
en acte.l 
Earlier a distinction was made between an organization and a 
structure. The structure serves as a kind of 11third man 11 moving in 
surreptitiously during the struggle between the organized and spon-
taneous levels. Seeking to profit from this conflict, it organizes 
these two levels according to its own goals. However, it doesn't 
always succeed. Evidently, organizations which exist within the 
structure would help in the structuration process. In these cases 
the.y are absorbed by the social structure . The contrary is never 
possible. The structure is impervious to the designs of organizations 
so far as they attempt to absorb it into their own life. However, 
certain social structures are greatly influenced by the organizations 
and must give them priority in the hierarchy of depth levels. This 
is true of the present era. 
1T ·t _, ral. e. • • , I, 21.3. 
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The function of structure as a concept is the same in the social 
sciences as it is in the pAfsical sciences. It is an intermediary 
element, thereby illustrating its dialectical nature, its suppleness 
and its relativism. It is equally impossible to link it with the 
static elements or to assign it the dynamic role in social life. 
Gurvitch maintains over and over again a rigid separation between the 
" static and dynamic factors of social reality is passe. Such a sepa-
ration fails to meet the empirical data of the present world. So often 
social structure is confused with the types or with patterns. These 
difficulties can be overcame by seeing social structure as an inter-
mediary element functioning between the total social phenomena and 
their expressions in the means of social control, or in the manifes-
tations which one calls institutions. They are intermediary between 
these same total social phenomena and the organized aspects of social 
life, the various human meanings which are grafted onto the total social 
phenomenon. They serve an intermediary role between the testings by 
fire (fundamental creative initiatives) and the forces of stability; 
in other words, between the basic acts, both collective and individual, 
and their subsequent works. Finally, they are intermediary between a cer-
tain expression of a total social phenomenon and the way in which it is 
seen and expressed. Structure has a dialectical function, then. The 
tension Which Gurvitch observes throughout calls for a dialectical 
1 . 1 ana ys~s. 
At this juncture Gurvitch differs radically from other social 
~rait: •• • , I, 205 • 
.. 
theorists, especially those in America. Rather than pointing to a 
stable social s~ructure, a fait accompli, he places the emphasis upon 
the tension between stability and the creative act, between the factors 
which unite what Americans call "cultural norms and patterns" with 
those tendencies towards conflict, competition and destructuration. 
.30.3 
The structuration process is never complete. There is a constant effort 
to renew on the part of the existing structure; there is an equal 
pressure from the various stratifications within to tear down. If 
there has been a successful overthrow of t he system, then the process 
of res t ructuration is going on. Obviously Gurvitch has been influenced 
by his testings by fire in the Russian revolutions. He was a keen 
observer. The experience was· unforgettable. If one compares his 
experience with the placid, stable and easy frame of reference oper-
ative for most American and British sociologists, it is no wonder that 
the emphasis has been placed on the static elements of social reality 
for them. No wonder integration has been the key phrase and structural-
functionalism the means b,y which one sees a society hold together. 
Neither is it surprising that the problem of change enters into the back 
door through the imprecise concept of dysfunction. Even the latent 
functions are still integrative functions giving support to those 
groups and individuals who otherwise are left out of the official 
1 
structures. 
This is a revolutionary age. Gurvitch 1s conception of social 
structure and of social reality in its entirety could be helpfully 
lor. Merton, Social Structure •• • , pp • .3-117. 
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applicable to the events transpiring in Cuba, South America, the Far 
East, Africa , and the Near East . Mor e will be said about the values 
of this theoretical outline in the final chapter. A moving passage 
from La vocation actuelle de la sociologie illustrates what has just 
been said. It is an apt description of this revolutionary world: 
One finds in the total social phenomena as they are expressed 
in the macrosociological frameworks, other factors (jmich lead 
to radical chang~ : it is the constant testing by fire of the 
"mobile and fluctuating forces~, of the "diffused milieux 11 ; 
these are "complete and complex reactions 11 of individual and 
collective minds, as well as by "corps of members'', they are 
the fugitive instants of social life, where groups, societies, 
humanity realize a consciousness of themselves and of social 
life, outside of the expected, the predictable, the anticipated. 
These are Marcel Mauss's own terms, the creator of the phrase, 
total social phenomena. Briefly, it is the perfectly unex-
pected element, the element which is completely unforeseen, 
discontinuous, whole and concrete, and inseparable from a to-
tality en marche . This totality is where the collective effort 
is stripped of every superficial layer, where the acte, in-
ventive liberty, decision-making liberty, and creative. liber:ty 
cause an eruption in the social life beyond all that is fore-
seen . This igniting material is the per.manent element of dis-
ruption present in the life of social totalities en marche . 
They can not be captured by any conceptualization or expression. 
They subsist in the total social phenomenon, be it global or 
partial, macrosociological or microsociological. Outside of 
the structured or structurable elements, and even the a-
structural, this inflammable material exists which can cause 
an eruption even at the most unexpected moments . In this 
respect, every structure--despite the a-structural elements 
which enter into its structuration, destructuration and re-
structuration and despite certain efforts and certain observ-
able movements which are immanent to them--is a tributary of 
the total social phenomenon as such, which it transcends while 
always at its base is this volcanic phenomenon which can never 
be fully expressed by the structure above . l 
One senses · ediately the character of Gurvitch's approach in 
reading this passage. It is a tour de force. It shows the influence of 
1 vocation .. • , I, 438-439. 
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the revolutions, the thought of Bergson, the phenomenologists, Fichte 
and Karl Marx. Proudhon and St. Simon are present also. Certainly 
Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss figure prominently in this definition 
of social structure . l 
Gurvitch finds it acceptable to use the terms political structures, 
economic structures and religious structures because one is talking 
about real groupings in concrete situations and .not simply about activi-
ties and functions as such. To illustrate, crafts, professions, farms, 
workshops, factories, industrial enterprises, bar~s, trusts and cartels, 
are all groupings involved in economic activity. It is legitimate, 
then, to speak of economic structures. However, if one is using the 
term in the abstracted sense of cultural structures or technical 
structures or juridical structures, one has left the realm of reality 
and entered into a kind of idealism. 
Structure for Gurvitch is not an abstract concept like ~ but 
rather is real, a concrete manner of establishing some kind of tenta-
tive equilibrium. This is not the same thing as a stabilization. The 
following definition ensues from all that has been said: 
Every social structure is a precari.ous equilibrium, constantly 
being renewed; this equilibrium is composed of a multiplicity 
of hierarchies at the heart of a total social phenomenon of a 
macrosociological type; the structure is only a weak substitute 
of this phenomenon. This equilibrium is specifically made up 
of hierarchies of the depth levels, of the manifestations of 
sociability, the means of social control, social times, mental 
colorations, modes of division of labor, of accumulations of 
goods, and if the situation calls for it, of functional group-
ings, classes, and their various organizations. This equi-
lcf. Chapter II for a discussion of these various influences. 
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librium of multiple hierarchies fortified and cemented by the 
patterns, signs, symbols, regular and habitual social roles, 
values, and ideas in brief, by the cultural works which are 
proper to these structures, and if they are global, by an 
entire civilization which invades them and in which they parti-
cipate1as both the creator and benefactor of these cultural 
works. 
A constant dialectic goes on within the structure between ~ and 
work. This dialectic makes it possible for the social structure to 
serve as a point of reference for other creative acts as well as the 
means by which global societies may be catalogued according to types. 
This is important for sociology since it links sociological analysis 
with history and political economy. 
Social structures, because of their concreteness, do not lend 
themselves to statistical analysis alone. Such methods of quantification 
are useful while studying the more superficial layers of social reality: 
e. g., the ecological factors, technical and economic patterns, and 
regular patterns of behaviour. But these multiple hierarchies, ar-
ranged as they are in a precarious equilibrium and representing only 
one aspect of the total social phenomena, must be studied by more 
effective means. The methods of history, ethnology, economics and 
political science are required if such a study is to be carried out 
successfully. This total method will be discussed after the types of 
global structures have been described. 
~raite ••• , r, 214. 
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2. Global Structures 
This survey of Gurvitch's sociological theory comes to a close in 
the consideration of the types of global societies. These frameworks 
for total social phenomena are the most immense in breadth, the most 
imposing in structure, the richest in content. They are the pos-
sessors of the sovereign power (social) over every functional grouping, 
every social totality, every sector within their domain. This means 
they hold the supreme juridical sovereignty over groupings of locality, 
including the state, no matter the extent of the latter's coercive 
power. The global social structure can hold the economic power as well 
but this is not always the case. This distinction will become clearer 
as the types are analyzed in the following sections. 
Ecologically these global societies are extremely extensive in 
their influence. Examples would be modern-day nations, the ancient 
empires of the Middle East or the for.mer kingdoms of the Orient. Only 
the Greek city-states and the Roman city-states at the beginning of 
their history were small in size. 
Each global society participates in the creation of and benefits 
from a particular culture. The global structure and ita civilization 
are not the same nor can they be separated and studied independently. 
This position held by Gurvitch separates him from American sociology. 
As previously stated, Gurvitch is in agreement with tne basic position 
of the French school of sociology. This school has never separated 
society and culture. In tenms of the relationship between social 
308 
structure and civilization,1 Gurvitch says it is false to confuse the 
two, since there are more social structures than civilizations. 
Furthermore, the civilizations form the material by which these 
structures are held together in their tenuous unities. However, each 
civilization is produced by the structures themselves. The essential 
point is these cultural products, designated together as the civili-
zation, survive the structures. So it is, Gurvitch finds Toynbee's 
famous study of the twenty-one civilizations of history an unfruitful 
exercise, since they are viewed in the abstract without taking into 
consideration their social structures as Gurvitch views them. Converse-
ly to study the types of global structures without taking into account 
the cultural bonds or products in which they participate neglects a 
whole area of the total social phenomena which is essential to a clear 
understanding of social reality. The best way to see these two elements 1 
the social structure and its corresponding civilization, is once again 
by the dialectical approach. Their relationships are similar to those 
between the individual and society. A reciprocity of perspectives is 
essential once again if one is to grasp the totality of these inter-
t . 2 ac ~ons. 
In order to establish a typology of global societies, concrete 
structures are essential for this kind of abstract generalizing. Every 
global society is structured. No longer is the framework simply structur-
able as was the case with groupings. The global society is the most 
~he terms civilization and culture are used interchangeably in 
Gurvitch's language. 
2 Determinismes sociaux ••• , p. 194. 
concrete macrosociologicalexpression of the total social phenomena. 
Taking into consideration the role of culture in this structuration 
process, it becomes clear that "the global structures are normally 
more solid and more resistant than the partial structures".l With 
the exception of revolutions which violently attack the global 
structure, these structures have a much slower movement of structur-
ation, destructuration and restructuration. 
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To study these global societies while noting the necessary re-
lationship with civilizations as such, a definite alliance with history 
and ethnology is required. Both history and sociology study the total 
social phenomena. Both find the concrete global. societies the richest 
domain for their study. Both discover theae structures approaching the 
character of being unique and irrepeatable. History especially affirms 
this fact. Both need each other. History is interested in showing the 
continuity which exists between various structures, in other words, 
seeing their singularized movement or what Gurvitch sometimes calls 
their conjunctures; sociology emphasizes the discontinuity of these 
same structures. It is interested in establishing types, in taking out 
time slices in order to observe the total social phenomena carefully 
and objectively. This relativism is a necessary corrective to the 
singularizing method of history which often leads to a dogmatic determin-
ism of the Marxian variety.2 More will be said later in the section on 
method concerning this necessary alliance between history and sociology. 
libid., p. 195. 
2Ibid., PP• 196-197. 
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Gurvitch sets up eight criteria for establishing types of global 
structures: 
1) How are the functional groupings hierarchized? 
2) How do the forms of sociability combine in the society and 
in the particular groupings? 
3) How are the depth levels accentuated? Which level gets 
priority? 
4) What is the stratification of the division of labor and the 
accumulation of goods? 
5) How are the means of social control hierarchized? 
6) What cultural works cement the structure together? 
7) What is the scale of social times? 
8) How are the various social determinisms ranked?1 
From these criteria Gurvitch sees four types of primitive (archaic, 
in his word) and ten types of historical or civilized structures. Four 
of these latter are in competition at the present time. Why make this 
separation? There are basically three reasons for considering the 
archaic apart from the historical types . First, the archaic society 
lacks the characteristic of a country (pays); it also lacks an histori-
cal sense . Second, there is a predominant or at least partially pre-
dominant presence of tribes, clans and bands. This is completely 
changed when one reaches the study of historical types . Third, there 
exists a subconscious character to human liberty in the archaic types , 
while creative freedom is consciously affirmed in historical types . 
1Trait~ • • • , I, 217-218 . ~--~-----
These latter two distinctions are exceedingly relative. 1 The con-
sciousness of human liberty has led Gurvitch to prefer the term 
Promethean as a descriptive word for historical societies. 
We believe • • • it is more precise to designate them by 
the term Promethean society. We name them thus because one 
discovers within them the Promethean element of collective 
and individual consciousness concerning the capacity of 
human libert~ for an active and effective intervention in 
social life. 
This human liberty can cause either constructive or destructive 
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change. It can even be a causative factor in the splitting up of these 
global societies. A dialectic is observable, then, among tradition, 
reform and revolution. Such a dialectical tension assures a degree of 
continuity, since it points the way a society should go through either 
the transmission of tradition or a rediscovery of it. 
The archaic structures are studied more by the ethnologist than 
the sociologist. The four types analyzed in Gurvitch's Determinismes 
sociaux et liberte humaine will not be described here.3 Since this is 
a sociological study, this description will concentrate on the Pro-
methean types. The following global societies will be surveyed in the 
remainder of this chapter: 
1. Charismatic theocracies. 
2. Patriarchal societies. 
3. Feudal societies. 
1ne'terminismes sociaux. . . , pp. 198-199. 
2rhe Spectrum •• • , P• 144. 
3cf. D~terminismes sociaux •• • , pp. 200-222. 
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4. Societies where the city state is in the process of becoming 
an empire. 
5. Societies containing the early signs of a market economy; also 
known as enlightened despotisms. 
6. Democratic-liberal societies corresponding to competitive 
capitalism. 
(The final four societies are those presently in actual conflict.) 
1. Economic societies corresponding to fully developed and 
organized capitalism. 
8. Fascist societies based on a techno-bureaucracy. 
9. P, lanned societies guided by the principles of state collec-
tivism. 
10. Planned societies guided by the principles of pluralistic 
collectivism.1 
These societies will be taken up in order . This theory of global 
societies is the result of Gurvitch's most mature and disciplined 
thought. There are exciting prospects for the future of sociological 
analysis in this typology. This will become evident as the description 
unfolds . 
1 . Charismatic theocracies . An extremely relative homogeneity 
and a tenuous unity are a result of the identification of the State and 
the Church in the organized person of the Living King-Priest-God . This 
complex institution has supremacy over all the other groupings . '~hese 
dynasties of power expressed through their representatives have a 
~raite •• • , I, 218. 
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character which is both supernatural and charismatically personal.nl 
Examples of this type of global society include the ancient civili-
zations of Babylonia, Assyria, the Hittites, Egypt, Persia, China, 
Japan, Tibet, India and the Khalifat of Islam from the eighth through 
the twelfth centuries. According to the criteria mentioned above these 
characteristics can be delineated: 
(a) The state church is the dominant grouping. (b) The masses are 
of greater importance than the communities or communions. Solely among 
the priests and the initiates of certain cults does the researcher find 
the presence of communions. (c) As to the depth levels, organizations 
are in first place; then come the morphological level, beliefs, re-
ligious and mystical symbols, and a supporting myth system for these 
factors. (d) The division of labor is sharply underlined; certain 
techniques are highly developed, e. g. , the embalmers of ancient Egypt. 
(e) Religion, magic and myths occupy the top positions among the means 
of social control. (f) As to cultural works, the mystical is predomi-
nant and impedes the development of the more advanced levels of cultural 
expression. (g) On the seale of tllnes one finds "a mysttcal-mytho-
logical type of cyclical time accompanied by that of deceptive tllne in 
which the great organizations move"2 occupying the top position. How-
ever below the global society's time the total social phenomena move in 
a different scale of social times which is in direct competition with 
that of the global structure. This scale shows a death struggle between 
1The Spectrum ••• , p. 149. 
2Traite ••• , I, 219. 
the time in advance and that behind; this latter type is supported by 
the time of irregular pulsations.1 
These theocratic societies give the appearance of being extremely 
stable and static in nature . However, there is the latent possibility of 
disruptive change and the constant presence of change factors . Gur-
vitch provides for this by re-emphasizing the volatile and dynamic 
potentialities of the global phenomena which invade the structures and 
their organizations at every point . The social times listed above pro-
vide for exploring this even further . In this way he makes change 
implicit in his whole theory. The spontaneous levels are perpetually 
at work beneath the crust of civilization. The constant struggle for 
these societies is to deal effectively with these explosive arease 
This is the great problem facing a civilization which struggles to 
survive, to continue, and to develop . Again, the interactive relation-
ship , this time between the infrastructure and the superstructure, the 
organized and the spontaneous levels which were observed in Gurvitch's 
social law theory, describes this dialectic . The theme is consistent 
and persistent . 
The unity of the charismatic society is especially tenuous be-
cause of the radical separation between the structure and its organized 
levels and the total social phenomena . The organizational level de-
velops around the ascendancy of rationalism derived mainly from eco-
nomic requirements , barter trade, the development of the individual 
rights and obligations incorporated in contracts, pledges and credit . 
1
cf. Appendix II, for a brief description of kinds of social time . 
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The organization of irrigation systems, the building of pyramids and 
the requirements of royal life in general led to extremely sophisticated 
organizational procedures, processes and controls. However, within 
these structures great heterogeneous masses of conquered peoples and 
slaves existed. "The charismatic theocracy does not have as calm a life 
as one would logically expect. They fly apart at different junctures 
and undergo revolutions. This is proof of the intense invasion by 
their subjacent total phenamena."l A patent illustration would be the 
collapse of the Old Kingdom in Egypt. Little is known as to why this 
happened, but a period of feudalism did set in, which underscores the 
disintegration of the old structures. 2 
2. Patriarchal societies . In this type there is very little 
observable difference between the structures and their total global 
phenomena. Obviously the structure is based on the exclusive pre-
endnence of the patriarchal family group. The territorial area can 
be large. Blood relationship is the means of unity and the way to 
define membership rights. 1~he preference is for the male filial 
relationship whether polygamous or not . n3 This patriarchal grouping 
absorbs all the other groupings . "All the economic, political and re-
ligious activities are united in the very structure of the domestic-
conjugal family, the patriarch being at once father, property owner, 
entrepreneur, priest, and political leader . •~ In this society, 
~raite •• • , I, 219. 
E. P. 
2cr. Jacques Pirenne, The Tides of Histo~, Volume I (New York: 
Dutton and Company, Inc., 1962), pp. 33- 6. 
3The Spectrum ••• , p. 157. 4Ibid. 
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religion loses a considerable part of its mystical quality and is sub-
servient to the patriarchal family. It serves as a kind of ethical 
insurance policy. Examples would be the type of structure emerging from 
the Old Testament and those found in the Odyssey and the Iliad. Once 
again the following outline emerges when the criteria are applied: (a) 
The domestic family is the dominant grouping. (b) The We predominates 
over the other forms of sociability and community over mass; communion 
is scarcelY perceptible, and the passive We outweighs the active form. 
(c) In terms of depth levels, certain traditional patterns and mores 
have priority. These are rooted in custom rather than procedure and 
ritual. Gurvitch comments that many sociologists and philosophers have 
over-generalized from this type of structure. They have thought that 
every society is traditionalist, routinized, immobile and stagnant, or 
closed in the Bergsonian sense, because of these characteristics of 
patriarchal society. The seconQ.level emphasized in this type of so-
ciety is the morphological. Next come the symbols, more rational than 
mystical, and social roles. (d) In terms of the division of labor, 
technical skill is of very little importance. The social division of 
labor is limited to the established relationships based on age, sex and 
inherited position, whether slave or freeman. Very little social mo-
bility exists. The accumulation of wealth is de-emphasized and then is 
measured in terms of cattle and slaves.1 (e) Among the types of mo-
rality, traditional morality and that of idealistic and symbolic images 
occupy first place. Such types of morality are the most important forms 
1La vocation ••• , I, 457. 
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of social control. Certain forms of knowledge, e. g., common sense, 
perceptive knowledge of the external world, nascent knowledge of poli-
tics, follow as means of social control. A rudimentary educational 
system, an early form of common law, plus a moralistic religion serve 
as the other forms of social control in this society.1 (f) Cultural 
works include only certain epic poems recited as songs and dances. 
Written language, religious services, rites, and orders just about 
complete the cultural heritage. (g) The scale of social times shows 
the time of long duration and in slow motion and the time behind itself 
canbined with a seasonal cyclical time based also on the religious calen-
dar as the most important types. Their only competition comes from the 
time of irregular pulsations resulting from the intrigues which arise 
within the patriarchal family in the struggle for power. This especial-
ly develops among the first-born and the younger brothers who are denied 
inheritance due to the laws of primogeniture. Another source of aggra-
vation comes from the natural calamities of famine, flood, epidemics, 
soil depletion, invasions and wars. 2 
3. Feudal societies. The environment changes radically in this 
type of society. This society tries to hide the very sharp cleavage 
existing between its structure and its underlying total social phe-
nomena. In contrast with the charismatic theocracy which, in appearance 
at least, exhi'b.;i ted a solid unity, the feudal structure contains a 
pluralism of hierarchies of groupings and means of social control~ · 
1neterminismes sociaux ••• , p. 235. 
Zrraite ••• , I, 220-221. 
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These are often in competition. For the first time one sees a set of 
complex equilibria. Another dramatic difference between t his type and 
that of t he charismatic theocracy is the role of the global phenomena. 
The turbulent, volcanic, highly explosive nature of the global phenome-
na in the theocracy is reversed. These characteristics are the proper-
ties of the feudal structure while its global phenomena live in the 
social times of long duration and slow motion, regressing to the point 
where the past dominates the present and the future. 1 
European feudalism (the tenth to the fourteenth centuries) has 
been studied at length by historians and provides a superb example of the 
pluralism which characterizes this type of structure. This extreme 
pluralism is not found in the feudal structures of Egypt, Japan, China 
and Russia. Nevertheless, the tendencies are present. Five different 
competing hierarchies are observable in European feudalism: (a) The 
federation of military groupings based on vassalage or the system of 
fiefs. (b) Patrimonial groupings formed out of the hereditary patterns 
that developed to meet the economic problems of land ownership. (c) The 
groupings headed by the monarchical state. In the feudal structure 
this was least effective, since power was fragmented. (d) The ecclesi-
astical hierarchy of the Roman Church, the most important structure 
within this feudal society. 
The Church is considered above all as the visible incarnation 
of the corpus mysticum integrating in its unity the plurality 
of groupings and their hierarchies. She seeks to utilize this 
position to assert herself as a superfunctional body par excel-
lence, representing the total, global phenomenon. Moreover, 
~raite •• • , I, 221. 
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after numerous statements and struggles, the Church finds her-
self strongly limited by the military preeminence of the feudal 
chain and by the economic and eventually the cultural superi-
ority of the self-emancipated cities.l 
(e) The federation of the free cities ana their hierarchies of groupings. 
In the European feudal structure, the free cities acquired an inde-
pendence with sufficient power to be serious competition for the Church, 
2 State and the whole system of vassalage. 
According to the criteria established by Gurvitch to classify 
these types, the profile of feudal society would look like the follow-
ing: 
(a) The various n!erarchies of groupings listed above are in 
competition with each other. The particular social and historical con-
juncture deter.ndJnes which hierarchy is in first position. 
(b) The We has priority over the relations with the Other. The 
communities as degrees of the We are highly influential. Sometimes 
this~ is actively expressed in the cities, cooperating enterprises, 
brotherhoods, associations, and religious orders; other times it is 
passive as illustrated in the manors, among the vassalage groupings, in 
the villages and conjugal families. These We's are often limited by 
the passive masses of the embryonic territorial states and the radical 
communions within the body of the Church. 
(c) The depth levels accentuated are social roles, certain col-
lective attitudes, mystical and rational symbols plus the underlying 
~he Spectrum ••• , p. 164. 
2La vocation •• • , I, 464-465. 
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values espoused by the collective mind. The organizational and morpho-
logical levels become competitive. 
(d) The division of technical labor is rudimentary but the divi-
sion of labor is pronounced. 
(e) In terms of social control, art religion and law surpass 
education and ethics in importance. 
(f) As to cultural works, the products of feudal society are out-
standing. They result from the synthesizing of various "cultural" 
influences which went to make up the stream of feudal life, e. g., 
Hellenistic, Roman, and Germanic. The whole magnus of cultural splendor 
derives from this synthesis and the dialectical relationships which were 
lived out between the various hierarchies of groupings. 
(g) The time scales of this global structure find a deceptive 
time veiling certain surprises . This time comes from the great organi-
zations of the Church, free cities and the feudal structure:: .. itself. It 
combines with the time of alternation between advance and regression. 
This is a natural result of the conflicts between the various hier-
archies plus the rise of the territorial state, the Crusades, and the 
beginnings of the market economy in the free cities.1 
The time scale of the feudal global phenomena is different. Here 
the situation is reversed. The unexpected, the tentative and the ex-
plosive are not present. Instead the times of long duration, turned 
back on itself, and cyclical time (seasonal and religious) predominate. 
lcr. Robert Heilbroner, The Makin~ of Economic History (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962 , PP• 45-71. 
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This is a heavy weight on the times of the global structure. The con-
flictsbetween the global structure and the subjacent total social 
phenomena provide the ignitible material precipitating social change. 
4. Societies in which the city-state is in the process of 
becoming an empire . This type of society exhibits very little sepa-
ration between the social structure and its subjacent global phenomena . 
This global society is illustrated by the Greek polis of the seventh 
through the fifth centuries B. C., and the Latin civitas in the early 
days of the Roman republic . Certain cities of the Italian renaissance 
are also examples of this type . 
The territorial group predominates in this type over other par-
ticular groupings . This supremacy of the city-state precipitates an 
emphasis upon secularism and rationalism. There is a victory of the 
natural over the supernatural. Individualism is also evident in the 
founding of Roman law, the dominium and the imperium. In Greece this 
same individualism is a prime factor in the system of law, philosophy, 
art, customs, morals and trade. The Italian renaissance is a restate-
ment of this classical Roman and Greek spirit. 
Technical knowledge remained far behind the advanced position of 
philosophy and science . This led to little division in technical labor. 
Social labor had a marked differentiation. So it was that horses were 
only used for ceremonial purposes in ancient Greece and slaves were 
hired to do manual labor considered beneath the dignity of the Greek 
city-state citizen. Accumulation of goods was principally in the hands 
of the commercial interests of the cities . Merchants thrived on the 
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maritime industry of the Greeks.1 ilitary conquest brought great 
wealth to Rome . Gurvitch denies the existence of social classes in 
Greece and Rome . His thesis has been expressed in the section on the 
definition of social class. Basically, this phenomenon only arose with 
industrial society. 
The general characteristics of this type of global society are 
arranged according to Gurvitch's criteria. 
(a) The polis dominated all groupings . Its power was pervasive . 
1Qnly the conjugal families and hereditary groupings were impervious to 
the city-state.n2 Even the atomized individuals were effectively con-
trolled. 
(b) The We was strongly limited by the relations with the Other. 
'~uch interindividual and intergroupal functions predominated over all 
partial fusions. From this was derived the broad accentuation of indi-
vidualism found at all levels and in all forms.n3 The rational and 
active communities at the heart of the city dominated the We expressions. 
Such types united easily with the relations with the Other. These 
rational communities also led to the development of organizations, 
secular social control through a judicial system, and the phenomenon 
of political democracy. 
(c) The depth levels were so arranged that patterns, rules and 
signs possessed a rational character and occupied the most important 
positions. Such depth levels based on reason and human will provided the 
~he Spectrum •• • , pp. 172-173. 
2Ibid., p. 174. 3rbid. 
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humanistic confidence which pervaded these societies. The potentiality 
of man and his society were optimistically viewed. Organizations oc-
cupied the second rung . Then came rational ideas and values. Scien-
tific knowledge, art and law were preferred. '~here was a preference 
for a collective attitude which had confidence in new experiences, 
original judgment and intuition.nl The morphological level remained 
very important; social roles accenting the creative side rather than 
routinized behaviour were preferred. Hence, the orator, sage, philoso-
pher and reformer were all important in these societies. 
(d) The division of technical labor was retarded, social labor 
extremely advanced . The accumulation of goods has already been noted. 
(e) Knowledge, law and art were on top of the means of social 
control. 
(f) The Greco-Roman civilization was a reality . Their cultural 
works were extraordinary. 
(g) The social time scale showed their structures affirming both 
the time ahead of itself and the explosive time of creation. There was 
a real consciousness of this time . But these times did not achieve 
success. A struggle ensued with the time behind and turned in on it-
self, the time of long duration and partially with the deceptive time of 
organizations. The global phenomenon once again lagged behind its 
structure in support of the creative and goal-seeking social times. 2 
1Ibid., p. 176. 
2T .t~ I raJ. e. • • , , 225. 
5. Societies leading to the birth of capitalism and enlightened 
despotism. This society historically supported an alliance between the 
territorial state and the bourgeoisies of the rapidly growing cities. 
Such an alliance dominated all other groups . The Church, the military, 
and most economic groupings, viz . , workers in the manufacturing plants, 
were subservient to this union of the bourgeoisie and the monarchy. For 
the first time in history one can point to the rise of the social classes . 
From this development class conflict ensues . 
The territorial monarchy supports the common bourgeois people, 
the industrial capitalists, merchants , and bankers (the king 
borrows money from the latter, wealth having increased in 
particular after the discovery of the New World) . The monarchy 
struggles against the nobility, the military, and both the 
workers and peasants . l 
The pattern becomes clear . The industrialized areas begin to 
flourish . Change is rapid . The state plays the role of a kind of 
apprentice- sorcerer . Improvement in technological know-how and means 
for the accumulation of wealth make the whole society more dynamic and 
moving. However, the global phenomenon slows down this drive towards 
'~regress" . The non- industrialized and stagnant rural areas limit the 
thrust of rising new industrial groups . 
The basic philosophical orientation is a ·radically rationalistic 
Prometheanism. Man is cajoled to believe he can attain success through 
the rational application of his will and ability. Success is his if he 
works diligently and is frugal in his living. There is a sllnilarity 
here with Weber's idea of the ~rotestant ethic". '~ime is the most 
1The Spectrum •• • , p . 182. 
precious thing; it is the producer of wealth and power. ttl There is no 
place in this kind of society of the indomitable will for the lazy, the 
sluggard, and the irrational in their employment of time. 
What are the traits of this society according to the criteria for 
analysis? 
(a) The territorial monarchy dominates every level or grouping. 
An official hierarchy of groupings includes the nobility, the clergy, 
the Third Estate and the peasants. However this "official" structure 
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is threatened b,y the nascent social classes rising to power in the 
cities. "New economic enterprises of great scope, manufacturing, facto-
ries, maritime commerce ••• at first favored by the monarch become 
hostile to him.n2 This is brought out in their reluctance to approve 
either war or the maintenance of a privileged nobility. 
(b) The passive masses are the most influential among the We' s. 
Partial fusions are limited by the active relations with the Other. 
Such passive masses are found in the state, urban life and partially 
in rural life. The capitalistic enterprises are also the foyers for 
these We's. The relations with the Other are especially active in the 
whole of economic life. To reiterate, this limits the active ~· 
(c) At the top of the depth levels technological and juridical 
patterns are firmly entrenched. They are basica~ creative and attack 
the time-worn customs in both the juridical means of regulation and in 
1Ibid., p. 184. 
2Ibid., p. 185. 
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the ways of conducting economic life. 
The morphological level follows. Manual labor and the problem of 
recruitment make this important. Third place is occupied by organi-
zations and social roles. Lastly, symbols, rational and creative ideas 
and values prod the members of society to take the initiative in con-
trolling their natural environment. 
(d) Technical labor's division is much more developed in this 
society than social labor. Emphasis on the accumulation of wealth 
increases . 
(e) As to social control, knowledge and law are competitors for 
the first rung. Within these, scientific and technical knowledge are 
in competition with philosophical knowledge; law is expressed through 
legislation and royal ordinances . Second place belongs to education as 
the universities begin to free themselves from the influence and control 
of the Church. The last rungs are left to morality, art and religion. 
(f) This cultural framework is per-meated with a triumphant 
naturalism, a growing individualism and the tantalizing idea of Progress . 
(g) The social time scale finds the time of alternation between 
advance and regression and the time of irregular pulsations at the top. 
The cities versus the rural areas would be an example. 1 
6. The democratic-liberal societies corresponding to developed 
competitive capitalism. This type of society dominated the United States 
and Europe at the close of the nineteenth century and the beginning of 
the present one. The state became democratic, dominated by the princi-
lrbid., PP• 186-187. 
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ples of the Declaration of Independence and the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789). This democratic, secular 
territorial state was the predominant grouping but its power waned from 
that of enlightened despotism. Powerful groupings which opposed it grew 
up out of the industrial enterprises. Technological patterns and busi-
ness-oriented frames of reference became decisive influences . This was 
the period of the complete development of the machine. Technology was 
the foundation of prosperity. Nations entered into competition on an 
economic level. Competition increased within these societies. Acute 
social problems arose out of this extreme competitiveness. 'rhis society 
is the epitome of capitalism. Its basic characteristics are easy to 
outline. 
(a) The territorial state, democratic and secular in character, 
remains at the head of all functional groupings. Its position of 
supremacy is tenuous . Industrial enterprises, trusts and cartels, labor 
groupings, and financial organizations (in the broad sense here) under-
mine the stability of the territorial state's hold on this top rung. 
The social classes move into contention for the first time threatening 
the foundation of the hierarchy. The techno-bureaucrats begin forming 
a rival class which is still seeking the ascendant position.1 
(b) Generally, the active masses are favored by this society. The 
bourgeois class does support certain communities through its economic 
structures, e. g., employer organizations. The proletarians, on the 
other hand, lend. their support to same communions observable in labor 
~raite ••• , I, 228. 
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unions and political parties which represent labor. The ~ in general 
is limited b,y the relations with t he Other which are expressed in the 
intergroupal and interindividual nature of competitive enterprise.1 
(c) Technical and economic patterns are more strongly accentu-
ated than any other depth levels. Here Mumford, Ogburn and Veblen are 
right in their basic assessments of capitalistic society but only this 
particular type. Other forces in the persons of social classes, labor 
unions and political parties play such vital roles, have such creative 
and explosive collective attitudes that they. must be put in second place. 
The organized level is in the next position. The morphological and 
ecological factors are still important but occupy a less important role. 
(d) This type of society has a full divi sion of both social and 
technical work. This is the significant contribution of the techno-
logical age. 
(e) Social control comes through scientific knowledge, followed 
closely by political knowledge, or ideology, in the strict sense of the 
word. Secular education, law (legislation), moralities of aspiration, 
and symbolic ideal images all belonging to the bourgeois class, follow 
after knowledge. 
(f) The cultural works are permeated by a scientism or cult of 
scientific knowledge which leads to a heady faith in the belief that 
every problem can be solved. This becomes the stuff of society, its 
cement and integrating force . 2 
1rbid. 
Grne Spectrum ••• , p. 195. 
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(g) The time ahead of itself finally comes to the fore in this 
type of global society. However, the time of alternation between ad-
vance and retardation poses a constant threat. Certain privileged 
groupings at the heart of the bourgeoisie resist any pretentions towards 
change; overproduction and decrease in profits also are causative fac-
tors. The time of irregular pulsations is a companion of economic 
crises. The ups and downs of the economy in the United States during 
the last fifteen years provide. a · good example of this type of time. 
The class struggle, difficulties and conflicts resulting from colonial 
expansion, create the milieu for this latter time of irregular pattern-
ing. The huge economic organizations hide underlying forces which 
could cause deep changes as well as veil those tendencies which would 
limit ''progress"· 
7. Managerial society corresponding to organized capitalism. 
The United States, Germany before and after Nazism, and in a 
certain sense Great Britain before World War II would fit this type of 
society. 
The economy is no longer abandoned to free competition; it 
is planned in the private interest of trusts, cartels and 
companies with the aid of the State which puts its vast 1 bureaucratic machinery at the disposal of the employers. 
(a) The state is under the control, at least partially, of pri-
vate corporations which regulate and plan for all other groupings. They 
use every means to corrupt these other functional groups. 
(b) The passive masses are unchallenged. They are successful in 
.3.30 
forcing back the communities. 
(c) Among the depth levels the economic organizations predominate. 
Technological patterns and economic patterns, followed by political and 
public relations slogans diffused b,y technical means, come next in 
importance. 
(d) Technical division of labor is somewhat curtailed by the 
augmentation of automation. "This has repercussions for the social 
division of labor since labor must be redistributed."l 
(e) The social control is headed b.Y technical knowledge. Edu-
cation and teaching reflect this type of knowledge in a uniform type 
of education. Morality, law and religion follow on the heels of these 
two forms of social control. 
(f) '"Technical civilization' dominating not only the social 
controls but 'human relations' themselves, causes the triumph of the 
'instrument over the act•.n2 
(g) The time ahead of itself is in a top position since this is 
a type of planned society. However, deceptive time at work in the 
organizations, the time of irregular pulsations active in the masses, 
and the time behind itself, always a part of management and the bureauc-
racy, do battle with the first place time. In the final analysis the 
time which belongs to the ''machine 11 supplants them all. The members of 
society, collective and individual, serve as "sorcerer's apprentices" 
to these engines of control. 
lrbid., P• 202. 
Zrraite •• • , I, 2.30. 
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8. Fascist societies. These are recent phenomena. They are 
still present. Emerging nations in the areas of rapid social change 
are particularly susceptible to these regimes. Moreover, when deep 
economic crises hit, the passive masses rise to prominence, making the 
modern capitalist society prone to "radical" solutions which promise 
to alleviate the conditions of angst and anger. 
Fascist societies' structures consist of "the complete fusion of 
organized capitalism with the totalitarian State, led by the techno-
bureaucratic groups linked with the organizational machinery of trusts, 
cartels, banks, administration and a highly specialized military. "1 
Gurvitcb sees the leader, der Fuehrer, as a semi-charismatic 
demagogue who is only a strawman for these great organizations which 
control and dictate. These groups enslave all levels and classes of the 
population. The voluntary organizations are dissolved. The techno-
bureaucratic organizations and groupings rely on a planned economy. 
They arrange all for their own profit. '~he chauvinist and racial 
mythology, the slogan of the 're-establishment of order' and the faith 
in national independence, abundance, 'public salvation' ••• are only 
screens behind which hides the techno-bureaucratic authoritarianism.u2 
This structure differs little from the organized capitalism de-
scribed in the previous section. The criteria for analysis reveal about 
the same results. However, there are these differences: this fascist 
structure combines a kind of mystical or mythological emotionalism with 
lrhe Spectrum •• • , p. 205. 
2Ibid. 
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cynicism and super-organization. '~ts communions are based on hate and 
an artificially inspired ecstasy; it declares war on every particular 
grouping which is outside the governmental machine; it shoves law and 
morality to the last rung of social control. ttl An artifi cial mythology 
is substituted which becomes its art form; military and athletic parades 
express this art. Even education becomes a kind of drill. 2 Moreover, 
the basic unity is illusory. The fascist leadership unleashes forces 
which are ultimately beyond its control. Each of the great organi-
zations, the ~echno-bureaucrata in particular, move in different social 
times. The dictators think they are in control of the time and that 
their mastery is complete; however, they are living an illusion which 
grows more grotesque as the crises worsen in the face of desperate 
decisions and poor leadership.3 
9. The planned socie~ according to the principles of the 
centralized collectivist state. Russia and China are examples. Their 
satellites of course would fit into this type. Yugoslavia is a case 
apart and will be discussed in connection with the next type. Gone are 
the bourgeois class and capitalist enterprises. This type's ideology 
rejects the absolute nature of private profit and industrial feudalism. 
Hence, the proletarian class, either alone or in combination with other 
groups, is the "official" dictator. "This dictatorship is not exercised 
1Ibid., p. 2o6. 
2Ibid. 
3cf. C. N. Parkinson, The Evolution of Political Thought (New York: 
The Viking Press, 19b0), pp. 238-304 for an excellent description of this 
whole process. 
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by the proletariat themselves, but by the communist party which becomes 
the supreme organ of the state, an organ charged with controlling the 
complete planning of the economy. "1 It is also the creator and pro-
mulgator of the official ''party line 11 • The proletariat does not control 
directly either the techno-bureaucracy, the state or the partye Certain 
professional organizational men, social engineers, are in control. 
Liberty and freedom are only promised for the second phase of communism 
when the class warfare will be ended and the state will have disap-
peared as an essential organ of control. 
The following characteristics describe this structure: 
(a) The single party controls the state and this latter dominates 
all other functional groupings . 
(b) The masses are emphasized. They are sometimes active and other 
times passive . There are occasional active communions, especially with-
in the party and in the kolkhoses. 
(c) Centralized planning controls the arrangement and content 
of the depth levels. This planning is directed not only at economic 
life but the total life. Hence symbols and ideas become important. 
Organizations are essential for planning. 
(d) Increased division of social and technical labor becomes an 
integral part of collective planning. 
(e) Political knowledge is the first means of social control; 
technical and scientific knowledge comes next. Humanistically oriented 
education follows and a morality based on ideal symbolic images with 
1 The Spectrum •• • , p. 208. 
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emphasis on creativity occupies the next rung. Art and law are last in 
. rt 1 J.mpo ance. 
(f) As to culture, there is a real effort to synthesize humanism 
and technology, though without apparent success. 
(g) The time scale is complicated. Explosive time of creation 
based on the ideals and values of humanism and the time ahead of itself 
which is guided by creative and novel plans for "progress", find them-
selves in competition with other times. Once again the deceptive time 
of the huge organizations, and the time of alternation between advance 
and retardation brought on by the relative success of the various plans 
which are implemented, as well as by the struggles between the several 
classes and groups occupy leading positions. There is a dissatisfaction 
among the proletariat in terms of their actually controlling the global 
structures; passive resistance exists on the part of the peasant classes. 
The impact of this is especially evident on the agricultural programs of 
both the Soviet Union and China. 
Gurvitch contends that in order for the time of creation and the 
time ahead of itself to succeed, it would be necessary t hat the organi-
zations be in the hands of the proletariat themselves and/or the 
peasants. Nor can they be dominated by the techno-bureaucrats or a 
powerful single party if this is to come to pass. 11It is difficult to 
judge if these conditions have a chance of being realized in the near 
future and if the subjacent total social phenomenon to this structure 
• 
1
cf. Parkinson's work once again for an interesting discussion on 
the role of religion in the Soviet Union. His thesis is that Communism 
is a bona fide religion and hence, would be a means of social control. 
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reveals a sufficient dynamism moving in this direction."l 
10. Planned societies according to the principles of decentral-
ized, pluralistic collectivism. As yet this society has never been 
realized. 'rhere are examples in the world at present which give cause 
for including this in the list of types. Certain tendencies can be seen 
in the popular democracy of Yugoslavia,2 in the Scandinavian countries,3 
and in Great Britain, which point to this decentralized planned society. 
This global society would try to effect a balance between industrial 
democracy and political democracy.4 
The process of planning would move from the bottom to the top, 
the reverse of the Russian communist experiment. '~t would commence 
with the general councils of controL and the . management of the local 
enterprises, passing on to the councils of industry and the regional 
economic councils, in order to arrive at a central economic council. 115 
Ownership would be federalized. Tnis means that property would 
be both individual and collective. The means of production would belong 
to these decentralized councils. Every person would participate indi-
vidually and collectively in this ownership process. The state would 
be decentralized and its power would be balanced by the power of this 
lrraite ••• , I, 232. 
2cf. The Atlantic Monthlz, CCX (December, 1962), 74-142. 
3cf. Marquis Childs,. Sweden: The Middle Waz (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1936). 
4Harold J. Rutenberg and Clinton S. Golden in their works on 
industrial democracy indicate more concretely what Gurvitch is pointing 
to in this type of global society. 
Srraite. • • , I, 232-233. Cf. Gurvitch.' s La declaration des 
droits sociaux (New York: Editions de la Maison Franyaise, 1944). 
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separated economic organization. An L~partial body would be established 
to rule on conflicts between the state and the economic council. 1 
The structure would have the following traits according to 
Gurvitch's criteria: 
(a) The economic groupings would be arranged in one h~erarchy; 
the locality groupings form another. The former would lL~t the latter 
(the state) and vice versa. 
(b) The communities and communions would be predominantly sup-
ported. 
(c) The depth levels emphasized would include economic planning 
based on the consent of the governed; open, versatile, creative values 
and ideas, innovating and unexpected roles, diverse types of federalist 
organizations would be in ascendancy. Competition would came from 
certain patterns and rules at the juridical level. 
(d) The division of technical ~rk will be more and more limited 
b,y automation; however, the social division of labor will be accentuated. 
(e) The hierarchy of social control will find knowledge stripped 
of its political overtones and a choice will be given between knowledge 
of the Other and of the We. Law in its different forms will also occupy 
this first rung. Morality (creative morality, morality of virtues and 
imperative morality in particular) will come next, followed by education 
and art. 
(f) A new humanistic civilization will be produced. All of the 
techniques, the means of controlling nature, the tools of creating a 
1 The Spectrum •• • , p. 212. 
' ' 
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wholesome environment will be placed in the hands of mankind. 
(g) For the first time the time of creation and the tL~e ahead 
of itself will vie seriously for first place. However tne time of 
alternation and the time behind itself could present some powerful 
competition. Conflicts are possible and probabl~ between the multiple 
groupings which would be active in this type of society. Also the 
majority would conceivably make a mistake as to what would be best for 
them in a given situation. Any society which would develop a juridical 
system to promote justice would tend to favor a time behind itself. 
This is the very nature of "juridical restraint n. 1 
The struggle to keep the separation between the structure and its 
global phenomenon will always pose problems. Gurvitch ends qy declaring 
he is in no way interested in proposing this as an ideal type of global 
society. 2 
This brings to a close the description of the macrosociological 
view of social reality. This concludes the descriptive analysis of both 
the horizontal and vertical aspects of social reality. This tapestry of 
social life is of one piece. It is a totality. When these various 
parts are considered together the web of social relationships, the 
interpenetrations and fusions of individuals and groups, they create 
a many-colored design that reveals certain patterns, certain regulari-
ties, certain observable characteristics. This whole is social reality. 
These many parts are held together by a dialectical process. In graphic 
form these dialectical relationships can be viewed in tnis way: 
1 , 3 Traite •• • , I, 2 3. 
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VERTICAL 
1) Ecolo! ical Level 
2) Organ· ~· tions 
3) Socia] at terns 
4) Pattex p d Collective 
Be he tr or 
5) The We p: of Social 
HORIZONTAL Rc s 
Microsociology Social Social Global 
~nf'i !>} Bonds l: >C ~~~ :::> Ll res 
6) Collec r-:ve Attitudes 
7) Social i ymbols 
8) Creati Collective Behavior 
9) Collec ve Ideas and Values 
10) The Co ective Mind 
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This diagram shows the intersecting of the vertical and horizontal 
aspects of social reality as Gurvitch has described them. At any point 
along the continuum the vertical total social phenomena are discovered. 
They are related through the dialectical processes which will be de-
scribed in the next chapter. It is important to underline once more the 
symbolic nature of this description of social reality as Gurvitch con-
ceives it. fo use the terms depth levels, or moving from the super-
ficial to the more profound, is in no way to make a value statement. 
This is simply one way of dealing with the extremely difficult material 
which makes up social reality. Nor is this diagram to suggest a static 
quality to society. These intersecting relationships are dynamic and 
moving. "All of these depth levels interpenetrate; more than this they 
are in perpetual conflict, tension, and threatened by estrangement or 
antinomy • The degree of their discontinuity and continuity, their 
mutual implication, or their polarization is a question of fact, and 
fact only. 111 Experience alone will provide the know-how to deal with 
the effervescent, continuously varying and changing combinations of 
these strata which roughly follow the contingent outlines of their dif-
ferent frameworks; always it is necessary to remember the Protean nature 
of the total social phenomena with their capacity to resist every at-
tempt at contai ning them. Such combinations, therefore, vary according 
to the types of frameworks and the historical circumstances. 
The dialectical method, Gurvitch contends, is the means by which 
the sociologist may at once describe the individual parts of social 
ln~terrrdnismes sociaux •• • , p. 103. 
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reality while holding to a view of the whole . This method becomes the 
central concern of Chapter VII . 
CHAPTER VII 
THE DIAlECTIC : EXPLANATION AND APPLICATION 
The constant task of this paper is to describe the nature of 
social reality. This exploration thus far has revealed a reality which 
is in Gurvitch's terms constantly moving, tension-filled, fluctuating , 
renewing, threatened b,y revolutions, in short characterized by a dynamic 
quality which St. Simon has called societe en acte . This view of' social 
reality then is dialectical . Such a dialectical character requires a 
special approach. It is this approach which must now be described . 
First, the dialectic concerns social reality. This means that 
such a reality is conceived or studied in its totality, in its various 
dimensions, expressions and manifestations . As a real movement the 
dialectic is the way ( dia) foil 'Owed or taken by human groups. "According 
to the beautiful fornmla of Jean Wahl, 'The dialectic is a pathway. 
Moreover, in the very word dialectic, there is this idea of dia, through. 
The dialectic is a way rather than a point of arrival. 1111 
Each of these totalities (groups and global societies) is made 
up of collective and individual consciences, or in a larger sense, the 
total psychological phenomena and the multiple significations wnich 
these consciences grasp and by which they are influenced or affected. 
loialectique et sociologie, p. 2. 
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'~n other words the dialectic as a real movement concerns a very spe-
cific reality, human reality, which is par excellence, social reality.nl 
If the first aspect of the dialectic is to assert its parallelism 
with social reality, the second logical step would be to see it as a 
method . Gurvitch contends that this is the means by which to grasp the 
basic reality of social groups as totalities. Here the essential unity 
of the subject and object is explicitly affirmed. There are several 
characteristics which help to clarify this term as a method. First, 
it denies every position which is rigidly held or unquestioningly 
espoused. The dialectic destroys every type of intellectual sclerosis . 
Such 'mummification" (a favorite word of Gurvitch throughout this whole 
discussion) impairs sociology's ability to grasp these totalities as 
dynamic wholes, as well as to understand their various parts. 
Furthermore, this dialectic as a method is predominantly negative 
in spirit . It must circumvent every propensity towards establishing 
laws, strictly formal abstractions, or superficial divisions which would 
undercut the basic realness of groups . The rational and the logical are 
insufficient . He would never deny the proper role of reason and logic . 
He finds them inadequate alone; they have their place in the formulation 
of theory and the expression of certain ideas about social reality, but 
they fail to do justice to the full- orbed nature of social reality. 
This is very close to the widely accepted distinction between deductive 
and inductive reasoning . Gurvitch is saying that the deductive, though 
essential in the building of hypotheses, is incomplete. The total social 
1 . IbJ.d. , p • 17 9 • 
phenomenon is so highly complex the only recourse is to the dialectic, 
alone sufficiently competent and imaginative to grasp the idea of social 
reality en marche. 
The dialectical, moreover, constantly struggles against every 
attempt to simplify social reality, to crystalize or anesthetize it or 
limit knowledge about it. "The dialectic focuses on the complexities, 
sinuosities, flexibilities and constantly renewing tensions, along with 
the unexpected turns of events of social reality; all of these must be 
taken into account to comprehend such social entities. 111 As a method 
it reveals the constantly changing character of human experience. The 
content of that experience (midpoints between the immediate and the 
constructed, in Gurvitch's terminology) and the frameworks which en-
compass this experience--such frameworks make it possible to construct 
a typology of social experience--are constantly varying and dynamically 
related. Obviously, Gurvitch's definition of the content of experience 
is very close to that of Henri Bergson . A two-fold application of the 
dialectic emerges from this description thus far: first, it shows the 
type of movement which reality takes; and second, it is the means by 
which such movements are studied. Even the natural sciences find some 
processes of the dialectic applicable since all experience is colored 
b,y the human factor. All experience is human experience, according to 
Gurvitch. 2 
'~he striking affinity which exists between the dialectic, as much 
a method as a real movement, and experience comes from their both 
1Ibid., pp. 180-181. 
2 
Ibid., p . 181. 
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being attached to the human factor.nl In another place Gurvitch ex-
plains this more fully as he describes what he means by experience. 
Experience has several levels, the immediate, the mundane and the 
constructed, e. g., the scientific. Experience is so rich in content 
it escapes the easy reduction to certain "given and observed facts" in 
a scientific induction as the positivists would assert. Nor is experi-
ence merely "the reflection guiding the sensations by the intermediary 
of associations, the position of Locke and Hume."2 Neither is it based 
on isolated sensations which are mechanically united as Condillac 
illustrates in his philosophy. The partisans of empirical research in 
sociology, especially among many .Americans, suffer from this kind of 
reductionism. They think they are free from presuppositions with their 
emphasis on objectivity and quantification, but this in itself reveals 
a preconception. 
Gurvitch 1s persistent criticiam of this all too simple reductionism 
on the part of a large segment of American sociology has been effectively 
re-enforced in C. Wright Mills 1 s writings. Mills calls this movement 
"abstracted empiricism". Though the practitioners of abstracted empiri-
cism believe they are free from any philosophical presuppositions, in 
reality they espouse a particular position at the very outset. ~t 
they have done in brief is to embrace one philosophy of science which 
they now suppose to be The Scientific Method • • • its most decisive 
result has been a sort of methodological inhibition.n3 
libid. 2Ibid., P• 1. 
3The Sociolo~ical Imagination, p. 57. 
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Mills explains that this loyalty to '~he Method" sorely limits 
the kinds of problems which are studied by social scientists. Those 
problems are mostly irrelevant; they lack the classical concern of 
social scientists; they fail to examine the critical questions which 
modern man faces in his struggle for survival. 
Gurvitch vigorously underlines the notion that the social scien-
tists have a different don~in for their study than the physical scientists . 
The study of social facts calls for a different approach than that used 
by the physical and natural sciences . Moreover, their method has under-
gone serious changes since the turn of the century. There is no longer 
a single method, only a basic attitude which can be called scientific. 
Polycarp Kush, Percy Bridgman and William Beck attest to this. ''!'here 
is no 'scientific' method and that which is called b,y that name can be 
outlined for only quite simple problems.•u As one writer has put it, 
'~cientific problems are solved by collecting data and by 'thinking 
about them all the time 1 ."2 
The basic approach for problem solving in the social sciences is 
more an attitude or a posture than it is a set method. It is an atmos-
phere in which exploration for truth may be made. It is much broader 
than so often conceived. The important thing is to be consistent with 
the elevated aims of classical social study or critical analysis in the 
finest sense of the word. What are the characteristics of this scien-
1Quoted in Ibid . , p . 58. 
2 
Abraham Wolf, ''!'he Scientific Method", The Encyclopedia Bri tan-
nica, Volume XX (Chicago: The Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1955), 125. 
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tific etbos? This is the question which concerns Gurvitch as he at-
tempts to correct what he sees as a stultifying narrowness in social 
science research. 
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As previously stated in Chapter IV, a dialectical tension exists 
between method and object of study. In the social sciences the object 
of study is social reality in all its depth and breadth . This reality 
is far from being simple, static ana stable as a field of investigation, 
but is a fluid, dynamic, ever-changing, explosive domain requiring a 
method of observation and comprehension equal to such a task. The 
method adequate to fulfill this aim, Gurvitch contends, has to be dia-
lectical. Furthermore, the goal of social science is to discover the 
truth about social reality. Such an aim of objective truth requires a 
loyalty to certain notions which make this exploration possible. The 
classical atmosphere of science involves opportunities for independent 
dissent, tolerance for the other person's point of view, a respect for 
reason, integrity, fearless observation, careful validation of hypothe-
ses, the invitation to imaginative speculation and open discussion. 
These classic characteristics are implied in Gurvitch's dialectic. He 
attempts to demolish every acquired concept which is crystalized and 
hardened . This is the point he makes in asserting that the dialectical 
approach is primarily negative . Absolutes are impossible. Only proba-
bilities and relationships are possible to the scientist. This has 
become patently clear in atomic physics. 
However, the dialectic suffers from certain stereotyped ideas 
about its nature. When one hears the word he assumes it is a philo- I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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sophical position. This is unfortunate in the light of twentieth 
century physics and the critical analysis of the dialectic itself. It ~s 
when one settles on a particular operational process of the dialectic 
and sees this as the passe partout to the solution of every problem in 
social reality, tnat subjectivism and dogmatism enter. Several oper-
ational processes are possible. They all belong to the dialectical 
method. Sometimes all are used; other times only one or two suffice. 
Furthermore, the number of processes is not limited; new ones can and 
will be discovered as this quest for truth continues. At present there 
are five distinct types of dialectical processes These will be dis-
cussed below. Before this is pursued, one final comment must be made 
about the general posture or attit de of the social scientist in the 
classical sense . 
The social scientist, because his field of labor is human reality, 
cannot enclose himself in a laboratory, where conditions allow more 
objectivity, fairly rigid control, and repetition of circumstances. 
There is no escape from the human condition. Those whom he examines are 
thinking, willing, conscious persons--he is also part of this same 
humanity. He is engage. There is no alternative. This is the essence 
of the dialectic. The processes of dialectical investigati on lend them-
selves to the tasks of the social scientist. They enable the researcher 
to move beyond the sterile dichotomy made famous by Einstein, '~or 
science can only ascertain what is, but not what should be, and outside 
of its domain value judgments of all kinds remain necessary. ul This is 
~uoted in Paul F. Schmidt, "Ethical Norms in Scientific Method, u 
The Journal of Philosophy, LVI (July 16, 1959), 644. 
a popular way of resolving the problems between ethics, theology and 
science, but Gurvitch would state that this is too neat a division. 
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Man's existence militates against such a precise separation. ~ seeing 
the relationship of values and method as dialectical, one has a more 
realistic estimation of the human condition . Classical social science 
included this element of involvement. The early social scientists were 
engaged thinkers and scholars . They were active in political life . 
They were far from being a-political and spiritually destitute . Humani-
ty mattered. In this period they were intellectually concerned even 
though less sophisticated in their technological skills. Gurvi tch, in 
his approach, _seeks to reaffirm this inescapable human coefficient . 
His own life as well as his method of analysis and study illustrate this 
concretely. 
1. The Operational Processes of the Dialectic 
A recurring theme in Gurvitch's analysis of social reality is the 
presence of the unexpected or the unanticipated. In his critical review 
of current sociology, Gurvitch complained that too few sociologists have 
paid enough attention to this aspect of social life .1 Experience is 
infinitely varied and the changes which take place within a social whole 
are continuous . The dialectical method takes into consideration these 
infinite variations; it is at once empirical and realistic because of 
this attribute . 
To be empirical does not mean to espouse the philosophical 
laobert Merton's idea of "serendipity" comes close to this 
requirement . Cf. Social Theory ••• , pp. 103-108 . 
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position of the positivists or the "abstract empiricists" active in the 
United States. They would assert that the only thing necessary is to 
gather the given and observable facts into a nice neat pile and make 
some generalizations from the findings . Social reality is considerably 
removed from this view. This is at once too limiting and too simple. 
It also forsakes any real effort at analysis and explanation. Gurvitch 
contends his view is broader, that his "scientific approach" is not 
limited to this abstracted empiricism, and that the operaticnal pro-
cesses go much further in attempting to understand. This is the first 
step towards explanation. 
All experience is dialectical . Gurvitch means that experience 
must be "managed" in part to be observed and explored. This means that 
experience is abstractly reconstructed b.Y the various sciences. These 
constructions are the essential expressions of the immediately experi-
enced. This also implies there are intermediary positions between 
the immediate and the superficial or the const ructed. Though these con-
structions are multiplied and multiplied, they can never contain the 
full richness of experience. Experience is a kind of Proteus. "It 
escapes us when we think we have caught it; we are dupes when we believe 
we have penetrated its secret; we are victims of it when we believe we 
are free of it , if only for a moment . 111 
Again, this is why experience cannot be reduced to one theory. 
As soon as one advances a particular theory of experience he has slipped 
into dogmatism. Whether one calls it sensualism, associationalism, 
positivism, pragmatism, phenomenology or existentialism, the result is 
lnialectique et sociologie, p. 8. 
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the same. "One deforms experience, arrests this experience, destroys 
its unpredictability, the infinite variety, and the unexpected aspects 
of its very frameworks."l Experience, to labor the point for just a 
moment, is uncontainable. Experience, then, plunges the researcher into 
the dialectic. It is the sole method which can deal with such a variety. 
The variety itself is dialectical. 
This whole argument is clear when one realizes that the dialectic 
and experience are both attached to humanity. Everything that is 
touched by the human condition is also within the spheres of the dia-
lectical and experience. 
Experience is always human; it is never sub-human or super-
human. It is the effort of men, the We, of the groups, 
classes, and entire societies to be oriented in the world, 
in the social world first, but also, by this intermediary, 
to be oriented in the natural world. It is the social praxis, 
at once individual and collective, which Karl Marx insisted 
upon with a particularly persuasive force. Scientific experi-
ence itself, not only in the social sciences, but in the 
natural sciences, remains essentially a "human experience". 
It bears the imprint of the human, the social, and the historic 
reverberating in the natural world.2 
This statement is an excellent summary of Gurvitch's essential 
position. Five operational procedures of the dialectic clarify the 
complexity of these relationships and tensions. 
i . Complementarity. 
Gurvitch points to Niels Bohr as one of the founders of the idea 
of complementarity. According to Bohr there are two sets of phenomena 
which can be interpreted in terms of contradictory theories (wave and 
particle) and which were obtained under experimental conditions 
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impossible to carry out simultaneously. He says explicitly, ''l'hey 
cannot be comprehended within a single picture, but must be regarded 
as complementary in the sense that only the totality of the phenomena 
exhausts the possible information about the objects."l 
From this Gurvitch argues for his emphasis on relativism and 
realism; or put another way, he argues contextualism. This is not 
a new concept. Whitehead and Mead preceded him. There is little doubt 
he was influenced by Mead whom he admires greatly. This idea of comple-
mentarity is a common-sense and commonplace scientific tool. The toler-
ation of one person by another requires some sort of complementary 
understanding. How could differing views exist side b,y side unless this 
were so in everyday life? It is logica~ to believe that if one were to 
examine certain phenomena from several perspectives or positions, the 
data accumulated and the generalizations coming from such observation 
would be more accurate and valid. Contradiction is part of social life 
and this contradiction, when it is included in analysis, makes the study 
much more relevant and authentic. This is certainly one of the basic 
ideas implicit in this notion. 
We cannot know an object in complete isolation either from 
ourselves or from other objects. It is the perceptual context, 
that is, the object in the context, or taken for granted. Ob-
jective relativism . • • emphasizes that this is indeed a con-
text, with transcendent ontological status in and of itself, 
but only a part of a totality of objective appearances defined 
by their relations to one another, that is to say defined in 
various contexts.2 
1
"Discussion with Einstein", in Albert Einstein, Philosopher-
Scientist, ed. by P. A. Schlipp (Evanston: The Library of Living 
Philosophers, 1949), p. 210. 
2patricia J. Doty, ''Complementarity and its Analogies", The 
Journal of Philosophy, LV (December 4, 1958), 1103. 
Gurvitch would agree. Social life is of such a nature the con-
ceptual framework must be coherent and wholistic in its approach, since 
the proper domain of sociology is the real social group. It is a 
totality because of the dialectical tensions at play within its interior 
life holding the various parts together, bringing order out of the human 
variety. The dialectic of complementarity explains this movement in 
part but it is only a first step. The other kinds of dialectical pro-
cess explain further. 
There are different types of complementarity. First, the type 
which reveals at first contradictory alternatives which turn out to be 
complementary notions or hypotheses; on closer scrutiny for instance, 
the dichotomy between comprehension and explanation is a false one. 
These two interact constantly, in fact complement each other. They are 
1 
necessary to one another. 
A second type of complementary dialectic works in a reverse sense. 
This is best explained by several examples, e. g., the relationships 
between effort and resistance, the given and the constructed, the 
mediary and the immediate, the continuous and the discontinuous, the 
superficial and the profound, the qualitative and the quantitative. A 
common way of describing this type is the use of the continuum which 
p~ots an infinite number of positions between the two polar positions. 
There is an element of compensation in this type. The discontinuous 
must be compensated by the continuous or order fails to materialize. 
Without order the group ceases to exist as a real unity. For instance, 
loialectique et sociologie, p. 193. 
there is a compensatory relationship between the We and the relations 
with the other.1 
The third type of complementar.y action, controlled always by the 
situation, causes the polar points to pull together (go in the same 
direction) or pull apart, though always as a compensatory action. In 
some ways this is the sense in which Toynbee puts forth his famous 
doctrine of "challenge and response". For instance, the morphological 
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and ecological factors are such that certain responses, certain compen-
sations must be made to meet the population explosion which is occurring 
in a country of ever-decreasing arable land. The way in which the 
various depth levels , e. g. , roles, symbols, collective attitudes and 
values respond, whether in a compensatory action towards each other or 
of separation, depends upon the various social and historical con-
junctions . This third type is also illustrated by the way in which an 
individual balances the various roles he is asked to play. 10ne can 
play an important role as a scholar or professor and succeed at playing 
only a minor one in his political party, labor union, or his own home . 112 
ii . Mutual Implication. 
This second kind of dialectic concerns those elements which on 
first sight appear to be heterogenous or opposite. However, upon a 
closer look, they illustrate a mutuality, an interdependency in which 
they are partially immanent in one another . 
One of the best illustrations of this is the relationship of the 
lrbid., pp. 194-195. 
2. 
i bid. , P• 196. 
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social and the psychological. It is impossible to understand how these 
sets of phenomena intersect and relate without recourse to this type of 
dialectic. See Chapter III for a detailed discussion of this . 
Another apt example is the mutual implication of culture and 
society . It is really foolhardy to try and separate them. Culture 
finds its framework in the social structure; the binding materials of 
society are the works of civilization . Though a structure f om time 
to time may be destroyed by its cultural content, a new structure is 
soon formed to contain these new arrangements and hierarchies . 
iii. Ambiguity . 
Gurvitch takes Freud's important finding and applies it to social 
reality. Complementarity fails to explore the profound levels in the 
relationships between the individual and collective minds . Mutual 
implication as well does not go far enough. The destiny of man which 
has caused him to live in societies, or in various We 1s, i. e . , groups 
and social classes, involves a further dimension, the presence of 
ambiguity . This ambiguity can eventually lead to ambivalence . This 
represents another process of the dialectic . At the heart of social 
groupings are friends and enemies, feelings of love and hate, comfort 
and insecurity. These are the conditions which belong to ambiguity. 
Take for example the polar attributes of the organized and the spontane-
ous within social reality . Excessive rigidity of the organized leads 
to a critical and disruptive explosion at the spontaneous level . Or, 
the situation can develop where the explosive elements are so prevalent 
as to threaten the unity of society. Frequently both conditions are 
355 
present and a tug of war begins which leads from ambiguity to ambiva-
lence and finally to polarization or the complete juxtaposition of the 
elements. Gurvitch asks how else it is possible to study the relation~ 
ships of three elements such as the mass, communion, and community with-
out recourse to this dialectic of ambiguity. The three are present at 
the same time and require the researcher see them all as they relate to 
each other ~ Obviously there are striking contradictions, but this is the 
truth about society. It behooves the social scientist to then adopt 
some means whereqy he can take into account this ambiguity. Such a 
means would help the social scientist escape the pitfall of placing a 
value judgment on one type of fusion in the We. Only then can empirical 
research be carried out in a truly "scientific., fashion. 
Examples of this type of dialectic would be relationships formed 
by contractual agreements or credit arrangements, or any kind of legal 
bond. There are points of integration where the two parties agree; 
there are points of disagreement as to interpretation of set clauses and 
the means of executing the document. .Ambiguity can lead to ambivalence 
when either individuals or groups or even global societies, at once are 
attracted and repelled by each other . In other words, there are times 
when the separate entities or individuals are burning with curiosity, 
other moments when they are indifferent, times when a spirit of friendli-
ness prevails, other junctures when backbiting and hypercriticism rules. 
Persons can be enemies now and friends later; there can exist within the 
same person and persons sympathy and coldness, love and hate. 
All of these relationships of ambiguity plus those of mutual 
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implication and complementarity can become antinomic. When this happens 
polarization obtains. This is the next type of diaLectical process. 
iv. The Dialectic of Polarization. 
Polarization is the usual type of dialectic when one thinks of this 
term. Gurvitch makes it plain these antinomies, dichotomies or oppo-
sites are not sacred. They only tell part of the dialectical stor,y . 
The mystical, sacrosanct connotations about this process must be elimi-
nated. A simple synthesis in the Hegelian~arxist dialectical sense is 
' 
untenable. Social reality gives little evidence that such antinomies 
are always present in clear, sharp form . It all depends upon the circum-
stances, situations, or Sitz im Leben. The tensions between the several 
factors or aspects are relative; they are observable in different 
degrees of intensity. Sometimes they reach the proportion of polari-
zation; other times they exist as ambiguities or mutual implication or 
evidences of complementarity. The paradoxical often resists the dia-
lectical process of polarity. 
Always there is the element of surprise. Sometimes one would 
think , upon first examination, polarity holds, but closer analysis 
reveals a less intense process. On the other hand, the relationship 
between the individual and society seems to be solved quite easily by 
the process of "reciprocity of perspectives", but there are occasions 
when the individual senses an acute separation or alienation from 
society. The dialectic of polarity helps to understand this. 
Another example where this process is particularly valuable is 
the presence of revolution within a given social structure . This 
dialectic is operational for analyzing the present situation in Africa, 
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South America and Southeast Asia. These are areas of conflict, disinte-
gration and "rapid social change". 
Technology in. the Western world threatens to create a more acute 
alienation than Marx ever envisioned. This alienation involves cultural 
works, social structure and technological know-how. "Is it not neces-
sary to insist on the fact that in order to study seriously the situ-
ation in which our societies are struggling, the use of polarization is 
essential?"l Our age reveals a critical, ever-widening abyss between 
technology and the other cultural works . 
Finally, this dialectical process is very useful in examining the 
problems of acculturation, particularly pervasive in every part of the 
modern world . 
v. The Dialectic of Reciprocity of Perspectives. 
This process of reciprocity concerns those aspects of a social 
whole which relate to each other in such a way that both total identi-
fication and separation are denied . They are mutually immanent. There 
is a parallelism and a symmetry between them which is more or less 
rigorously maintained. 
Gurvitch maintains this is no solution-clef. It lacks universal 
application. Yet like the notion of the collective mind and the impor-
tance of social law before it, there is a certain primordial quality to 
this process for Gurvitch which resists denial. 
This process explains the centripetal force of a group, for ex-
ample. Still it would be in error to deny the constant possibility of 
~ialectique et sociologie, p. 211. Cf. also Association inter-
nationale des sociologues de langue franyaise, Structures sociales et 
democratie ~conomique (Brussels: Institut de Sociologie, 1961), pp . 269-
280. 
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surprises, or the unexpected which can enter a given situation and wreak 
havoc with the symmetry and parallelism implied in the reciprocity of 
perspectives. The hyper-empiricism in its radical dialectic takes these 
possibilities into account. The reciprocity of perspectives takes its 
place alongside the other types of processes. In the final analysis, 
the concrete experience of the living social reality will determine the 
type(s) of dialectic operating in that particular, peculiar and specific 
historical-empirical situation.l 
This ends the presentation of these various operational pro-
cedures . This method is an approach to analysis . Inherent in this 
role are limitations. Such a method is called on to describe what is. 
It stops at the thres hold of explanation. It assembles the data, de-
scribes what is happening. Explanation is subject to a different set 
of rules . It is concerned with why and whither. This is the subject 
of the following section. Before moving into the rules of explanation, 
it is best to summarize what the dialectical method accomplishes . 
a) The method apprises the social scientist of the nature of 
social reality in all its explosive and revolutionary movements, its 
ebb and flow, its dialectical character. 
b) It describes the mov~1ents of structuration, destructuration 
and restructuration • • • This includes a view of the total social 
phenomena moving towards existence as a totality and being split apart 
by the opposite force of anarchy or disintegration. 
c) This method shows that the various types of groupings and 
lrbid., p. 218 . 
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societies are more than mere images. They are concrete points of 
reference for analyzing the real social entities in all their fluidity. 
d) Finally, the dialectical approach only leads to explanation. 
Its sole job is to describe. Assigning other roles to this phase of 
the sociological enterprise is invalid. It still remains descriptive. 
''The most beautiful girl in France is no more than what she is. "l 
Many sociologists try to go beyond description even though they 
operate within the framework of a method whose limit is in gathering 
data and preparing the soil for explanation. There is only so much 
an approach can tell the researcher. 
2. Explanation in Sociology2 
Any discussion of explanation in science must take into consider-
ation the whole idea of determinism. Two conclusions follow: a) "It 
is impossible t o detach the notion of determinism from the concrete and 
real frameworks which it directs. Such a determinism is limited by the 
time i n which it lives. ~he outcome is a pluralism of limited, relative 
and varying partial determinisms which are distinctly different in each 
concrete universe, each specific world studied by a particular science. 113 
b) The technical processes or descriptive tools by which to explain 
these determinisms vary according to the same criteria. New tools will 
libid., p. 219. 
2This section is largely taken from the Traite •• • , I, 236-250. 
This represents the first systematic discussion o£ the rules for explan-
ation in sociology. Previous reviewers of his work did not have access 
to this latest addition to his thought. 
3cr. Determinismes sociaux •• • , pp. 9-40. 
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have to be covered as knowledge expands. Causal laws, functional laws, 
evolutionary laws, laws of statistical probability, singular causality, 
tendencies towards regularity, functional correlations or direct inte-
gration in the totalities are all possible. One or several may apply 
in one situation. Others will fit other circumstances. Contingency 
limits coherence. This is the central problem of explanation. 
This double contingency does not deny there are concrete wholes 
which have certain patterns, certain regularities plus a certain coher-
ence. However, a paradox obtains: at one and the same time there 
exists a coherent contingency coupled wlth a contingent coherence. Such 
a paradox is consistent with those other ambiguities, e. g., discon-
tinuous continuity and continuous discontinuity, qualitative quantity 
and quantitative quality. 
Gurvitch 1s definition of determinism hammers home this relative 
and limited pluralism. 
Detenninism is the integration of particular facts into one 
of the real, multiple frameworks or concrete universes (actual, 
known or constructed) which always remains contingent; it 
(deter.odnism) situates these facts, that is explains them in 
relationship to its understanding of the framework. This inte-
gration presupposes, in effect, an understanding of the rela-
tive cohesion of the contingent framework in question, plus its 
unfolding life within one or several of the temporalities. 
These latter are seldom singularized and never uniform.l 
Straightway one notices the close alliance betweerJ .comprehension 
and explanation. Uurvitch sees these dialectically related. Each is 
part of the other. It is fruitless to separate them. "It is as im-
possible to explain wi thout understanding the framework, as it is to 
1Ibid., p. 4o. 
comprehend the relative coherence of this latter without reaching some 
conclusion as to the manner of integration that is explanation. nl Max 
Weber comes under attack by Gurvitch far his loyalty to Dilthey, who 
separated explanation from comprehension by subsuming both into the 
latter. Dilthey's explanation was mechanistic. He failed to realize 
that in order to explain anything one has to have an understanding of 
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the framework itself which in turn presupposes the framework is !!!!• 
Weber reintroduced explanation into sociology by subsuming it under the 
comprehensive interpretations of the internal meanings of behaviour. 
He thereby transformed comprehension or Dilthey's intuitive understanding 
of real totalities into a subjective introspection of the internal mean-
ings of individual behaviours and their liaison with spiritual meanings 
thus fragmenting and demolishing these frameworks of social reality 
which must serve as the basis for explanation.2 
A tight predictability is out of the question in most cases. Only 
rare circumstances will allow this type of conclusion. The social 
sciences are particularly removed from such hope. The determinisms 
are much more relative, numerous and consequently limiting. Increasingly 
it becomes obvious, as Gaston Bachelard was wont to say, that soci-
ology's task is "to find the hidden".3 This is a difficult assignment. 
What is real rarely becomes evident from mere surface estimation. Hence, 
Gurvitch asserts his depth sociology and his empirical-realist dialectical 
2rraite •• • , I, 239. 
3La vocation • • • , I, 5. 
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method are justified. 
The ways in which explanation is erroneously attempted are ex-
plained in Chapter III.1 Explanation in sociology is so often betrayed 
by false assumptions or total dismissal. Explanation is desperately 
needed today. The threatening contemporary prool~ns of fascism, tech-
nocracy (even sociology in certain areas has became the servant of 
power), social revolutions in countries where a proletariat is nearly 
non-existent, e. g., Russia, China and most of Asia, all await socio-
logical analysis and explanation. Such an explanation is dependent 
upon an adequate theory. Only a valid theory is able to produce working 
hypotheses . Such hypotheses provide guidelines for research whereby 
comprehension of social frameworks and explanation through certain con-
ceptual tools can be realized. False hypotheses are better than none 
at all. At least they will indicate the superficial nature of a con-
siderable mnount of generalizing and serve to point one's efforts in 
the direction of unveiling the hidden. In sum, to distrust theory is 
to render explanation impossible . 
3. The Rules of Explanation in Sociology 
A. Harking back to one of the basic notions in Gurvitch's L1 idee 
du droit social, each social element stands in relationship to the next 
larger context. Hence, the microsocial aspects are integrated in group-
ings, the groupings in social classes, the groupings and social classes 
in global societies . The movement of explanation is from the abstract 
to the concrete . The totality tends to predominate over the separate 
laf . above, pp. 110-112. 
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elements, the whole over the partial. The total social phenomena are 
global. This view of the totality is possible and the ability to con-
trol these phenomena ~epends upon certain points of reference which 
represent partial manifestations of these concrete total phenomena, 
e. g., the We, groups and classes. These frameworks suggest the com-
plex character of the total social phenomena. The various depth levels 
and the a-structural, structurable and structured elements are in 
ceaseless tension with each other . 
B. To study these total global phenomena requires the researcher 
go through the intermediary of their structures . Since the global 
society is always structured, this step is a logical one. Two exi-
gencies hold for this rule: l)The structure must always be seen as an 
intermediary; its character is supple and dialectical. It cannot serve 
as the basis for sociological explanation . The total social phenomena 
alone can do this. 2) Neither the social structure nor the total phe-
nomena should be confused with their types . The various types are only 
operational conceptions constructed for purposes of grasping these con-
crete and real entities . 
C. The changes and reversals within each global structure are 
explained by the conflicts between the structure and its subjacent total 
social phenomena . Each structure serves as a category of explanation 
depending upon its type, "the character, force, feebleness, relative 
changeability or immobility of the organizations supported by it.nl 
1T •t' ra1 e • • • , I, 242. 
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D. One must include a detailed consideration of every partial 
structure though the global is pre- eminent. These partial structures 
and partial expressions of the total social phenomena have built-in 
conflicts and tensions. Examples are the conflicts among the classes, 
the struggles among groupings at the interior of the social classes and 
the opposition among the various We 1s . 
E. A sociological study must take every depth level into con-
sideration . The myopic study of one level fails to see the whole . This 
view of the whole separates sociology from the particular social 
s ciences . Furthermore, it underlines the necessity of sociology's 
working closely with the particular disciplines wliich.·are branches 
within sociology. Explanation can only come from such cooperation. 
Once again the variability of the social determinisms is accentuated 
by this approach, since the arrangement of the depth levels in a hier-
archy changes with each type of global structure. 
F. One must distinguish between social determinisms and sociolo-
gical determinism. The former are the abstract determinisms belonging 
to the individual depth levels and to the a-structural microsociological 
frameworks which encompass the forms of sociability. The sociological 
determinism belongs to the properly sociological realities in which 
these social elements are integrated. It does not always follow that 
the concrete global societies reveal the most vigorous and consistent 
type of determinism. Certain uni-dimensional determinisms (a one depth 
level type) provide manageable areas for quantitative analysis . The 
ecological level especially is open to this type of study. However, 
most laws of probability are inapplicable for global structures. Of 
necessi ty the sociological determinisms are dialecti cally oriented since 
the conflicts and tensions among the global, uni-dimensional and micro-
determinisms do not abate as the drive towards sociological explanation 
continues. Again the structural framework is all important. For pur-
poses of understanding and explanation social and sociological determin-
isms are better kept conceptually separate. 
G. Causal laws are ext remely rare in sociology. Such laws resist 
ever.y scientific effort. There is too much discontinuity, too much con-
tingency and lack of repetition in social reality to generalize in this 
manner. Even a singular causality linked to just one particular social 
structure is suspect. The singular causality tends to become increasingly 
individualized. If one goes from the ecological to the deepest level 
this becomes manifestly true. The same holds when moving from the uni-
dimensional to the multi-dimensional, from the partial to the total. 
There is too great an abyss between cause and effect for such a con-
ceptual tool. It is simply inadequate. Sociological explanation must 
rely on other means. History provides the best clue. 
H. Three processes hold for sociology, since causality reveals 
precious little: (1) functional correlation, (2) tendency towards 
regularity, and (3) the direct integration in the whole. 
(1) Functional correlation. This process of explanation concerns 
two or more elements which demand being integrated in the same totality. 
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Hence, the mystical form of knowledge is often linked with the most 
intense type of We, the communion; the rational form of knowledge is 
more than likely integrated in the community; the symbol and the sym-
bolized have a like correlation. These examples resist putting one as-
pect before the other; nor are they reciprocally causal. Neither are 
they constant, since other variables could affect the total situation. 1 
These functional correlations will become apparent upon examining the 
concrete entities, whether partial or global. hannheim observes that, 
"Every social fact is a function of the time and place in which it 
occurs.n2 In other words, the two or more elements fit. They can be 
correlated. This is the sense in which Gurvitch uses the term. 
(2) Tendency towards regu1arity. While the functional correlation 
is a substitute for causal and functional laws, tendencies towards regu-
larity are substitutes for evolutionary laws. '~hese tendencies are the 
patterns in which totalities move, certain approximate directions , 
though they are always ambiguous and tentative. In each type of global 
structure, and even at times in certain sectors of the structure, sever-
al contradictory regularities exist simultaneously.") These patterns 
apply only at the macrosociological level. A contemporary example would 
be the contradictory patterning of capitalist society. It can go in the 
direction of technocracy or towards a pluralistic democratic economy, or 
in the direction of communism. It can persevere or take an unexpected 
~eterminismes sociaux. • • , pp . 64-65. 
2cited in Social Theory ••• , p. 21. 
\eterminismes sociaux ••• , p . 65. 
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turn. Still, patterns are present. They are tendencies and nothing 
more. Within certain limits the diverse aspects of social life, whether 
economic , political, juridical, moral, religious, cognative or esthetic, 
can be stated in this manner. Each type of global or partial structure 
contains certain tendencies towards regularity. One can only ascertain 
their success post-factum. Then the results are al~s contingent and 
tentative. 
(3) The direct integration in a social whole. There are certain 
elements wnich are directly explained ~ the social framework. One 
takes them for granted . Gurvitch points out it is not by chance that 
sexual habits differ or relationships between different generations 
vary, or expressions of affection are dissimilar among different soci-
eties or even among social classes within the same society. It is suf-
ficient to say this is a process of sociological explanation. '~either 
the causality of the framework in question, nor the particular function-
al correlations need b~ considered."l These facts are integrated di-
rectly and naturally. They belong. This is Gurvitch 1s conception of 
verstehen. Here is the internal significance of the real group. How-
ever, he stops abruptly at this juncture. He is careful to avoid any 
total separation of compre~ension and explanation. 
I . Sociology must see the necessary collaboration between histori-
cal and sociological explanation. Experimentation needs to be distin-
guished from observation. The former has had little success in soci-
ology. At least when analyzing group, class and global phenomena such 
~raite ••• , I, 244-245. 
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a method is inoperative. This behooves sociology see the invaluable 
assistance which history can offer. Historical causality places more 
emphasis on continuity. It is more singularized and more tightly inte-
grated. There is less "recurrence of states 11 in historical description. 
History deals with those factors which never repeat themselves. Hence, 
historians have a better chance of explaining ~ than sociology. The 
discipline of history has wrongly waited for sociology to provide the 
ultimate explanation. Sociology must depend on history for necessary 
help. '~or it is from the total concrete situation and its strictly 
singular, rigorously non-recurring causality ••• that one can arrive 
at certain explanations which are more in keeping with the human con-
dition.'~ The relationship between history and sociology has been dis-
cussed previously. It is enough to say that a paradox exists which can 
only be overcome by a cooperation between the two disciplines. History 
through its method which places emphasis on continuity and singularity 
studies a reality which includes tendencies towards discontinuity and 
pluralism. Sociology emphasizes the discontinuous and follows a typo-
logical approach as social reality tends more towards continuity and 
unity. In essence the two approaches complement each other. Each must 
rely on the work of the other. Conflict is unrealistic. Both study 
the total social phenomena. Answers to the questions of why and whither 
depend on their close collaboration. Gordon Allport's work on prejudice 
contains an approach to that problem which is very similar to that which 
1Ibid., P· 245. 
Gurvitch is proposing here.1 
4. An Example of Empirical Research 
The foregoing discussion of Gurvitch's dialectical method and his 
follow-up rules for explanation in sociology serve as a backdrop for the 
following analysis of certain empirical trends which have developed from 
Gurvitch's theory. 
Only in the last few years have concrete studies been made to test 
Gurvitch's ideas. These studies carried out b,y the National Research 
Center of France, and under Professor Gurvitch's personal direction, 
exhibit a certain technical know-how and familiarity with the inherent 
problems of empirical research in the social sciences. 
Previously Gurvitch advocated certai n methods of sociometry, but 
only with his characteristic reservations and additions. 2 Since the 
weight of this dissertation rests on the macrosociological frameworks, 
a project dealing with a group's knowledge of the other was chosen. 
Parenthetically Gurvitch places great emphasis on the use of role-
playing, psycho- and socio-drama. He has suggested using the theater 
as a valid means to study the microsociological elements or social 
bonds. 'There is a striking affinity between real social life and the 
theater. "3 
~he Nature of Prejudice (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books , 
19$8), PP• 201-212. 
2sociometry, XV, 1949, "Sociometry in France and the United 
States "• Gurvitch edited this volume and wrote the initial article. 
Jbr. La vocation •• • , I, 272. 
categories in his "Sociometric Study 
XVI, 1950, PP• 48 ff. 
P. -H. Maucorps used Gurvi tch 1 s 
in the French Army, " Sociometry, 
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In his introductory remarks to tne ational Research Center 
project, Gurvitch asserts the approach to the knowledge of others has 
l 
changed in this century. The rejection of Neo-Kantianism and the rise 
of phenomenology suggest the outlines of the change. Max Scheler is 
especially important for Gurvitch. In The Nature of Sympathy, Scheler 
states the problem: "The difficulties • • • are mostly self-engendered, 
owing to the assumption that each of us is 'primarily' aware only of 
his self and its experiences, images, etc., are related to other indi-
viduals.n2 Scheler rejects such a starting place for the knowledge of 
others. Inference, analogy and empathy are equally invalid. We cannot 
know other minds this way. 
The problem as stated in these arguments is a pseudo-problem. 
It is generated by a false, prejudicial reading of reality. 
For it proceeds on the assumption that we first know only our 
own selves and must grope our way to the knowledge of others 
with the help of some artificial theory.3 
The important thing is such a knowledge of the other is prior to 
knowledge of one's self. We are in direct contact with other minds from 
childhood on. They are part of our immediate experience. We don't 
infer other selves from our own self. We are fully inunersed in a conunun-
ity of minds from the outset . The conscience or mind is not closed in 
on itself. It is open to others . The mind directly and immediately 
1Jean Cazeneuve, Paul-H. Maucorps and Albert Henuni, ''Enquete 
sociologique sur la connaissance d 1 autrui ", CIS, XXIX (Juillet-Decembre, 
1960), pp. 137-156. 
~ranslated by Peter Heath (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1954), p. 238. 
J.Max Scheler, Man 1 s Place in Nature, translated by Hans Heyer hoff 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), p. xviii. 
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experiences others. Scheler's realism becomes apparent. There is a 
specificity to the knowledge of others . Gurvitch is basically in 
agreement with this psychology, but he parts company with Scheler on 
two issues . First, he feels Scheler identified the intuitive with 
knowledge; second, Scheler conceived the "openness" of the mind in tenns 
too narrow, relying solely on sympathy and love. Experiences of the 
other are much broader and more complex. For example, the other ap-
pears in social reality as father, brother, stranger, companion or 
rival . The intuitive is a direct apprehension of the other. "Knowledge 
on the other hand entails reflection and the elaboration or systematic 
images of the other based on judgments which pretend to be true. rrl 
Gurvitch thus sees this in a dialectical manner. Direct apprehension 
and knowledge are two different ways of knowing the other . They are 
both relevant and present. There is a constant movement back and forth 
between the two experiences . The processes of complementarity, mutual 
implication and polarization are at play. Such dialectics also apply 
when analyzing the variations among transcendance and immanence, homo-
geneity and heterogeneity, among the self, other, and the We . The de-
gree of their integration in particular groups, social classes and 
global societies also requires the dialectic. 2 These global societies 
are limiting factors to the rise of spontaneous images of the other 
within the more restrained groups active in their midst. 
The knowledge of others lends itself particularly to empirical 
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research because there is an especially close correlation between this 
knowledge and the specific reality in which it resides. Hence, particu-
lar groups possessing a structure are better suited for these initial 
studies. First, from a technical standpoint all the participants of a 
group can be interrogated . This eliminates the guess-work so patent in 
superficial sample polling procedures. Second, each group is a member 
of the same global society and is strongly influenced by it. Third, 
these groups include microcosms of sociability which in turn are part 
of real groups; they are likewise part of larger entities. 
The basic results of this study are simple: considerable vari-
ations are observable in the ways in which the other is experienced. 
The central hypothesis is validated, that a positive correlation exists 
between the forms of knowledge and their social frameworks . 
i . The Mechanics of the Study. The central aim is to test two ways of 
apprehending or perceiving the other: qy intuition and by knowledge. 
An interview was devised and tested in the Lycee Louis-le-Grand . Re-
finements of the interview ensued from findings there. 
Next eight groups were chosen. They can be broken down into four 
categories . These are: a) intellectual - two groups , a philosophy 
class in the ~cee Turgot and a company of actors from the Theatre 
d 1aujourd 1hui; b) industr ial - four groups, one on the assembly line 
at the Renault plant in Par is, one semi- assembly line group at the same 
plant , one group working in a f oundry (Acieries Legenisel-Blanchard) 
and a group of research engineers, chemists and their assistants at the 
Centre de Recherche Pechiney; c) administrative - one group of adminis-
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trators involved in the direction of a technical school; and d) rural -
a small village, Seine-et~Iarne. 
These eight groups were subject to depth interviews by the re-
search team. Each member of each group was interviewed. Definite 
directions were given to the interviewers, thereqy reducing the sub-
jective factors to a minimum.• However, a certain spontaneity was 
encouraged, enabling the interviewer to assess the individual personality 
factors . The questionnaire was not conceived as a rigid instrument but 
a framework for guiding the interviews . 
Four themes were spelled out in the study: 
I. The first one sought to measure the direct intuition of the 
person. Among the questions explored with the interviewees were, What 
was striking about the other persons? and What were they like at first 
glance? 
II . The second theme aimed at discovering the role of ideal 
images or stereotypes of the other . This explored the importance given 
to social prestige, situation in the group, conversations with fellow 
members and common work . The key question was this one: Upon re-
flecting further, what permits you to arrive at a more precise image 
of the other? 
III. The third theme oriented the interview in such a direction 
as to determine how the knowledge one has of the other person changes. 
Furthermore, how important are the mutual estimations of each other? 
IV. The fourth theme dealt with communication and knowledge. 
How important were verbal communication, gestures and the circumstances 
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in which communication is attempted? How easily and rapidly was the 
knowledge of others consummated? 
The guiding questions for these interviews are included at the end 
of this section. The first part of the stuqy is a quantitative assess-
ment of the findings . The second section is a qualitative analysis of 
the data . They are separated for scientific purposes, but it is es-
sential to realize they are interrelated.l 
ii. Conclusions Drawn from This Inquiry. 
a) The factors which affect the way the other is perceived var.y 
according to the type of grouping involved. This became especially 
apparent with the first theme . The intellectuals and the industrial 
groupings were particularly different . The rural group was a case 
totally apart . (See the graphs at the end of this chapter.) The type 
of grouping, though less apparent in the other themes, still was a 
decisive factor. The resemblance and dissirnilarit,y factors were dif-
ferent according to the specific groups . 
b) A general consensus grew out of this study concerning the 
importance of both verbal and non-verbal communication. The slow intro-
duction of change in the image of the other was preferred over brutally 
rapid social change . There is little doubt the global societies exert 
the strongest influence . 
c ) The stuqy showed con~lusively how impossible it is to validate 
too general theories . The variations are apparent even among groups of 
lrhese conclusions are of necessity quantitative alone . The 
promised qualitative assessment has not as yet been published in the 
Cahiers internationaux de sociologie . 
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the same global society. 
d) Final~, each category shows a marked character. The intel-
lectuals: placed a greater emphasis on physical appearance and social 
attitudes. Less importance was attached to overt behaviour. They 
defined their image of the other by noting how he differed from them. 
They placed only a relative importance on the circumstances of life in 
the group; they had less difficulty with abrupt changes, but were never 
quite certain about knowing tne other well . 
The industrial participants: placed greatest value on the be-
haviour of the other and very little on his physical appearance; they 
showed ambivalence concerning the role of similarity and dissimilarity 
in the estimation of others . The same holds for the slow or rapid 
change in the image of the other . They placed greater confidence in 
their own judgments of others t han the estimations these others had of 
them. 
Administrative participants: were sensitive to the behaviour of 
the other . Physical appearance was of little importance; however, 
social attitudes carried considerable weight. Specific aspects of their 
group life were important; they rarely modified their notions of the 
other once these had been clearly defined . They, too, placed more 
confidence in their own estimations of others than vice-versa . Conver-
sations and communication based on gestures were important in building 
the image and knowledge of others . 
Rural groups: direct apprebtension barely discernible; their 
knowledge was based mostly on similarity or an analogy with themselves 
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and corresponded closely with the stereotype dictated by the global 
society. Only the women did not fear being known for what they really 
are. Less emphasis placed on verbal conversations; consist nt be-
haviour wfut~ the global society's expectation of basic importance. 
In conclusion, parallels can be drawn between industrial and 
administrative groupings. IntellHctuals and rural participants were 
diametrically opposed. However, -~he main hypothesis holds. Each 
specific group manifests its own lffiY of apprehending and knowing the 
other. 1 
The approach which this rese1arch team took in studying the 
knowledge of others would be a useful method for sociologists and social 
psychologists studying such problems as race relations and the impact of 
technical change on cultural patterns. One of the basic dilemmas of our 
time is the lack of adequate knowledge of the other person. Such re-
search would enable modern n~ to ferret out some of the individual and 
collective bases for hatreds, conflicts and irrational behaviour. 
1Ibid., pp. 152-153. Cf. CTI> XXXII (January-Jun~, 1962), 135-176, 
for an eXcellent bibliography ontiie sociology of knowledge. This was 
compiled by the research team at the Centre National. Other recent 
research projects using Gurvitch's categories include: P.-H. Maucorps 
and Rene Bussoul, 11Jeux de miroirs et sociologie de la connaissance 
d'autrui 11 , CIS, XXXII (January-Juno, 1962), 43-60; Honique Vincenne, 
11La ville et les paysans ", in Ibid .. , pp. 125-134; Georges Kavadias, 
"L I etude de la circulation des homnies et des biens' point de depart 
d 1une enquete de sociologie rurale", CIS, XXX (January-June, 1961), 
167-174. -
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iii. The Questionnaire 
Theme I: What strikes you about your work partner? 
a) His physical appearance 
b) His facial expressions 
c ) What he says 
d) What he does 
e) His attitudes towards you 
f) His attitude towards other fellow workers 
g) His spirit of cooperation within the group 
h) His spirit of cooperation within your particular work team 
i) His attitude towards his superiors 
j) His attitude towards his subordinates 
Theme II: On reflecting further, what permits you to reach a 
more precise image of the other? Was it--
a) His resemblance or difference in terms of yourself? 
b) Because he had to be or did not have to be your work partner? 
c) The degree of his influence in your group? 
d) The conversations that y1:>u had with him? 
e) The work in cormnon which you did with him? 
Theme III: When you believ~~ you possess a precise image of t he 
other, how is this knowledge modified? 
a) Does it change slowly or rapidly? 
b) Under the influence of what circumstances? 
c) Do you believe you are often wrong in your impression of others? 
d) Do you consider your comrades are often wrong about their 
estimations of you? 
e) Which is most frequent: that the other is wrong about you, 
or that you are wrong about them? 
Theme IV: Communication and Knowledge 
a) Do you enter rather easily or with difficulty i nto congenial 
relationships with your fellow workers? 
b) Rapidly or slowly? 
c) Does the exchange of words always help you know your fellow 
workers better? 
d) If no, give example(s) of the case where verbal communication 
did not aid in this knowledge, or even undermined it. 
e) If yes, gi ve example(s) of conversations or discussions with 
your fellow workers which helped you to know them better. 
f) Classify in a hierarchy the subjects of the conversations and 
discussions which were most revealing for this knowledge. 
g) Does non-verbal communication with your fellow workers permit 
you to know t hem better? 
h) If yes, what forms? 
i) Under what circumstances?1 
libid., pp . 153-154. 
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FIGURE ONE 
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The Interaction of the Options (Yes and No) and Certain Elements in Ap~ 
Erehending the Other 
Legend: The figure at the left represents the percentage of positive re-
sponses (concerning the relative importance of the factors dealing with 
the knowledge of the other) and is marked by the numbers on the vertical 
line; the figure on the right represents the percentage of negative re-
sponses . 
The numbers under the horizontal line represent the three factors 
considered: (1 = physical, 2 = behaviour, 3 = social attitudes). 
The intellectuals (I) are represented by dashes ( ) . 
The workers (W) by a plus sign ( + + +) . - -- --
The rural (R) by dots and dashes ( • ) . 
For example the rural curve has a maiim-ui positive response towards 
behaviour of 35% . The same holds for the workers; but their percentages 
for positive responses in favor of behaviour are considerably greater 
(75% in terms of the behaviour of the other) . l 
1 . Ib~d ., P• 1.42 . 
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The Interaction of the Options "Resemblance-Difference" and the Types of 
Collectivities 
Legend: The horizontal line carries the four types of collectivities . 
The vertical line represents the percentages of responses . 
Very clearly this shows the greatest difference between the two 
curves is in relation to the responses of the rural group (R) . Con-
siderable importance is given to resemblance and little to the differ-
ences between them and the other or neighbor . At the left of the 
table the two curves are noticeably separated. Such is the case of the 
intellectuals (I) . In the center, the opposite holds for the factory 
groups ( ) and the administ ration ( ) . he curve of responses in favor 
of resembl&nce and the curve of responses insisting on differences are 
at just about the same level.l 
1Ibid. , P• 144. 
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FIGU THREE 
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The Interaction of Options and Types of Collectivities 
Legend: Below the horizontal line, t e options "yes" and 1'no 1 are 
given; the vertical line gives the percentages of responses . Dashes ; 
intellectuals ; straight line = administration; pluses = workers . 
The "yes" and "no" here correspond to Theme II .. The difference 
between the positive responses and the negative ones is less prominent 
on the intellectual curve than the others . 
The rural group was not considered in this question.1 
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FIGURE FOUR 
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The Interaction of Options and Certain Factors in the Knowledge of Others 
Legend: Conversations (d) straight l i ne; work in common (e) dashes; 
role in group (c) dashes and dots; ideal companion (b) pluses. Below 
the horizontal line , the responses "yes" and "no"; the vertical shows 
the four factors in knofdng the other envisioned in Theme II (the 
factor ttresemblance-difference" has been envisioned in part) . 
The percentages of responses are important for each collectivity. 
Clearly the curve of response dealing with the importance of 
conversations (d) denotes the madimum approbations (91%) and the minimum 
of negative responses (7%) while the ideal companion reveals on the 1 contrary the minimum of "yes" (47%) and the maximum of "no's t (30%) . 
1Ibid., p . 146. 
Rapi d];z 
I = 30% 
w ;: 30% 
A "' 40% 
R = 24% 
TABLE FOR THEME I II 
Slowll 
I = 33% 
w = 49% 
A 57% 
R = 42% 
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FIGURE FIV 
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d. s . d. a. .s. . a . 
Rarely Often 
The Interaction of Options (Rarely-often) , Propositions (Fear of being 
wrong concerning his own judgments of the other; fear of error concerning 
the judgments of the other of himself) , and the Types of Collectivities 
Represented Here as in Figures One and Three. 
Legend: Below the horizontal line the propositions: d. s. (fear of 
error in terms of himself, formulated in this question, 1~o you believe 
you are rarely wrong or often in error in your knowledge of the other?") 
and d.a . (fear of being wrong in the judgment of the other formulated 
in the question: '~o you consider that the others are rarely or often 
mistaken in their judgment of you?"); the vertical line gives the 
percentages of responses . 
To illustrate the curve of administrators (A = straight line) 
reveals a great confidence in their own judgments of the other and a 
considerabl~ fear of error concerning the estimations of others of 
themselves . 
libid., p. 148. 
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FIGURE SIX 
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Conversations and Knowled e of the ther. The Interaction of the 0 tion 
and the Types of Collectivities. 
Legend: Below the horizontal line, the type of collectivity is 
represented; the vertical line give the percentages of responses. 
The "Yes" curve is sho'Wl1 as a straight line, that of "no" as 
dashes . The question posed was that of the importance of conver-
sations in the knowledge of the other. minimum separation exists 
between the two curves when considering the rural group, while the 
distinction is uniformly ~uite sharp for the other three types of 
collectivities.l 
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FIGURE SEVEN 
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Communication without Words 
Legend; Below the horizontal the different types of groups; the 
vertical represents the percentages of responses (positive = yes; 
negative = no) to the question: "Does all types of communication 
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without words among fellow workers permit them to know each other better? 11 
The maximum separation between Yes and No clearly is evident at 
the administrative level, while as to the rural group the two curves are joined. l 
1 . Ib1d., p. 151. 
CHAPrER VIII 
A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF GURVITCH 1S SOCIOLOGY 
OF THE TOTAL SOCIAL PHENOMENA 
The descriptive task of this dissertation has ended. This study 
has sought to present an honest and candid interpretation of Gurvitch's 
theoretical position as it relates to general sociology. Every effort 
has been made to get ''within tt the thought of this scholar in order that 
what he has to say may came through with a certain amount of clarity 
and precision . The burden of this chapter is to deal critically with 
the sociological position of Gurvitch. The discussion follows some-
what generally the outline of the descriptive narrative. 
1. Natural Law 
Gurvitch contends that natural law is impossible . It is inopera-
tive to his way of thinking since it does not apply in a positive sense 
to reality. It lacks specificity and concreteness. If universality is 
desired, if the existence of a law to which all mankind can turn is the 
goal, then such a law must be discovered within the social milieu of 
mankind as a whole. This relativistic position, however, hides a funda-
mental natural law theory. 
Gurvitch asserts a natural law theory in two different ways: first, 
he maintains that justice is a way of settling the attributive-imperative 
dichotomy of human society. Each individual has certain rights within 
society but also certain obligations. Whenever such an assertion is 
,386 
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made , natural law is present. There is a certain inevitability to the 
whole notion of natural law. It is a part of the human condition. If 
man makes decisions based on values then he is within the scope of 
natural law. He has a set of priorities operating for him and they are 
in part reflective of his society, in part reflective of mankind in 
general. The differences occur in making the general applicable to the 
particular but this does not deny the general. Man requires this. 
wben he denies such a natural law he leaves himself open to chaos and 
disintegration. 
In sum, to assert the attributive-imperative is to arrive at a 
natural law level of thinking . One cannot declare there are certain 
rights and then in the next breath deny natural law. wbenever rights 
are affirmed , natural law exists . 
A judgment about the good for man cannot be both rendered 
and not rendered at the same time . If it is rendered, and 
supposed to be within the competence of reason, reference 
is somehow made to the nature of man, whatever account may 
be given of how this is known . Entailed in any serious 
utterance about the rights of man (unless of course one 
wishes to base the rights and the dignity of man on reve-
lation) is some conception of human nature, and so of the 
natural law. Nothing hinders such judgment being uttered 
in medias res in a personal moral dilemma or in judicial 
decision. ! 
Gurvitch illustrates this with particular clarity in his own life. 
What he has said about social law undergirds his estimates of man's 
nature and his firm conviction in seeing to it that justice is esta-
blished "in the gate 11 • His stand on the irresponsible action of the 
1Paul Ramsey, Nine Modern Moralists (Englewood Cliffs, New Jerse.y: 
Prentice Hall , 1962), p. 214. 
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action of the OAS in France during the Algerian crisis is indicative 
of his conviction. Whenever one is involved in asserting this is wrong 
and proclaims that injustice is loose in the streets, he is saying 
something about general principles, a natural law. 
Second , not only does he provide for natural law by virtue of his 
discussion of rights , but his social law theory fails to escape his own 
criticism. Though he constantly reiterates that social law is no more 
important than contractual or individual law one has the distinct im-
pression, after having read the various volumes which he wrote on the 
subject that underneath he favors social law. There is little doubt he 
sees it as the basis for all law. Isn't this a real assertion of natural 
law, since social law as the underlying source, becomes the general 
principle upon which all decisions of fact are made, depending of course 
upon the particular situation? Gurvitch 1s admission of rights and his 
obvious preference for social law are mutually complementary . This fits 
the individual- collective reciprocity of perspectives. This agrees with 
Buber's thesis in Between Man and Man: individualism and collectivism, 
if either is overemphasized, can vitiate community. Individualism 
understands only a part of man and collectivism understands man only as 
a part. 1 Buber goes on to see organic community comprising communities 
which are smaller and smaller but all encompassed in the wider circle 
of the global community. This is very similar to Gurvitch's idea of 
the circles of influence and control moving from the microsocial to the 
macrosocial. This recalls Eero Saarinen's memorable statement: "Always 
design a thing by considering it in its next larger context--a chair in 
4Martin Buber, Between Man and Man (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1955), 
P• 200. 
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a room in a house, a house in an environment, environment in a city 
plan". 2 In Gurvitch's terms a given social law promulgated by a parti-
cular social grouping has validity only if it is considered within the 
context of the next larger grouping. Hence, the particular social 
grouping is included within the social class , which in turn is incor-
porated with the given global society which has its existence because 
of international society whose validity undergirds the normative fact 
of the society. 
2. The Total Social Phenomena 
Gurvitch states the proper domain of sociology is social reality. 
Social reality is the total social phenomena . Such phenomena must be 
studied vertically and horizontally . Basically of what value is this 
vertical view, or depth sociology? On first glance one is easily capti-
vated by Gurvitch's facile transfer of Freud's notion in psychology to 
the study of sociology. A second and third glance reveal certain per-
sistent questions . 
Though one longs to make a study "in depth" of social reality, ~ 
there any reason to see this reality in terms of layers or levels? Are 
they arranged in discernible strata similar to geological formations? 
Gurvitch lists ten levels starting with the ecological and moving down-
ward through organizations, collective behaviours, signs, attitudes , 
symbols arriving lastly at the collective mind . The criterion for depth 
is accessibility. Certain factors seem readily apparent: first, 
2Time, July 2, 1956, p. 51. 
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Gurvitch is still attached to Bergson's inversion o~ Husserl 1s phenomeno-
logical reduction . Why else would he view such social phenomena as roles 
and symbols in terms of depth levels? They obviously deal primarily 
with the horizontal relationships of persons and groups . Moreover in 
terms of accessibility they are just as observable as the morphological 
data , sometimes more so . To arrange various concepts, hammered out over 
decades of sociological exploration, in depth levels fails to help either 
in analysis or explanation. For one thing it is hard to discover how 
they are separated. What are the criteria for moving from one level to 
the next? Though they are interdependent and interactive with the hori-
zontal as Gurvitch asserts, doesn't he make the very mistake he accuses 
many American sociologists of committing when they separate culture and 
society? He has confused the study of social reality by separating these 
phenomena into vertical and horizontal arrangements. To make a study in 
depth does not require arranging the data in depth levels . 
One gets the impression that Gurvitch looks upon depth sociology as 
an intriguing idea which ought to work. It ~ fascinating. But he 
pushes it too far. As a symbol it has limited usefulness. He has 
struggled to fit the data into such an organizing notion and ironically, 
this has lead to an error against which he has forcefully spoken. For, 
despite all his arguments against mummification and rigidity, it 
appears he has tried to press many aspects of social reality into such 
hierarchical arrangements resulting in a distortion of that very same 
social reality. The symbols in which a group participates are the very 
means by which that group finds cohesion and union. Such a function is 
horizontal in nature. Why should symbols occupy the seventh or ninth 
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position on a vertical ladder of social phenomena? When the search is 
for clarity in sociological theoiJ~, the vertical view seems to lead to 
confusions and unnecessary complexity. For instance, such an example 
is the manner in which this approach gets in the way of a clear under-
standing of social stratification, an important area of study in the 
whole discipline of sociology. 
Gurvi tch 1 s original idea was good, to provide for ··the study of both 
the superstructure and the infrastructure . His first concern was to look 
at the organized, the more rigid, the more obvious manifestations of 
social life in relationship to the spontaneous, the dynamic and vola-
tile aspects which are at play beneath the surface. Certain~ this is 
a legitimate view. His early work in social law points to this simple 
division between the organized and the spontaneous. However, there 
seems to be little reason to view social reality in ten depth levels as 
long as one notes conflict and tension which produce change, sometimes 
violent , always persistent. This only confuses and certainly makes the 
possibility of empirical research much smaller . 
Change comes about because of tensions and conflicts resulting 
from relationships among individuals and groups . Relationships are 
horizontal . To get at them in depth is to apply the tool of social 
science with incisiveness and perspicacity. This does not warrant 
arranging them in complicated and hazy hierarchies which themselves are 
changing and dynamic . Concentration on relationships themselv-es would 
seem to be the far more useful approach . 
Gurvitch makes things even more difficult by insisting there are 
vertical levels to the horizontal frameworks . ·.rhis only adds to the 
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complexity of his thought. Understanding what he is attempting to say 
is even more arduous. Again, the simpler thing would be to stick with 
the basic category of relationship and note the organized and spontaneous 
characteristics of this primary social fact . To mix the metaphors is 
both confusing and contradictory. Gurvitch constantly calls for preci~ 
sion in language but here he is deliberately toying with the words in 
such a way that the reader is hard pressed to know what he is suggesting. 
This critical analysis of the vertical view must take into con-
sideration Gurvitch's whole notion of the collective mind . Gurvitch 
declares that the social mind is essential if a group's reality is to be 
affirmed . He has followed Durkheim in this contention but he claims to 
have left Durkheim when the latter made the collective mind something 
apart from the individual minds which compose it. He argued that 
Durkheim fell into this error because of his basic psychology. He was a 
captive of a theory which saw the individual mind as closed. He started 
with the postulate of isolated minds meaning that the existence of 
other minds is explained by inference, by analogy . Hence, he was 
forced to see the birth of the social mind in the common grasping of 
certain symbols, through the means of communication. Such symbols 
produced the social mind. Now Gurvitch maintains that he has escaped 
this pitfall which not only creates a mind wholly other of the indi-
vidual minds, but leads to an a priori reason . His answer lies in the 
dialectical tension of the "reciprocity of perspectives 11 • The indi-
vidual and collective consciences presuppose each ether and are immanent 
in each other. This is all well and good but Gurvitch asserts this 
collective mind is the most profound depth level. All values and ideas 
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and symbols are created by it and held by it. He contends that the 
creation of the collective mind is the result of an immediate awareness 
on the part of the individual consciences, an intuition, a fundamental 
experience . 
However , in taking this position, Gurvitch falls into the same 
error. To argue the existence of the collective mind, sui generis, to 
view it as the primordial fact, is to take a position of faith much in 
the same way Durkheim was accused of doing. If the individual minds are 
"intending" something besides each other then exactly what is it? 
Either they find their existence in a common purpose, common interest, 
common situation all of which mean ideais, values, symbols, hopes and 
the rest , or one is forced to take a leap of faith and affirm this 
groupd mind exists per se . As Husserl argues the conscience cannot 
intend nothing; thEre has to be something even if it is a fiction. In 
a sense the collective mind as Gurvitch sees it is a fiction . More-
over, if the collective mind is given its existence by such an exten-
sion of faith, then it is something apart, separate from the individual 
consciences . It indeed is transcendant and the immanence which Gurvitch 
claims is there , no longer holds. 
If one is to accept the notion of the realism of groups, he sees 
the creation and development of the group as a result of a common 
interest or tie. Such an interest involves these so-called levels of 
roles, ideas, symbols, signs, attitudes and behaviours. Awareness of 
these social "facts" is a matter of degree, hence, the variability of 
this group consciousness . 
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Moreover , is the intuitive grasping of such a mutual existence 
scientifically useful? This word is filled with many difficulties . 
Usually it carries with it the connotation of infallibility and funda-
mentalism. This is certainly the case with Bergson, Husserl and 
Scheler. 1 Since Gurvitch asserts the social mind is fundamental and 
essential for the study of social reality, or for the existence of 
groups, and since this social mind is based upon intuition, he has 
denied the possibility of sociology becoming a science. It cannot be 
constructed on an empirical foundation. Intuition requires there be 
given that which is beyond question , beyond logical analysis, and cer-
tain beyond empirical appraisal. Certainly Gurvitch views the collec-
tive mind as the ontologically prior essence. Hence, this takes the 
group; mind outside the realm of rational or observational validation. 
All along Gurvitch contends it is essential to have theory lead to 
empirical research but merely s~ying it is insufficient. 'fhis 
intuited social or collective mind, the fundamental source of social 
reality which is the proper domain of sociology as Gurvitch views it, 
cannot be tested in any scientific way. 
Gurvitch obviously realizes the difficulties in claiming the 
priority of the collective mind reached by phenomenological reduction 
or inversion, when repeatedly he denies tha~ it does not take priority 
over the other depth levels . On the other hand he clearly points out 
how each level is permeated b,y the collective mind. The confusion be-
tween the horizontal and vertical becomes apparent here . 
4Mario Bunge, Intuition and Science (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962) , pp. 9-28 . 
If the ten depth levels rest upon the collective mind, and if it 
must be accepted as ontologically prior, then how can the whole 
theoretical scheme of the vertical view be subjected to empirical in-
vestigation? In a sense it would follow that each level is intuited, 
is sensed or grasped by the so-called dialectical approach, especially 
as one descends fUrther into the recesses of social reality. The 
methods of statistical investigation now utilized are inadequate, con-
tends Gurvitch, for these more profound levels. Dare one reach the 
conclusion that the spontaneous levels are not subject to objective 
investigation, but only to the processes of the dialectical method? If 
his theory is beyond verification then it holds very little value for 
current sociology. 
The irony of this vertical view is that Gurvitch uses it as his 
criterion for judging other sociologists . He finds so often they fail 
because they leave out this or that or these depth levels. If the 
sociologist doesn't view social reality vertically and with just as 
many levels as Gurvitch does, he fails in his attempts to understand 
the true nature of the total social phenomenca .. For Gurvitch, it must 
be remembered, the true nature is basically intuited and hence, outside 
the purview of science as conceived in this modern day. From previous 
discussions it may be recalled that Mauss, Durkheim, Cooley, Ward, 
Giddings, Parsons, Merton and innumerable others fail the test of depth 
levels . Gurvitch has in each case created a straw man according to 
his own measurements and then proceeded to cut him down. 
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The concept of the total social phenomena, indeed an important 
sociological insight on the part of Marcel Mauss, can be investigated 
empiricially, in fact grew out of empirical observation concerning the 
practice of potlatch. It is a much more useful notion than the need- ' 
lessly complicated and involved schema which Gurvitch presents. There 
is an intolerable weightiness and complexity to Gurvitch's notion. It 
was Newton who observed that in nature the true is simple. Gurvitch has 
quotea Bachelard as saying science must now dialectize the simple. His 
method will be analyzed in a later section. The point is, the sheer 
complexity of Gurvitch's vertical view frustrates real empirical work . 
Complexity for the sake of complexity only vitiates scholarship. 
Gurvitch presented three rules for approaching these ten depth 
levels . In sum,they are the following: a) to say one level is more 
profound·than another is to make a value judgment; b) these ten phenomena 
are linked indissolubly together and must be seen as a whole; c) finally, 
the number of depth levels is not fixed. Gurvitch states that the 
vertical view is not an a priori conception but an operational tool. He 
cites these three rules to clarify what he means. Unfortunately, these 
three rules lend very little assistance to empirical investigation. To 
deny value judgments is not to escape the criticism. Already Gurvitch 
fails in terms of his collective mind theory. Though the number of 
levels is not fixed, it would appear Gurvitch is the only one who knows 
which ones should be added and the collective mind is a fundamental 
prerequisite beyond any scientific doubt . As noted, anyone who has 
failed to grasp the essences Professo1· Gurvitch has come to describe 
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fails the test. It is well to ask just why Gurvitch decided to add the 
levels of roles and patterns? The reasons given in the descriptive 
section were far from conclusive. There is little evidence that empi-
rical studies turned up these levels. Furthermore Gurvitch does not 
explain why he decided to add these to his original list of seven. Was 
it by intuition? Those critics who have called him formalistic and 
eclectic perhaps have a right to make this observation. He seems to 
have bowed to what was in vogue at the particular moment, significantly 
influenced by the situation in which he found himself. Apparently when 
he was in the United States, the work of certain cultural anthropologists 
and sociologists dealing with the notions of roles and patterns had an 
important impact. Empirically speaking these two levels are the most 
susceptible to criticism since they are basically concerned with rela-
tionships placing them more on the horizontal scale. 
Concluding this critical estimation of the vertical view one must 
reject this schema as useful approach to the study of society. It is 
needlessly complicated, theoretically unmanageable, logically faulty, 
and empirically unverifiable. 
The horizontal view also has certain difficulties. This analysis 
will focus on the macrosociological frameworks since this has been the 
main emphasis of the dissertation. 
Gurvitch's definition of a group is somewhat similar to current 
conceptions. He sees groups as real unities based on collective atti-
, tudes and focused on co~non tasks. However, this definition appears to 
be in contradiction with his notion of the collective mind for reasons 
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already indicated. In short, the very realism of the group depends upon 
an intuited fusion of the members. Interestingly, this definition 
emphasizes two separate levels of social reality, attitudes and collec-
tive behaviour. Why? Aren't symbols, values, ideas, roles, and patterns 
as important? Seemingly, Gurvitch has chosen certain levels arbitrarily 
to fit his definition, while elsewhere he maintains that the vertical 
cuts across the horizontal frameworks at every level. Gurvitch's in-
sistence on the levels has complicated the approach so much that his 
definitions fail to encompass all they should if he is to be consistent 
with his theoretical schema . 
Gurvitch makes a distinction between the passive and active We, 
the We being the collective mind. He utilizes this distinction to sug-
gest that the publics, aggregates of all kinds, crowds, consumers, age 
groupings can and do constitute real groups. Yet don't many of these 
groups exist without the members sensing a '~a-feeling," a participation 
in a group mind? Gurvitch tries to account for the obvious differences 
in group consciousness by making the distinction between mental acts and 
mental states . These become concepts by which symbols and other areas 
of knowledge can be rescued from the vagaries of intuition. He s ays 
symbols are necessary for the partially open minds. This seems to be a 
device, a philosophical device to deal with a reality which otherwise 
would prove contradictory to his theoretical position. 
Gurvitch constructs an intricate typology of groupings listing 
fifteen criteria for describing groups. Certain questions immediately 
come to mind. Why is it necessary to utilize a formal list of criteria 
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for classification? Such a typology seems to ~e of little value for the 
furtherance of empirical research as such. Yet Gurvitch at the outset 
of his discussions on social groups states the reason for such a typology 
is to aid in empirical study. Given the definition would it not be of 
greater value to observe groups in action and from their particularity 
and specificity describe what they are? Perhaps there are broad cate-
gories for classification which have come directly from the group study 1 
e. g., family or kinship groups, friendship groups, locality groups, but 
there is little heuristic value in imposing a list of traits upon various 
groups . Such an approach oft~imes colors the work of the researcher . He 
looks for these traits when an open, objective approach would be more 
scientifically accurate. This taxonomy is impressive but it suffers from 
all attempts to codify or categorize too neatly. It leads to endless 
interpretations and additions , in short, casuistry. Broad general types 
have the merit of providing frameworks without forcing the data into 
cramped quarters. It is paradoxical that Gurvitch for the second time 
suffers from the very criticism which he has sought to avoid . He is 
interested in providing the dynamic and spontaneous and yet he has turned 
to an almost endless typology in order to contain, rigidifY and mold. 
Is this a necessary outcome of a radical emphasis upon the spontaneous 
and dynamic factors of social reality? This will be examined later. 
What is the purpose of a typology? Gurvitch has said it takes a 
position half-way between the generalizing approach of the physical 
sciences (postulation of laws) and the sihgularizing approach of history 
(idiographic) . This means Gurvitch is very close to Max Weber's 
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ideal type or Howard Becker's constructive typology. 1 However, in terms 
of practice, the three theorists are dissimilar . Gurvitch fails to live 
up to his definition once again. Here those who have called him a 
formalist have a right to do so. Gurvitch has spun a set of criteria for 
his typology which has come in part from history but mostly from mere 
speculation without the benefit of empirical observation. Weber at least 
based his studies on careful historical analysis. Gurvitch shows some 
reliance on historical sources but he ranges far and wide and his studies 
lack the specificity required for adequate verification. Only when he 
gets to the study of global societies does he construct a typology which 
illustrates some evidence of empirical work. This is no doubt the most 
valuable part of his macrosociology. More will be said about this 
later. 
Gurvitch says this typology is useful only if it leads to empi-
rical research. To date there have been studies only in the areas of 
the sociology of morals and knowledge. Just why this typology of groups 
has failed to encourage research is not difficult to answer. In short , 
Gurv~tch 1 s system presents too many problems for getting hold of a 
proper handle to conduct empirical studies. It is too vague, contra-
dictory and involved to provide the framework for more concrete explo-
ration . Add to this a persistent question. Is this in the final 
analysis a theoretical sociology? The growing impression is that 
Gurvitch's whole approach goes beyond the usual task of sociology. This 
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typology of groups for the reasons cited above is too cumbersome, in 
reality a formal set of criteria, too rigid, multi-faceted to lend it-
self to concrete studies. To wade through the underbrush is just too 
great a task. The schema needs to be pruned. And then, there is some 
question as to whether this will solve the basic problem since the 
typology rests upon an intuitive foundation. This becomes patent~ 
clear in the analysis of social classes. 
Gurvitch in keeping with his theoretical position sees social 
classes as real. Their reality comes from the collective consciousness 
or the collective mind. This mind is closely related to esE!it de_ 
· corps or Kohn's "state of mind". The dogmatic assertion that all social 
classes are real results from Gurvitch 1s intuitionist approach to the 
collective mind. If the collective manifests itself in any way, the 
collective mind must be in evidence. But what kind of mind? It is a 
mind which has its existence because of certain intuited feelings, 
senses, or awarenesses~ Karl Marx at least saw the collective con-
scious arise out of a relationships of persons to the means of produc-
tion. This has the merit of being concrete. Gurvitch has based his 
collective mind on a principle which goes beyond empirical verification. 
Mutual participation in certain activities, attitudes, and symbols is 
much more useful. Marx saw the classes arising out of a specific rela-
tionship or function of the different segments of the social order. 
Such a function or relationship depended upon the means of production. 
However, the reality of classes must be questioned as a hard and 
fast generalization. To take a page from Gurvitch's own dialectic, the 
process of complementarity seems particularly useful . Howard Becker 
points to the essential position: 
The pqysicist • • • makes use of working fictions in theo-
ries of atomic process and structure . As someone has put 
it , "On Monday, Wednesday, and Friday we use a corpuscle or 
particle theory" . Both of these theories work for the 
specific purposes for which they were intended; they pro-
cure prediction. l 
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Gurvitch uses this same illustration to describe the dialectical 
process of complementarity. In terms of social class theory it would 
seem that he has taken a dogmatic stand based on the intuitionist 
fallacy which necessitates him rejecting the very process he so ably 
expounded. Complementarity is simply contextualism. In Gurvi tch' s 
words each social class must be studied within the context of its own 
global structure . Now, doesn't he essentially defeat this ~en he 
asserts all social classes are real: If contextualism holds, under 
certain circumstances, within certain global societies, class con-
sciousness and the distinctiveness of the various classes is very 
apparent; they are real. In other global societies this does not hold 
at all . The viewing of caste and class is much more effective from 
the standpoint of "categories , aggregates, simple collections of 
individuals • • • or assemblages of positions, statuses, ranks and 
roles" · 2 
As Raymond Aron maintains, society is ambiguous, hence no single 
definition is sufficient even to specify different groups in a complex 
lrbid. , p . 12.5. 
2rraite • •• , I, 199. 
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society. Usually social classes must be ranked or placed on a con-
tinuum according to whetner they follow certain criteria which lead 
either towards being a real class or away from it. So often too , class 
consciousness is separated from style of life and educational or voca-
tional tendencies . Some men who live and think the same can lack 
totally a consciousness of their unity. This is apparent in the United 
States among the so-called middle classes. 
Aron's most telling point is that Gurvitch espouses a philoso-
phical position when he maintains classes are real totalities resisting 
penetration by the global society and which have a consciousness of 
their being totalities . Gurvitch tries to save the collective rnind by 
his intuitionism whereby all minds are fused with one another to create 
the social mind and each person is imbued with the qualities of the 
collective. This gives the sense of totality. The We may be present , 
but this is no reason to go beyond and say a sense of the whole is 
present . At historical moments this exists with intensity for classes . 
Gurvitch admitted this waned and remained dormant only to be revived 
at certain conjunctures . Still one must ask, does the ~ feeling neces-
sarily imply a sense of totality as far as social classes go? Social 
class theory may be in a muddle but perhaps the functionalists and 
so-called nominalists are on sounder footing when they seek to analyze 
statuses and roles and positions as the best way to get at this whole 
problem of class and caste . Perhaps the best that can be done is to 
analyze from the general notion of class, i.e . , socio-economic similari-
ties , the consciousness of this socio-economic similarity and the will 
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for common action . To have a sense of totality is asking too much. 
This requirement is based on a particular interpretation of the col-
lective mind. 
In sum, Gurvitch's conception of class suffers from his adherence 
to a notion of the collective mind which makes it necessary to see 
classes as real social wholes . Such a position militates once again 
against empirical verification . Since such verification requires 
analysis; this means taking this a priori totality apart. Gurvitch's 
dogmatism rules this out. Even the construction of a continuum between 
realism and norminalism, which might be one way of studying social 
classes and groups and their tendencies or lack of tendency towards 
being real groups , is implicitly denied by Gurvitch. Certainly the more 
valuable approach would be to see these in complementarity. The social 
nominalism and individual realism of the United States' schools of 
sociology and the psychological nominalism and social realism of the 
Europeans could balance each other out in a most fruitful way . 1 
The final link in the horizontal scale has to do with global 
structures . As stated above this is Gurvitch's best typology since it 
has been constructed from empirical evidence, albeit mostly historical 
in nature. In a certain sense when the canvas is as broad as a global 
society (or nation) the more formal categories which serve to delimit 
the exceedingly rich content of the structure, are welcome so long as 
these categories are based on empirical evidence . 
lcf . Kurt H. wolff, ''The Sociology of Knowledge and Sociological 
Theory" in IJ.ewellyn Gross, SrQPosium on Sociological Theory, (Evanston, 
Illinois: Row, Peterson and ompany, 1959), pp. 58o-582. 
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The four types of modern societies do not include emerging nations 
or the so-called underdeveloped countries and the archaic types could 
not include them. Since Prometheanism characterizes historical struc-
tures,emerging nations would by definition be those just coming into 
an awareness of their nationhood. Would new types need to be devised to 
fit these since they seem to escape the present typology? The cen-
tralized collectivist state or the mature capitalist type do not quite 
fit. Using Gurvitch 1s notion of Prometheanism coupled with W. W. 
Rostow 1s five stages of economic growth or Robert Heilbroner's discus-
sion of the states of growth for an underdeveloped country, might shed 
more light on the contemporary history. Gurvitch has failed to deal 
adequately with this phenomenon of the emerging nation. Moreover, the 
growth of regional economic arrangements leading to political ties and 
perhaps federal schemes for governmental cooperation have been by-passed 
in his typology . 
As to those he does include, the final type needs to be thought-
fully considered. Though Gurvitch vigorously denies any preference 
for a global type, it readily becomes apparent he prefers the decen-
tralized collective planned economy. He is a utopian thinker here . He 
left Russia because the decentralized arrangement was abandoned by the 
Bolsheviks. He talks of this type in the future, seeing it as a goal; 
he admits this society has yet to appear in an actual sense. Clearly 
this planned society based on the principles of decentralized, plura-
listic ownership and management is his choice. This smacks a parti-
cular philosophical and political position. This need not be 
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deprecated but it is mentioned only because Gurvitch claims objectivity 
and freedom from such alliances . 
In this last type Gurvitch commits an error which he has made on 
other occasions. Such an error is a result of his political and philo-
sophical preferences. It does not grow out of an analysis of historical 
alternatives . In his typology of global structures he has seemingly 
made a complete circle moving from dogmatic, philosophical preferences 
through a momentary concrete, empirical phase (actual global types, past 
or present), to a particular political and philosophical position. 
~fuat this tenth type lacks is a clearly delineated liaison be-
tween the economic and political segments of the society. Gurvitch 
would separate them into different compartments . It is unrealistic to 
attempt to create or expect to evolve a global structure in which the 
state would be decentralized and its power balanced by the power of a 
separate economic organization . Gurvitch would establish an i mpartial 
body to rule on conflicts between the state and the economic councils. 
The economic and the political are so closely meshed in modern day that 
Napoleon was incorrect in asserting that "politics is our fate" and 
Rathena~ was equally in error a century later when he declar ed, '~cono­
m.ics is our fate". History--above all recent history--dramatizes how 
the links between politics and economics are indissoluble. It is 
strange Gurvitch would make this error in the light of his concept of 
the total social phenomena . In reality he is saying there are tight 
compartments called economics and politics. His own theory counters 
this by saying no single political issue is free from the economic, 
social and cultural ties . They are mutually interactive . Likewise 
every economic issue has many political overtones . 
Such a pluralism which Gurvitch proposes has one other difficulty. 
It fails to deal realistically with planning and with power. How would 
planning on an overall basis be effectively carried out under such a 
diffused schema? How would power be arranged? The federalist principle 
developed by the United States has greater merit in that it has been 
hammered out on the anvil of history. Secondly, it has left little 
doubt that the ultimate authority rests with the "federal government". 
Gurvitch's ideal type fails to come to grips with this problem. More-
over, decentralized planning appears to be a contradiction in terms, in 
the final analysis. Pluralistic democracy structured in such a utopian 
plan hardly shows evidence of being grounded in the needs of the 
twentieth century. One of the critical problems facing contemporary 
democracies is the ability to make decisions quickly, and precisely and 
to be able to act with speed and effectiveness. Competing centers of 
control would only serve to undercut this ability to choose and act . 
Pluralism and diffusion are essential as well to democracy but they must 
be expressed within a structure which can deal with the problem of 
power . 
) . The Dialectical Method 
Gurvitch has two central aims in his use of the dialectical 
method: l) to analyze the ~ ensions and conflicts among the various 
levels and frameworks of social reality; 2) to maintain a 9estalt view 
or wholistic view of that social reality. It is well to remember the 
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totality or wholeness of a social group or global structure is ontolo-
gically prior to its disparate parts . To put it another way, the cen-
tripetal forces are stronger than the centrifugal pulls. The dialec-
tical method was attained because of the nature of social reality itself. 
This object of scrutiny is dialectical and hence, requires a method 
which can take cognizance of such sinuosities and tensions which charac-
terize its nature. The dialectic also recognizes the close relation-
ship between the observer and the observed. Their interactions are 
dialogic and thus dialectic . There is no escape f rom the engaged charac-
ter of the researcher . He is part of the very thing he seeks to observe. 
He too is a part of humanity; the human condition is the object of his 
study. 
Gurvitch, you recall, outlined five processes of this dialectic. 
He suggested these would help in analyzing social reality leading to 
the threshold of explanation. Ultimately explanation must follow its 
own rules. The dialectic leads to understanding which is not separated 
from explanation but is carefully linked to it by the reciprocal pro-
cess of the rules of explanation. 
There are certain serious problems which arise from this method: 
1) Gurvitch is faced with the fundamental problem of getting at 
the ontologically prior depth level, the collective mind. He states 
that his method is best described as superempiricism, a radical rela-
tivism. Just what does this mean? It is not a clear concept. It seems 
to mean that scientific validity is attained by maintaining a pluralism 
of types, that objectivity is automatically available to the sociologist 
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who notes the pluralism of social situations and structures. Diver-
sity, complexity, heter ogeneity, spontaneity, and pluralism are the 
criteria of the dialectical method. This adds up to Gurvitch 1s idea 
of scientific truth. Though these may very well be important features 
of social reality do they represent adequate criteria for scientific 
work in sociology? The next section will deal with this view of social 
reality. 
The point is that Gurvitch is looking for the fundamental reality 
of the social. He desires to find the authentic character, the exis-
tential realness, the essence of social experience. This is a meta-
physical longing, usually alien to science in the United States. Gur-
vitch moves from this central aim which is to know what is the very 
ground of social existence, to a consideration of the method by Which 
to know. A special method is required because social reality is what 
it is and because the researcher , the method and the object are tied 
closely together . Hence, he develops his dialectical method as the 
solution to this very difficult task. Such a dialectic is based on a 
special way of knowing . A special field of study requires a special 
type of knowledge . Gurvitch distinguishes between intuitive knowledge 
and reflected knowledge . The former is the direct apprehension of 
what is . This fits with the goal to apprehend, to know directly the 
nature of social reality . The what is, in this case , is the ontologi-
cally prior unity, made possible by the existence of the collective 
mind . Such a mind is known and knows by intuition. It may also be 
known later on by reflective thinking but fundamentally it is known b,y 
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the inunediate grasping of this reality . The sense of the group , the 
awareness of being a part of a totality, is intuited. 
As indicated above , this is a metaphysical goal, and likewise as 
a method it is philosophically oriented. The intuitionism is not dif-
ficult to locate. In An Introduction to Metaphysics Bergson states: 
11Intuition is that kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places 
oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it 
and consequently inexpressible . nl Elsewhere Bergson makes this state-
ment concerning the movement of an object in space . When "outside" the 
object the movement is relative. "But when I speak of an absolute 
movement, I am attributing to the moving object an interior and, so to 
speak , states of mind; I also imply that I am in sympathy with those 
states , and that I insert myself in them by an effort of imagination. 112 
Note the means by which one arrives at this awar.eness is through sympathy 
and imagination. The absolute is above all desired, that is , the 
fundamental and the certain about this and everything else . (A l egiti-
mate longing but hardly adequate for science.) 
••• What I exper ience will depend neither on the point 
of view I may take up in regard to the object , sin~ I 
am inside the object itself, nor on the symbols qy which 
I may translate the motion, since I have rejected all 
translations in order to possess the or iginal . In short, 
I shall no longer grasp the movement from without, remain-
ing where I am , but from where it is, from within , as it i s 
in itself. I shall possess an absolute . 3 
1Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics (New York: G. P. 
Putnam's Sons , 1912), p . 7. 
2~., P • 2 
3Ibid., pp . 2~3 . Italics supplied. 
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Though Gurvitch pointedly renounces all affiliation with Bergson's 
position, denial is insufficient . Moreover, it seems apparent that 
Gurvitch's emphasis on both reality and the immediate self-evidence of 
this reality to the researcher betray Bergson's influence in his method. 
Husserl's and Scheler's presence are also noted. Husserl was 
looking for the indisputable evidence about things as they really are . 
This seems going beyond their properties and laws. Such knowledge re-
quires a special method which Husserl calls Wesensschau, '~sion of 
essences 11 • This is not a rational process but a special one •1 Such a 
process is the source and ultimate justification of every judgment. 
'l'hese operations, the phenomenological reduction of epoche , 
the "eidetic variation," etc., are as many purification 
rites that remind us of the preliminary acts by means of 
which Bacon (1561-1626) wished us to get rid of the idola 
before marrying that chaste old lady, observation . The 
phenomenological rites , too , are supposed to remove from 
our minds the burden of presuppositions . 2 
This knowledge which Husserl points to is a special type of 
knowledge . It is removed from the realm of fact . It cannot be submitted 
to empirical investigation. It is in a world above facts. At least 
Gurvitch does admit the reality of the morphological level as self-
evident . He does not take the extreme position of Husserl . In fact, 
he criticizes Husserl precisely for his nee-Platonism. But Gurvitch 
does take from this phenomenologist his basic method. Succinctly, this 
1Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomena-
l~, trans . w. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1~31), pp. 44ff . Cited in Bunge, Intuition and Science, pp. 16-17. 
2Bunge, Intuition and Science, p . 17. 
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means moving from the self-evident to the more profound all the while 
holding the level(s) above in parentheses as the descent is made lower 
and lower to the ground of all social being, the collective mind . 
Ultimately, intuition is the means by which one knows the immediate 
existence, the real existence of the collective mind . Gurvitch calls 
his method dialectic . It may be dialectic in terms of analysis; cer-
tainly it gives precious little help to the gathering and arranging of 
data. 
Scheler nails down the independent nature of the so-called 
intuited experience . 
The essences and their connectlons are "given" before 
any experience of this kind i.e., ordinary experience , 
that is, they are given a priori; on the other hand, the 
propositions that find their fulfilment in them are "true" 
a priori.l 
Elsewhere Scheler concludes, '~hat which is intuited as an essence 
or as a connection among such essences cannot, as a consequence, be 
nullified either by observation o~ by induction, and cannot be improved 
or perfected". 2 Such truths then are absolute, definitive, and hence, 
removed from science which sees only probabilities, only tentative 
arrangements . 
Science is predicated on systematic doubt. ~henamenology allows 
doubt to operate in the realm of empirical experience, to it clearly 
second-class as experience. However, doubt has no province in the area 
~ax Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethic und die materiale 
Wertethik, pp. 69-70, quoted in Bunge, Intuition ••• , p . 18. 
2Ibid. 
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of apodictic evidence . There the absolute reigns supreme . No questions 
need be asked. 
The generaloonclusions which can be drawn from this discussion of 
philosophical intuitionism are these: first, as a method of approach 
it claims to lead to irrefutable, infallible evidence upon which all 
else is constructed. Closer analysis reveals a system of thought bas ed 
on pure and simple dogmatisms about social reality. What social 
reality looks like is up to the mood of the researcher . It would appear 
the end result might very well depend upon 'Jw'hat he ate for breakfast". 
Intuition is dangerous in that it leads to this type of arbitrariness . 
There are no correctives . Like t he old lawyer arguing his case, '~hese 
are the opinions upon which I base my facts" . Gone are the checks and 
balances in this approach . Gurvitch maintains the dialectic provides 
tne checks necessary to purify and eradicate every philosophical 
notion . This is far from evident . l:t 'or what is claimed? Clairvoyance , 
infallibility and absolute certainty are the sociologist who follows 
this lead. 
Second, intuitionism represents a confusion with what is commonly 
called psychological certainty. Same things ~self-evident but why 
are they so? Once laborious effort has been put into the analysis of 
a certain phenomenon, finally resulting in an understanding of the work-
ings , patterns , and involved relationships it encompasses (all of which 
can only come through observation and investigation) , then when such a 
phenomenon is observed again, it is immediately grasped for what it is . 
The investigator is totally familiar with what he sees . He has covered 
this ground before. Therefore, a psychological certainty exists but to 
claim this certainty in terms of truth, is "to go beyond science and 
complete it prematurely", to take a faith position, an irrational posi-
tion which has no place in science. Science can accept practical cer-
tainty which enables experimentation to go on and work to proceed, but 
there are no absolutes in science, only hypotheses and conventions 
functioning as postulates or laws . 
Such axioms are not self-evident but result from a laborious 
work in search of the most perspicuous and economical arrange-
ment of a body of knmvledge . • . • Scientific knowledge is 
justifiable opinion , grounded opinion--but still opinion . 
If knowledge is secure , then it is not of fact but of form; 
and if it refers to reality, it is insecure, corrigible , 
perfectible. l 
This is the paradox. Gurvitch has argued eloquently and percep-
tively for exactly what Bunge has said in this last sentence. Gurvitch 
has made every attenpt to do just this , but he has failed . In his re-
jection of the scientific posture which must depend upon observation, 
theory, and empirical corroboration, inductive attack , and then more 
field work , Gurvitch has unwittingly aligned himself with a method that 
discovers truth by "other" or "special" means and consequently is re-
moved from the theater of research and empirical verification . One 
cannot refute that which pleads infallibility. Gurvitch's intuitionist 
approach does just this . Certainly this becomes apparent when Gurvitch 
is involved in criticizing another social theorist , philosopher or social 
scientist . What has been said already about the "straw man" method 
holds . Gurvitch rejects everyone who fails to s ee social reality or the 
1Ibid ., P• 24. 
task of sociology and its method of study in exactly the same way as he 
does . In the words .of the mythical Quaker, "All are wrong except me and 
thee and sometimes I have my doubts about thee. 11 Gurvitch appears to 
take the same stand . This illustrates how far he has strayed from the 
scientific posture which includes among other things, humility, 
tolerance , and appreciation for the contributions of the past and pre-
sent to the whole corpus of social fact and theory. 
This leads to a further summary problem in the intuitionist's 
approach, namely irrationalism. Certainly irrationalism was not in-
tended to be included in the first steps of such an attack on the common 
problems of social science but the claim to the existence of a higher 
knowledge, a 'more perfect way" leads ultimately to the deprecation of 
reason and thence to the distrust of reason. This leaves the way open 
to degeneration into irrationalism and anti-intellectualism. When 
instinct and intuition are exalted above reason , when the grasping of 
the whole over against the analysis of structure, direct or immediate 
perception of what is , as opposed to inferential fact--the proper 
method of science--vrhen all of these are preferred, the dangers of 
dogmatism, arbitrariness in science and then in society lead to the overt 
manifestations of such attitudes exemplified in a Nazism er Stalinism. 
Naked force becomes the sole source of legitimation. What Gurvitch 
argued against in his social law theory is brought to life in all too 
brutal a fashion. To wit , the slow aggrandisement of power on the part 
of De Gaulle in France is evidence of this irrationalism based on a 
nineteenth century conception of nationhood which had its birth in 
romanticism, a movement that rejected the enlightenment , but in the 
process threw out the baby with the bath . 
Another tendency inherent in the intuitionist ' s epistemology is a 
radical anarchy . "If a given intuition is as good as any other , it is 
not corrigible by any other intuition; hence every knowledge is personal 
or private , when a plurality of theories and even of world views results; 
and there is no possibility of choice among them, because they are 
equally valuable even though they are mutually inconsistent." 
This appears in Gurvitch 1s thought . He is a doctrinaire position 
which leaves him intolerant of others' ideas about social reality. He 
appears to be saying, '~ou follow my theoretical system and I will lead 
you out of the forest and into the clearing." Having worked through 
the labyrinthine ways of his thought one is aware that the clearing is 
still surrounded qy trees, and they appear even more dense than those 
one just left . 
2) A second difficulty which the dialectic presents is its inap-
plicability . There are five s~parate processes and certain variations 
within each process which must be noted at all times . Just how feasible 
is such a method? How does one keep the processes straight? How does 
he know when to apply which one? Gurvitch seems to give no clue except 
in terms of instinct or intuition. This suggests that the method itself 
is actually intuitional . Is this the character of social reality: Gur-
vi tch seems to rely so much on those experiences in and since his youth 
libid., p . 26 . 
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in which the spontaneous elements appeared to burst forth with an 
eclat on the scene. Gurvitch asserts then that this is a general im-
pression. This is social reality. He is saying, "I experience this . 11 
We all have at some time or another watched these spontaneous, dynamic, 
and revolutionary factors come to the surface. These facts are immedi-
ately given . At other moments, other data are immediately given , while 
the volatile elements are latent. The whole, the totality of these 
experiences must be captured. These are the total social phenomena . 
Since this is the way social reality appears to me, seems to me, the 
only method which will be able to deal with depth levels is the dialectic . 
Once again, confusion reigns . Gurvitch maintains that the object 
determines the method. However , his arrival at a conclusion that social 
reality is dialectical has been determined largely by intuition. Is 
this because a certain separation needs to be maintained between method 
and object of study? · Gurvitch does this by a special way of knowing . 
Can this method be trusted? What are its corrections? Certainly there 
is in the social sciences much improvement necessary in their use of the 
scientific method . The method is far from rigid. However, is there any 
justification for doing away with a method which has made remarkable 
progress gy virtue of its expressed goal of remaining as objective as 
possible? Objectivity and the lack of involvement should not be con-
fused . One can be scientifically objective, if need be, and yet take 
certain stands on issues. The objective approach in social science needs 
to grow in its attempt to fathom the complexity of social reality. Need 
for growth should not be linked with the radical solution of chucking 
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the whole thing and starting over with an entirely alien method called 
the dialectic. Perhaps the dialectic can teach some of its ways of dis-
cerning and analyzing. There is little evidence it will or can ever be 
a substitute. 
In sum, no principle exists for applying this method. It remains 
confusing, contradictory and highly complicated. 
3) The dialectic fails to help in observation. It does not aid 
in gathering information. Its sole value comes in terms of analysis. 
It even fails in the philosophical task of synopsis. If social reality 
is so complicated, ambiguous, showing the attributes of polarity, com-
plementarity, and reciprocity, then how does one gather the "right 11 
material, what does he find in terms of specifics, how does one distin-
guish and discriminate? These are the problems. Certainly social 
reality is a Proteus. Granted it is a will-o-the-wisp which resists 
every effort to capture it and analyze it conclusively. But then, the 
natural environment, modern scientists confirm, is likewise slippery and 
evasive. This does not preclude following those approaches which main-
tain a distance between the observer and the observed and which seek1' to 
find certain patterns, establish certain postulates upon which further 
research can be carried out. 'l'he depth levels cannot be submitted to 
empirical research; the design is too grand, the theory to burdensome, 
too complicated, too unmanageable for these purposes. Moreover the 
fundamental categories are there because of an i nstinctual conclusion. 
There is no underlying logical principle for their arrangement. They 
are in perpetual movement and yet Gurvitch contends they are phenomena 
which can be grasped and typed. Gurvitch confuses process and struc-
ture in his list of depth levels. He confuses the horizontal and 
vertical by including too much which often is contradictory as noted 
above. The dialectic fails to show a way of garnering information , and 
data, and hence , dealing directly with social reality. The mystery 
remains . 
4) When the dialectic has been applied it reveals nothing new. 
The one project described in this dissertation uncovers nothing dif-
ferent from the research being done elsewhere under so-called sterile 
conditions. What is new or different about saying social behaviour and 
attitudes differ according to the social structure? This is a basic 
contention of cultural anthropology and sociology. Moreover , the 
techniques used, the interview and questionnaire were all primitive in 
style and the compilation of data and analysis were inferior in quality. 
5) Finally, Gurvitch seems to be saying that the dialectic is a 
substitute for inductive reasoning. The nature of social reality is 
vastly different from the physical world where certain patterns are much 
more discernible . In fact such regularities do exist to a greater degree 
of particularity than in the area of social experience . The pattern in 
society is dialectical , tension-filled , contingent, spontaneous, dynamic 
and effervescent . To infer general rules, postulates , or configurations 
from such an aggregation of disparate movements and influences is to 
ask the impossible . Though the centripetal is dominant over the centri-
fugal and remains the ontological reality, the way of seeing how this 
wholeness is manifested is through the dialectic. Fundamentally, how-
ever , the dialectic lacks discipline. Where inductive reason follows 
the gathering of data originally directed by a tentative hypothesis, 
the dialectic has no organizing principle. It provides no handle, no 
way of determining what to look for and how to look for it. It is like 
Don Quixote who climbed on his merry steed and rode off in all direc-
tiona. Though the philosophical argument is fasci nating and at times 
highly illuminating, the values ,for sociological investigation are nil. 
Confusions abound since the method purports to describe the way social 
reality is and social reality is dialecticalj therefore this is its 
nature. Such circuitous reasoning only leads to an affirmation without 
adequate facts to back it up, as to the attributes of society. If 
empirical investigation is used at all i t is to support that which has 
already been discovered through the processes of the dialectic. There 
are values in the dialectic, but for the central task of sociology its 
uses must remain peripheral. In one reviewer's words, "I wonder 
whether • • • the author reaches his goal of rendering dialectics 
thoroughly 'virulent and efficacious' by making it dialectical 
he shears dialectics of all heuristic value so as to dilute it and 
render it rather limp and innocuous " •1 
4. The Spontaneous as the Starting Point 
Gurvitch desires to save free will. In his work on social deter-
minism and human liberty he clearly points out there is a plurality of 
determinisms in each social whole while underneath the creative human 
will remains basically free. 
~dward A. 
Georges 
701. 
This is why he must affirm the tenuous 
by 
1962), 
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and dynamic character of social reality. No generalizations can be made, 
only tendencies towards regularity can be noted. Many times it is im-
possible to go this far. Only conjunctures can be described. 
Doesn't this emphasis on the spontaneous undercut all possibilities 
of sociology following the scientific method (in the generic sense here)? 
How can a science be a science unless THERE ARE OBSERVABLE PATTERNS? The 
dialectic fails to uncover any patterns . If anything it proliferates 
and fragments more than it unites or sees these social phenomena as 
totalities . Gurvitch gives certain rules for explanation. f hese rules 
are nothing more than a reiteration of what he conceives social reality 
to be like . These are dogmatic assumptions , at best based on an intui-
tive grasp of the immediately given. This is Gurvitch's way of bringing 
order out of chaos. If there is order, and if the spontaneous is the 
starting point of sociological investigation (denying thereby an over-
arching determinism which is essential for scientific work) , then Gur-
vitch1s system falls outside the realm of science . 
Moreover, since the dialectic is used and order is ontologically 
prior, though the spontaneous is the starting point (already contra-
dictions adhere), vurvitch must see order in a doctrinaire or purely 
categorical way. Hence , his typological schema become formalistic and 
imperialistic. They are imposed upon the reality he thinks he sees. 
This reality is formed and molded. Since chaos would reign otherwise , 
the way to order (which obtains most of the time) is by an involved set 
of categories that try to take into consideration every contingency. 
Hence, the casuistic nature of his system. It is a complicated 
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taxonomy because of this necessity for order. There is also this 
contradiction: emphasis is placed on both the spontaneous and the 
prior unity of all collectivities . 
~urvitch is like Eve in Mark Twain's version of her diary. She 
says the following about naming and describing this new world in which 
she finds herself: 
During the last day or two I have taken all the work of 
naming things off his dam's hands, and this has been a 
great relief to him, for he has no gift in that line and is 
evidently very grateful . He can't think of a rational name 
to save him, but I do not let him see that I am aware of his 
defect. ~menever a new creature comes along I name it before 
he has time to expose himself by an awkward silence. In this 
way I have saved him many embarrassments. I have no defect 
like his . The minute I set eyes on an animal I know what it 
is . I don't have to reflect a moment; the right name comes 
out instantly, just as if it were an inspiration, as no doubt 
it is, for I am sure it wasn ' t in me half a minute before . I 
seem to know just by the shape of the creature and the way it 
acts what animal it is . l 
The telling sentence from this "diary" is that "the right name 
comes out instantly". Gurvitch 1s taxonomic structure strikes one as 
being just about like this. It seems or feels right to him, once again 
going back to his intuitionist foundation, and he is going to call it 
for what it is. To be a "good'' sociologist one will have to accept 
these definitions and categories . Otherwise he is outside the realm 
of the truly enlightened. A case in point is Gurvitch 1s assertion 
that institution as a word should be stricken from sociological language. 
This shows the dogmatic and arbitrary nature of his theory. The word 
institution has a long history in sociologicalthought. It is part and 
~ark Twain, The $30,000 Bequest and Other Stories, (New York: 
Harpers and Brothers, 1935), PP• 364-46$. 
parcel of the discipline . It would lead only to difficulty and regres-
sion to eliminate it as a concept . There is a certain givenness to it 
which has been laboriously defined through these years of theoretical 
growth. Gurvitch argues over and over again for contextualism when 
analyzing data . This is part of his dialectical approach. This is the 
fundamental meaning of complementarity. The word institutional or 
institution is ambiguous, but to recall Aron's words, so is social 
reality . Gurvitch includes ambiguity as part of his dialectic . There-
fore institution is a word with many meanings. It must necessarily be 
so. The context of its usage usually clarifies what is being said . 
This is the way in which such important words as institution must be 
understood and explained. Precision is desirable but with certain 
phenomena, if not with all, precision only comes within the context of 
the situation . 
To return to the original thrust of this critical remark, Gur-
vitch ' s arbitrariness is a direct result of his starting with spon-
taneity. He makes a valiant effort at salvaging free will, or creative 
action , but the question is , does he sacrifice the scientific posture 
of sociology in the process? One may look at the postulate of order 
in terms of a polarity.1 There are those who state one must note a 
universal determinism or system of order: "All phenomena stand in 
invariant relations with each other". 2 On the other hand, the opposite 
lcf. Nicholas Timasheff, ''Jrder, Causality, Conjuncture, 11 in 
Symposium on Sociological Theory, Llewellyn Gross, ed. (Evanston, 
Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1959), p. 147. 
2Ibid., p. 146. 
position is to see this as a very limited determinism. As Gurvitch 
has so well expressed it himself in Determinismes sociaux ••• , the 
principle of indeterminacy developed by Bohr, Planck, Heisenberg and 
Einstein requires one see the determinism as relative. Hence, the 
neopositivists would adhere to a more general order (as far as social 
science goes) and Sorokin and Gurvitch would plead for i ndeterminacy. 
The burden of the present question is t o ask whether Gurvitch goes 
too far in his assertion of indeterminacy or spontaneity? For if one 
goes too far off the map, all attempts at establishing a science are 
doomed, the dialectic notwithstanding. 
Again Gurvitch seems to take a needlessly arbitrary position. 
Though his corrective is welcome when it comes to assessing the posi-
tion of the neopositivists, he has gone too far in the other direction. 
He has affirmed the indeterminacy of things to s uch an extent that 
little understanding can really be realized from sociological inquiry. 
By this is meant that explanation of factors is possible, a description 
of what they are is vdthin the realm of sociology but to know why 
these factors came together as they did to form what is being observed 
is impossible. Prediction is doomed . Though tight prediction is im-
possible in the social sciences, Gurvitch with his heavy emphasis upon 
the spontaneous starts at a point which makes all study impossible 
simply because there is no reward . 1 Timasheff notes the complexity of 
the task when he states in his characteristically concise manner, 
lcr . The whole of this article by Timasheff is especially reward-
ing . Ibid., pp. 145-162. 
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"The predictive table is then an attempt to determine the resultant of 
the composition of forces corresponding to the causal tendencies present 
in a field of observation. 111 Gurvitch seems to limit the possibilities 
to those of mere explanation of con,junctures and description of functions, 
seen here in mathematical terms and not in the sense of the structural 
functionalist school led by Merton et .al . Gurvitch with his dialectic 
and his concept of the total social phenomenon attempts to save the 
necessity of order. As stated repeatedly above he does this by virtue 
of his intuitional philosophy. Certainly the postulate of order is 
where all science begins . This is its faith position. It cannot get 
around it . But Gurvitch fails to admit this is a necessary given . 
Rather creative freedom and spontaneity are the givens in his system. 
Therefore, in order to extricate himself from such a dilemma he imposes 
order by way of intuition. This is at once the value and the contra-
diction in his concept of the total social phenomena. Taken at face 
value, the total social phenomena is his principle of order. This 1.1/ 
principle is immediately vitiated by his reliance upon spontaneity. 
This confusion is especially apparent when one looks at the depth levels 
and notes that n~ber nine belongs to ideas and values which cause 
creative collective behaviour. This level is at the spontaneous end of 
the spectrum of social reality. To go further one notes immediately the 
collective mind is the deepest level. It is the source of order and 
at the same time the most profound stratum in terms of spontaneity. Here 
the contradictory character of his depth sociology comes into sharpest 
focus . 
1Ibid . , P• 156. 
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In final analysis Gurvitch is very much aware that order, conjunc-
ture and causality or causal tendencies are present in every kind of 
reality. This is implicit in his writings on this subject matter. How-
ever, the intuition of the spontaneous, the influence of the young Marx, 
of Bergson, and Scheler , plus his experiences in Russia at the time of 
the revolutions lead to this over-emphasis of the spontaneous elements. 
Gurvitch seems to be on sound footing when he makes his principle the 
total social phenomena but this is soon superseded by pressing too hard 
for a consideration of the spontaneous . 
5. The Task of Sociology 
To get at this critical section some development is necessary. 
Gurvitch, as the appendix and Chapter Two summarized, stands in a tradi-
tion which comes out of homanticism. This movement as will be recalled 
was a protest against the Age of Reason . Fundamentally, Romanticism 
"was a reaction against a too narrow construing of human experience in 
terms of reason alone . It was an emphasis on the less rational side 
of human nature on everything that differentiates man from the coldly 
calculating machine.'~ The world is not simply a mechanical order 
Life is more than this , more richly endowed, greater than mere intel-
ligence. Romanticism appealed to total experience. It did not wish to 
limit or obstruct. It saw as the object of its purview all of human 
lJohn Herman Randall, Jr., The Making of the Modern Mind, (New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 194o), p . 399. 
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experience. In Bergson's words: '~de cannot sacrifice experience to the 
requirements of any system.'~ This open-endedness and receptivity to 
all kinds of experience, the emphasis upon the emotional passionate side 
of human experience heightened and broadened the scope of one's world 
view. Though the values of openmindedness and receptivity are apparent 
in this approach, the difficulties which this view encounters are mainly 
in terms of definition and discipline. 
Its besetting vice is that it may lead men to disregard 
all standards of truth and value, to refuse to make any 
of the distinctions that are essential to an ordered life-
like the drunken man, who accepts all things as of equal 
worth, the romanticist often fails to criticize his 
experience, and in the mere joy of living remains obli-
vious to the greater joys of living well . 2 
Gurvitch follows in this tradition. His intuitionism has already 
been mentioned and critically examined. His separation of reflective 
knowledge from immediately perceived knowledge leading to the ontolo-
gically given, his depth levels which encompass the whole range of 
human experience, and fundamentally his notion of t he total social 
phenomena all fit into romanticism. The view of the whole separate from 
the sum of its parts yet immanent in each indlv~aual and the individual, 
in turn, immanent in the whole, the broad sweep of his theoretical 
int erests moving all the way from the microsocial to the global society, 
and the endless possibilities of his taxonomy of types likewise are an 
outcome of the romantic spirit. Also it must be noted is Gurvitch's 
emphasis upon the revolutionary. The young Marx whom he admires was 
lHenri Bergson, Creative Evolution, Ch. I, p. 39 in Ibid. 
2Ibid., p. 4oo. 
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influenced by these romantic tendencies and bequeathed some of these 
notions to Gurvitch. Shelley could write as a romantic poet of 
Prometheus Unbound and Gurvitch would call the historical global socie-
ties Promethean. His basic abhorrence for any kind of system and his 
anger at anyone who calls his theoretical formulations formalistic or 
a system of thought again suggest his relationship to this nineteenth 
century movement . 
Gurvitch eloquently argues that in this age of science and 
technology which has seen the rise of mass movement, the growing per-
vasiveness of technocracy and bureaucracy, the increasing emptiness of 
social symbols , and where social structures are threatened by the 
forces of totalitarianism and centralized collectivism, a wider view is 
required. Rationalism must be questioned , and new methods developed 
for the study of social reality. 
His motives are good , but his aim is poor. In sum, one could say 
he has simply tried to cover too much ground and the whole effort lacks 
a cohesiveness . He refuses to be a system builder and in the process 
he sacrifices cogency and conciseness . All the while he constantly 
calls for a return to general theory building . This is confusing. How 
can general theory be developed unless it is done system~~ically . 
In another sense he has asked sociology to do too much . Sociology, 
as it is conceived in the twentieth century, is much more limited in its 
aims . Gurvitch emerges from the welter of his prodigious effort re-
sembling more a social philosopher than a sociologist . As social 
philosophy his work falls short of being an integrated system of thought. 
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In this sense, Gurvitch fails as both a sociologist and a social 
philosopher . li-Jhy? 
George Santayana had some incisive thoughts about Goethe, one of 
the great German romantics. His words fit very well the critique be-
ing made of Gurvitch's position: 
How, indeed, should we draw the sum of an infinite experi-
ence that is without conditions to determine it, and without 
goals in which it terminates? Evidently all a poet of pure 
experience can do is to represent some snatches of it, more 
or less prolonged; and the more prolonged the experience 
represented is the more it will be a collection of snatches, 
and the less part of it will have to do with the beginning 
• • • • To be miscellaneous, to be indefinite, to be unfin-
ished is essential to the romantic life. May we not say 
that it is essential to all life in its immediacy; and that 
only in reference to what is not life--to objects, ideals 
and unanimities that cannot be experienced but may only be 
conceived--can life become rational and truly progressive? 
Herein we see the radical and inalienable excellence of 
romanticism; its sincerity, freedom, richness, and 
infinity.l 
Having explored the whole sweep of Gurvitch's thought one comes 
out with these impressions (perhaps they are intuitions) . Gurvitch has 
travelled too far . At once the student is impressed with Gurvitch's 
sincerity, freedom, richness and the magnitude of his effort. These 
are both his strength and weakness. For he desires to include every-
thing and in so doing he formulates little which is precise. The sheer 
scope and expanse of his concerns speak of this. So often he is 
miscellaneous when it comes to the intricacies of his endless typologies; 
he claims no finished product so that he is deliberately indefinite, 
lacking thereby a true synthesis which would in a systematic way pull 
1Randall, op. cit., p . 401. 
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the disparate parts together into some coherent whole. The very 
pilgrimage of his life shows him taking up first this interest, de-
veloping this lead and then that. This is seen in his interpretation 
of the task of sociology. The discipline is reasserted as the queen 
of the social sciences. Its task is to synthesize. Yet his theory 
lacks such a synthesis and coherency. What appears on the surface to 
be logically consistent and interrelated fails to stand the test of 
analysis . It is too loose, contradictory, too imprecise in its de-
finitions of certain concepts he has too often left the student in the 
wake of his involved discussions and cumbersome rhetoric more confused 
than when he embarked. His concepts have often been ponderous and hard 
to manage . He has frequently been too aggressive and antagonistic in 
his estimates of others. This has militated against communication and 
the sharing of ideas . 
He has sweepingly dismissed American sociology for its lack of 
theory . The question could be asked as to how it is possible for anyone 
to carry out any kind of scientific research without some hypotheses 
to guide that research? It is unfair to dismiss the Americans in such 
a cavalier fashion . 
On the other side of the coin, exactly why has Gurvitch been sumarily 
dismissed, ignored or shunted off to a dark loneliness? Why do most 
American and many European socio1c r ists refuse to take him seriously or 
even attempt to deal with him honestly? It is apparent from these 
critical pages that Gurvitch contributes little to the advancement of 
theoretical sociology. His depth sociology fails to convince and the 
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confusions which it presents limit the possibilities for research. 
His theory of the collective mind is based on a faulty premise for any 
kind of scientific growth. fhe underlying intuitionism only leads to 
irrationalism, arbitrariness, and authoritarianism. The dialectic as 
a method is inapplicable , needlessly complicated and once again dis-
trustful of the scientific approach which alone can guard against 
delusions of infallibility and fundamentalism. He over-emphasizes the 
indeterminacy in social reality to such an extent it defeats all 
scientific endeavor. His insistence on the realness of all groups leads 
to the transcendental fallacy which he criticized in Durkheim. Gur-
vitch's macrosociology with its necessary typology for achieving order, 
is endlessly taxonomic, and fundamentally inapplicable. 
Gurvitch, in the final analysis presents an impression of social 
reality. It is ill-defined, confusing, deliberately complex, and 
philosophically questionable . He denies any pretension at developing a 
system of thought and certainly the result is less than systematic . 
He desires to develop the field of general theory which requires at 
least some kind of system building, and yet he refuses any such de-
limitation. The confusion is complete when he admits about himself that 
sociologists consider him a philosopher who has somehow gotten in the 
wrong room and the philosophers have long since been convinced that he 
forsook their discipline for the greener landscapes of sociology. This 
is the heart of the problem. There is a persistent ambiguity in his 
position which makes it at best difficult to grasp . 
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In the final analysis, it can be said Gurvitch is more of a social 
philosopher than a sociologist . He goes beyond the accepted scope of 
sociology as a social science . As a philosopher there are snatches of 
brilliance, despite the weaknesses of his thought as a total system. 
The final paragraphs of this chapter will consider a certain number of 
those creative concepts which could benefit contemporary sociology. 
6. Inherent Values for Contemporary Sociology 
a) Gurvitch attempts to re-establish a line or bridge between 
the different social sciences and to relate sociology once again to 
history and philosophy. His general sociology is viewed as a synthesiz-
ing discipline . His emphasis upon the realness of groups and the essen-
tial unity of both man and society is helpful. To him the science of 
man studies the individual and collective efforts at building a society. 
Norman Birnbaum points to a strength of Gurvitch's contribution: '~is 
distinctions represent an interesting attempt to deal with a funda-
mental problem--the unity of the social system--in a bold and critical 
way . nl 
The object of study for the social sciences and sociology is to 
look at the human condition. This condition comes under the scrutiny 
of each discipline in its own particular manner but always the emphasis 
is placed on the act over the product , the total or whole effort over 
the disparate activities . Moreover the compartmentalization of the 
social sciences is only relative since man is one and the various 
lNorman Birnbaum, a review of Ou va la sociologie fran9aise? by 
Armand Cuvilli er , American Journal of Sociology, LX, (September , 1954), 
199. 
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groups in which he acts cannot be permanently dissected. 'l'hey too are 
totalities. Society is en acte, it is becoming what it shall be. This 
is a central focus. Gurvitch's approach shows the possibilities of 
interdisciplinary study. He constantly underlines the necessary inter-
dependence of the various disciplines. He radically opposes any 
approach which would permanently dissect or which only partially views 
social reality, thereby distorting i~s real character. Moreover , in 
placing the emphasis upon the human condition, Gurvitch brings the study 
of sociology in line with the essential nature of social reality. This 
is an essential character of society as observed today. The pace is 
fast. The emphasis must be placed on the dynamic and the creative, the 
spontaneous and the unexpected, the fluid and the dissonant, the ruptures 
and the discontinuous. This is a part of reality. It is sensed by 
modern man. It appears in all he writes, expresses in art, lives in his 
industrial centers or experiences in the areas of rapid social change 
where the processes of structuration, destruction and re-structuration 
are especially evident. Somehow the study of depth levels, the search 
for the hidden, the uncovering of the irrational, typing the phenomena 
which the dialectical processes reveal has a fit which cannot be 
neglected. The structural-functionalist seems to have difficulty taking 
into account this dynamic aspect, this spontaneous level, this infra-
structure below the superstructure. Gurvitch has taken a symbolic 
notion of the total social phenomena. He has explained that it is a 
device or tool by which to understand these layers or levels to social 
reality. The ten levels are open to much criticism. They distort and 
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complicate. Mauss's notion is far more helpful. Uurvitch was more 
relevant in his early social law theory than later when he tried to 
develop a comprehensive theory for sociology. The concept is insuf-
ficient to capture the total aspect of social life . Still there are 
values in the original notion of depth sociology. Certainly the spon-
taneous and the dynamic need to be taken into account. Uurvitch calls 
this to mind. To him, detendnism is relative alongside human liberty. 
They are interactive but the ontological priority is given to the 
element of freedom. ·rhere is a residue of freedom which persists come 
what will. 'l'here is necessarily a price to pay for placing the 
emphasis upon the spontaneous. Gurvitch pays too dearly. 'I'his has 
already become apparent. Still, this is a valuable emphasis in that 
to deny the existence of this stratum or aspect of social reality is to 
distort that reality . The theories of the structural-functionalists 
do appear static. As Bennett Berger states: 'Parsons seems 'unmusical' 
when it comes to matters of power; conflict is something a very impor-
tant thinker like Marx wrote a great deal about and which Parsons 
consequently must take account of. 111 Or in the words of c. Wright 
Mills : 
The social scientists, knowing little history, study at 
most short-run trends; Marx, usin6 historical materials 
with superb mastery, takes as his unit of study entire 
epochs. The values of the social scientists generally 
lead them to accept their society pretty much as it is; 
the values of Marx lead him to condemn his society--
root, stock and branch. The social scientists see society's 
l"l'he Study of Man," Commentary, XXXIV, (December, 1962), 511. 
problems as matters only of "disorganization", Marx sees 
problems as inherent contradictions in the existing 
structure; Marx sees in the future of this society a 
qualitative break1 a new form of society--in fact a new 
epoch--is going to come about by means of revolution.l 
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The perspicacity of Gurvitch's remarks concerning the inherent 
conflicts and tensions within social reality which make up the spon-
taneous is readily apparent. A more valuable approach would be to see 
determinism and freedom as polar concepts with the weight necessarily 
on the side of determinism if sociology is to exist as a science. An 
incisive question which Gurvitch 's emphasis raises is this: must not 
the choice be made between a closer abstraction which tends towards 
looking at society in unreal categories both from the standpoint of 
spontaneity and totality and a view which notes change and contingency 
affecting the level of abstraction? Abstracted empiricism and static 
functionalism are the natural results of the former . On the other 
hand, Gurvitch's approach sees the social as .it exists and sees it for 
its unity and wholeness, while emphasizing its discontinuity and 
fluidity . Vagueness and theoretical fuzziness are real dangers in the 
latter . 
Sociology must not neglect the historical dimension. l'he data 
for establishing the typologies of groups and global societies come 
from the study of history. Gurvitch has been preeminently successful 
in his typology of global societies. Being more concrete, they appear 
to submit more readily to his method. History studies these 
lThe Marxists (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1962), p. 11. 
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manifestations of the total social phenomena just as does sociology . 
Its emphasis is upon the continuous and hence its causal explanations 
are more sophisticated. Sociology must depend upon history to explain 
and clarify plus provide essential data . History is imperative to 
carry out any comparative study. Sociology provides history with cate-
gories , i . e . , types of social groupings and social structures. It 
serves as a corrective against any tendency to dogmatize a position or 
reduce tbe causal factors to one or omit essential material . They are 
mutually supportive and if amelioration is to be effective, both must 
counsel . 
b) Gurvitch attacks the tendency towards abstracted empiricism. 
He sees that this fragmentation and atomization leads to even greater 
alienation and anomie . His solution attempts to fuse empirical re-
search and theory into a dialectical whole . One great problem with 
much research is its inability to construct a systematic theory which 
leads in a logical and fruitful direction. The milieu are often small-
s cale . Research is done for the sake of technique , overlooking the 
ultimate goals and systematic views of social reality which then can be 
put to the test of empirical research. 
Gurvitch points to a view of the total social phenomena . Such a 
view as conceived by Mauss and utilized in the "early" Gurvitch is 
helpful . It is not far removed f r om current func t ional theory . Cer-
tainly the wholistic approach of Benedict , Mead and others in a cultural 
anthropology is very close to this idea. What is the character of this 
total social phenomen.a becomes the question for sociology and cultural 
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anthropology. Gurvitch 1s insistence upon the totality is welcome . 
The phenomena are varied with each totality but there remains a basic 
unity. He has sought to come to grips with the problem of unity 
versus diversity. 
In democracy this is expressed in the unending attempt to reach 
some consensus or unity without uniformity. Uniformity is an invalid 
way to look at social reality. Still there is a tentative, persistent 
unity which asserts itself, is stronger than those forces which would 
destroy or pull apart. Social law is one aspect of the positive fac-
tors producing unity. The centripetal forces are stronger than the 
centrifugal ones. What causes this? A single glance at social life 
begins the explanation. First, one notes the obvious. He confronts 
the organizations . He studies their activities. He reads the world 
almanac, gathers data from the encyclopedias, carries on research pro-
jects which plot the demographical facts of life, but only the surface 
manifestations have been touched. There is obviously much more . 
Gurvitch notes that classical sociologists asked certain probing ques-
tions which sought to get bet~ath the facade. He cites the works of 
Proudhon, Marx, Spencer , C·ooley, Durkheim and Mauss which give clues 
to a vertical view of social reality. Below the crusted layers of 
society the volcanic, the spontaneous, the moving and dynamic are at 
work. Furthermore, the irrational behaviours have to be explained. 
They distort a clear cut configuration of moven1ent which lends itself 
to predictability or social engineering. Mathematical formulas fail 
to describe adequately. The human coefficient, the engaged character 
v 
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of social science or the nature of its object of study eludes and 
escapes the researchers like Proteus of old. The natural temptation 
is to select those problems, create those universes which lend them-
selves to rigid notions about the scientific method. 
The idea of the total social phenomena then is an emphasis which 
correct tendencies towards abstracted err~iricism. An over-insistence 
upon totality as such however leads to a philosophical position which is 
as unacceptable as abstracted empiricism. This is the ambiguity of 
social reality. The tension between realism and nominalism must be 
maintained. As to how this is done, Gurvit ch provides few clues. 'fhis 
is certainly one of the important questions which sociology must resolve 
as it matures • 
Gurvitch's critique of abstracted empiricism led him to reflect on 
what he considers a dangerous trend among certain segments of American 
and French sociology. His analysis agrees with those of C. Wright Mills , 
Lorin Baritz and others . Sociology has many times become a servant of 
power . It is part of the manipulative process seeking to adjust workers 
to their environment, thereby maintaining the logics of size, functional 
efficiency and hierarchy now operative in the industrial order . 1 The 
lack of theory has led to a general indecisiveness as to goals and pur-
poses. This has made sociology and the social sciences particularly 
open to use by bureaucracies of all types. 11The phenomenological 
1naniel Bell, "Work in the Lif e of an American," Manpower in the 
u. S.: Problem and Politics, William Haber, ed. (New York: Harpers, 
1954), pp . 3-23. 
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insistence on the concrete and immediate can contribute (if only in-
directly) to a new humanization of sociology in a period when it has 
become another instrument of bureaucratization". I 
c) Gurvitch's typology of global societies seems to have real 
possibilities for sociology. 'I'his could provide a general basis for 
empirical research and augment comparative studies in whole cultures . 
Such a task is needed as regionalism develops and the boundaries of 
space and time diminish. These global types since they are dr~~ from 
historical data have a concreteness and authenticity which indicates 
that some aspects of Gurvitch 's approach have real merit . Since these 
global types represent the widest and most inclusive framework, they 
seem to fit more precisely the theoretical criteria of his approach. 
Is it because his hypotheses lack the necessary specificity to apply 
to smaller groupings , whereas their very generality at this level makes 
possible a more satisfying analysis? Whatever be the answer, Gurvitch 
has provided history and sociology with an interesting and challenging 
typology. 
d) Professor Gurvitch's dialectic adds a dimension to analysis 
which could help in ascertaining the nature of this protean social 
reality. The dialectical processes present themselves as possible 
tools for analysis and critical evaluation . 
In terms of method Gurvitch is following a pathway traversed by 
such disciplines as psychology and pschotherapy. These latter have 
1Birnbaum, op. cit. , p. 199. 
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been receptive to the modern movements of existentialism and pheno-
menology. Gurvitch is taking the lead in sociology. He has sought to 
use certain ideas which phenomenology and existentialism present. 
Especially be borrm-1s the belief in the necessity of going beyond the 
subject-object dichotomy. He denies the idealist-materialist conflict. 
Social reality is inconceivable from either pole. It is incomplete if 
viewed as simply subject or object. To go further if one looks only at 
the essences--the substances of social reality--he will be able to de-
scribe ~ characteristics, make ~ abstr-act generalizations which 
will be ~ but they miss reality. A conclusion may be statistically 
accurate but still fail to grasp the essential, authentic nature of 
the phenomenon. Gurvitch sees that what is true, in an abstract sense, 
is dialectically related to what is real. This is the whole burden of 
his typological method for sociology. It stands midway between the 
essentialist and realist positions. l'his explains why Gurvitch is im-
patient with those sociologists who would select phenomena which lend 
themselves to control and analysis and the formulation of abstract laws. 
wbether the data have relevancy to reality itself is unimportant to 
them. Hence , abstraction can be piled upon abstraction without touching 
reality itself. 
Relationship is a key idea in this dialectical approach. Hence, 
Gurvitch insists upon seeing the total social phenomena within their 
social framework and their historical situation. But more than that, 
this relationship means seeing the sociologist's role as a participant 
in the very object which he is examining. 1'he old notion that the less 
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one is involved in a situation the more he can fathom is questioned . 
To be sure, one must be certain he understands where he and what he is 
and the pre-suppositions upon which he works , but this does not require 
detachment and abstraction. If such a view is taken then the net result 
is a "handful of seafoam 11 to use the analogy of Rollo May.1 Paraphrasing 
T. s. Eliot , it would be like trying to dissipate a fog by throwing 
handgrenades into it . 2 The Protean nature of social reality is , to say 
the least, overwhelming. A way to get at these phenomena of the social 
is to see the relationships both contextually and as an observer . 
Though there are dangers in this view of the researcher's role 
the problems against which it reacts are important and Gurvitch at 
least raises the issues. Therefore, "knowing something involves a 
dialectical participation with the other 11 .3 The purely technical 
will be insufficient to see what really is. It is false to assume a 
thing is real only if it can be quantified . This is to reduce it to 
some manageable abstraction . Then comes the task of persuading one-
self what he has abstracted is the real thing. "Society is like love 
and consciousness • • • to abstract them is to lose what we have set 
out to describe • • • • u4 The end is to describe what is . This means 
seeing that total phenomenon within the cont ext of its world. The 
!Existence (Glencoe, Illinois: Basic Books , 1958) , p. 27. 
2T. s. Eliot, ed., Pascal's Pensees (New York: Dutton Everyman 
Paperback, 1958), p . xiii . 
~1ay, Existence, p. 40. 
4Ibid. 
social group and its world are unitary . This is the value of Gurvitch's 
views of social reality, the vertical and the horizontal . (And only they 
are used symbolically for descriptive purposes . ) They are always 
dialectically related. The vertical implies the horizontal and the 
horizontal the self . One cannot exist without the other, and they are 
only understandable in terms of each other . The same holds for the 
relationships of the individual and the collective, or synopsis and 
analysis . Probably the dichotomy of the individual and society resulted 
from the subject-object separation. They interpenetrate and are mutually 
supportive. This is the whole meaning of reciprocity of perspectives . 
It is one process of the dialectical method. The others , however, are 
variations on this essential theme. When the concept of reciprocity is 
seen as a dialectical process it is useful for sociological analysis e 
~~en it is postulated as a way of explaining the collective mind, it 
becomes part of Gurvitch 1s intuitive proof. All of the dialectical 
processes should be of help to the researcher who is seeking to see 
every type of relationship . Current sociology is looking for more 
effective ways to discern the patterns of human behaviour . These pro-
cesses might aid in this effort . 
e) The notion of the multiplicity of social times contains some 
provocative ideas for the study of social change . After closer 
empirical study these various types of social time, especially as they 
correspond to the global types , could emerge as useful categories for 
effecting social change . 
The study and understanding of the emerging nations might be 
helped by an analysis of their hierarchies of social times. Such a 
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theory of social time might be helpful to fully-developed societies 
facing the prospects of increasing technocracy, bureaucracy, automation, 
depersonalization , leisure time and alienation. 
f) The basic emphasis on the spontaneous, exogenic, indeter-
minate aspects of social reality which Gurvitch makes might well balance 
out sociological thought in the area of causality and order. This 
insistence on indeterminacy attempts to bring modern social science 
in line with twentieth century physics and seeks to overcome a seri-
ous cultural lag . That lag is the gap between scientific knowledge of 
human behaviour and technological know-how. Gurvitch has sought to 
bridge this gap by underlining the human condition, by pointing to the 
subject-object dichotomy and by seeing the existential reality both of 
the human persons as a total psychical phenomenon and social reality 
as a total social phenomenon. 
g) Gurvitch's argument in favor of the collective mind is a 
stimulant to theoretical debate. It is important enough to consider 
again; too few have bothered to wrestle with the notion . The sense 
of the collective mind is more widely accepted than might be realized. 
Hans Kohn in his works on nationalism has consistently maintained this 
is a state of consciousness or mind . Such a statement implicitly 
recognizes the collective mind at the level of partial fusion in the 
We . Maciver and Page.•s use of "community sentiment" comes very close 
to the idea of the collective mind . The following description of this 
sentiment indicates the challenge of t his notion: 
A neighborhood is not a community because it does not 
possess a feeling of belonging together--it lacks com-
munity sentiment ••• locality, though a necessary 
condition is not enough to create a community. A com-
munity • • • is an area of common living. There must 
be the cowELon living with its awareness of sharing a 
way of life as well as common earth.l 
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h) Gurvitch points up the value of being intellectually and 
politically involved. He is not advocating that sociological knowl-
edge have a political coloration. On the contrary, sociological 
knowledge pertaining to certain structures must be devoid of every 
philosophical bias. The sociologist should feel he can ill afford 
to be insulated from political affairs or isolated because of scienti-
fie endeavors. He has the same responsibility as any other person 
to take the knowl!edge and apply it according to his own conception of 
justice. Gurvitch advocates in the third colloquium of the Association 
international des sociologues de langue franyaise on the Structures 
sociales et democratie economique2 certain solutions to save democracy 
from the impending threats of technocracy and technology. Be con-
tends these are so serious that a st.:.stained effort to decentralize ,: 
national economies and place the decision-making in the hands of the 
working people is the only hope before the deluge. Many sociologists• 
unwillingness to be politically engaged and their efforts to sepa-
rate their tasks from every mention of values make this plea of 
1
society: An Introductor r Anal sis (Ne"'v York : 
and Winston, Inc., 19 9 , quoted in Elgin F. Hunt and 
Society Today and Tomorrow, (New York: The Macmillan 
p . 28 . 
Holt, Rinehart 
Jules Karlin, 
Company, 1961), 
2(Brussels: Institut de sociologie, 1961), pp . 269-280 . 
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Gurvitch especially significant . Such involvement is desperately 
needed from every level of academe . 
i) Closely linked to the above observation is the task sociology 
holds in Gurvitch's scheme . To him it is imperative that sociology 
serve as a guide in integrating the social sciences. Th · s goes beyond 
the accepted task of sociology. However, sociology as an empirical 
science lacks something . Basically, it is bereft of a global view of 
social reality . It is occupied at the microscopic level . As to 
whether sociology can obtain this necessary scope and dimension within 
the framework of her orientation as a social science needs to be 
questioned. Perhaps a closer liaison with philosophy is a way out . 
Gurvitch persistently contends that only sociology can perform the 
integrative function. Tiryakian of Harvard says much the same thing: 
The need to pose global problems , to seek the most general 
level of analysis , to develop a global perspective--all of 
which should be imparted by a philosophical background--is 
a necessity seldom considered. As a result, research pro-
jects accumulate , but are not cumulative. Sociological 
theory of a general and systematic nature is seen as some-
thing esoteric and recondite, not as a practical necessity 
to the development of sociology.l 
Though Gurvitch himself fails in presenting a systematic general 
theory his plea is eloquent for its revival. 
i) All along Gurvitch contends that general theory in sociology 
is ~npossible without a close cooperation with philosophy. Likewise 
sociol~gy provides the philosopher with a vast storehouse of aata con-
cerning social reality without which his work could not be accomplished. 
lTiryakian , Sociologism and Existentialism, p. 4. 
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Sociology on the other hand, is indebted to philosophy for its 
means of synthesis, its conceptual framework for working out general 
theories which will release sociology from both the grip of an empty 
abstracted err~iricism and an etheral theory out of touch with reality. 
Philosophy is indispensable in the study of those subjects which Gur-
vitch includes in the sociology of the spirit , e.g., morality, law, 
religion, knowledge and art . Philosophy provides the schemata for 
1 ·f· t· 1 c assJ. J.Ca J.on . 
Gurvitch 1s discussion of this necessary relationship between 
sociology and philosophy warrants consideration. It is central to his 
thought . In reality it has led him away from the general conception 
of sociology's task . As a social phi losopher he stands in the tradi-
tion of French thinkers such as Auguste Comte, St . Simon, Proudhon, 
and to a certain extent Durkheim and Marcel Mauss. Each saw the neces-
sary liaison between these two areas of study. It is ironic that 
Gurvitch 1s isolation as a scholar , his sense of alienation from both 
philosophy and sociology is the result of his being unable to bring 
these two disciplines together in such a way that the distinctiveness 
of each remains . This failure is the source of his ambiguity and 
rejection. 
laurvitch, 'Thilosophie et sociologie", Enc1clopedie francaise, 
XIX, (Pari s: Societe Nouvelle de l 1Encyclopedie Francaise, 1957), 
2615-28 . 4. 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS 
Professor Georges Gurvitch's effort to write a general sociology 
based on the concept of the total social phenomena is fundamentally a 
feeling or impression of social reality . Hence, that reality is split 
into two gener al levels, the superficial or organized exterior and the 
spontaneous stratum beneath8 Appearances of phenomena suggest one 
thing . Always there is more than what composes the immediate view. 
Recently upon looking at a certain church structure in Marseilles 
from the outside the observer was aware of a general idea of the style 
and location of the church basilica , its bell tower , and its symbols of 
the cross and dove . From such a perspective it was easy to describe 
the height of the windows , the number of doors, the materials which 
went into making the edifice . But this was not all . These were the 
surface phenomena, the external details , the quantitative data. IVhen 
the main door was opened and one stepped inside the whole impression 
changed unbelievably. A life and spontaneity were present which were 
unsuspected before . The whole character of the building had been 
transformed. 
Such an analogy can be applied to Gurvitch 1 s description of the 
total social phenomena . ~lhat appears to be may turn out to be very 
different once all the facts are in, once the search for the hidden, 
for the levels in depth has ended. The dialectical processes enable 
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the researcher to see some of these depth levels. They try to open up 
a view of society as a whole in all its effervescent and vividly 
dynamic aspects. For underneath, contends Gurvitch, the crust of tradi-
tion and organization reside the well-springs of revolutions, of rapid 
change; there reside the irrational roots of behaviour and the creative 
acts and attitudes which provide the excitement for all social science 
research and in turn hold the clues to man's future . 
Education is after all the search for the quickening of human 
life. Georges Gurvitch has made a contribution to this quest . 
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APPENDIX II. THE TYPES OF SOCIAL TIME 
Social time "is the convergency and divergency of movements of 
the total social phenomena, giving birth to times and living within 
them. nl Gurvitch contends that social reality lives and produce·s 
certain hierarchies of the various types of time. 
"Social time is characterized by the maximum of human meaning 
which is grafted on to it, and by its extreme complexity ••• 
Except for historic time, it is by far the most discontinuous of human 
times. 112 
In his Determinismes sociaux . . ., Gurvitch first presented his 
general schema for the types of social time. These have been elaborated 
on in The Spectrum of Social Time, from which this discussion is 
taken.3 
1) Enduring Time (Time of long duration and slowed down). 
Here the past is projected in the present and the future. Continuity 
is emphasized to a greater degree. The ecological level moves in this 
time . Kinship and locality groupings, e.g., familY and rural village. 
The patriarchal type of global society places this time in the first 
position .. 
2) Deceptive Time. Under the veil of enduring time exist 
lThe Spectrum •• • , p. 27. 2Ibid., p. 26. 
3rn Determinismes sociaux •• • , pp. 38-40; The Spectrum •• • , 
pp. 28-32. 
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latent crises and uneXpected turns which reinforce discontinuity. It 
is at once agitated and slovred down. Large cities, political '~ublic," 
and charismatic-theo~ratic global societies live in this time . 
3) Erratic Time. A time of irregular pulsation between the ap-
pearance and disappearance of rhythms . This is a time of uncertainty. 
Chance is a prime factor . The greatest emphasis is ambiguity. The 
qualitative and discontinuous are relative . The present appears to 
prevail over the past and the future . Patterns are hard to discern . 
Transition groups and relations fit into this time , e . g., technology, 
passive masses , non- structured groupings , emerging social classes, and 
waning social structures such as the present Western European ones . 
4) Cyclical Time . An apparent image of activity masks a withdrawal 
into itself . Continuity is accentuated. The past , present and future 
are projected into each other . The chance element is weakened. The 
qualitative is highlighted. Mystic communions , churches, sects, and 
primitive societies fit into this type . 
5) Retarding Time, Time Turned in on Itself. The adage , "time 
waits for no one , 11 describes this type . Continuity and discontinuity fail 
to achieve a balance. Symbols fit this type . They are always outmoded 
at the very moment they become crystallized. Communities , professional 
associations , and academic faculties live in this time . 
6) Alternating Time. The time alternating between retardation 
and advance . The past and the future compete for the dominant position . 
Discontinuity holds the upper hand . The qualitative and the element 
of chance are de-emphasized. The victory of one over the other is 
always costly. Global societies incorporating an emerging capitalism 
are examples of types which live in this time . 
7) Time in Advance of Itself. Discontinuity, chance and the 
qualitative trlumph over their opposites. The future is present . The 
proletariat fit into this category of time as does competitive 
capitalism. 
8) Explosive Time . In this time the present and the past are 
fused into the creation of the immediately transcendant future . Dis-
continuity, the contingent , and the qualitative find their maximum 
expression. This time · ives rise t o the acts of creation. Revolutions 
bring to the surface this type of social time . Creative communions 
live in this ambiance . In pluralistic collectivities this time is 
dominant . The global and partial structures are always in danger 
when confronting this time . 
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ABSTRACT 
GEORGES GURVITCH 1S SOCIOLOGY OF THE TOTAL SOCIAL PHENOMENA 
(Library of Congress No. Mic. (3 ) 
Charles Phillip Bosserman 
Boston University Graduate School, 1963 
Major Professor: Walter G •• uelder, Professor of Social Ethics 
Problem of the Dissertation 
The dissertation's central purpose is to present the sociology of 
Georges Gurvitch. The approach is two-fold: first, to give to American 
sociology a study of current French sociology and second, to explain 
Gurvitch 1s theoretical system showing how his theory provides a con-
ceptual scheme for looking at social reality as a totality. 
A central focus of the dissertation is on one phase of Gurvitch's 
general theory, his treatment of groups. In general, the task of this 
dissertation is to work through the hypotheses Gurvitch has devised for 
empirical research, to discover the directions which they take and to 
examine them critically in the light of American sociology. This whole 
study was made in close contact with Professor Gurvitch. 
The Approach 
The background and life of Gurvitch are considered in Chapter 
Two. This focuses especially on his philosophical heritage and his 
early social law theory. It was from this study of social law that Gur-
vitch first developed his thesis that there are levels to social reality: 
underneath the organized superstructure exists the spontaneous 
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infrastructure from whence is derived the dynamic, the effervescent 
factors which bring on social change and cause society to be en acte . 
From this early concept Gurvitch began to formulate a sociology of law 
which eventually led him to the study of general sociology. 
Chapter Three explains Gurvitch's views on the present sociolo-
gical situation. This is concluded with a brief description of the 
actual task of modern sociology. 
Chapter Four examines the method which Gurvitch employs . He 
wrestles with the basic problem of the subject-object relationship in 
the social sciences . He maintains that a tension exists between the 
method and the object of study which must be dealt with concretely. 
He contends that social reality is dialectical and hence, the method 
must also reflect this dialectic . The dialectical nature of society 
is seen in conflicts and tensions that exist among the several depth 
levels which make up the superstructure and the infrastructure . The 
fundamental stratum is the collective mind. This is the primordial 
depth level which explains the existence of real groups. Gurvitch 
follows the tradition of Durkheim in espousing the notion of the col-
lective mind as the source of group life. 
Chapter Five follows with the horizontal view of social reality. 
Gurvitch's notions of microsociology and macrosociology remain within 
the tradition of Tonnies' Gemeinschaft and Jesellschaft and Durkheim's 
organic and mechanical solidarity. In this chapter Gurvitch's typo-
logy of social groupings and social classes is detailed. 
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Chapter Six concludes the discussion of macrosociology by describ-
ing Gurvitch's typology of global societies . Closely related is his 
definition of social structure. The definition counters functional and 
structural-functional sociologies . 
The dialectical method is scrutinized in Chapter Seven. Gurvitch 
contends that this method is the only one which can describe at once 
the individual parts of social reality while maintaining a view of the 
whole . Some research projects using this method conclude the chapter. 
Conclusions 
Chapter Eight concludes b.Y examining critically Gurvitch 1 s theory. 
Gurvitch presents a challenging position to contemporary sociology. 
There are important ideas and emphases but he fails to contribute new 
or useful categories for real theoretical growth . His method is too 
complicated. He over~nphasizes the spontaneous which vitiates 
scientific endeavor . His theory suffers from a lack of systematic 
construction, clarity and preciseness . As social philosophy his 
thought contributes certain provocative ideas and makes some essential 
~nphases . 
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